1. By this miscellaneous petition u/s 482, Cr.P.C. the petitioners (namely, Nunaram, Rameshwar, Bhagirath, Subh Karan, Birju, Mangaram, Jagdish, Ram Kunwar, Birbal, Ganesharam, Hari Singh, Birju (s/o Hari Singh), Girdhari, Narsa Ram, Hanuman (s/o Asharam), Phoolaram alias Harphool, Bhanwarlal and Smt. Jeevani) praying for quashing of an order dated the 31st March, 1989 passed by the Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur whereby he took cognizance against the petitioners in Cr. Case No. 70/88.

2. Criminal Case No. 70/ 88 arises out of a complaint having been filed on November 16, 1988 by respondent, Bhagwana Ram, against the petitioners. Bhagwana Ram (under Section 200, Cr.P.C.) and others namely, Hariram, Ramlal, Harlal, Chandra Ram, Birbal and Narain Singh (ASI) (under Section 202, Cr.P.C.) were examined. Thereafter, under impugned order dated 31-3-1989, cognizance has been taken against the petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 302, 342, 364, 120B, 147, 148 and 149, IPC.

3. Pertinently to mention that before the complaint dated 16-11-1988 out of which the present Cr. Case No. 70/88 arises was filed by Bhagwanaram (present complainant), a written report which was registered as F.I.R. No. 94/88, was lodged by Bhagirathmal (one of the petitioners) on August 31, 1988 at 3 a.m. at Police Station, Fatehpur, relating to an incident alleged to have taken place inside the house of Bhagirathmal in village Tajsar at 10.30 p.m. when he was aroused out of sleep hearing some noise. It had also been stated in F.I.R. No. 94/88 that on awakening, Bhagirathmal saw five intruders (including Sanwarmal -- since deceased) standing in the compound of his Haveli; and that, the intruders assaulted Nunaram (one of the petitioners); the in-mates of the house up-roared, hearing which the intruders bolted away, except Sanwarmal who was apprehended on the spot. Upon the said allegations in FIR No. 94/88, the police registered criminal case for offences punishable under Sections 452, 323 and 147, IPC, and the police then started investigation. Narain Singh (ASI) reached the scene of occurrence where he found Sanwarmal tied to a pillar in the verandah having a bleeding injury on his head, besides other injuries including fractures being visible in the right elbow and left knee.

4. Upon enquiry by Narain Singh, Sanwarmal allegedly reported that Bhagirathmal and Nunaram were responsible for inflicting injuries on his person. Thereupon, Sanwarmal was taken to Dhanuka Government Hospital, Fatehpur for his treatment. From the hospital, Amilal who was Station House Officer, P.S. Fatehpur was informed of the incident by Narain Singh. Amilal reached the hospital and was given a written first information report by Narain Singh for alleged offences punishable under Sections 307, 325, 323 and 342, I.P.C. In that written report, Bhagirathmal and Nunaram were named as the two accused assailants. And, F.I.R. No. 95/88 came to be registered on 31-8-1988 at 6.30 a.m. The police during investigation inspected the site and prepared its inspection note, and the witnesses were examined by it u/s 161, Cr.P.C.

5. On September 1, 1988, at 2p.m. Sanwarmal died in Sri Kalyan Hospital, Sikar. So, offence of Section 302, IPC, was further added. After completion of the investigation, the police submitted a challan on September 27, 1988 in F.I.R. No. 95/88 against seven accused namely petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 for offences punishable under Sections 302, 147 and 149, IPC. And the Subordinate Magistrate had already taken cognizance against the petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 for the aforesaid offences vide his order dated 5-11-1988 in F.I.R. No. 95/88.

6. After taking cognizance by the Subordinate Magistrate on 5-11-1988 in F.I.R. No. 95/88 for the same incident, alleged to have taken place on 30-8-1988 in the night, criminal complaint, referred to. above, has been filed by Bhagwanaram wherein again, the Subordinate Magistrate as stated above, took cognizance not only against the persons (against whom he had already taken cognizance on 5-11-88) namely, petitioners Nos. 1 to 7, but also others namely, petitioners Nos. 8 to 18.

7. Before I dwell on merits of the present issue, I would like to deal with the scope of Section 482, Cr.P.C. The matter is now settled by a plethora of precedents in authoritative decisions in Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Jagir Singh Vs. Ranbir Singh and Another, Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State and Others, Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, and L.V. Jadhav Vs. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar and Others, From the precedents in the cases (supra), it is trite law that two jurisdictions (under Sections 397 and 482, Cr.P.C.) operate in different spheres and have different parameters. Section 482, Cr.P.C. confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass order ex debito justitia in cases where grave injustice has been done or where the process of the Court is seriously abused. In Smt. Nagawwa Vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, and in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan (supra), the Apex Court laid down that an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside in exercise of powers u/s 482, Cr.P.C.:

(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary, having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of complaint by legally competent authority and the like.

8. Verily, the test laid down is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the proceedings can be quashed by invocation of Section 482, Cr.P.C. by this Court so as to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. But, in such cases, the Court will not readily accept the applicants prayer and quash proceedings, and what is to be remembered for the Court is that there will be no question of appreciating evidence and it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In other words, these powers are not appellate and there will be neither any meticulous consideration of evidence and materials nor any premature assessment of evidence by Court (as laid down in Mohd. Akbar Dar and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, and State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, duly approved by three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari (1990) 1 Crimes 106 : (1990 Cri LJ 668). Viewed thus, this Court though does not lack jurisdiction to entertain 482 petitions but, 482 powers are intended to be sparingly used under compelling circumstances.

9. Now I advert to the present controversy on the point whether the Magistrate could re-take cognizance of the offence on a complaint made to him, particularly when he had already taken it of the same offence on police report against some of the accused also named in the complaint, which was filed after the challan was filed and the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence against them upon police report.

10 At this stage, it is not in dispute that the impugned order of taking cognizance of the offence second time, one upon police report and secondly on a complaint made to the Magistrate has emanated from evidence of such witnesses who had not only kept quite (sic) were not believed by the investigating agency on a report of the offence made to it. These witnesses are Bhagwanaram (complainant and brother of the deceased), Hari Singh, Ramlal, Harlal, Chandra Ram and Birbal. Undisputedly, these witnesses are known enemies of the petitioners because of their long standing animosity which arose out of some quarrels culminating into registration of criminal cases against each others. Against first seven petitioners, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 147 and 149, IPC, upon police report and subsequently on the complaint for offences punishable under Sections 264, 342, 148 and 120B, IPC, and against rest of 11 petitioners (Nos. 8 to 18) the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 364, 342, 148, 149 and 120B, IPC, firstly on the complaint.

11. In this context, veteran lawyer Shri S.R. Bajwa on behalf of the petitioners contended that the provisions of Section 210, Cr.P.C. are attracted but, by not following the same, the Subordinate Magistrate has committed an error of law. Conversely, diligent young advocate, Shri R.S. Rathore on behalf of the complainant firmly placed reliance upon the decisions in Kesavan Natesan Vs. Madhavan Peethambharan and Others, , followed in Hari Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1986 Raj Cri C 394 and Sidhan and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Another, and in S.M. Abdur Rahim Vs. State of Bihar and Another,

12. In Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court Kesavan Natesan Vs. Madhavan Peethambharan and Others, their Lordships disapproved the view expressed in Ram Lagan Singh v. State of Bihar 1980 Cri LJ 62 (Patna) which runs as under (at page 331 of Cri LJ) :--

Where cognizance is taken of an offence on police report filed pursuant to information given to them and subsequently with regard to the same offence a protest petition of the complainant is treated as a complaint and cognizance is taken, it is obvious cognizance cannot be taken twice over on the same offence. It is no argument that the police case and the complaint case are two distinct proceedings.

However, while disagreeing with the afore-quoted view of the learned single Judge of Patna High Court in Ram Lagan Singhs case (supra), the Full Bench made an agreement with the view expressed by him in Ram Lagan Singhs case (stated in the first para of the short notes) which reads as under :--

Where cognizance taken on police report does not relate to a person against whom complaint is pending, the Magistrate after taking cognizance on the police report can proceed with the enquiry relating to that person, Section 210(3) does not prohibit the Magistrate from proceeding u/s 209 with regard to an accused against whom there is neither a police report nor cognizance on such report.

13. The Full Bench had also occasion to consider facts of the decision in Essakutty Haji v. Raman 1974 KLT 744. The offences involved therein were all offences triable by a Magistrate who took cognizance of the offence on the basis of a police charge and refused to take cognizance on the basis of a later private complaint where certain additional persons were shown as accused. According to the Full Bench decision, the facts therein were reverse of the situation contemplated u/s 210, Cr.P.C. It has taken note of the observation of the Division Bench in Essakutty Hajis case that Section 210 incorporated only a preventive measure to avoid as far as possible taking cognizance of the same offence again and to avoid separate trials for the same offence and if the preventive measure proves successful, occasion may not arise at all to resort to the curative process and the provisions in Section 210 are in perfect accord with the principles laid down in Asokans case 1972 KLT 728, that the proper course for a Magistrate taking cognizance u/s 191, Cr.P.C. of any offence, irrespective of the nature of its trial, is to take cognizance of it only once and since that was what the Magistrate did in the case the Court declined to interfere in revision.

14. In contrast, the Full Bench observed that the observations in this behalf contained in Asokans case are formulated in too broad a manner, and that where a Magistrate acts on a subsequent private complaint, it does not amount to taking cognizance twice and even if it be so, there is no bar provided by the Cr.P.C. against such action. According to the Full Bench, the facts in Essakutty Hajis case (1974 K LT 744) did not attract the provisions of Section 210, Cr.P.C. because, it deals with a case where pending a case arising on a private complaint, it is brought to the notice of the court that a police investigation is in progress, and that being so, it does not cover a case where after the police charge is filed, an aggrieved person approaches a criminal court with a private complaint with a slightly different version of the same transaction or implicating more persons than are found as accused in the police charge.

15. In later paragraph, the Full Bench distinguishing the case of Essakutty Haji concluded that the Division Bench in Essakutty Hajis case was not called upon to decide what exactly is the position in regard to such cases involving offences exclusively triable by Sessions Court and, therefore, the observations did not actually arise on the facts of the case and do not represent the correct position.

16. Having gone through the provisions contained in Section 210, Cr. P.C. and benefited by the enlightments derived from the Full Bench decision Kesavan Natesan Vs. Madhavan Peethambharan and Others, (ut supra), I am also firmly of the view that Section 210 deals with a case where pending a case arising on a private complaint it is brought to the notice of the Court that a police investigation is in progress, and it does not cover a case after the police charge is filed, an aggrieved person approaches a Criminal Court with a private complaint with a slightly different version of the same transaction or implicating more persons than are found as accused in the police charge,-- as are the circumstances of the case at hand. In the instance case also, as noticed above, the complaint with totally different version of the same transaction so also with implicating more persons than are found as accused in the police report, has been filed before the Criminal Court after the police report has been filed. In this view of the matter, the facts of the case at hand does not attract the provisions of Section 210, Cr. P.C. at all and there has been nothing wrong in the Magistrate by not following the provisions of Section 210, Cr. P.C. Therefore, the contention in this behalf of the petitioners is rejected.

17. In Kesavan Natesan Vs. Madhavan Peethambharan and Others, the Full Bench, while dealing with an argument that since the 1973 Code contemplates only "committal of the case" there could not be plurality of cases and committal proceedings; and considering the meaning of the expression "case" used in Section 209, Cr. P.C., observed that the expression only means "case presented to Court and taken on file" and nothing more, inasmuch as it is not synonymous with occurrence of crime or transaction. In this view of the matter, rightly too, the Court can commit an accused to the Sessions or a case to Sessions but cannot commit a transaction or crime or an offence to the Sessions. I lend support from the view expressed by the Full Bench and endorse under one of the provisions of Section 190, Cr. P.C. he may take on file another instituted under the other clauses of Section 190. I further find support from the decision of the Apex Court in Joginder Singhs case, 1979 Cri LJ 333 : Joginder Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another, though it dealt with the application of Section 319, Cr. P.C. and the powers of the Sessions Court. In this case, it has been held that once the in respect of the offence qua those accused who are before the Court is committed then the cognizance of the offence can be said to have been taken properly by the Sessions Court and the bar of Section 193 would be out of the way. Thus viewed, the expression case means the particular case before the Court and not the entire case relating to a particular offence.

18. Even in a case where, in the F.I.R. the persons subsequently shown as additional accused in the private complaint were also shown as accused, and in the final report of the police these persons were dropped from the array of accused and the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on the basis of such final report, there had been an argument that against such persons there could not be a fresh proceeding, the Full Bench rejected such a contention after taking the aid of the principles of law down in Dr. S.S. Khanna Vs. Chief Secretary, Patna and Another, which was based on another decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, in latter decision, the Supreme Court made it clear that notwithstanding the decision of the Court not to issue process against one of the accused, at a later stage, if evidence would be available against that person, the Court would have jurisdiction to proceed against him also. Much emphasis has been made on the phraseology, "if the evidence is available against that person". In this view of the matter, if the evidence is available against the accused at a subsequent stage, there would be no bar to proceed against the accused relating to a particular offence.

19. In the case at hand, we are having the facts and circumstances being very much categoric and precise, on better footing than those which were in the cases cited above. Herein, the complaint case instituted at a subsequent stage after the police charge has been filed, relates to different set off offences qua different accused. As noticed earlier, the F.I.R. deals with offences punishable under Sections 302, 147 and 149, I.P.C., qua petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 only as is evident from the police reopen file, whereas complaint case instituted at a later stage after the police report was filed relates to offences punishable under Sections 364, 342, 148 and 120B, IPC, qua these petitioners Nos. 1 to 7. Thus, it cannot be said to be a case where the Criminal Court took cognizance of the same offence qua petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 twice, one on police report and another on complaint case. For other accused (petitioners Nos. 8 to 18), as laid down in plethora of decisions (some of them considered above), in my considered view, there was no legal bar to proceed against them, if the evidence was available against them for the offences alleged qua them, and in other case, there would be an abuse of process, and in that situation, this Court has no inhibition to interfere with the issue of process.

20. This brings me to the " main and clinching issue on which the fate of this misc. petition is hanged, whether there were sufficient grounds or material to issue process against the petitioners or whether the complaint and the evidence adduced u/s 202, Cr. P.C. do constitute or establish the ingredients of the offences stated against the petitioners, in complaint case. But, before doing so, I would deal with a short legal question. That is, whether it was open to the subordinate Magistrate, i.e. committal Court to launch on a process of satisfying that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits, if the case is triable by the Court of Sessions

21. In this behalf, suffice it to lend support from the decision in Chettian Veetil Ammad and Another Vs. Taluk Land Board and Others, At the stage of Sections 203 and 204, Cr. P.C. in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. there is prima facie evidence in support of the allegations made against the accused; and whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial Magistrate/Judge. Even, the Magistrate is debarred from scrutinising the evidence because the standard to be adopted by him in doing so is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. The stage of framing charges in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions arises within the competence of the Court of Sessions and not the Magistrate before whom the complaint or police report is filed. That apart, as held in State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, even at the stage of framing charges the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complaint produces or proposes to adduce at the trial; is not to be meticulously judged. Moreover, Section 209, Cr. P.C. itself dispenses with the inquiry preliminary to commitment in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Sessions, irrespective of whether such a case is instituted on a criminal complaint or a police report. In my considered view, in such cases the preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate is restricted to find out whether or not the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. The Magistrate before whom any complaint or police report is filed, lacks inherent jurisdiction to launch on a process of satisfying himself that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits. Thus, if the Magistrate is allowed to go into the merits even for a prima facie satisfaction, it would be an act to frustrate the Parliaments purpose in remoulding Section 207A (old Code) into its present non-discretionary shape. (Thus, by change in the scheme under the new Code, the scope of preliminary inquiry by the Magistrate before whom the police report or complaint is filed, has been made subject to narrow inspection through which he (Committing Magistrate) has only to look at the case merely to ascertain whether the case, as disclosed by the police report or the complaint appears to him to show an offence triable solely by the Court of Sessions. I lend the view from the decision in Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, In this view of the matter, it is not open to the subordinate Magistrate before whom the complaint or police report is filed to launch on a process of satisfying that a prima facie case has been made out on the merits, if the case is triable by the Court of Sessions.

22. In the instant case, having perused the impugned order of the subordinate Magistrate, I find that the subordinate Magistrate acted as if he were trial Magistrate and for his prima facie satisfaction he has gone into merits and held that the offences alleged against the petitioners are prima facie proved. Such finding and satisfaction process launched on by the subordinate Magistrate clearly smacks of abuse of process resulting in miscarriage of justice because, he lacked inherent jurisdiction while passing the impugned order to hold that the offences alleged against the petitioners are prima facie proved or that prima facie case for the offences alleged against them is made out. The subordinate Magistrate had only to see whether assuming the facts to be correct as stated in the police report or the complaint and the evidence under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C., if the offences alleged against the accused are plainly ones which are triable by Court of Sessions only and he had simply to commit for trial before the Court of Sessions as has been held in Sanjay Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, On this score also, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.

23. Now I must pass on to fateful question, whether there is evidence or whether the facts disclosed in the complaint and the evidence recorded u/s 202, Cr. P.C. constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners for which process has been issued against them As observed above, if the aforesaid question is answered in negative, then in view of the guiding principles expounded from a plethora of decisions of the Apex Court, (supra), there will be no inhibition to interfere with the issue of process order and quash criminal proceedings instituted on the basis of complaint and the evidence recorded thereupon u/s 202, Cr. P.C. by exercise of the powers u/s 482, Cr. P.C.

24. To consider the last question, I have gone through the contents of the complaint and the evidence recorded thereon u/s 202, Cr. P.C. Here I reiterate that in the instant case, i.e. complaint case in question, issue of process under impugned order has been issued against the petitioners for the offences stated herein below :

Here, first I would like to brief essential ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioners which must be disclosed in complaint and its allied evidence recorded thereon u/s 202, Cr. P.C.

25. In order to fasten vicarious responsibility oh any member of an unlawful assembly in a rioting the allegations in the complaint and its evidence must disclose that the act constituting an offence was done in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or the done is such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object of that assembly and during the course of that assembly all of them armed with weapons had assaulted the deceased. However, there must be material to show that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in prosecution of the common object of the members of the unlawful assembly. (See 1989 Cri LJ 1782 : Rambilas Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar,

26. A bare reading of Section 120A which defines criminal conspiracy, along with its proviso, makes it manifestly clear that the essence of offence of criminal conspiracy, there must be material to show that there had been an agreement to commit an offence. Similarly Section 340 which defines wrongful confinement, postulates that whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongfully to confine" that person.

27. A bare reading of Section 364, I.P.C. makes it clear that in order to punish a person under this section, there must be material to show that the deceased was kidnapped or abducted with intention to commit his murder or to dispose him of as to be put in danger of being murdered. According to Section 359, I.P.C. which defines kidnapping, it is of two kinds; kidnapping from India and kidnapping from lawful guardianship. As per Section 362, IPC which defines abduction, in : order to constitute an offence of abduction, there must be material to show that the person had been compelled by force or any deceitful means and induced to go from any place.

28. Now I pass on to have a look at the complaint and the evidence recorded thereon. The story propounded in the complaint and the evidence is that Sanwarmal (deceased) was in the company of the accused persons (Jagdish, Subh Karan, Narsa and Bhanwara) and they were drinking wine -- during the period, the complainant along with his persons went to the deceased and persuaded him to return back with them to his house. In the evidence it has been given out that the deceased while in the company of the accused persons taking wine, had been talking about a compromise. Thereafter, Jagdish went to the house of Nunaram and after 10-15 minutes, came back along with accused petitioners (Nunaram, Rameshwar, Bhagirath, Birju Mangaram, Ram Kunawar, Birbal, Ganesharam, Harisingh, Birju of Harisingh, Girdhari, Hanuman and Phularam) duly armed with weapons. Pertinently to point out here that there is no assertion in the complaint about specifying the weapons or its kinds. It is only in the evidence that some of them were armed with lathies and iron rods but that too does not disclose as to which of the persons was armed with which of the alleged weapon. There is a vague allegations that they were armed with lathies and iron rods.

29. Then there is allegation that the deceased was taken to Nunarams house and during the course of taking him, the deceased was beaten. There is only vague allegation that the deceased was beaten during taking him to Nunarams house but it has not been alleged either in the complaint or the evidence recorded thereon as to which of the accused had been beating the deceased with which of the kind of weapons allegedly armed with. The allegation is also that in the house of Nunaram the deceased was tied with a rope to a pole by all the accused. Even in the complaint and the evidence, no overt act either of tying or beating with any kind of weapon during taking him to Nunarams house, specifying the infliction of blows at a particular body part of the deceased, has been assigned. There is vague allegation that all the accused persons inflicted blows with weapons alleged to have been in their hand. Even I find no material in the complaint or the evidence thereon to show that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in prosecution of the common object of the alleged unlawful assembly. The material on the file of the complaint case does not disclose any common object or formation of unlawful assembly or any culpable intention with an agreement either to induce the deceased to go to Nunarams house after using force or deceitful means where the deceased had to be tied to a pole and then to kill him after beating him.

30. It is significant to note that the police case has been registered on the information of the police officer who had gone to the scene of occurrence upon F.I.R. No. 94/88 lodged in by Bhagirathmal (one of the petitioners). None of the persons from the complaint in the instant complaint case had taken any steps immediately after the transaction of the crime alleged in the complaint; by informing the police. They kept themselves quiet. A perusal of the F.I.R. of the same transaction of the crime out of which the present complaint has been filed, with the police case, shows that names of petitioners Nos. 8 to 18 are not mentioned therein. On the private complaint in the case at hand that had been given nearly after two months of the F.I.R. lodged in with the police, the petitioners Nos. 8 to 18 have been shown as having participated in the incident and petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 as having further committed offences other than police case offences. Some of the present petitioners are figured as prosecution witnesses in F.I.R. No. 94/88 lodged in by Bhagirath Mal (petitioner) of the same transaction of the crime in question, that has been filed against the witnesses who have been examined u/s 202, Cr. P.C. in the complaint case at hand. In F.I.R. No. 94/88 the deceased and the witnesses examined u/s 202, Cr. P.C. in the complaint case at hand, have been shown as intruders in doing incriminating act of the alleged offences therein.

31. I am also conscious of the law that the intrinsic value of the statements u/s 202, Cr. P.C. is very little. But it cannot be overlooked that mere ipse dixit of the petitioners is neither sufficient reason for ground within this provision of Section 204, Cr. P.C. In my opinion, the intrinsic value of the complaint and the evidence recorded thereon makes no prima facie acceptable and therefore it is a circumstance not connecting the petitioners with the imputation. That apart, since vague allegations against the petitioners even if accepted, it would be an abuse of process of the Court to face trial which is known to be long drawn and bitterly contested.

32. The complaint and the evidence do not disclose any alleged offence at all. Consideration of intrinsic value of the evidence, therefore, makes it difficult for this Court to discover sufficient ground in this complaint case as required u/s 204, Cr. P.C. In this view of the matter, the continuation of any further proceedings in complaint case No. 70/88 pending before Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur, would be nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and deserves to be quashed.

33. For the reasons (ut supra), this application u/s 482, Cr. P.C. succeeds and is allowed. The proceedings before Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur in criminal complaint case No. 70/88 (Bagwanaram v. Nunaram and Ors.) are hereby quashed, so far as they relate to the petitioners herein are concerned for the offences under which process was issued by the subordinate Magistrate under the impugned order which is also quashed. However, it is made clear that the proceedings against the petitioners Nos. 1 to 7 in police case under F.I.R. No. 95/88 out of which cr. original case No. 222/8 (State v. Nunaram etc.) is pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur Sekhawati, will continue in accordance with law and whatever the observations have been made in this order at hand by me are only prima facie in nature on the merits of the complaint case for the purpose of deciding this criminal misc. petition only, and will, in no way affect the merits of the police case at any subsequent stage of the proceedings therein.