Das, J.In this suit the plaintiffs claim to recover the properties set out in Schedule D of the plaint. These properties undoubtedly at one, time belonged to Ram Keshwar Prosad Chowdhury who died on 27th July 1917 without leaving any issue, but leaving a will by which be devised those properties to Mt. Pan Kuer, defendant 1 and the appellant in this Court, for life, with remainder to his sister Mt. Hem Kuer, defendant 4 absolutely. Mt. Pan Kuer in due course applied for grant of letters of administration with the will annexed. That application was opposed by various persons including the present plaintiff, Ram Narain Chowdhury.

2. In those proceedings Ram Narain Chowdhury not only alleged that the will was a forgery, but put forward his title to the disputed prcperties on the ground that prior to his death, Ram Keshwar Chowdhury had reunited with him. The question of title for obvious reasons could not be investigated by the Court of Probate; but the learned District Judge found in favour of the will and granted letters of administration with the will annexed to Mt. Pan Kuer. The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted on 5th November 1924. The plaintiff claims title on two grounds; first, on the ground that under an ekrarnama safainama executed by his father Shanker Chowdhury, Ram Keshwars father Lachman and Mt. Pan Kuers husband Lal Narain Chowdhury he is entitled to the properties of Ram Keshwar as he has died without leaving any male issue; and secondly, on the ground that on 19th June 1917, Ram Keshwar reunited with him and was incompetent to execute a will which is the foundation of the claim of Mt. Pan Kuer. The learned Subordinate Judge has found reunion established on the evidence in the case; but having regard to the authorities which were binding on him, he held that it had no operation in law. But he gave the plaintiff all the reliefs which he claimed in the suit on the basis of the ekrarnama safainama to which I have already referred.

3. The material facts are these. One Gayanandan Chowdhury had six sons, Dubri Chowdhury, Thakur Chand, Bidhi Chand, Bodhi Chowdhuri, Lila Chand Chowdhury and Fateh Chand Chaudhury. Bodhi Chaudhury appears to have separated from the family before all material dates; and Thakur Chowdhury appears to have died instestate and without issue. It is the plaintiffs case that sometime in 1886 partition proceedings started between Dubri Chowdhury and Bidhi Ghand on the one hand and Lila Ghand Chowdhury and Fateh Chand Chowdhury on the other. The plaintiff alleges that the partition was completed sometime in 1887 and as a result of those proceedings, an 8-anna share of the joint family properties was allotted to Dubri and Bidhi to be held by them jointly; and another 8-annas share was, allotted to Lila and Fateh. We are not in this litigation concerned with the share allotted to Lila and. Fateh.

4. The plaintiff alleges that after partition Bidhi Chand became the karta of the joint family consisting of himself, his two sons, Lal Narain Chowdhury and Lachman Chowdhury, and Shankar Chowdhury the grandson of his deceased brother Dubri Chowdhury. The plaintiff, Ram Narain is the son of Shankar Chowdhury and great-grandson of Dubri Chowdhury, Mt. Pan Kuer is the widow of Lal Narain who was one of the sons of Bidhi Chowdhury. Ram Keshwar was the son of Lachman Chowdhury, who, as I have said, was the other son of Bidhi Ghand. Now Bidhi Chand appears to have died sometime in March 1895 and it is the plaintiffs case that on his death disputes broke out between Shankar Ohowdhury on the one hand and Lal Narain and Lachman on the other; and that these disputes were settled by the execution of two deeds of partition, one relating to the residential house and the other relating to the cattle and kamias belonging to the joint family.

5. The parties appear to have separated in mess in December 1895. The plaintiff alleges that in July 1896 (Asar 1303) an ekrarnama was executed by Shankar Chowdhury, Lai Narain Chowdhury and Lachman Chowdhury which provided that if any of them died without issue, the share belonging to him would devolve on those having issue. Shankar Chowdhury died in July 1900, leaving two sons, KunBihar and Ram Narain, the plaintiff Lai Narain died on 1st September 1909 leaving a widow Mt. Pan Kuer and three daughters Mt. Ramkala Kuer, Mt. Radhesham Kuer and Mt. Janki Kuer. The plaintiff alleges in the plaint that on Lal Narains death Lichman became entitled to succeed to the pro perties which were of Lai Narain by virtue of the ekraranma of July 1896. Now whatever the position may be, Lachman undoubtedly took the properties belonging to Lal Narain. He died in April 1912 leaving a son Ram Keshwar and a daughter Mt. Hem Kuer. Ram Keshwar died on 27th July 1917 having executed, as I have already said, a will by which he devised his estate to Mt. Pan Kuer for life, with remainder to his sister Mt. Hem Kner absolutely.

6. On the death of Ram Keshwar disputes broke out in the family. There were proceedings in the land registration department as to who should be recorded in the place of Ram Keshwar. Murab Chowdhury, a son of Lila Chowdhury and Gobind Prosad son of Fateh Ghand claimed as the heirs of Ram Keshwar. Ram Narain claimed that he was already in possession of the properties of Ram Keshwar as there was reunion between him and Ram Keshwar on 19th June 1917. Mt. Pan Kuer claimed under the will in respect of which administration had not at that date been granted to her. It is noteworthy that in those proceedings Ram Narain did not put forward the ekrarnama safainama in support of his claim. The land registration Deputy Collector went into the matters and investigated with care the case of reunion set up by Ram Narain and especially the documents showing that Ram Narain was in possession; and he had no difficulty whatever in coming to the conclusion that the case of Ram Narain was wholly false and that he was not in possession of the disputed properties. He could not investigate the title set up by Mt. Pan Kuer as that was a matter solely for the Court of Probate. In the re3ult he held that Murat Chowdhury and Gobind Prosad were entitled to possession of the disputed properties as the heirs of Ram Keshwar and directed that they should be recorded in the land registration department in the place of Rim Keshwar.

7. Mean while Mt. Pan Kuer applied for grant to her of letters of administration with the will of Ram Keshwar annexed. That application was opposed not only by Murat Chowdhury and Gobind Prosad but also by Ram Narain. I have already mentioned that Rim Narain not only disputed the genuineness of the will but he put forward a title to the properties on the ground that Ram Keshwar had reunited with him on 19fch June 1917. It is remarkable that even in those proceedings Ram Narain did not put forward the ekrarnama safainama of July 1896. It may be contended that the probate Court was not competent to enter on a question of title. This is undoubtedly so, but Ram Narain did put forward a question of title, namely, a title based on reunion with Ram Keshwar shortly before the latters death. In view of the specific title put forward by Ram Narain in the probate proceedings, it does seem remarkable that belaid no claim on the basis of the ekrarnama safainama of July 1896. On 30th July.1918 the learned District Judge of Patna found in favour of the will and directed that letters of administration with the will annexed should be issued to Mt. Pan Kuer. There was an appeal to this Court on behalf of Murat Chowdhury and Gobind Prosad, but none on behalf of Ram Narain. That appeal was dismissed on 13th July 1920. The plaintiff on 5th November 1924 instituted the present suit; and, as I have said, he bases his title first on the ekrarnama safainama of July 1896; and secondly, on the reunion alleged to have taken place between him and Bam Keshwar on 19th July 1917.

8. I will first consider the case of reunion. It may be mentioned that reunion among coparcerners, though provided for by the text books, is of very rare occurrence and, to establish it, is necessary to show, not only that the parties already divided lived or traded together, but that they did so with the intention of thereby altering their status and of forming a joint estate with all its usual incidents. The oral evidence in support of reunion is ludicrous, and the learned Subordinate Judge has not referred to it; but it is as well to deal with the evidence of the plaintiff and of Bihari Mahto, the servant of the plaintiff in order to understand what the plaintiffs case is on the point. According to the plaintiff reunion took place on 19th June 1917. It will be remembered that the will, which is the foundation of the title of Pan Kuer, was executed on 21st July 1917; and it is certainly remarkable that, having reunited with the plaintiff and living in the house of the plaintiff, Ram Keshwar would think of executing a will on the footing that the properties dealt with by the will were absolutely at his disposal. (His Lordship after considering the evidence both oral and documentary concluded). The other documents upon which the learned Subordinate Judge relies are wholly irrelevant. I do not propose to refer to them as Mr. Pugh does not say that those documents advance his case. He has based his whole argument on the three important documents which I have already considered. In my opinion it is impossible to say that on such evidence as we have in this case a case of reunion has been established.

9. But assuming that there was reunion in fact, the question still remains whether it has any operation in law. The leading text on this subject is that of Brihaspati:

He who being once separated dwells again through affection with his father, brother or paternal uncle is termed reunited.

10. Now, if literally construed, reunion must be restricted to three classes of cases; (1) between father and son, (2) between brothers, and (3) between paternal uncle and nephew; but it was strongly urged before us that the text should be read as illustrative and not as restrictive. It was pointed out that both Bachaspati Misra (the leading authority of the Mithila School) and Nilakantha (the leading authority of the Guzrat School) put a generous interpretation on the text of Brihaspati, and it was suggested that there is nothing in the Mitakshara to show that that text should be differently construed. With the latter argument, I am unable to agree. The Mitakshara is perfectly clear on the point that

reunion cannot take place with any person whoever it be but only, with a father, a brother, or a paternal uncle. "see Sutlers Collection of Hindu Law Books, p. 51,

11. The parties are governed by the Mitakshara law and are bound by the construction which the author of the Mitakshara has placed upon the text of Brihaspati. It is settled beyond doubt that the text is interpreted literally by the Mitakshara and the authorities of Southern India and Bengal as excluding reunion with other relations: Basanta Kumar Sinha v. Jogendra Nath Sinha [1906] 33 Cal. 371. It is quite true that the text has been differently interpreted in the Mithila school and in the Bombay school; but we are concerned with the interpretation which the text has received in the Mitakshara. Mr. Pugh indeed urged us to construe the text for ourselves and to come to the conclusion that the text should be read as illustrative and not restrictive; but it is impossible for us to do so. As it has been pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Collector of Madura v. Muttu Ramalinga Sathupathy [1867] 12 M.I.A. 397,

the duty of a Judge, who is under the obligation to administer Hindu law, is not so much to enquire whether a disputed doctrine is fairly deducible from the earliest authorities, as to ascertain whether it has been received by the particular school, which governs the district with which he has to deal and has there been sanctioned by usage.

12. I hold therefore that even if reunion had been established as a fact, the plaintiff could not base his title on it as it would have no operation in law. I now come to the question of the ekrarnama safainama. A question was raised as to the genuineness of the document; and the learned Subordinate Judge answered the question in the affirmative. I have grave doubt as to the correctness of the finding; but I do not propose to discuss this question, nor the question whether it was properly admitted in evidence having regard to the fact that it was not registered in accordance with law, as I have no doubt whatever that the plaintiff has no title to put forward on the basis of the ekrarnama. The document runs as follows:

We are Lal Narayan Chowdhury and Lachman Chowdhury, sons of Babu Bidhichand Chowdhury, deceased, and Shankar Chowdhury, son of Babu Tekam Chowdhury, deceased, by caste Koohaisa Kurmi, residents of mauza Gunjar Chak, Pergana Pilich, district Patna, by occupation zamindars and cultivators.

As various sorts of ill feeling and disputes arise among us, uncle and nephews, all of us sincerely desired to get all the things divided among ourselves and all of us agreed to this proposal. We, therefore, of our own free, will and accord without pressure on the part of anybody else, took charge of all the properties, i.e. houses, grain, as well as collection etc. and brought them into our respective possession. The estate and management of the mauzas remained joint and the ornaments were placed in our respective possession. No dispute now exists nor will it in future arise among us. It was settled among us the three persons that should, God forbid, any of these three become heirless, in that case the property and assets of the heirless person, move able and immovable, standing in his own name and in the names of others, shall devolve on such of the three persons whose heirs will then be living, and nobody else has or shall have any right or claim to the same In case the heirless person has any daughter and with a view to deprive others of their right he transfers (the properties) to that; daughter, or in any way ruins the same it shall on the face of this deed of agreement, be considered null and void in Court. If (our) heirs or representatives take or want to take any proceeding in violation of this deed of agreement it shall be considered as wrong and false in Court. It is incumbent on (our), heirs and representatives to act according to this deed of agreement. According to the settlement regarding the house and the terms of this deed of agreement we have obtained1 and shall in future remain in possession. W& have, therefore, executed and affixed out signature to this deed of mutual agreement settling (the affairs) so that it may be of use when required Finis.

14. The word "heirless" in the critical passage, when read with the text must mean "sonless." There is, however, no doubt that if any persons were bound by the agreement, they were the executants, namely, Lal Narayan Chowdhury, Lachman Chowdhury and Shankar Chowdhury. The agreement may be considered to be a perfectly valid one so far as the parties to the agreement are concerned; but, if we were to adopt the construction, which Mr. Pugh invites us to put on the covenant, we must hold that the whole; agreement is bad as an attempt for all; times to alter the Hindu Law of Succession, which it is not competent for owners1 of property to do. In this case Bhankar died first, and, as he left two sons, the1 agreement had no operation so far as he was concerned. Then Lal Narayan died, and his brother Lachman took possession of his properties. According to the plaintiff, Lachman succeeded to the properties of Lal Narayan by virtue of the ekrarnama; according to the defendant, he succeeded to those properties as he and Lal Narayan were members of a joint family. But assume that Lachman succeeded by virtue of this ekrarnama; surely the ekrarnama could not be in force for all times to come. Lachman was the last to die; and his properties-devolved on his son; and I have no doubt whatever that the ekrarnama (to which he was not a parby) did not operate so as to prevent him from dealing with the properties which belonged to him in any way he liked. The learned Subordinate Judge suggests that, in entering into the agreement, Lachman was acting on behalf of his son. But the suggestion is-an impossible one, for there is nothing in the document to support the suggestion. It is well settled that in construing a covenant from the point of view of the doctrine of perpetuities or testing it on the ground of remoteness, regard must be had to all possible contingencies and not to actual events only. I am of opinion therefore that if the covenant be construed, not as a personal one, but as binding the executants and their heirs for ever, the whole agreement would fail as offending against the doctrine and would not bind even the parties thereto.

15. Mr. Pugh next contends that, on the hypothesis that the covenant was a personal one, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed to the properties of Lal Narayan together with Lachman, and that there is no reason why we should not give him a decree for his share in this litigation. Lal Narayan of course died without leaving any male issue; but he died on 1st September 1909. It is conceded in the plaint that, on the death of Lai Narayan, his brother Lichman took possession of the properties belonging to Lai Narayan by virtue of the ekrarnama. Mr. Pugh now contends that the plaintiff was equally entitled with Lachman. Even if the ekrarnama should bear the construction which Mr. Pugh, as a last resort, has discovered for his client, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs suit must nevertheless fail as barred by limitation. As I have said, Lai Narayan died on 1st September 1909. The plaintiff did not put forward any title to the property within the statutory period; and it is too late for him now to claim any portion of the estate of Lai Narayan. Mr. Pugh contends that the plaintiff obtained possession when Ram Keshwar reunited with him. I have investigated that case and I have found it to be devoid of any substance. It follows therefore that the plaintiffs suit so far as it can be regarded as a suit for possession of a share of Lal Narayans estate must be held to be time barred.

16. I am of opinion that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained. I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and the decree passed by the Court below, and dismiss the plaintiffs suit with costs in both the Courts. It is conceded that the connected appeals must all be allowed on the finding arrived at by us in the main appeal. They arise out of a suit instituted by Ram Narain Chowdhury for possession of certain properties on the footing that he is the owner of the properties which were of Ram Keshwar. His suit having failed in regard to these properties, it is obvious that his suit out of which the connected appeals arise should also have been dismissed. I would accordingly allow these appeals and dismiss the plaintiffs suit out of which these appeals arise with costs throughout.

Adami, J.

I agree