Orissa Cement, Limited v. Adikanda Sahu

Gajendragadkar, J.

1. This appeal by special leave arises out of the proceedings taken by Orissa Cement, Ltd., Rajggangpur, Orissa (hereinafter called the appellant), against Sri Adikanda Sahu (hereinafter called the respondent) under S.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent was a fitter employed by the appellant. It appears that on 6 January, 1955 he went into the time office and abused Mr. S. K. Misra, the labour officer of the appellant, in filthy language. The said officer reported the matter to the management that very day. The respondent was called by the resident engineer of the appellant and was asked to give explanation. In reply the respondent denied the statements of the labour officer. On 8 January the respondent raised slogans against the secretary and the labour officer and in the same evening he again abused Mr. Misra in filthy language. On 8 January the labour officer made another complaint against the respondent. In regard to this complaint also the respondents explanation was called for and duly received. The resident engineer rejected the explanations given by the respondent and on his report the appellant made an application against the respondent under S.33 of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission to dismiss him.

2. The tribunal found that the labour officer who was a respectable young man had been abused by the respondent in vulgar and filthy language and that this conduct of the respondent was undesirable and was subversive of discipline. The tribunal rejected the respondents explanation and accepted the labour officers account without any reservation. Nevertheless, it felt that the respondent should not be sacked as he was a young man of immature and impulsive age and should be given a chance to correct himself. In coming to this conclusion the tribunal was influenced by the consideration that the respondent had offered an apology to Mr. Misra. On this view the tribunal rejected the appellants application. Against this order the appellant appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal took the view that no enquiry had been made by the appellant before it applied under S.33 of the Act, and so it confirmed the finding of the tribunal that the respondent should not be dismissed having regard to the mitigating circumstances mentioned by the tribunal in its award. That is why the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.

3. It is clear that both the tribunals have agreed in holding that the respondent had used filthy language in abusing the appellants labour officer. They, however, thought that the respondent had offered an apology and that would meet the ends of justice in present case. In our opinion, this view is obviously erroneous. It is clear that the respondent in fact has not offered an unconditional apology as has been assumed by the tribunals below. He has merely stated that in discharging faithfully his duties as a trade unionist, he might have been misunderstood by Mr. Misra and he has added that if Mr. Misra felt offended by his behaviour, he would express his regret for all that had happened. It is obvious that the expression of regret by the respondent is conditional and cannot be taken as an unconditional apology. Besides, the words used by the respondent in abusing the labour officer not once but twice without any provocation are absolutely indecent and vulgar. In such a case, if the appellant took the view that it should not keep in its employment a person who was capable of such indecent conduct, it would be justified in dismissing him. The jurisdiction of the tribunals in dealing with the application made by the employer under S. 33 is limited, and as we have already observed, on the merits the concurrent finding has been in favour of the appellant. That being so, we do not see how the order passed by the tribunals below dismissing the appellants application can be justified. This is a clear case where the appellants prayer for permission to dismiss the respondent should have been granted. If no enquiry was held by the appellant, it has produced evidence before the tribunal to support its case, and as we have just indicated, that case had been held proved by both the tribunals.

4. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside, and the appellants request for permission to dismiss the respondent is granted. Since the respondent does not appear, we make no order as to costs.

5. Appeal allowed.