Raghubar Dayal, J.

1. This appeal, by special leave, is against the order of the Punjab High Court dismissing the appellants appeal against his conviction under S. 307, I.P.C.

2. Bimla Devi, P. W. 7, was married to the appellant in October, 1951. Their relations got strained by 1953 and she went to her brothers place and stayed there for about a year when she returned to her husbands place at the assurance of the appellants maternal uncle that she would not be maltreated in future. She was, however, ill-treated and her health deteriorated due to alleged maltreatment and deliberate under-nourishment. In 1956, she was deliberately starved and was not allowed to leave the house and only sometimes a morsel or so used to be thrown to her as alms are given to beggars. She was denied food for days together and used to be given gram husk mixed in water after five or six days. She managed to go out of the house in April 1956, but Romesh Chander and Suresh Chander, brothers of the appellant, caught hold of her and forcibly dragged her inside the house where she was severely beaten. Thereafter she was kept locked inside a room.

3. On 5th June 1956, she happened to find her room unlocked, her mother in law and husband away and, availing of the opportunity, went out of the house and managed to reach the Civil Hospital, Ludhiana where she met lady Doctor Mrs. Kumar, P. W. 2, and told her of her sufferings. The appellant and his mother went to the hospital and tried their best to take her back to the house, but were not allowed to do so by the lady Doctor. Social workers got interested in the matter and informed the brother of Bimla Devi, one Madan Mohan, who came down to Ludhiana and, after learning all facts, sent information to the Police Station by letter on 16th June 1956. In his letter he said :

"My sister Bimla Devi Sharma is lying in death bed. Her condition is very serious. I am told by her that deliberate attempt has been made by her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in law and sister-in-law. I was also told that she was kept locked in a room for a long time and was beaten by all the above and was straved.

I therefore request that a case may be registered and her statement be recorded, immediately."

The same day, at 9-15 p.m., Dr. Miss Dalbir Dhillon sent a note to the police saying My patient Bimla Devi is actually ill. She may collapse any moment.

4. Shri Sehgal, Magistrate, P. W. 9, recorded her statement that night and stated in his note :

"Blood transfusion is taking place through the right forearm and consequently the right hand of the patient is not free. It is not possible to get the thumb impression of the right hand thumb of the patient. That is why I have got her left hand thumb impression."

5. The impression formed by the learned Judge of the High Court on seeing the photographs taken of Bimla Devi a few days later, is stated thus in the judgment :

"The impression I formed on looking at the two photographs of Bimla was that at that time she appeared to be suffering from extreme emaciation. Her cheeks appeared to be hollow. The projecting bones of her body with little flesh on them made her appearance skeletal. The countenance seemed to be cadaverous."

After considering the evidence of Bimla Devi and the Doctors, the learned Judge came to the conclusion :

"So far as the basic allegations are concerned, which formed the gravamen of the offence, the veracity of her statement cannot be doubted. After a careful scrutiny of her statement, I find her allegations as to starvation, maltreatment, etc., true. The exaggerations and omissions to which may attention was drawn in her statement are inconsequential."

After considering the entire evidence on records, the learned Judge said :

"After having given anxious thought and careful consideration to the facts and circumstances as emerge from the lengthy evidence on the record, I cannot accept the argument of the learned counsel for the accused, that the condition of acute emaciation in which Bimla Devi was found on 5th of June, 1956, was not due to any calculated starvation but it was on account of prolonged illness, the nature of which was not known to the accused till Dr. Gulati had expressed his opinion that she was suffering from tuberculosis."

He further stated :

"The story of Bimla Devi as to how she was ill-treated, and how, her end was attempted to be brought about or precipitated, is convincing, despite the novelty of the method in which the object was sought to be achieved. ............. The conduct of the accused and of his mother on 5th of June, 1956, when soon after Bimla Devis admission in the hospital they insisted on taking her back home, is significant and almost tell-tale. It was not for better treatment or for any treatment that they wanted to take her back home. Their real object in doing so could be no other than to accelerate her end."

6. The appellant was acquitted of the offence under S. 342, I.P.C., by the Additional Sessions Judge, who gave him the benefit of doubt, though he had come to the conclusion that Bimla Devis movements were restricted to a certain extent. The learned Judge of the High Court considered this question and came to a different conclusion. Having come to these findings, the learned Judge considered the question whether on these facts an offence under S. 307, I.P.C., had been established or not. He held it proved.

7. Mr. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant, has challenged the correctness of this view in law. He concedes that it is only when a person is helpless and is unable to look after himself that the person having control over him is legally bound to look after his requirements and to see that he is adequately fed. Such persons, according to him, are infants, old people and lunatics. He contends that it is no part of a husbands duty to spoon feed his wife, his duty being simply to provide funds and food. In view of the finding of the Court below about Bimla Devis being confined and being deprived of regular food in pursuance of a scheme of regularly starving her in order to accelerate her end, the responsibility of the appellant for the condition to which she was brought up to the 5th of June 1956, is clear. The findings really go against any suggestion that the appellant had actually provided food and funds for his wife Bimla Devi.

8. The next contention for the appellant is that the ingredients of an offence under S. 307 are materially different from the ingredients of an offence under s. 511, I.P.C. The difference is that for an act to amount to the commission of the offence of attempting to commit an offence, it need not be the last act and can be the first act towards the commission of the offence, while for an offence under S. 307, it is the last act which if effective to cause death, would constitute the offence of an attempt to commit murder. The contention really is that even if Bimla Devi had been deprived of food for a certain period, the act of so depriving her does not come under S. 307, I.P.C., as that act could not, by itself, have caused her death, it being necessary for the period of starvation to continue for a longer period of cause death. We do not agree with this contention.

9. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code reads :

"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, and, if hurt is cause to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death."

Section 308 reads :

"Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both : and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine, or with both."

Both the sections are expressed in similar language. If S. 307 is to be interpreted as urged for the appellant, S. 308 too should be interpreted that way. Whatever may be said with respect to S. 307, I.P.C., being exhaustive or covering all the cases of attempts to commit murder and S. 511 not applying to any case of attempt to commit murder on account of its being applicable only to offences punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, the same cannot be said with respect to the offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide punishable under S. 308.An attempt to commit culpable homicide is punishable with imprisonment for a certain period and therefore but for its being expressly made an offence under S. 308, it would have fallen under S. 511which applies to all attempts to commit offences punishable with imprisonment where no express provisions are made by the Code for the punishment of that attempt. It should follow that the ingredients of an offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder should be the same as the ingredients of an offence of attempt to commit that offence under S. 511.We have held this day in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 226 of 1959 : (AIR 1961 S.C. 1698) that a person commits the offence of attempting to commit a particular offence, when he intends to commit that particular offence and, having made preparations and with the intention to commit that offence does an act towards its commission and that such an act need not be penultimate act towards the commission of that offence, but must be an act during the course of committing such offence. It follows therefore that a person commits an offence under S. 308 when he has an intention to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder and in pursuance of that intention does an act towards the commission of that offence whether that act be the penultimate act or not. On a partly of reasoning, a person commits an offence under S. 307 when he has an intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It is to be clearly understood, however, that the intention to commit the offence of murder means that the person concerned has the intention to do certain act with the necessary intention or knowledge mentioned in S. 300. The intention to commit an offence is different from the intention or knowledge requisite for constituting the act as that offence. The expression whoever attempts of commit an offence in S. 511, can only mean whoever intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge necessary for the commission of that offence. The same is meant by the expression whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstance that if he, by that act, caused death, he would be guilty of murder in S. 307. This simply means that the act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence of murder. The expression by that act does not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death. Such a result must be the result of that act whether immediately or after a lapse of time.

10.The word act again, does not mean only any particular, specific instantaneous act of a person, but denotes, according to S. 33 of the Code, as well, a series of acts. The course of conduct adopted by the appellant in regularly starying Bimla Devi comprised a series of acts and therefore acts falling short of completing the series, and would therefore come within the purview of S. 307 of the Code.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred us to certain cases in this connection. We now discuss them.

12. The first is Queen Empress v. Nidha, ILR 14 All 38, Nidha, who had been absconding, noticing certain chowkidars arrive, brought up a sort of blunderbuss he was carrying, to the hip and pulled the trigger. The can exploded, but the charge did not go off. He was convicted by the Sessions Judge under Ss. 299 and 300 read with S. 511, and not under S. 307, I.P.C., as the learned Judge relied on a Bombay Case - Region v. Francis Cassidy 4 Bom. HC Cr 17 - in which it was held that in order to constitute the offence of attempt to murder, under S. 307, I.P.C., the act committed by the person must be an act capable of causing, in the natural and ordinary course of events, death. Straight J., both distinguished that case and did not agree with certain views expressed therein. He expressed his view thus, at page 43 :

"It seems to me that if a person who has an evil intent does an act which is the last possible act that he could do towards the accomplishment of a particular crime that he has in his mind, he is not entitled to pray in his mind an obstacle intervening not known to himself. If he did all that he could do and completed the only remaining proximate act in his power, I do not think he can escape criminal responsibility, and this because his own set volition and purpose having been given effect to their full extent, a fact unknown to him and at variance with his own belief, intervened to prevent the consequences of that act which he expected to ensue, ensuing."

Straight J., gave an example earlier which itself does not seem to fit in with the view expressed by him later. He said :

"No one would suggest that if A intending to fire the stack of B, goes into a grocery shop and buys a box of matches, that he has committed the offence of attempting to fire the stack of B. But if he, having that intent, and having bought the box of matches, goes to the stack of B and lights the match, but it is put out by a puff of wind, and he is prevented and interfered with, that would establish in my opinion an attempt."

The last act, for the person to set fire to the stack, would have been his applying a lighted match to the stack. Without doing this act, he could not have set fire and, before he could do this act, the lighted match is supposed to have been put out by a puff of wind.

13. Illustration(d) to S. 307, itself shows the incorrectness of this view. The illustration is:

"A intending to murder Z, by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in As keeping; A has not yet committed the offence in this section. A places the food on Zs table or delivers is to Zs servants to place it on Zs table. A has committed the offence defined in this section."

As last act, contemplated in this illustration, is not an act which must result in the murder of Z. The food is to be taken by Z. It is to be served to him. it may not have been possible for A to serve the food himself to Z, but the fact remains that As act in merely delivering the food to the servant is fairly remote to the food being served and being taken by Z.

14. This expression of opinion by Straight J., was not really with reference to the offence under S. 307, I.P.C., but was with reference to attempts to commit any particular offence and was stated not to emphasize the necessity of committing the last act for the commission of the offence, but in connection with the culprit taking advantage of an involuntary act thwarting the completion of his design by making it impossible for the offence being committed. Straight J., himself said earlier :

"For the purpose of constituting an attempt under S. 307, I.P.C., there are two ingredients required, first, an evil intent or knowledge, and secondly, an act done."

15. In Emperor v. Vasudeo Balvant Gogte, ILR 56 Bom 434 : (AIR 1932 Bom 279 [LQ/BomHC/1932/2] ) a person fired several shots at another. No injury was in fact occasioned due to certain obstruction. The culprit was convicted of an offence under S. 307, I.P.C. Beaumont, C. J., said at page 438 (of ILR Bom) : (at p. 281 of AIR) :

"I think that what S. 307 really means is that the accused must do an act with such a guilty intention and knowledge and in such circumstances that but for some intervening fact the act would have amounted to murder in the normal course of events."

This is correct. In the present case, the intervening fact which thwarted the attempt of the appellant to commit the murder of Bimla Devi was her happening to escape from the house and succeeding in reaching the hospital and thereafter securing good medical treatment.

16. It may, however, be mentioned that in cases of attempt to commit murder by fire arm, the act amounting to an attempt to commit murder is bound to be the only and the last act to be done by the culprit. Till he fires, he does not do any act towards the commission of the offence and once he fires, and something happens to prevent the shot taking effect, the offence under S. 307 is made out. Expressions, in such cases, indicate that one commits an attempt to murder only when one has committed the last act necessary to commit murder. Such expressions however are not to be taken as precise exposition of the law, though the statements in the context of the cases are correct.

17. In Mi Pu v. Emperor, 10 Cri LJ 363 (Low Bur) a person who had put poison in the food was convicted of an offence under S. 328 read with S. 511, I.P.C., because there was no evidence about the quantity of poison found and the probable effects of the quantity mixed in the food. It was therefore held that the accused cannot be said to have intended to cause more than hurt. The case is therefore of no bearing on the question under determination.

18. In Jeetmal v. State, AIR 1950 Madh. B 21 it was held that an act under S. 307, must be one which, by itself, must be ordinarily capable of causing death in the natural ordinary course of events. This is what was actually held in Cassidys Case 4 Bom HCCr 17 and was not approved in Niddhas Case ILR 14 All 38 or in Gogtes Case ILR 56 Bom 434 : (AIR 1932 Bom 279 [LQ/BomHC/1932/2] ).

19. We may now refer to Rex v. White 1910-2 KB 124. In that case, the accused, who was indicated for the murder of his mother, was convicted of attempt to murder her. It was held that the accused had put two grains of cyanide of potassium in the wine glass with the intent to murder her. It was, however, argued that there was no attempt at murder because the act of which he was guilty, namely, the putting the poison in the wine glass, was a completed act and could not be and was not intended by the appellant to have the effect of killing her at once : it could not kill unless it we are followed by other acts which he might never have done." This contention was repelled and it was said :

"There seems no doubt that the learned judge in effect did tell the jury that if this was a case of slow poisoning the appellant would be guilty of the attempt to murder. We are of opinion that this direction was right, and that the completion or attempted completion of one of a series of acts intended by a man to result in killing is an attempt to murder even although this completed act would not, unless followed by the other acts, result in killing. It might he the beginning of the attempt but would nonetheless be an attempt."

This supports our view.

20. We therefore hold that the conviction of the appellant under S. 307, I.P.C. is correct and accordingly dismiss this appeal.

21. Appeal dismissed.