SANDEEP N. BHATT, J.

1. At the request of learned advocates for the parties, this petition is disposed of finally. Rule. Learned advocate Mr.Salil Thakore waives service notice for respondents.

2. This petition is filed challenging the order dated 3.12.2021 passed below Exh.110 by the learned 5th Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) at Mirzapur, Ahmedabad in Special Civil Suit No.25 of 1984.

3. The brief facts leading to filing of this petition are such that the agreement to sale was entered with grandfather Pujabhai Ishwarbhai Patel by Sushil Corporation through Nandlal Ramanlal Thakkar on 21.3.1980 and under the agreement to sale, all legal permissions including from new to old tenure, ULC permission for due execution of sale deed had to be obtained by the plaintiff-Nandlal R Thakkar (now deceased in 2019). The total sale consideration was fixed at Rs.2,20,000/- and out of that only Rs.21,000/- was paid as earnest amount and the duration of agreement to sale was fixed 12 months and time was essence of the contract. However, the deceased plaintiff did not obtain any permission. The plaintiff filed Special Civil Suit No.25 of 1984 for specific performance of an agreement to sale dated 21.3.1980, wherein conditional decree was passed on 28.6.1983 specifically directing the plaintiff to obtain all legal permissions and if the owner do not cooperate either in taking money or in getting permission or do not execute sale deed, plaintiff was permitted to get all legal permissions through court commissioner and was directed to get the sale deed executed. The said decree was a conditional decree for 30 days, which expired on 17.7.1993.

3.1. It is further case of the petitioner that after the expiry of the period, the plaintiff made an application below Exh.110 in the said civil suit or extension of time for six weeks in above conditional decree, which six weeks also expired way back in 1993. It is further submitted that the said Exh.110 application was pending for almost ten years and suddenly on 26.8.2002, a one line ex-parte order of extension of six weeks came to be passed on 5.8.1993. It is submitted that when the order was passed on 26.8.2002, the original exclusive owner on record was already expired on 5.4.2000 and the legal heirs were not brought on the record.

3.2. It is further case that after the said extension order was passed, immediately Execution Application No.120 of 2022 was filed by the plaintiff, wherein the order was passed for appointment of Court Commissioner in 2003. That against the said one line order of extension and against the appointment of Court Commissioner, two Special Civil Applications were filed before this Court, which were admitted and interim reliefs were granted till final hearing and thereafter, both the petitions were dismissed. It is submitted that the said orders of Special Civil Applications were challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein the orders passed by this Court as well as the civil Court were stayed and both the SLPs were converted into Civil Appeals. Thereafter, vide order dated 24.8.2011, the order of extension dated 26.8.2002 below Exh.110 application was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the civil Court, Ahmedabad to decide the application Exh.110 in accordance with law and on its own merits keeping all contentions of the parties open. It was also mentioned in the order that all the parties shall remain present before the civil Court, Ahmedabad on 14.9.2011 without a formal notice from the civil Court.

3.3. It is the case that the petitioner herein appeared through advocate, gave applications, copies placed on record, however, the papers of the main suit were not traceable. It is submitted that instead of requesting to hear the application Exh.110, the plaintiff approached the revenue authority and for the first time, in March, 2016 the request was made to comply with the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, at the instance of the defendant-petitioner, the application Exh.110 was taken up for hearing, again the matter was sought to be prolonged, applications for legal heirs were filed by the respective parties etc. Thereafter, on 3.12.2021 the impugned order came to be passed and even the request for suspension was refused. Hence, this petition.

4. Heard learned advocate Mr.Shital Patel for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Salil Thakore for the respondents.

5. Learned advocate Mr.Patel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order is based on a complete misreading of the decree; that the decree (as well as clear terms of the agreement to sale) directs the petitioner to simply cooperate with the plaintiff in getting the requisite legal permissions and does not impose any obligation upon the defendant to procure permissions; the only obligation imposed was that the when the plaintiff calls the defendant to give signature for permission for due execution of sale deed, the defendant to cooperate, however, no evidence is produced that the defendants were called upon for signature or permission; that the plaintiff has failed to fulfill his reciprocal promise of paying the balance sale consideration and as per Sections 51 and 54 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 the defendant is not obliged to fulfill his part of the decree; that the impugned order is based on the grounds not stated in the extension application at Exh.110; that non-filing of reply to extension application cannot be relevant criteria for extension in law; plaintiff was to show in his own bonafide; plaintiff was to seek extension; plaintiff was required to deposit in time; that the case on hand is not an ordinary case of extension; the case on hand is a case relating to specific performance of prime urban land of Ahmedabad, where decree is conditional and operative for mere 30 days considering equitable principal; the plaintiff ought to have even secured interim/ad interim order, which was not admittedly done in this case.

5.1. He further submitted that the plaintiff filed extension application at Exh.110 in the year 1993 (which itself was filed after the expiry of time limit to deposit the money on 17.7.1993) and till 2002, he did not pursue it and allowed it to languish, while the order at Exh.110 was passed on 26.8.2002, the rojkam shows that even the process fees was not paid till 27.6.2002. He further submitted that there is no compelling explanation whatsoever given by plaintiff in order to justify the delay; allowing extension at this stage is contrary to law and equity; non compliance of decree for indefinite period; more so, when mandate of decree self operative; besides case of urban land; prices sky rocketed during the interregnum pending suit and after decree.

5.2. On the aspect of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, the learned advocate for the petitioner has cited the following judgments:

(1) V.S.Palanichamy V/s C Alagappan reported in 1999(4) SCC 702, para nos.13 and 17.

2) P.Shyamalal V/s Gundur Mastthan reported in 2023 SCC Online 184, para nos. 20, 21, 24 and 26.

(3) C.Haridasan V/s Anappath Parakkattu Vasideva Kurup & Others reported in 2023 SCC Online 36 para nos. 39, 51, 56, 57, 59 and 62.

(4) U.N.Krishna Murthy V/s A.M.Krishnamurthy, reported in 2022 Live Law (SC) 588, para nos.38, 39 and 43.

(5) Ravi Setia V/s Madanlal, reported in 2019(9) SCC 380, para nos. 14 to 16.

(6) P.R.Yelumalai V/s N.M.Ravi reported in 2015(9) SCC 52 para nos.13,14 and 16.

5.3. Relying on the above citations, learned advocate Mr.Patel submitted that merely because the judgment debtor has not sought rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does not automatically result in extension of time and the decree of special performance is a preliminary decree and court retain control of the suit and even after preliminary decree of special performance (agreement to sale), the contract between parties is not extinguished.

5.4. He further submitted, relying on the decision in the case of Bhupendrakumar V/s Angrej Singh reported in 2009(8) SCC 766, more particularly, paragraphs 10, 11, 15, 17, 25 and 26, that plaintiff has to perform first his obligation to pay or deposit and nonfiling of Section 28 is no excuse for extension.

5.5. He further submitted, relying on the decision in the case of G.Kesavan V/s B.C.Raman reported in 2013(4) LW 626, paragraphs 11 to 20, whereby the Court also considered Section 148 of CPC and held that non filing of application under Section 28 at the relevant point of time also no ground to allow the extension application, though after remand Section 28 pressed into service in reply.

5.6. Learned advocate for the petitioner also relied on the judgment in the case of Prem Jeevan v. K. S. Venkata Raman reported in 2017(11) SCC 57, whereby the Court has held that non filing of reply, no ground for decree for specific performance. The plaintiff requires to be proved his case independently.

5.7. He has relied on the case of Balraj Taneja V/s Sunil Madan reported in 1999(8) SCC 396, paragraphs 29, 30 and 45 and submitted that any defendant can raise plea of non-compliance, readiness and willingness of mandatory requirement under Section 16(C) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

5.8. He has relied on the judgment in the case of Ram Awadh (dead) By Ltd.and others V/s Acchaibar Dubey and Others, reported in 2000(2) GLH (SC) 600, more particularly, paragraphs 6 to 8 and has submitted that in view of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, the balance amount is not paid though the suit is filed in 1981 and the Court has still not granted decree for specific purpose.

5.9. Learned advocate for the petitioner has relied on the judgment in the case of Venkitalakshmi V/s K.Raju, reported in 2019(15) SCC 49, more particularly, paragraph no.9, whereby the Court has held that the Court’s discretion not to decree specific performance, escalation in price, judicial notice taken, cannot be given unfair advantage to plaintiff.

5.10. Learned advocate has lastly relied on the judgment in the case of Najappan V/s Ramasamy and anr. Reported in 2015(14) SCC 341, more particularly, paragraphs 10 to 13 and 15 and 16, which pertains to inequitable grant any relief when the price in urban land escalates quickly and in view of 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, the Court should not grant such extension.

5.11. He, therefore, submitted that in view of the above mentioned position, this Court should interfere by exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and allow this petition.

6. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.Thakore for the respondents submitted that the impugned order is a well reasoned order; that under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, the civil Court has the power to grant extension; moreover, in the present case, the extension application was filed within a very short time of the decree being passed and there is no gross delay; that no application is filed by any defendant or by the petitioner seeking rescission of the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and when there is no rescission of the contract, they have no locus to file this petition or challenge extension; no reply was filed by the petitioner or any of the defendants to the Exh.110 application; that by their own inequitable conduct, the defendants are trying to frustrate a decree passed in 1993 and which is confirmed uptil the Hon’ble Supreme Court and such conduct disentitles them to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227; that the defendants have failed to perform their obligations under the agreement and the decree and they have no locus to complain about the contesting respondents’ actions, much less, in an equitable jurisdiction; that the petitioner has been proceeding with the hearing of the matter without making any attempt to serve persons who were parties before the trial Court and even seeks to delete them, this petition is required to be dismissed on principles of non-joinder of necessary parties.

6.1. In support of his submissions, learned advocate Mr.Thakore relied on the following citations:

(1) Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. (In voluntary Liquidation) v. Haridas Mundhra and others reported in AIR 1972 SC 1826 [LQ/SC/1972/147] paragraphs 22 and 24.

(2) Sardar Mohan Singh Through Power of Attorney Holder, Manjit Singh v. Mangilal Alias Mangtya reported in 1997(9) SCC 217 paragraph 14,

(3) Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara reported in 1994(2) SCC 642 and

(4) Asis Nasir Khan V/s State of Maharashtra, reported in 2022 SCC Online Bom. 473.

And submitted that in view of these judgments, the Court has power to extend the time and also submitted that in absence of any application for rescission by the petitioner or any defendant, the Court can grant extension. He has further submitted that there is a difference between condonation of delay and extension of time, he has also submitted that the provisions of any procedure of CPC is handmade for justice and technicalities should not stand in the way.

6.2. On the point of Section 148 of the CPC, the power of Court to extend time, he relied on the judgment in the case of Nashik Municipal Corporation v. M/s. R. M. Bhandari reported in AIR 2016 SC 1090 [LQ/SC/2016/338 ;] ">AIR 2016 SC 1090 [LQ/SC/2016/338 ;] [LQ/SC/2016/338 ;] , paragraphs 13 and 15 and submitted that the time limit for 30 days under Section 148 is not mandatory one.

6.3. Relying on the judgments in the cases reported in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in 1995(6) SCC 576 paragraphs 9 and in the case of Lal Ram Narain (dead) through L.R.S. V/s 10 th Additional District Judge, Muradabad and others, reported in 2012 SCC Online All 1516, paragraph 11, 12 and 16 and submitted that the High Court has limited scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

6.4. Lastly, relying on the judgment in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in 1998(7) SCC page 123, more particularly paragraph 9, submitted that when the civil Court decides to grant extension or condone delay, normally superior Court would not interfere.

6.5. In response to the judgments relied on by learned advocate for the petitioner in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India reported in 2017(11) SCC 757, he submitted that the said judgment is not applicable in the present case as the plaintiff has already filed application for extension.

6.6. Also responding to judgment cited by learned advocate for the petitioner P. R. Yelumalai v. N. M. Ravi reported in 2015(9) SCC 52, he submitted that the judgments cited by the petitioners is not applicable to the present case as in the present case, decree dated 18.6.1993 does not provide that the consequent of not depositing would result in dismissal of suit and it is not a self-operative decree which results in dismissal and the plaintiff has immediately complied with the order upon extension being granted.

7. Heard learned advocates for the parties and also perused the impugned order passed by the learned trial court below Exh.110, by which the extension order was passed by the learned trial Court in Special Civil Suit No.25 of 1984.

Order 20 Rule 12A of CPC reads as under:

“12A. Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property.—

Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property order that the purchase-money or other sum be paid by the purchaser or lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made.”

Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

16. Personal bars to relief.—Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person—

[(a) who has obtained substituted performance of contract under section 20; or].

(b) who has become incapable of performing, or violates any essential term of, the contract that on his part remains to be performed, or acts in fraud of the contract, or wilfully acts at variance with, or in subversion of, the relation intended to be established by the contract; or

(c) [who fails to prove] that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.

Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (c),—

(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in court any money except when so directed by the court;

(ii) the plaintiff 4 [must prove] performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”

Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed.—

(1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require.

(2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court— (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and, if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract

(3) If the purchase or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:— (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; 13 (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease.

(4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be.

(5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court.”

8. The petitioner has contended mainly two contentions, one that because the judgment debtor has not sought rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act does not automatically result in extension of time and second contention that decree of specific performance is preliminary decree, the Court retained control of the suit, preliminary decree of specific performance (agreement to sale) contract between the parties is not extinguished. The petitioner has contended that the entry of Will was entered in the year 1999 and validity of Will nor entry of Will (is in public record) ever challenged by any party.

9. It transpires from the record that though the judgment and decree is passed long ago dated 18.6.1993, whereby as per the agreement to sale which is executed in 1980, the balance consideration is required to be paid within 12 months or at least within 30 days from the conditional decree dated 28.6.1983. It is contended by the petitioner that the price of the land has substantially increased and therefore such extension granted by the trial Court should be declared as improper and the learned trial Court has no authority to grant such extension. While going through the record, it transpires that the such contention sounds very attractive but considering the provisions of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, the civil Court has power to grant extension. It is also required to note that the defendants had agitated that respondent never shown readiness and willingness to deposit balance amount and get appointment of Court Commissioner to execute the sale deed. However, conduct of the petitioner shows that the petitioner has also dragged the litigation by adopting various means, which also requires to be considered for any equitable consideration.

10. Therefore, when the civil Court has exercised its discretion to grant extension of time after giving valid reasons for doing so and this Court is also satisfied that there is no illegality or impropriety committed by the learned civil Court by using its discretion, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court would not normally interfere with the said discretionary order of granting of extension.

11. It transpires that such application for extension is filed within reasonable period from the decree passed by the trial Court. The contention raised by the respondent regarding the aspect that no application has ever been filed by any defendant or by the petitioner seeking rescission of contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and when the present petitioner or any of defendant have never sought rescission of the contract, then they have no valid authority to question such extension which also sounds good and attractive, but considering the fact that though the present petition is filed by challenging such extension and the petitioner being a party to the proceedings, can certainly agitate his grievance by way of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is also relevant to note that no reply was filed by the petitioner or any defendants to the Exh.110 application. To that extent also, it can be said that the petitioners have merely agitated the grievance without any proper action and not filed any application or reply to such application. It is also relevant to note that when it transpires from the record that after passing of decree in the year 1993, the decree was not implemented either by discharging their obligation by the present petitioner or any other defendant, then it also rightly pointed out by learned advocate for the respondent that one brother i.e. defendant no.1/2 had not filed any reply for years and the other two brothers i.e. defendant nos.1/3 and 1/4 had evaded service despite all residing together and therefore, considering such proceeding under the Specific Relief Act, the main consideration is based on equitable consideration and considering the conduct of the defendants who had tried to frustrate the decree passed in 1993, cannot get any relief in the present proceedings.

12. Even in some of the proceedings pending before the Court, it also appears that the petitioner had not made any attempt to serve respondent no.3.1.2 as well as respondent no.3.2 and respondent no.3.3 in the petition as well as some of the opponents in the civil application. Considering this aspect, and by considering the judgments cited at the bar by the learned advocates for the parties, the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

13. In view of all the contentions factual and/or legal recorded in the earlier portion of the judgment, I am of the opinion that in absence of any application made for rescission of the contract as required under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, in an application filed by the present respondent who is the original plaintiff, the learned trial Court has used its discretion by granting extension as decree is not implemented as the amount is not deposited within the stipulated time period and therefore the Court has rightly exercised discretion by granting extension. Accordingly, when the present respondent has also complied with the direction given by the court while granting extension, I am of the opinion that the trial court has used discretion in appropriate manner.

14. Therefore, in view of the limited jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court and more particularly in view of Garment Garment Craft V/s Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181, [LQ/SC/2022/43 ;] ">(2022) 4 SCC 181, [LQ/SC/2022/43 ;] [LQ/SC/2022/43 ;] whereby the Apex Court has said that supervisory jurisdiction of High Court when to be exercised, more particularly, paragraph 15 to 17 which read as under:

“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.

16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. has observed:-

"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to."

17. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If it was felt that the application for setting aside the exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an application for condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.”

And in the case of M/s Puri Investments V/s M/s Young Friends and Co & Ors. Reported in 2022 Law Suit (SC) 306, more particularly, in paragraphs 10 and 11 it is held as under:

“[10] In the case before us, occupation of a portion of the subject-premises by the three doctors stands admitted. What has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that once the Tribunal had arrived at a finding on fact based on the principles of law, which have been enunciated by this Court, and reflected in the aforesaid passages quoted from the three authorities, the interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was unwarranted. To persuade us to sustain the High Court's order, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has emphasized that full control over the premises was never ceded to the medical practitioners and the entry and exit to the premises in question remained under exclusive control of the respondent(s)-tenant. This is the main defence of the tenant. We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel and also gone through the decisions of the factfinding fora and also that of the High Court. At this stage, we cannot revisit the factual aspects of the dispute. Nor can we re-appreciate evidence to assess the quality thereof, which has been considered by the two fact-finding fora. The view of the forum of first instance was reversed by the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court was conscious of the restrictive nature of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the judgment under appeal, it has been recorded that it could not subject the decision of the appellate forum in a manner which would project as if it was sitting in appeal. It proceeded, on such observation being made, to opine that it was the duty of the supervisory Court to interdict if it was found that findings of the appellate forum were perverse. Three situations were spelt out in the judgment under appeal as to when a finding on facts or questions of law would be perverse. These are:-

(i) Erroneous on account of non-consideration of material evidence, or

(ii) Being conclusions which are contrary to the evidence, or

(iii) Based on inferences that are impermissible in law.

[11] We are in agreement with the High Court's enunciation of the principles of law on scope of interference by the supervisory Court on decisions of the fact-finding forum. But having gone through the decisions of the two stages of factfinding by the statutory fora, we are of the view that there was overstepping of this boundary by the supervisory Court. In its exercise of scrutinizing the evidence to find out if any of the three aforesaid conditions were breached, there was re-appreciation of evidence itself by the supervisory Court.”,

When the trial Court has used discretion which is vested with it and there is no infirmity, illegality or impropriety or perversity found in the order passed by the learned trial Court while granting order of extension which is impugned in the petition, this petition is required to be dismissed.

15. Hence, this petition is dismissed. No order as to cost. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated.

16. In view of the dismissal of the main petition, no orders are required to be passed in the civil application. Hence, the same also stands disposed of.