The Petitioner, a Publisher-cum-Chief Editor of a local news paper published from Tirupathi, challenges the legality and validity of the orders passed by the second respondent on 16.03.2012 declining to extend the period of license and requesting the petitioner to vacate the premises under his occupation within three days.

2. The writ petitioner who is a resident of Tirupathi town is a Publisher-cum-Chief Editor of an eveninger published from Tirupathi. The second respondent Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams (T.T.D. for short) was endowed with several buildings and immovable properties in and around Tirupati town, and one such building which is situate at Tilak Road, at Tirupati is known as Sridevi Complex. Room No.14, located in the II Floor of the said Sridevi Complex was allowed to be occupied by the writ petitioner pursuant to a license granted in his favour by the second respondent. The terms and conditions subject to which the license was accorded were placed at pages 59 to 61 of the paper book filed in support of this writ petition. The necessary proceedings granting the license were passed by the second respondent on 16.04.2008. In accordance with the terms of the license, the petitioner was granted permission to carry on the business mentioned in the aforesaid proceedings. Condition Nos.1 to 3 make this position explicitly clear. Condition No.5 thereof required the licensee to pay the license fee by 05th of every succeeding month and non payment of the license fee shall entail cancellation of the license apart from the levy of penalty of 24% p.a. on the arrears of the license fee till the date of payment in full. Condition No.10 thereof sets out that the licensee shall not act to the detriment of the interests of the Devasthanams in any manner. Condition No.13 reserves the right of access and entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the Officers and Staff of the T.T.D. Condition No.15 sets out that the license is liable to be cancelled for violation of any of these terms and conditions of the license. The writ petitioner quietly entered upon the demised premises on 04.08.2008 and he is entitled to remain in possession thereof for a period of three years, which, were to expire on 03.08.2011, subject of course to his payment of the monthly license fee of Rs.4,535/-.

3. The writ petitioner asserts that as part of his professional activity, he has been exposing the administrative lapses and the faults of the policy decisions adopted and implemented by the second respondent Devasthanam. He seems to have also participated very actively in protesting against the media cubs put in place by the second respondent Devasthanam. It also appears that the writ petitioner has exposed some of the crucial misdeeds of the then Executive Officer of the second respondent Devasthanam and brought them to the notice of the State Government, the institution of Lokayukta, the Press Council of India and to the Chairman of the notified authority of the second respondent Devasthanam. In view of this, the petitioner perceives that the T.T.D. administration has been very hostile towards him.

4. On 23.12.2010 a written complaint was lodged with the Tirumala I Town police station alleging that on 10.07.2010 at about 05.15 a.m. during verification of the V.I.P. Break Darshan tickets at Vaikuntam I queue complex, one female devotee who gave her name as Ms.J. Sudha Reddy has produced a ticket which was taken in the name of one Sri Narayana, care of Dilli Babu Reddy. In view of the apparent discrepancy, when the devotee has been further probed, she disclosed that she purchased the ticket in question for four persons from an unknown source by paying additional amount than the price of the ticket. This led to further investigation of records at the Joint Executive Officers office and it was realized that one Sri Dilli Babu Reddy filed an application for issuance of V.I.P. Break Darshan ticket in the name of one Sri Narayana, a resident of Keerthi Automobiles, Plot No.41, Ward No.26/2, Wood Complex, Vedayapalem, Nellore District. As part of investigation, one of the Vigilance Inspectors was deputed to Nellore to verify the genuineness of the address and other details. The enquiries revealed that the address is correct but the person whose name is mentioned in the requisition form is fictitious. When an attempt was made to contact the person whose cell phone number is mentioned in the requisition form, it turned out that the cell phone number belongs to one Sri Kiran, resident of Tirupathi but not Narayana who is said to be a resident of Nellore. It is, therefore, viewed by the second respondent that a requisition has been generated in a fictitious name and the tickets so procured were put to misuse. Since, apparently the requisition came from the writ petitioner, the aforementioned complaint was lodged with the police, who registered it as F.I.R. No.29 of 2010. The writ petitioner was arrested on 03.01.2011 and when he moved a regular bail application, the bail was granted, accordingly enlarging him subject to his executing personal bond for Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for a like sum. In quick succession thereto, the second respondent has put the petitioner on notice on 11.01.2011 viewing his conduct which led to the misuse of Break Darshan tickets, as an act detriment to the interests of the second respondent Devasthanam, proposing to cancel the license granted in his favour, for violation of Condition No.10 of the license. It was also alleged that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of license fee. The writ petitioner has filed his detailed reply thereto on 28.01.2011. He has pointed out that in case of two other licensees, when requested, the second respondent Devasthanam has reduced the license fees by 50% and hence he has also been making requests to the Chairmen of the Trust Board to reduce his license fees to the extent of 2/3rds and charge him only Rs.1,509/- p.m. and since the Chairmen have assured him of necessary action in the matter, he has not, paid the license fee promptly. He, therefore, pleaded that his default in payment of monthly license fee should not be unnecessarily viewed as a serious misconduct as the default is not a deliberate one. He has assured that no such error would be repeated in future. In so far as the allegation of misuse of the Break Darshan ticket is concerned, while denying his involvement in the said episode, the writ petitioner has asserted that he has not issued the requisition in question which was at the centre of the controversy. The petitioner has also asserted that the allegation has been thrown against him purposefully.

5. However, even before the writ petitioner could file his detailed explanation to the show cause notice dated 11.01.2011, the second respondent passed orders on 24.01.2011 cancelling the license granted in favour of the petitioner to occupy Room No.14, situate in the II Floor of Sridevi Complex, Tirupathi. The writ petitioner instituted W.P. No.3790 of 2011 challenging the correctness and legality of these orders dated 24.01.2011. Entertaining the said writ petition, an interim order was passed by this Court in W.P.M.P. No.4694 of 2011, suspending the operation of the orders of the second respondent dated 24.01.2011. Consequently the writ petitioner continued to occupy Room No.14 of Sridevi Complex. On 13.07.2011, the writ petitioner has been served with a final notice by the second respondent drawing his attention to the fact that the license granted in his favour is to expire on 03.08.2011 and hence called upon the petitioner to clear all dues and quietly vacate Room No.14 on 03.08.2011, without fail. In response to this final notice, the petitioner has filed a representation dated 25.07.2011, which was sent by him through registered post on 26.07.2011, requesting for extension of the period of license.

6. The petitioner has pointed out that he was regularly paying license fee for the premises occupied by him and there are no arrears of license fee payable by him as on that date. The petitioner has further pointed out that he has established a full fledged office in the said room No.14 and that he has provided employment for more than 40 members who are helping him in bringing out his newspaper. It was also pointed by the petitioner that he has furnished the said office address to each and every Government institution and hence if he were to change the premises at this stage, he will suffer lot of inconvenience and sustain heavy loss. He, therefore, requested to extend the lease period for a further three more years from 03.08.2011 on wards. This representation dated 25.07.2011, Ex.P-13, was placed at page No.81 of the paper book. Thereafter, the writ petitioner instituted W.P. No.22055 of 2011 and the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 03.08.2011 directing the second respondent Devasthanam to consider the petitioners representation dated 25.07.2011 for extension of the period of license and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law, within a period of two weeks and till such time, the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the premises in question.

7. It appears, a notice dated 10.01.2012 was served on the petitioner providing him an opportunity of personal hearing on 17.01.2012 at 12 noon. The petitioner has not availed the said opportunity, however, he has addressed a representation dated 17.01.2012 to the Executive Officer of the second respondent Devasthanam that he was unable to attend the matter within the stipulated time because of road traffic problems and that he has attended the office of the Executive Officer ten minutes behind the schedule time and that he was informed by the Revenue Department staff and the Private Secretary to E.O., T.T.D. that further date will be informed for hearing and hence he requested that he may be allowed for next hearing. He appears to have sent this communication by registered post with acknowledgement due. The acknowledgement received from the office of the Executive Officer of the second respondent Devasthanam and the postal receipt vouching for dispatch of his letter dated 17.01.2012 are both placed at page No.84 of the paper book. From the postal receipt furnished by the Tirupati Head Post Office, it is evident that this letter dated 17.01.2012 was in fact mailed at 16.49 hours on 21.01.2012. Therefore the contents of the representation dated 17.01.2012 do not inspire much of a confidence, as it would not have taken any one four days to scribble four or five sentences and dispatch the same. Perhaps, the petitioner could not attend the hearing on 17.01.2012 possibly for some other reasons and subsequently he could have been advised to make appropriate amends for the missed opportunity. Otherwise, one cannot believe that it requires four days to dispatch the letter dated 17.01.2012.

8. In the meantime, it should be noticed that the second respondent Devasthanam has taken steps to file O.A. No.110 of 2011 on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Endowments Tribunal for securing the eviction of the writ petitioner and for recovery of the arrears of the license fee. The said O.A. No.110 of 2011 is being contested by the petitioner and it is still pending.

9. The second respondent Devasthanam has passed orders through the impugned proceedings dated 16.03.2012 rejecting the request of the petitioner for extension of the license for a further three years period and hence the petitioner was requested to vacate the premises under his occupation within three days of the receipt of this notice. Hence, this writ petition.

10. Heard Sri Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad, learned Standing Counsel of the second respondent Devasthanam.

11. Sri Seshadri Naidu would contend that it is not the language employed in the order of allotment that is final but it is the character and nature of the grant which should determine whether the premises in question has been leased out or licensed in favour of the petitioner. It is further contended that as of now O.A. No.110 of 2011 has been initiated by the second respondent and before the same is adjudicated and decided, the second respondent cannot seek to evict the petitioner through the impugned order, from the premises under his occupation. It was, further contended that a Criminal case was already booked at the instance of the second respondent and it is pending before the competent Criminal Court and hence the second respondent - Devasthanam cannot adjudicate and pronounce the petitioner guilty of the allegation thrown at him in the said Criminal case. It was, further contended that several others, if not all others, have been granted extension of leasehold period by the second respondent Devasthanam and it has picked up the writ petitioner for hostile treatment for the reason of prejudice nurtured by it against the petitioner. Sri Seshadri Naidu, learned counsel for the petitioner, would contend that the second respondent being the creature of a statue cannot act in a discriminatory manner, while dealing with its properties.

12. Earlier, I had an occasion to notice the salient features of Easements Act, in a judgment rendered on 30.09.2011 in W.P. Nos.21509 and 21962 of 2011, and noted them as under :-

9. The earliest definition in English Law of the term easement described it as a privilege that one neighbour hath of another, by writing or prescription, without profit, as a way or sink through his land, or such like. Ancient history of Hindu Law and Mohammedan Law had recorded the codified rules of easements in various ancient works. With a view to reform the Indian laws, efforts were put in and as a result of the examination by the Indian Law Commissions consisting of Sir Charles Turner, Mr. Justice West and Mr. Whitley Stokes, ultimately the Indian Easements Act, Act 5 of 1882 has been enacted to define precisely the law relating to easements and licenses. The simplest form to understand the easement is to set out that, it is merely a right annexed or appurtenant to land to utilize other land of different ownership in a particular manner or to prevent the true owner of such other land from utilizing his land in a particular manner or to do something or require something not to be done thereon. In other words, an easement is a prohibitive or restrictive right of enjoyment. For an easement to exist, there must be two tenements one the dominant and the other servient owned by two different persons. The piece of land in respect of which an easement is enjoyed is called the dominant tenement, and that over which the right is exercised is called the servient tenement. An easement is essentially a land locked right. All easements therefore lie in grant. No right of an easement can exist independently unless the same has been granted by a deed or word.

10. Thus, easement is recognized as a burden on the owner or occupier of a servient heritage. In juxtaposition, a bare license which does not allow profits arising therefrom, to be shared, confers upon the grantee no property in the land. The grantee has a mere right of possession for achieving the object or purpose of the grant. A bare license whether granted by deed or not and whether it is backed by consideration or not, is revocable.

11. Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defined "license" as, where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property. It is manifestly clear that every license originates in a grant made by one person in favour of another or a definite number of other persons. By implication a license cannot be granted to a fluctuating body of persons who will not be answering the expression of definite number of other persons. Most importantly, what has been granted was only to do something which would in the absence of such grant be unlawful to be done by the other persons. Equally important to notice is the fact that the person to whom the grant is made, does not acquire any right whatsoever, including easementary right or any interest in the property. It can, therefore, be deduced that a grant, which is called license merely authorized the person or persons to whom the grant is made, a right of possession for enjoyment and hence such a right is not juridical possession but amounts to mere occupation. Possession being a legal concept, one of the most essential ingredients of it is the specification of the actual period of time granted for such occupation. Therefore, a bare license, without anything more is always revocable at the will of the licensor, since the grant itself is limited by a period of time, and the payment of license fee does not by itself create an interest in the licensed property. Consequently, mere acceptance of the license fee even for the periods subsequent to the revocation of the license would not amount to acquisance of the possession of the licensee. It merely amounts to fictional or unreal extension of the period of license without in any manner affecting the rights of the owner from securing eviction of the person or persons to whom the grant is initially made. In law, grantor or the licensor is always liable to be treated to be in possession of the land in question all through the subsistence of the license and even beyond. Hence, it would be open to the licensor to re-enter the premises and reinstate himself once the period of license granted by him expires. This power to re-enter or to reinstate himself is conditioned by not using more force than is actually necessary. As per Section 54 of the Easements Act, the grant of a license may be express or implied from the conduct of the grantor, and Section 60 of the said Act sets out the circumstances when a license can be revoked and Section 61 sets out that such a revocation can be express or even implied. Section 62 listed out nine circumstances when a license is deemed to be revoked.

12. Of them, Clause (c) clearly discloses that a license is deemed to be revoked when it has been granted for a limited period and the said period expired. Thus, it becomes evident that a license granted for a limited period is deemed to have been revoked upon expiry of the period of grant. Section 63 recognized that, where a license is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the property affected thereby and to remove any goods which he has been allowed to place on such property. What would be the reasonable time required for achieving these objectives is therefore dependent upon the facts and circumstances prevailing in each case. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed in this regard. Section 64 recognized the right of the licensee, when he was evicted without any fault of his by the grantor before he has fully enjoyed, under the license, the right which he was granted, to recover compensation from the grantor, for the breach of the grant.

13. The term Lease has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as under:

A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specific occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer of such terms.

14. The expression lease normally connotes the preservation of the demised estate put in occupation and enjoyment thereof for a specified period or in perpetuity for consideration; the corpus user thereof does not disappear and at the expiry of the term or on successful termination the same is handed over to the lessor subject to the terms of the contract, either express or implied (see State of Karnataka and others V. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar and others (1993) Supp 3 SCC 290).

15. The relationship of a lessor and lessee is therefore one of contract. (See Puran Singh Sahni V. Sundari Bhagwandas Kripalani (Smt) and others (1991) 2 SCC 180 [LQ/SC/1991/109] ). In juxtaposition, a license confers a right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of the right, may be unavailable. It creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of the grantor. Thus, the distinction between the lease and license lies in the interest created in the property demised. It is therefore essential to gather the intention of the parties to an instrument from the terms contained therein and also by scrutinizing the same in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The description ascribed by the parties to the terms may, evidence the intention but may not be very decisive. The crucial test, therefore, is whether the instrument is intended to create or not to create an interest in the property which is the subject matter of agreement between the parties. If it is in fact intended to create an interest in the property, it becomes a lease and if it does not, it is a mere license. In determining whether the agreement creates a lease or a license, the test of exclusive possession, though not decisive, is of great significance. (See Sohan Lal Naraindas V. Laxmidas Raghunath Gadit (1971) 1 SCC 276 [LQ/SC/1971/25 ;] ). Thus, there is no readily available litmus test to distinguish a lease as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, from a license as defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act, 1882, but the nature and character of the transaction, the terms settled by the parties and the intent of the parties hold the key. Therefore, if an interest in the immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment is created it becomes a lease, and if mere permission to use without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, it becomes a license. (See Associated Hotels of India Vs. R.N. Kapoor (1960) 1 SCR 368 [LQ/SC/1959/131] , B.M. Lal (dead) by L.Rs V. Dunlop Rubber and Company Limited and others AIR 1968 SCC 175, State of West Bengal V. Sardhia Thakurani AIR 1971 SCC 2097).

16. As was already noticed supra, the conditions of the grant which are placed at pages 59 to 61 of the paper book leave no doubt in my mind that the parties to this writ petition have only intended the transaction to be a mere license but not a lease. Particularly, condition No.13, which reserved the right of entry into the licensed premises and to carry out inspection by the officers and staff of the T.T.D any time during the subsistence of the license makes the position clear that the possession of the licensed premises remained with the second respondent Devasthanam, all through, and the writ petitioner has only been granted a license to use the premises. Further, the monthly fee, which formed the consideration for the grant, was called as license fee. Right to recall the grant for violation of the terms and conditions, prematurely, is another pointer. The final notice dated 13.07.2011 is also in the same direction. I have therefore no hesitation to reject the first contention of Sri Seshadri Naidu that the premises in question has been leased out in favour of the writ petitioner. In the instant case, the original period of license has already expired by 03.08.2011.

17. However, the question that remained to be answered is whether the second respondent has erred in rejecting the representation of the petitioner, for grant of extension of the period of license made by him, on 25.07.2011, as directed by this Court in W.P. No.22055 of 2011

18. When we examine the representation made by the writ petitioner on 25.07.2011, he made out a case for extension on three grounds, 1) that he is not in arrears of payment of license fee as of that date, 2) he has established a full-fledged office and provided employment for more than 40 members in the matter of publication of his news paper and that he has furnished the address of the licensed premises to each and every Governmental institution and hence, if he were to change the said address now he will suffer lot of inconvenience and sustain heavy loss and 3) that he is also publishing a monthly magazine by name Bhakti Jyothi, which is a spiritual magazine from the demised premises.

19. I am not at all impressed about the sustainability of any of these three reasons, for extension of the grant. The fact that the writ petitioner was not in arrears of payment of license fee cannot automatically fetch him any extension of the period of license. Similarly, the fact that he has been providing employment to 40 persons is also of a very little relevance in securing an extension of the license. If the petitioner were to render his establishment from a different premises, neither the employment potential nor the circulation of his news paper will get diminished. Therefore, the likelihood of inconvenience or hardship one has to undergo due to shift from out of the licensed premises is purely imaginary and hence is of no serious consequence. Further, if such an inconvenience were true, then the petitioner will be required to be granted the license in perpetuity. The third reason that he was also publishing a spiritual magazine cannot be a relevant factor for securing an extension of the license at the hands of the second respondent. It would have been entirely different if the said magazine has been got published for and on behalf of the second respondent, but when he is publishing a spiritual magazine on his own, as a part of his business activity, he cannot pray for grant of extension of the license period on that score.

20. The impugned order has recorded a finding of fact that the writ petitioner was not regular in payment of monthly license fee. As was already noticed supra, in his explanation dated 28.01.2011, the writ petitioner has not seriously disputed this fact; he tried to explain away his default by stating that he has taken up the issue for reduction of the license fee with the successive Chairmen of the T.T.D., who in turn assured him that the matter would be placed for consideration before the Trust Board and appropriate orders would be passed thereon. This explanation cannot be seriously taken into account or consideration for more than one good reason. There is nothing on record to lend support to the claim of the writ petitioner that he has in fact represented to the successive Chairmen of the T.T.D. Board for reduction of the license fee. The oral representations, if any, are incapable of being verified or ascertained at this distant point of time and that too by the Executive Officer, for, those Chairmen to whom he has represented orally are no longer functioning as the Chairmen of the Trust Board. Further, he himself has pointed out that in case of two other licensees the license fee has been reduced by 50%. If that be the case, there would not have been any further necessity for the matter to be placed for consideration before the Trust Board, inasmuch as it is not the case of the petitioner that pursuant to a resolution of the Trust Board, the reduction of license fee has been accorded to those two individuals. If the trust board resolution is not need for them, for considering his case, no such resolution would be needed. Therefore, the explanation offered by the petitioner for default in payment of the monthly license fee is plainly not acceptable.

21. However, his involvement in a Criminal case, pursuant to investigation of V.I.P. Break Darshan ticket misuse, has been adverted to in the impugned order with a view to highlight that his conduct was blameworthy, which by itself could have resulted in cancellation of the license, even before the license period has expired. In the impugned order, there is no pronouncement of any final opinion about the guilt of the writ petitioner in the Criminal case. In the impugned order, the factum of his involvement in a Criminal case has been adverted to, as the same being the result of the investigation taken up by the Vigilance Wing of the T.T.D. It is therefore difficult to find any infirmity, legal or otherwise, in the orders passed by the second respondent Devasthanam in not acceding to the request of the petitioner for grant of his license period.

22. Further, it is urged at the Bar, by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he was singled out and discriminated. There was no such claim made in the representation submitted on 25.07.2011 seeking extension. No factual data or details as to, in whose cases such extensions were granted was conspicuously missing. In the absence of any factual substratum, the plea of discrimination cannot be examined.

23. However, one important factor which deserves to be taken note of is this; by virtue of amending Act 33 of 2007, which was brought into force on 03.01.2008, the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 has been suitable amended. Section 83, after the amendment, enables the A.P. Endowments Tribunal to adjudicate upon a complaint of encroachment made over any land, building or tank belonging to an institution or endowment and then order for removal of such an encroachment and order for delivery of possession of the land or building or space encroached upon to the institution concerned. The second respondent Devasthanam has already availed of this provision by instituting O.A. No.110 of 2011. It is apt to recall the principles of law in respect of possession held by a person, even if there is no title in support of it, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Rame Gowda V. M. Varadappa Naidu AIR 2004 SC 4609 [LQ/SC/2003/1276] . Thefollowing the principles have been enunciated in paragraph Nos.5, 6 and 7 of the said judgment in the following words :

5. Salmond states in Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition), "few relationships are as vital to man as that of possession, and we may expect any system of law, however primitive, to provide rules for its protection... Law must provide for the safeguarding of possession. Human nature being what it is, men are tempted to prefer their own selfish and immediate interests to the wide and long-term interests of society in general. But since an attack on a mans possession is an attack on something which may be essential to him, it becomes almost tantamount to an assault on the man himself; and the possessor may well be stirred to defend himself with force. The result is violence, chaos and disorder.(at pp. 265, 266).

In English Law possession is a good title of right against anyone who cannot show a better. A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except the true owner himself. Many other legal systems, however, go much further than this, and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even against the true owner himself. Even a wrongdoer, who is deprived of his possession, can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner, who takes his own, may be forced in this way to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of his ownership. The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law. (Salmond, ibid, pp. 294-295)

Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession even against ownership are called possessory, while those available for the protection of ownership itself may be distinguished as proprietary. In the modern and medieval civil law the distinction is expressed by the contrasted terms petitorium (a proprietary suit) and possessorium (a possessory suit). (Salmond, ibid, p.295)

6. The law in India, as it has developed, accords with the jurisprudential thought as propounded by Salmond. In Midnapur Zamindary Company Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy and Ors. T 1924 PC 144, Sir John Edge summed up the Indian law by stating that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court.

7. The thought has prevailed incessantly, till date, the last and latest one in the chain of decisions being Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya Vs. Anil Panjwani T (2003) 7 SCC 350 [LQ/SC/2003/590] . In-between, to quote a few out of severals, in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others (1968) 2 SCR 203 [LQ/SC/1967/355] , this Court has held that a landlord did commit trespass when he forcibly entered his own land in the possession of a tenant whose tenancy has expired. The Court turned down the submission that under the general law applicable to a lessor and a lessee there was no rule or principle which made it obligatory for the lessor to resort to Court and obtain an order for possession before he could eject the lessee. The court quoted with approval the law as stated by a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad Vs. Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 All. 1 [LQ/AllHC/1957/338] ,4), "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause...

24. In view of this firm legal firmament, the writ petitioner cannot be dispossessed or evicted from the demised premises, under his occupation, till the Andhra Pradesh Endowments Tribunal, adjudicates O.A. No.110 of 2011.

25. With this, the writ petition stands disposed of, at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs.