( 1 ) THE plaintiff in O. S. No. 78 of 1964 on the file of the Court of the first Assistant Judge, city Civil Court, Secunderabad, is the petitioner before me. He and defendants 1 and 2 formed into a partnership by a deed dated 26th August, 1953 and carried on business under the name and style of " D. Venkata Narasaiah " in the execution of contract works of various State Governments. It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint that on 7th November, 1960 three documents, namely, (1) dissolution of partnership, (2) release deed, and (3) General Power of Attorney were got into existence, to which the plaintiff was a party and under which the plaintiff was paid by the defendants a sum of Rs. 13,000 with a promise that the accounts would be looked into and settled later on. There is also the further allegation in paragraph 4 of the plaint that the three documents were obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and with the active connivance and assistance of one Ratan Singh and Satyanarayana and Sattaiah. Therefore, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for a *7 dissolution of partnership, directing the 1st defendant to render the accounts of the partnership firm and declaring the shares of the plaintiff, and, for a decree for such sum as found due and payable to the plaintiff by the defendants after the settlement of accounts. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed I. A. NO. 624 of 1964 in the lower Court under order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, for amending the plaint by adding the following reliefs :" The plaintiff prays for a decree in his favour cancelling- (1) the dissolution of partnership deed, dated 7th November, 1960, (2) the release deed, dated 7th November, 1960, and (3) the General Power of Attorney, dated 7th November, 1960 and declaring that the said three documents are void, ineffective and illegal. "

( 2 ) THE prayers already made in the original plaint are to follow the above prayers. This application was opposed by the first defendant. The lower Court, while dismissing the application for amendment, framed the following two points for consideration : (1) Whether the suit and the relief sought are barred by limitation (2) Whether by allowing the amendment the jurisdiction of this Court gets ousted as being beyond its pecuniary jurisdictional competency on both the above points, the lower Court held against the plaintiff. Hence, this revision is filed by the plaintiff. I shall now consider the question whether the jurisdiction of the Court will be ousted if the amendments are allowed. Each of the documents sought to be set aside recites that the plaintiff received Rs. 13,000 in full settlement of his share in the partnership. All the three documents form part of the same transaction. The effect of those three documents was that the plaintiff received Rs. 13,000 and gave up all his rights in the partnership. Under the General Power of Attorney, he authorised the first defendant to collect whatever the dues were to the partnership. The lower Court thought that each of the documents has to be valued at Rs. 13,000, and not on the total value, and if the amendments are allowed, it would have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Then it was argued that the plaint and the petition for amendment may be returned so that they might be presented to the Court having jurisdiction to entertain the plaint as amended. But the lower Court did not think it necessary to do so, as in its opinion, the amendments could not be granted for the reason that the amended claim would be barred by limitation even on the date of the plaint, which was filed more than three years after the plaintiff became aware of the circumstances which entitled him to setting aside of the deeds. The relief as to the setting aside of the documents is to be valued under section 37 (1) of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act ). Clause (1) of the said section is as follows :" 37. (1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value or other document Which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be- (a) if the Whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the decree Was passed or other document was executed ; (b) if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or of the value of the property. "

( 3 ) IT is on a reading of this clause that the lower Court held that the three reliefs sought to be introduced for, the cancellation of the three documents, are to be valued separately on Rs. 13,000 each. But, the learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the amount of Rs. 13,000 is not the value of the property released by the plaintiff under the document, but it was the amount received by him as consideration for the release of his rights, and therefore, the view taken by the lower Court that each of the documents has to be valued at Rs. 13,000 is erroneous. In support of this argument, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court in. S. K. Mohamad Ibrahim and others v. M. Vedachala Mudaliar (died) and others, (1958) 2 M. L. J. 442 : I. L. R. (1959) Mad. 90 which is a decision given by Justice Ramachandra Iyer (as he then was ). That case also arose out of a suit for dissolution of partnership firm, or in the alternative for taking accounts, if the Court were to hold that the partnership was already dissolved. The plaintiffs were the heirs of a deceased partner. Even in the plaint, it was stated that for a certain consideration each of the plaintiffs were made to give up their rights and execute receipts which were marked as Exhibits. B-1, B-2 and B-3, which recited that the plaintiffs gave up all their rights in the partnership firm. The question was how the suit was to be valued, and what was the Court-fee to be paid. The relevant provision of law applicable was section 7 clause (iv-A) of the Madras Court-fees Act which is as follows :" In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document executed ; if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled such part of the amount or value of the property. "

( 4 ) FROM this it will be seen that section 37 of the Act, and section 7, clause (iv-A) of the madras Court-fees Act are substantially the same. In that case, the plaintiffs, valued the suit for dissolution and for accounts at a certain figure and paid the Court fees thereon. The question argued before the learned Judge was whether the plaintiffs had to value the plaint on the amounts which they received under the three receipts, Exhibits B-l to B-3 and pay Court-fee thereon as, in substance, what the plaintiffs asked for was the cancellation of the three receipts. The learned Judge agreed that in substance the plaintiffs had to ask for the cancellation or setting aside of the three receipts as under the said receipts the plaintiffs relinquished their rights in the partnership. Considering this question, the learned Judge held : " What is released is not the amount mentioned in the receipt but their future interest in the assets; of the partnership or a right to obtain relief by Way of accounting. If the receipts are set aside they would be bound to pay back or at least give credit to the sums acknowledged by them to have been received under the receipts and that cannot properly be said to be any property secured by the documents. In the case of a release the value of the property released should be the value for purposes of section 7 (iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. The learned Judge was further not correct in saying that not merely the amounts mentioned in the receipts but also subsequent interest on the amounts and the share of the profits of the defendants should be included in the valuation.

( 5 ) IF the receipts Were to be set aside the plaintiffs Would get only a relief by way of accounting and that right alone they gave up by means of the release under Exhibits B-l to B-3. It is that accounting that has got to be valued and that has been valued already in the original plaint itself. Though the substantial relief Would be the setting aside of Exhibits B-l to B-3, the value of the relief would be the same as the consequential relief of accounting for Which Court-fee has been paid. In the circumstances of the case, I find that the Court-fee paid is sufficient. " the above decision would apply to the language of section 37 of the Act, as the wording of both the sections is substantially the same. But, the learned Counsel for the respondent laid stress on the phrase in section 37 (1) of the Act: " and such value shall be deemed to be if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed ", and contended that the value of the property for which each of the document was executed is Rs. 13,000 and under the above clause that should be deemed to be the value of the subject-matter of the suit. Reliance also is placed on an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in (Satti) Ramanna v. (Padala) Amireddi and others, (1931) 61 M. L. J. 43 - A. I. R. 1931 Mad. 67 [LQ/MadHC/1930/47] . The facts of that case are not quite clear. But, from a close perusal of the judgment what appears is as follows :

( 6 ) THE plaint was for a declaration that the release deed dated 23rd March, 1924, executed by the plaintiff and some other defendants in favour of 1st defendant was not valid in law but fraudulent and void and that it could not bind the plaintiff, for dissolution of partnership, and for other consequential reliefs. The plaint was valued at Rs. 100 and a Court-fee of Rs. 11-4-0 was affixed to the plaint. On objection taken by the 1st defendant, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the valuation should be Rs. 56,919-2-3 in addition to another sum of Rs. 2,318-6-0. But, on appeal, the learned District Judge stated that the Court-fees on Rs. 2,318-6-0 need not be paid apparently because that was the amount received by the plaintiff, and also court-fee need not be paid on the entire amount of Rs. 56,919-2-3 but it should be paid only on the value of the 5/6ths share of the plaintiff and other defendants in the amount of Rs. 56,919-2-3 which was in dispute and with respect to which, probably, the release deed was executed. I used the word, " probably " because it is not clear from the judgment, but from the context it may fairly be inferred that the amount of Rs. 56,919-2-3 represented the total value of the assets of the partnership, and the plaintiff was asked to pay the Court-fee on the value of the 5/6ths of the said amount which represented the value of the plaintiffs share and the shares of the defendants other than the 1st defendant in the partnership. Thus, if the decision is understood in that manner, it will be in consonance with the decision of Justice Ramachandra Iyer (as he then was) in S. K. Mohamad ibrahim and others v. M. Vedachala Mudaliar (died) and others, (1958) 2 M. L. J. 442: I. L. R. (1959) Mad. 90 Perhaps in that case, in the release deed, the total value of the assets was given as Rs. 56,919-2-3, and that was why the learned Judge directed the Court-fee to be collected on 5/6ths of Rs.56,919-2-3. But, in the present case, it does not appear what is the value of the total assets of the firm. No doubt, the plaintiff stated in the plaint that he is entitled to thousands of rupees if accounts are taken, but that is an indefinite claim and until the accounts are taken, it cannot be predicted what would be the plaintiffs share in the partnership, assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to any amount.

( 7 ) THAT is why Justice Ramachandra Iyer in his judgment stated that if the documents were to be set aside, the plaintiffs would get a relief by way of accounting and that that relief was already valued. Similarly, in the present case, if the plaintiff succeeds in getting the General Power of Attorney, the dissolution deed and release deed set aside, the relief to which he would be entitled is a decree for an account, and that, he has valued already and paid Court-fee thereon. No doubt, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent section 37 of the Act says : " the value of the property for which the decree was passed or other document was executed ". In my view, the meaning of the expression, " the value for which the document was executed " would be only the value of the property which was released or with respect to which the document was executed, and with regard to which the plaintiff seeks relief. The plaintiff cannot ask for any relief with regard to the amount which he already received. He wants relief with regard to the amount which he has not received, but fraudulently made to relinquish. Therefore, I hold that the suit has already been properly valued even if the three additional reliefs are included, and that proper Court-fee has been paid and that no question of return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court would arise even if the amendments sought are allowed. The next question is whether the lower Court is wrong in holding at this stage that the claim is barred by limitation even on the date of the plaint. My attention is drawn by the respondents learned Counsel to paragraph 5 of the notice given by an Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff on 2nd November, 1961, where it is stated thus : " Thereafter, in December, 1960 my client approached you through S. Satyanarayana and R. Sattaiah the aforesaid persons through whose assistance you got the aforesaid documents by fraud and misrepresentation and that you Were promising from time to time that you Would look into accounts and settle matters and pay the amount due to my client after looking into the accounts. ".

( 8 ) FROM this, it is submitted that the plaintiff must have been aware of the circumstances which entitled him to have the deeds set aside even in December, 1960, i.e., more than three years prior to the suit, and therefore, the claim would be clearly barred by limitation. But, in my view, this is a matter for evidence. The question cannot be decided in a summary way in a petition for amendment itself. If the amendments, are allowed, it would be open for the defendants to take the plea in an additional written statement that the claims sought to be introduced by the amendment, are barred by limitation, and that the plaintiffs suit has to be dismissed, and the lower court will then frame an issue and decide. At this stage, the lower Court is not justified in going into the question of limitation. The Civil Revision Petition is, therefore, allowed, and the application for amendment (I. A. No. 624 of 1964) will be allowed on condition that the plaintiff (petitioner) pays Rs. 150 (rupees one hundred and fifty only) to Mr. C. Balagopal, Advocate, within one month from today. If the amount is paid within the time prescribed, the plaintiff is permitted to carry out the amendments in the plaint within one month from the date of the receipt of the records of this case in the lower Court. Revision allowed.