1. Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. Hari Agrawal, counsel for the petitioner.

2. Mr. Animesh Tiwari, Deputy Advocate General for the State/ respondents No. 1 and 2.

3. Mr. Ashok Gadhewal and Ms. Pushpa Seva, counsel for respondent No. 3.

4. Heard on I.A. No. 2/2023, application for grant of ad-interim relief.

5. Mr. B.P. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that at the instance of respondent No. 3, offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 313 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, 'the Act of 1989') have been registered against the petitioner herein. He would further submit that by way of interim relief, he is seeking no coercive action against the petitioner i.e. not to arrest the petitioner till the final hearing of the writ petition and to stay the investigation against the petitioner, as he would submit that date of incident is from 6-1-2019 to 6-7-2022, whereas the FIR has been lodged on 19-1-2023 and as per the FIR itself as well as the affidavit filed on behalf of the victim, the victim is major and married woman and working as Sports Teacher and considering that she is major and already married, therefore, sexual intercourse on the pretext of marriage would not arise and the FIR is totally false and fabricated which has been lodged to pressurize the petitioner considering his father's position, as such, the FIR is totally uncalled for and, therefore, taking the contents of the FIR as it is, no offence under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 313 of the IPC & 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 is made out against the petitioner. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel has cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 9 SCC 293, [LQ/SC/2013/107] Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another (2019) 9 SCC 608 [LQ/SC/2019/1298] and Dr Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra and others (2019) 18 SCC 191 [LQ/SC/2018/1483 ;] to bolster his submissions. He would also submit that Section 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 is not attracted as none of the scheduled offences have been charged against the petitioner. Therefore, the application be allowed and ad interim relief/coercive action against the petitioner i.e. not to arrest the petitioner till the final hearing of the writ petition and stay of investigation against the petitioner be passed in his favour till the final hearing of the petition.

6. Mr. Animesh Tiwari, learned State counsel, would submit that the petitioner has already been charged for offence under Section 313 of the IPC which is punishable for imprisonment of life and furthermore, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others , it is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. Moreover, in the instant case, the investigation is going on after registration of cognizable offences against the petitioner and the petitioner is not cooperating with the investigation, as he is absconding and the petitioner is at liberty to file application under Section 438 of the CrPC which he has not availed and as such, the application for interim relief deserves to be rejected.

7. Mr. Ashok Gadhewal, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, would also support the submissions of learned State counsel and the stand taken by learned State counsel.

8. We have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and went through the record with utmost circumspection.

9. Admittedly, on report of respondent No. 3, offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 313 of the IPC and 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989 have been registered against the petitioner on 19-1-2023 and investigation is going on. Offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC is punishable with minimum punishment of rigorous imprisonment for ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Similarly, offence under Section 313 of the IPC, which is an offence for causing miscarriage without woman's consent, is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

10. The Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) laid down the principles of law with regard to grant of interim relief while hearing the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India/Section 482 of the CrPC.

"80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/ not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/ complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;

vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 [LQ/SC/1960/96] and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

11. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it is quite vivid that investigation for offences punishable under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) & 313 (causing miscarriage without woman's consent) of the IPC is in progress and is at the initial stage after registration of cognizable offence i.e. Sections 376 & 313 of the IPC against the petitioner and nothing has been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner to hold that investigation is totally unauthorised and without authority of law. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case; seriousness of offences registered against the petitioner i.e. Sections 376, 376(2) (n), 313 of the IPC & 3(2)(va) of the Act of 1989; punishment prescribed for those offences; and the investigation is in progress and is at the initial stage and more particularly, the petitioner has the remedy of filing application for grant of bail, it would be inappropriate to stay the investigation against the petitioner and further inappropriate to grant the relief of no coercive steps against the petitioner or restraining the official respondents from not arresting the petitioner. As such, no case is made out for grant of ad-interim writ / order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we do not find and merit in the application for grant of ad-interim relief (I.A. No. 2/2023), it deserves to be and is accordingly rejected.

12. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. The petitioner is at liberty to avail the remedy available to him under the law including filing application for grant of bail which shall be considered by the concerned court strictly in accordance with law and in accordance with the parameters for grant of bail without being influenced by any of the observations made herein-above, as the observations made herein are only for the purpose of considering the application for grant of ad-interim writ in the writ petition.

13. Parties are at liberty to complete the pleadings within six weeks and thereafter, paper book be also filed in accordance with the High Court Rules.