John Beaumont, J.

 1. As long ago as 1884 in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 237, the Privy Council made the following observation on Section 622 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, which was replaced by Section 115 of the Code of 1908: "The question then is, did the judges of the lower Courts "in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally "or with material irregularity. It appears that they had "perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before "them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided rightly "or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even "if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." In Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 261, 267 the Board observed: "It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction "alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal "assumption of it. The section is not directed against "conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction "is not involved." In the present case the learned judges of the High Court did not act on this principle. They set aside the judgment of the District Judge because they considered that he had made a serious mistake in the construction which he had placed on the will of the testator, and they seem to have thought that a serious error of law could be corrected in revision. There have been, no doubt, decisions in some High Courts in India which lend support to the view on which the judges acted. The cases are collected in the fourth edition of Chitaley and Rao on the Code of Civil Procedure, vol. I, p. 1105. In Mohunt Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi (1896) 1 C.W.N. 617, 626, the High Court of Calcutta expressed the opinion that Sub-clause (c) of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was "intended to authorize the High Courts to interfere and "correct gross and palpable errors of subordinate courts, so as "to prevent grave injustice in non-appealable cases." This passage was dissented from by the Calcutta High Court in Enat Mondul v. Baloram Dey (1899) 1 C.W.N. 581, but was cited with approval by Lort-Williams, J. in Gulabchand Bangur v. Kabiruddin Ahmed (1930) I.L.R. 58 C. III. Their Lordships can see no justification for any such view; it would, indeed, be difficult to formulate any standard by which the degree of error of subordinate courts could be measured. Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and, where the legislature has provided no right of appeal, (he manifest intention is that the order of the trial court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the subordinate court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusion; of the subordinate court on questions of fact or law. No such, matters arose in this case, and the order of the High Court on the petition was without justification.

 3. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that, this appeal be allowed, that the order made by the High Court at Madras on November 6, 1944, on the original petition No. 15 of 1939 be set aside and that the order on such petition made by the learned District Judge at Ramnad, dated August 7, 1943, so far as it declared the temple to be a private one, be restored. Their Lordships, however, must not be understood as expressing any opinion on the question whether the temple is a private one or a public one, which question is not before them. The respondent must pay the costs of the revision application to the High Court made in O.P. No. 15 of 1939 and of this appeal.