BALAKRISHNA, J.

(1) THIS is an appeal preferred by the oriental Insurance Company Limited, mysore, against the award made by the commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Mysore District, Mysore, in W.C.A. CR-2/86-87 dated 13th July, 1987 awarding a compensation of Rs.44,200-80 paise on account of the death of the husband of the claimant and a penalty amounting to 50% of the aforesaid compensation together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the compensation awarded and cost of Rs.50/-.

(2) Learned Counsel for the Insurance company submitted that the provisions of section 95 (1) (b) and Section 95 (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the M. V. Act) are applicable to the facts of the case and that there is no liability on the part of the Insurance company to pay any compensation to the claimant in the facts and circumstances of the case. We have examined these provisions and we find that they are not attracted to the facts of this case because of the reason that the accident took-place not when the vehicle was in motion but purely in the circumstance that the deceased was trying to remove the timber from the stationery lorry and it was in the course of employment that the accident took-place thus attracting the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 and not the provisions of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939.

(3) WE are of the opinion that the provisions of Section 12 of the Workmens Compensation Act are applicable and that the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation to the claimant. Sec. 12 (1) reads as follows : where any person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the principal) in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business contracts with any other person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workmen employed in the execution of the work any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from the principal, this Act shall apply as if references to the principal were substituted for references to the employer except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the wages of the workman under the employer by whom he is immediately employed. "

(4) IT is not in dispute that the deceased was the employee of M/s. Vasavi Transport, Hunsur Town, Mysore district, which is respondent No. 4. Since the death occurred while unloading the timber from the stationary lorry at the timber Depot, the insurance coverage is invoked and the Insurance Company has to be fastened with liability under the workmens Compensation Act and not under the M. V. Act.

(5) THE quantum of compensation awarded which is Rs. 44,200 80 paise is not seriously contested as being excessive or unreasonable. The next contention urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that penalty awarded by the commissioner for Workmens Compensation is not sustainable in view of the fact that there was no issue raised on the question ; that there was no finding on the issue and that no opportunity was given to the claimants to assign reasons in support of their case for condonation of delay in not making the payment of compensation in time. In this regard, learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the decision rendered in N.A.K. Pathan v. Julekhabi Pathan (.L.R. 1986 Karnataka 2413). The relevant paragraph for the purpose of this case on the question of the correctness of the levy of penalty reads thus :-"second Part of Section 4a (3) deals with levy of penalty, which becomes impossible if in the opinion of the commissioner there is no justification for the delay, in paying the amount. The question of justification for the delay or the absence of it depend, at least partially, on factors subjective to the employer and will have to be decided after considering his case and his explanation. An order imposing penalty for failure to cary out a statutory obligation, it is true, is in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty may not be imposed unless the party obliged has either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. It is a matter of discretion of the authority to be exercised judicially and on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances. However, in a proceeding under a law of this kind and having regard to the objects of the law and the mischief sought to be suppressed and remedy to be advanced by the law it is not proper to import into them a dichotomy in the stages of the adjudication-one in respect of the settlement of the dispute arising out of the claim and thereafter in respect of the imposition of the penalty. That is not the scheme of the act. The act provides for an expeditious settlement of the claim arising out of employment injuries and death. It is, of course, necessary that the employer is enabled to know the case he has to meet and should have the right, and be afforded a reasonable opportunity to, present his case and be heard. The procedural sophistications attending levy of penalty in other contexts should not be imported to a proceeding under the present act which is law providing for speedy and expeditious settlement of claims arising out of employment injury or death. Having regard to the social purposes of the statute, any embellishments of the procedure which might impede a speedy settlement should not be imported. All that is necessary is that the employer should khow the case he is required to meet and has and is afforded a reasonable opportunity of meeting the case."

(6) WE are in respectful agreement with the finding recorded by this Court that penalty cannot be imposed merely as a matter of course but the discretion to levy a penalty must be exercised judiciously and after due consideration of the relevant circumstances. This also presupposes an opportunity to be given to the Insurance Company to explain the circumstances for the delay which entails material consequences.

(7) THERE is another important question to be considered in this case. It is, whether the insurer is liable to pay penalty when the insurance policy is taken to cover specifically and only the risk of injury or death of the insured. On careful examination, we are of the opinion that the lusurance Company is liable to meet only the compensation payable for the risk covered and not the penalty unless the terms of the policy specifically include payment of penalty also. Penalty is not a necessary part of compensation. Compensation is pecuniary damages payable in respect of the damage or injury caused including death. But penalty is material reparation payable for breach of duty to pay the compensation within the statutory period prescribed under the Act. Penalty is distinctly different from compensation. In the instant case, we find that there is no specific term or condition in the insurance policy which binds the Insurance Company to pay penalty apart from compensation. We are of the opinion that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the penalty in the instant case.

(8) FOR the reasons stated above, we set aside the order with regard to the levy of penalty and confirm in all other respects, the award passed by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation. Parties to bear their own costs. Appeal Partly Allowed.