T.N. Singh, J.

1. In this appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, for short, W.C. Act, the legality is in issue of a part of the award, absolving the insurer and saddling on the employer liability for payment of penalty and interest under Section 4A(3) of the said Act, which I extract:

(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner may direct that, in addition to the amount of the arrears, simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the amount due together with if in the opinion of the Commissioner there is no justification for the delay, a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent, of such amount, shall be recovered from the employer by way of penalty.

2. Still, a tryst with the law for a grand debate appears to me inevitable because the legal landscape is clumsy. Appellants counsel Mr. Chaturvedi submits that the legal complexion of the lis needs not a renewed exercise as a learned single Judge of this Court has decided the legal issue against the insurer in the unreported decision in the case of National Insurance Co. v. Urmila Bai Misc. Appeal No. 53 of 1981; decided on 11.2.1987. I propose, however, to sail on the legal odyssey with the insurers counsel Mr. Dubey, who has cited a respectable mass of case-law exposing divergence of judicial opinion on the question. I have no doubt at all that the question deserves better consideration and not summary decision. I propose, therefore, to guard myself lest my vision is blurred looking first at Urmila Bais case, Misc. Appeal No. 53 of 1981; decided on 11.2.1987, wherein the judicial endeavour as Mr. Dubey has submitted, had a narrow focus.

3. First, few facts. Long ago, on 3.10.1979, Prahlad Singh met a fatal end in a motor accident. He was employed as a cleaner on the truck which the present Appellant owned. Mr. Dubey represents the fourth Respondent, the National Insurance Company, from whom a policy in respect of the vehicle in question was obtained by the Appellant. Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are wife and minor daughters of deceased Prahlad Singh, who had preferred claim, for his death under W.C. Act. The Appellant (as employer) and the fourth Respondent (as insurer) were impleaded in that proceeding and they both separately filed their written statements. Evidence was adduced in that proceeding though at one stage, the Appellant remained absent and eventually, the award was pronounced ex parte against the Appellant which was set aside on application being made in that behalf. The matter had then come to this Court and it was remitted to the Commissioner by an order passed on 10.1.1981 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 49 of 1980 for disposal of the claim petition afresh in accordance with the directions made therein.

4. Finally, on 25.2.1982, the claim petition of Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was disposed of after hearing parties and an award was passed allowing a sum of Rs. 18,000/- as compensation for the death of Prahlad Singh. The employer and the insurer were directed to deposit within two months the said sum in court though it was made clear that the insurers primary liability had to be discharged in doing so. So far, there is no contest or dispute. But in the award a further direction was made that the employer not having deposited in court within a month of the date of death of Prahlad Singh, namely 3.10.1979, compensation due payable under the law, he was to pay a penalty of Rs. 1,800/- and also interest at the rate of six per cent per annum on the sum of Rs. 18,000/- which he should deposit in court with the costs awarded Rs. 200/-.

5. The basic position in law has to be made clear firstly and immediately before looking into the authorities cited on both sides that the death of Prahlad Singh having occurred in a motor accident, the provisions of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, M.V. Act, are immediately attracted. As an extension of this position, it is to be noted further that the provisions of Section 96 of the M.V. Act also operate ipso jure though it may not be necessary to look beyond that except Section 110-AA whose purport indeed deserves due consideration. In virtue of the provision contained in Section 110-AA the claimant being given an option thereunder to invoke the aid of the forum contemplated under W.C. Act for the adjudication of the claim, the procedure to be adopted for adjudication of the claim made before that forum would be one provided under W.C. Act and the Commissioner would be entitled, ex hypothesi, to exercise powers under W.C. Act in disposing of the claim petition.

6. What is also to be made clear is that when the claim arises in terms of the policy contemplated under the proviso to Section 95(1) of the M.V. Act, it shall not be within the competence of the Commissioner to pass the award in derogation of the provisions of Section 95(1) of the M.V. Act or, for that matter, also of Section 96 of that Act. The legal position that in such a case the liability ensues also under the policy and Sections 95 and 96, M.V. Act would also be determinative of the liability of the parties besides W.C. Act bears special emphasis.

7. Insurers counsel, Mr. Dubey, who supports the award in respect of penalty and interest, has relied on the provisions of Sections 2(1)(c), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(n), 3, 4, 4A(3), 14 as also 30 itself of W.C. Act. The short contention of Mr. Dubey is that W.C. Act envisages clearly and distinctly the liability of an employer for payment of compensation under the Act, but it also contemplates further that it is the employer who has to discharge his liability under the Act, whether for compensation adjudged according to Section 4, or penalty and interest levied under Section 4A(3). At no stage and in no manner, jurisdiction is vested in the Commissioner to pass any award under W.C. Act against the insurer. It is his contention that the insurer comes into picture only in the contingency evisaged under Section 14 of the Act, namely, when the employer becomes insolvent.

8. It is, no doubt, true that the several provisions of the Act referred to and relied on by Mr. Dubey speak only of employer and of his liability. But it cannot be overlooked that the liability is attached to the incidence of an accident under Section 3 and therefore, when the accident is a motor accident (arising out of use of a motor vehicle) the risk for which is covered by a policy of insurance taken under Section 95(1) of M.V. Act, the impact of the provisions of M.V. Act on the claim made under W.C. Act is apparent and inevitable. Merely because in Section 30, appeals are separately provided under Clauses (a) and (aa) it would not, in my opinion, indicate that it is incumbent on the part of the Commissioner to pass separate awards for compensation under Section 4 and for interest or penalty under Section 4A. The scheme of Section 30 clearly negates the construction pressed inasmuch as only few orders which the Commissioner may pass during the course of the proceedings before him are separately itemised thereunder merely to indicate that all orders passed by him are not appealable. It is difficult to accept the contention that it is so done so that by separate orders liabilities may be saddled separately on different persons to make each order separately appealable. Indeed, if I have to say anything more, I would simply draw a parallel between the drafting technique adopted in Section 30, W.C. Act and Order 43, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. In so far as reliance is placed on Section 14, suffice it to say that it speaks of a liability under a contract, pure and simple; and not a statutory contract such as is envisaged under Section 95(1), M.V. Act. On the other hand, recourse, in such a case, would be permissible le only to the provisions of Section 97, M.V. Act and not to Section 14, W.C. Act.

9. It must be made clear that interaction and interplay between the provisions of the W.C. Act and M.V. Act is to be taken seriously. Under Section 3 of W.C. Act, the liability of an employer to pay compensation operates immediately and automatically; it is not dependent on any fact except the accident or the statutorily envisaged requirements. Indeed, only such workman as is defined in Section 2(1)(n) or his dependents (in case of his death) are competent under the Act to claim compensation against the employer and in such a case only when an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment takes place. Indeed, it is for this reason that care is taken in the proviso to Section 95(1), M.V. Act to speak of liability arising under the Workmens Compensation Act. However, in derogation of the definition of the term workman in Section 2(1)(n) of W.C. Act, the liability is extended under the said proviso to an employee of the type specified in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof.

10. In a decision of this Court in the case of Oriental Fire and Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dhanno 1987 ACJ 759 (MP), the legal position which was generally noticed may be re-constructed in this context. When a policy contemplated under the proviso to Section 95(1) in respect of any motor vehicle was in force at the time of any motor accident, insurers liability, unless it was excluded under the terms of the policy (in the manner and to the extent held permissible under M.V. Act) the limit or extent of the liability for compensation would not be governable by the provisions of the W.C. Act, but by those of M.V. Act and the policy of insurance.

11. I may now turn to the moot question as to whether the Commissioner can specify in his award, passed under the W.C. Act, any part of the liability arising in terms of the provisions of W.C. Act and M.V. Act, to be satisfied by the employer by absolving the insurer from that part of the liability despite the fact that the entire liability (both parts) falls within the limit prescribed under Sub-section (2) of Section 95 of the M.V. Act. I am clear in my mind that there is no warrant in law under W.C. Act or under M.V. Act for the Commissioner to do such a thing. Because, although Section 110-B, M.V. Act statutorily contemplates that the Claims Tribunal may specify respective liabilities of the insurer, owner and driver of the offending motor vehicle, such a power, the Commissioner, acting under the W.C. Act, does not enjoy. He is required to pass a single indivisible award only against the employer. And indeed, because to such an award also the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of M.V. Act are attracted, the insurer will be required to satisfy the award passed by the Commissioner against the employer in its entirety, albeit to the extent permissible under Section 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which I extract:

96. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks.--(1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under Sub-section (4) of Section 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.

12. True it is that Section 96(1) speaks at one place of "judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by policy" and at another place, it speaks of "liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum". The only object of specifying statutorily only costs and interest in Section 96(1) is to make clear that such amount, even if they are excluded by the terms of a policy shall be a liability, to be discharged by the insurer. In no case the liability as a whole under an award permissible for discharge by an insurer under the policy can be avoided by the insurer. I find much support for the view in the decision, Narmada Choudhury v. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal 1984 ACJ 283 (Gau). In that case it was held that "the liability to the extent allowed by Section 95, of the insurer, to satisfy the award by virtue of the provisions of Section 96, is not extinguished merely by reason of specification in the award of any lesser amount." It was also held that "this liability or obligation is created as against the insurer in terms of Section 95 and not as a result of the amount being so specified in the award." Mr. Chaturvedi has rightly stressed, also, the concluding portion of para 10 of the Report wherein it is stated that the statutory obligation of the insurer, though tentative and inchoate in the offing, it is "perfected in the course of discharge of the judgment-debt arising under the award in respect of total amount of compensation payable in respect of the claim determined in the course of adjudication thereof."

13. Thus, the resolution of the controversy, according to me, turns on few expressions or rather certain clauses of the provisions of Clause (i) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 95, Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) thereof and of Section 96(1) of M.V. Act. In both sub-sections of Section 95, the mention is made of liability or liabilities and in both cases they are referred to as arising under W.C. Act. In Section 96 (1), afore-quoted, the duty of the insurer to satisfy judgment in respect of any such liability is referred to as a liability created under the insurance policy which an owner of a motor vehicle is statutorily required to effect in respect to his vehicle under Section 95(1)(b). It is necessary also to stress that the limit or extent of any liability covered by a policy of insurance effected in terms of Section 95(1) are indicated severally in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 95(2). Therefore, the only conclusion which may be drawn, reading conjointly these provisions, about the intention of the legislature, is that a duty is statutorily cast on the insurer in respect of the judgment-debt of an employer arising under an award passed under W.C. Act against the employer and that the duty is inexorable except to the extent it is statutorily relaxed under Section 95(2)(a), M.V. Act, which I quote:

(2) subject to the proviso to Sub-section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely-

(a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of one lakh and fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, arising under the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle:

14. Let me candidly explain further my view. Clause (i) of the proviso to Section 95(1) speaks of a liability arising under W.C. Act in respect of which the policy may cover any risk in order to meet the statutory requirement of Section 95(1)(b). Indeed, the statutory requirement envisaged under Section 95(1)(b) does not extend to all types of liabilities arising under the W.C. Act in respect of any accident. It would be, therefore, open to an insurer to exclude, in the policy, any such liability which, though it arises under the W.C. Act, is not the statutory liability envisaged under Section 95(1)(b) or under any provision of M.V. Act. I reiterate once again the view I took in Oriental Fire and Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dhanno 1987 ACJ 759 (MP), that proviso (i) to Section 95(1) which speaks of the liability arising under the W.C. Act deals only with the nature of the liability and not with the limit of the liability for which specific provision is made in Sub-section (2) of Section 95 itself. The duty to satisfy a judgment-debt by the insurer contemplated under Section 96(1) must, ex hypothesi, be restricted in a case in which in any policy of insurance, the insurer has explicitly excluded any particular type of liability that arises only under W.C. Act but not under M.V. Act. Except in that regard and to that extent, the liability or duty of an insurer to specify the judgment-debt arising under an award, indeed whether passed by a Commissioner or by a Claims Tribunal, appears to me to be "ultimate and indefeasible" as held in Narmada Choudhurys case, 1984 ACJ 283 (Gau).

15. The policy of insurance which the Appellant took out in this case is on record and is marked Exh. D/2. Mr. Dubey has stressed Clause (c) of the proviso to para 1 of Section IIof the terms and conditions of policy while Mr. Chaturvedi submits that the proviso need not be looked into as para 1 itself totally covers the instant case, excluding applicability of the proviso. I would prefer, however, to extract the stressed portion of para 1 as also proviso to Clause (c) in extenso:

"1. Subject to the limits of liability the Company will indemnify the insured against all sums including claimants cost and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of

(1) death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use (including the loading and/or unloading) of the-motor vehicle.

(c) Except in so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in relation to liability under the Workmens Compensation Ac, 1923, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person (other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment) being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the motor vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which any claim arises."

It appears clear to me that the proviso Clause (c) afore-quoted does not unfortunately restrict liability of the insurer under the W.C. Act by excluding explicitly other liabilities arising under that Act and limiting the risk only to the liability in respect of payment of compensation. In other words, it does not say that the insurer shall not be liable for the award that may be passed for penalty or even interest under Section 4A(3), W.C. Act. This view I have to take reading the proviso in the context of para 1 wherein the obligation of the insurer to indemnify the insured is specified and it is "against all sums including claimants costs and expenses which the insured legally becomes liable to pay." (Emphasis added). The obvious need not be stressed that the liability of the employer, or for that matter, of the insurer as respects penalty and interest under Section 4A(3) of the W.C. Act is evidently a liability under W.C. Act and when an award is passed by the Commissioner under Section 4A(3), the employer and for that matter the insurer becomes legally liable to pay that in terms of para 1; the obligation of the insurer to indemnify the employer in respect of such a liability ensues under para 1 itself.

16. In course of his arguments Mr. Chaturvedi also referred to me to two other reported decisions of this Court besides Dhannos case, 1987 ACJ 759 (MP) and it is my duty, therefore, to look into them. One of them, of the Division Bench, in the case of Northern India Insurance Companys case, : 1973 JLJ 806, is also placed for my consideration by Mr. Dubey. In that case, it was held construing the provisions of Section 19, W.C. Act and Section 96, M.V. Act that the insurer was also liable to discharge the liability of the employer determined under W.C. Act. Mr. Dubey submits that insurers right to appeal against an award passed under W.C. Act was duly recognised and it was further held that like the employer, who was required to make prior deposit of the amount as contemplated under the third proviso to Section 30, the right was not so restricted. Banking on this distinction, Mr. Dubey has submitted that a distinction has to be drawn in the matter of satisfaction of liability concerning compensation on the one hand and interest or penalty on the other hand, because separate provisions of appeal in respect of those two liabilities are contemplated in Clauses (a) and (aa) of Section 30. I do not, however, find any merit in counsels submission, nor any warrant for the contention pressed on the authority of the Division Bench decision. Indeed, I have earlier stated my view on this aspect of the matter and it is not necessary to reiterate the same. The only observation to be made is that the decision does not deal expressly or even obliquely with the provision of Section 4A(3), W.C. Act though it undoubtedly supports the view that the ultimate liability to discharge the claim adjudicated under W.C. Act rests with the insurer.

17. The Division Bench decision was followed by learned single Judge of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. v. Bagdibai Manaklal 1985 ACJ 828 (MP), wherein it was held that the Commissioner adjudicating a claim under W.C. Act was competent to decide the question raised by the insurance company of the breach of policy by the insured, taking the view that this followed from the proviso to Section 95(1)(b), M.V. Act, which covered the liability arising under the W.C. Act. This decision is evidently in line with the view taken by me and reliance thereon must avail the Appellant. The decision in Premier Insurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Thomas 1983 ACJ 783 (Mad), also cited by Mr. Chaturvedi, also supports the view taken by me even as respects any interpretation of Section 110-AA, M.V. Act. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C. Thomass case (supra) held that an insurer could not only be impleaded in the proceedings taken under the W.C. Act, but he could also be held liable in those proceedings as the provisions of Chapter VIII, M.V. Act must be allowed to have their full play even in such a case. The contention based on Section 14, W.C. Act to contest this position was negatived which view also I would like to reiterate, accords with the view I have taken in this matter.

18. The decisions cited and discussed above, I must, however, confess, shed no light on the specific question of liability of the insurer under Section 4A(3), W.C. Act, though in the unreported judgment of this Court in National Ins. Co. v. Urmila Bai Misc. Appeal No. 53 of 1981; decided on 11.2.1987, that question undoubtedly fell for consideration. In that case, the decision of the Orissa High Court, in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Matias Burla 1986 ACJ 732 (Ori), was cited but the contention based thereon was rejected although about the decision cited, no view was expressed. The learned single Judge took the plain and simple view in Urmila Bais case, Misc. Appeal No. 53 of 1981; decided on 11.2.1987, that initial liability for payment of compensation and penalty under the Act is on the employer and that liability is shifted on an insurer by the policy of insurance. Because in that decision contentions which are urged today on behalf of the insurer were not pressed, I have taken pains to do so to remove any ambiguity about the ratio of that decision and also to indicate further that there law was widely stated. Indeed, it was not noted therein that the insurer could lawfully provide in the policy appropriate terms and conditions to exclude to the permissible extent (under M.V. Act) any particular liability envisaged or imposed in the award passed under W.C. Act.

19. In discussing the case-law cited by Mr. Dubey, I propose to deal first with Matias Burlas case, 1986 ACJ 732 (Ori), on which also the learned Counsel has placed reliance. In this case, a learned single Judge of the Orissa High Court took the view that Section 4A(3), W.C. Act, being a penal provision, has to be construed strictly. Because the word "employer" figures in the section and not any person which figure in Section 31, the liability under Section 4A(3) cannot be saddled on the insurer. With due respect, I am unable to agree with the proposition that appealed to the court in that case, for reasons earlier alluded. I have already taken the view that the liability of an insurer in such circumstances is not a pure and simple contractual liability arising from the policy of insurance, but it is statutory liability as well which arises under Section 95(1)(b) and Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 96, M.V. Act. Although the liability is of the employer under Section 4A(3), that liability has to be discharged by the insurer under the relevant provisions of M.V. Act and the policy of insurance. With the view of the learned single Judge of Madras High Court in the case of Venkataraman v. Abdul Munaf Sahib 1971 ACJ 77 (Mad), I also beg to differ respectfully as I find myself unable to accept the law stated in that case that Section 95, M.V. Act, on its proper construction, means that a liability of an employer, or, for that matter, of the insurer has to be determined even in regard to its extent with reference to the provisions of W.C. Act. I need not repeat reasons once again for this view except to say that a proper synchronising is necessary of the relevant provisions of the two enactments that is to be carefully handled. I would also add that in a later decision, another learned single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Jay a Lakshmi Ammal 1975 ACJ 159 (Mad), has taken care to qualify the holding in Venkataramans case, 1971 ACJ 77 (Mad), to some extent, saying that the extent of liability could be enlarged by the policy of insurance. Still, I would add that neither in Venkataramans case (supra) nor in Jaya Lakshmi Ammals case (supra), while speaking about the extent the courts were called upon to consider the nature of the liability envisaged under Section 4A(3), W.C. Act and indeed, in those cases, the courts had no occasion to deal with a claim thereunder. This position also obtains in two other decisions cited by Mr. Dubey, both of Orissa High Court, wherein Venkataramans case, 1971 ACJ 77 (Mad), was considered. In Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Champati 1975 ACJ 196 (Ori), the question raised, as in other cases too, was of compensation, which was determined in terms of the Schedules of W.C. Act. The case of Subasini Panda v. State of Orissa 1984 ACJ 276 (Ori), was a case of fatal accident and the claim was tried by a Claims Tribunal. Although Venkataramans case (supra) was cited and the holding thereof was accepted that by virtue of Section 95, M.V. Act, the Claims Tribunal was competent to determine the liability of insurance company to the extent the workman was entitled to compensation under W.C. Act, no question of extent of liability, but rather of nature of liability under two Acts came up for decision in that case. Because the claim was found to be maintainable not at the forum of the Tribunal on the failure of the claimants to prove rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle, the claimants were refused relief holding that they could have gone to the Commissioner because the nature of the claim was such that without proving the tortious liability, the claimants could have got relief at Commissioners forum in accordance with the provisions of W.C. Act.

20. True it is that in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mathura Prasad v. Saiyed Khurshed Ahmad 1982 ACJ (Supp) 153 (All), Section 4A, W.C. Act was interpreted and a learned single Judge of the court took the view that the liability in respect of compensation was distinct from that of interest and penalty contemplated under Section 4A because they were appealable under different provisions of the Act. However, what came to be decided rather in that case is that the Commissioner, while making an order awarding compensation should normally also make, if necessary, an order awarding interest and penalty under Section 4A, but failure to do so would not disable the Commissioner in making an order under Section 4A subsequently when the Commissioner did not direct his mind to facts of the case to decide the question as to whether an order should also be made under Section 4A on the ground that the compensation had not been paid for a long time.

21. If anything has to be said on this decision, I would say that it rather meets the common contention of the Appellant (employer) as also the fourth Respondent (insurer) that on merits even award of penalty and interest is not sustainable in law. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in Allahabad case that no separate proceeding for passing an order under Section 4A(3) is contemplated and I would add that it is also not necessary to frame any issue or hear parties expressly on the question of imposition of penalty and interest under Section 4A(3). Because, the only condition to be satisfied for passing an order under Section 4A(3) is statutorily specified, namely, on default of payment of compensation "within one month from the date it fell due" and in Sub-section (1) itself, the mandate is that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. What further appears from Section 3 is that compensation falls due as soon as the accident takes place. Circumstances of the case would be telling to warrant an order being passed on admitted fact for payment of penalty and interest. My tentative view is that the question of default being wilful or not should not arise, though in the instant case facts are fairly telling and indeed beyond question that the default was wilful. The proceeding in Commissioners court was dragged, stalled, staggered in questionable ways making it necessary for the poor claimants to come earlier also to this Court and the simple remedy as also immediate relief alluded them for a period of more than eight years.

22. I would now sum up and say that I do not see any reason further to hold otherwise than that the insurer has no case against the Appellant, having not excluded himself under the terms of the policy to satisfy the judgment-debt under the award which includes the liabilities under Section 4A(3) in respect of penalty" and interest. He cannot claim exemption from any part of the liability under the award for a total amount of Rs. 19,800/- which is well within the limit of the statutory liability cast on the insurer, namely, Rs. 50.000/-, under Section 95(2)(a), M.V. Act, as it stood at the time of accident and issuance of policy in 1977. In so far as the liability as respects payment of. interest awarded under Section 4A(3) is concerned, suffice it to say that not only that liability is explicitly covered by the provisions of Section 4A(3), W.C. Act and the policy of insurance that is also covered in specific terms under Section 96(1), M.V. Act.

23. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and of course, with costs.