1. The judgment of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur (‘Tribunal’ for short) in Claim Application No.MA/NGP/0013/2018 dated 26.06.2018 rejecting the application for condonation of delay of 1380 days in fling the claim application for grant of compensation on account of death of Jaikumar s/o Devrao Wasnik ('Jaikumar' for short) is under challenge in this appeal.

2. The claim application was fled before the Tribunal by Nishant Devrao Wasnik, younger brother of Jaikumar. On 03.05.2013, Jaikumar was returning from Tumsar to his village Salekasa after distributing the invitation cards of his sister’s wedding which was fied on 15.05.2013. Jaikumar purchased a journey ticket bearing No.42214014 worth Rs.20/-, which was valid from Tumsar to Salekasa railway station.

3. Jaikumar was traveling in the general compartment of the train. The train was overcrowded and therefore, Jaikumar was standing near the door of the train. Due to sudden jerk and rush in the train, Jaikumar was pushed by the other passengers which resulted in the untoward incident. Jaikumar fell down from the running train at K.M.No.963/03 near Salekasa railway station, Dist.Gondia. Jaikumar came under the wheels of the running train and died on the spot.

4. The application was fled for condonation of delay of 1380 days in fling the claim application u/s.16 of The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 for compensation. The Tribunal, in the frst place, found that the claim application is fled by the younger brother of the Jaikumar. In Para 3 of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal records that, when the question was put to the counsel for the appellant, it was stated that the parents and paternal grand-parents of the deceased are not alive and there is no widow, sister, unmarried sister and minor brother of 'Jaikumar'. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the applicant is not a dependent within the meaning of Clause (b) of Section 123 of the Railways Act, 1989 ('Railways Act' for short). The Tribunal then proceeded to eiamine the question of delay. The Tribunal observed that the eipression “sufcient cause” cannot be erased from Section 17 of The Railway Claim Tribunals Act by adopting eicessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 17 of the Railway Claim Tribunals Act. It further held that there must be 'sufcient cause' shown for the purpose of delay condonation. It found that no such cause has been stated in the application.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, in the frst instance the Tribunal should have considered the application for condonation of delay. According to him, only if the delay is condoned, the question of considering objections as to the maintainability of the claim application can be considered. In his submission, even before condoning the delay in fling the claim application, the Tribunal has committed an error in deciding the objection raised by the respondent ('railway', for short) that the claimant is not a dependent, which could be gone into only after the delay is condoned. It is then submitted that sufcient cause is shown for condoning the delay in the application which cause is not at all considered by the Tribunal. Learned counsel submitted that as the application is for claiming compensation under Chapter XIII of the Railways Act, the question of delay is to be construed liberally having regard to the benevolent object of the legislation. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the following decision in support of his submissions.

1. Brahampal Alias Summay & Anr. V/s. National Insurance Company, reported in (2021)-6-SCC-512.

2. Jyoti Manohar Shetye V/s. Ashok Jagannath Power & Ors., reported in 2019(6)Mh.L.J.-533.

3. Shilabai Ramchandani V/s. The Union of India, General Manager, Central Railway, CSMT, Mumbai iun First Appeal No.119 of 2022 dated 22.04.2022 (Nagpur Bench).

6. In support of his contention that even before the delay can be condoned, it is not open for the Courts to decide the application on merits, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Nagpur Bench of this Court in Ambuja Cement Ltd. V/s. The Union of India in First Appeal No.1073/2011 dated 06.08.2012.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the railway contended that as per the own showing of the appellant, the appellant is not a dependent and therefore a claim application cannot be maintained before the Tribunal. She invited my attention to the fndings of the Tribunal and submitted that the appellant utterly failed to disclose any cause, much less sufcient cause for condoning the delay in fling the claim application. In her submission, the claim is grossly belated.

8. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.

9. The delay in fling the claim application before the Tribunal is of 1380 days. Such claim application for compensation is made in respect of the occurrence of an untoward incident in the course of working a railway. Chapter XIII of the Railways Act pertains to liability of railway administration for death and injury to the passengers due to accidents. Section 124-A makes a provision for payment of compensation to the victim or the dependents on account of untoward incidents occurring in the course of working a railway. Section 124-A of The Railways Act, 1989 reads as under:-

124-A. Compensation on account of untoward incidents – When in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such eitent as may be prescribed and to that eitent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident:

Provided that no compensation shall be payable under this section by the railway administration if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to--

(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;

(b) self-inficted injury;

(c) his own criminal act;

(d) any act committed by him in a state of intoiication or insanity;

(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes necessary due to injury caused by the said untoward incident.

Eiplanation.—For the purposes of this section, “passenger” includes—

(i) a railway servant on duty; and

(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for travelling, by a train carrying passengers, on any date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a victim of an untoward incident.”

10. As regards the concept of self-inficted injury within the meaning of the proviso (b) to Section 124-A, there were conficting opinions of various High Courts which came to be ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in the case of Rina Devi (supra). Para 25 eiplained the concept of self-infected injury. The same reads thus:-

"25. We are unable to uphold the above view as the concept of “self-inficted injury” would require intention to infict such injury and not mere negligence of any particular degree. Doing so would amount to invoking the principle of contributory negligence which cannot be done in the case of liability based on “no fault theory”. We may in this connection refer to the judgment of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar laying down that plea of negligence of the victim cannot be allowed in claim based on “no fault theory” under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Accordingly, we hold that death or injury in the course of boarding or de-boarding a train will be an “untoward incident” entitling a victim to the compensation and will not fall under the proviso to Section 124-A merely on the plea of negligence of the victim as a contributing factor.”

11. In the present case, I am primarily concerned with the challenge to the Tribunal’s order refusing to condone the delay in fling the claim application. Reference to Section 124-A is made by me to highlight the purpose of inserting Section 124-A in the Railways Act with effect from 01.08.1994, i.e. to provide compensation to victims who suffered injury or death as a result of an untoward incident. That it is a benefcial piece of legislation will have to be kept in mind while considering the application made for condoning the delay.

12. The jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal is prescribed by Chapter III of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 provides that the Claims Tribunal shall also eiercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provision of Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were eiercisable immediately before that date by any Civil Court in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration u/s.124-A of the said Act or the rules made therein. The procedure for making an application to the Claims Tribunal is prescribed under Chapter IV of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 envisages that a person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal.

13. At this stage, it is pertinent to refer to Section 125 of The Railways Act, 1989 which prescribes categories of persons who may make an application for compensation u/s.124 or Section 124-A to the Claims Tribunal. Section 125 reads thus :-

125. Application for compensation – (1) An application for compensation under section 124 [or section 124-A] may be made to the Claims Tribunal-

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or

(b) by any agent duly authorised by such person on this behalf, or

(c) where such person is a minor, by his guardian, or

(d) where death has resulted from the accident, [or the untoward incident], by any dependent of the deceased or where such a dependent is a minor, by his guardian.

(2) Every application by a dependent for compensation under this section shall be for the beneft of every other dependent.”

14. Clause (d) of Section 125(1) provides that where death has resulted from the accident, or the untoward incident, an application for compensation may be made to the Claims Tribunal by any dependent of the deceased or where such a dependent is a minor, by his guardian.

15. In the present case, it is pertinent to note that the appellant, as a younger brother of Jaikumar made the claim application for compensation as a result of the untoward incident. Before the Tribunal was the application for condonation of delay in fling the claim application by the younger brother of Jaikumar. During the course of hearing of the application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal sought instructions from the claim applicant as to whether any of the dependents of Jaikumar as stated in Section 123(b) are alive, to which the counsel for the appellant fairly replied that none of them are alive. In such circumstances, the Tribunal opined that the appellant cannot be a dependent within the meaning of Section 123 (b) of the Railways Act.

16. In the facts of the present case, in my opinion, the eiercise of rendering a fnding on the question whether the appellant is a dependent within the meaning of Section 123(b) did not arise at the stage when the Tribunal was hearing the application of condonation of delay made by the younger brother of Jaikumar, though a major. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 envisages a person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub-section (1A) of Section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal. As to whether the person is a dependent within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 123 of the Railways Act is a question that the Tribunal could have gone into only after deciding the application for condonation of delay, if at all the delay is condoned.

17. The limitation for fling a claim application is prescribed u/ s.17 of The Railway Claims Tribunal Act. The relevant portion of Section 17(1) reads thus :-

"(a) …………

(b) under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) [or, as the case may be, sub-section (1A) of section 13 unless the application is made within one year of occurrence of the accident;

(c) ……….

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), an application may be entertained after the period specifed in sub-section (1) if the applicant satisfes the Claims Tribunal that he had sufcient cause for not making the application within such period.”

18. Thus, as provided by sub-section (2) of Section 17 of The Railway Claims Tribunal Act, a claim application may be entertained after the period specifed in sub-section (1-A) of Section 13, if the applicant satisfes the Claims Tribunal that he had sufcient cause for not making the application within such period.

19. As indicated earlier, the application for condonation of delay was made by the younger brother of the victim, though a major. The Tribunal at the stage of deciding the application for condonation of delay called upon the advocate for the appellant to take instructions as to whether there are any dependents of the victim as provided under clause (b) of Section 123 of the Railways Act. In my opinion, the fnding on the question whether the appellant was a dependent, need not have been gone into at the stage of deciding the application for condonation of delay. The language of sub-section (1) of section 16 makes it clear that the person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in sub-section (1A) of section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal. As to whether such person is a dependent within the meaning of sub-section (b) of Section 123 of the Railways Act is obviously to be eiamined on merits when the application under Sub-Section (1) of Section 16 is heard. In terms of Section 17 of The Railway Claims Tribunal Act the Claims Tribunal cannot admit an application for any claim under sub-section (1) of section 13 unless the application is made within one year of the occurrence of the accident. Sub-section (2) of section 17 then ordains that an application u/s.16 may be entertained after the period specifed in sub-section (1), if the appellant satisfes the Claims Tribunal that he had sufcient cause for not making the application within such period.

20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara Vs. Labour Court, Bhilwara & Anr., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 525 [LQ/SC/2009/47] has held that while deciding the application for condonation of delay, it is well settled that merits of the case cannot be gone into and it is only to be seen whether sufcient cause has been shown for condoning the delay in fling the application. The Tribunal should have only confned itself to the decision on the application for condonation of delay.

21. This takes me to the neit question as to whether the Tribunal is justifed in rejecting the application of the claimant requesting condonation of delay in fling the claim application. In para 5 of the impugned order, the Tribunal has reproduced the facts pleaded in the application seeking condonation of delay. Para 5 of the impugned order of the Tribunal reads thus:-

“The claim application in this case has been fled with a delay of 3 years, 9 months and 15 days (1380 days) (eicluding limitation period of one year). The only facts which are pleaded for seeking condonation of delay are stated in paras 2 to 5 of application, which reads as under:

Para 2 - After death of the deceased, the applicant was in mental shock and sorrow. The applicant was facing many family problems. The applicant was not aware about the provision of the compensation for the death in untoward incident.

Para 3 to 5 – After 8-9 months applicant came to know about the compensation from Suresh Borkar and thereafter he applied for the certifed documents from the police and heanded over the case papers to Sunil Borkar for fling the claim application at Nagpur in the month of August 2014. He was unable to contact the advocate up to November 2014, anyhow he contacted the advocate who replied him that his claim has been handed over to one lady lawyer namely Adv Khobragade from the Gondia District who assured him for fling the case, but nothing has been done by the said advocate. Finally he came in the month of September 2017 at RCT Nagpur and came to know that there is no such claim application is fled in his name. The applicant contacted the present counsel and handed over all the documents to the present counsel in the month of January 2018, who fled the claim application in the Tribunal. Due to this all reasons, the delay caused for fling the claim application, which is not intentional or deliberately.”

We shall consider these averments in order to see whether either of them can be regarded as “sufcient ground” within the meaning of Sec.17 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act.”

22. These averments are then considered by the Tribunal in para 6 of the impugned order while coming to the conclusion that the eiplanation cannot be regarded as “sufcient cause” within the meaning of Section 17 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act., reading thus :

“(6)(i) (Para 2) So far due to mental shocks to the applicant is concerned, all that needs to be stated that when did he came out from the mental shock/phobia, situation has not been eiplained and which was the family problem nothing has been mentioned.

(ii) So far as the applicant has no knowledge about legal procedure is concerned, all that needs to be stated that “ignorantia juris non eicusat” i.e. ignorance of law is not an eicuse. In any case, we fail to believe that in today’s date and age people are not aware of their legal rights of being entitled to fle petitions/appeals.

(iii) (Para 3 to 5) So far as to getting copies of documents from the concerned Police authorities, all that needs to be stated that when he made the application to police authorities and when he got the photocopies, no evidence has been placed on record and as well as no eiplanation has been given. No evidence has been enclosed just a bald statement has been given.

(iv) So far as argued, the petitioner was unable to approach to concerned advocate after handing over the documents for fling the claim application is concerned, all that needs to be stated that we fall to believe the contentions of applicant because admittedly the deceased died on 04.05.2013 and the applicant fled the application for condonation of delay after about 5 years from the date of incident on 21.02.2018. The applicant has not eiplained or given any sufcient ground for the period of 3 years, 9 months and 15 days for fling the claim application after eipiry of limitation period of one year. It is also not disclosed by the applicant that when did he fle the application for obtaining the documents from concerned authorities and when were the documents received. Further, no documentary evidnece has been produced by the applicant that when did he approached to concern Advocate and when he contacted, just a bald statement has been given by the applicant. The applicant has also not been able to eiplain the delay for approaching to Advocates for legal action and fling the application.”

23. The Tribunal has observed that the eipression “sufcient cause” cannot be erased from Section 17 of The Railway Claims Tribunal Act by adopting eicessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. According to the Tribunal, there must be some cause which can be termed as a sufcient one for the purpose of condonation of delay. The Tribunal did not fnd any sufcient cause for condoning the delay.

24. The provisions of Chapter XIII of the Railways Act are in the nature of a benefcial legislation which imposes a liability on the railway administration for compensating passengers for death and injury due to accident or injury suffered by the victim in the course of working a railway. The liability of the railway administration u/s.124A of the Railways Act is based on the concept “no fault theory”. The Supreme Court in para 25 of Rina Devi (supra) has held that death or injury in the course of boarding and de-boarding a train will be an “untoward incident” entitling a victim to the compensation and will not fall under the proviso (b) to Section 124-A merely on the plea of negligence of the victim as a contributing factor.

25. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 provides that amount of compensation payable in respect of death for injury, shall be specifed in the schedule. The schedule appended to the these Rules provides for the amount of compensation payable in respect of the death and injuries. Section 124-A ordains that when in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration such as would entitle a passenger who has been injured or the dependent of a passenger who has been killed to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such eitent as may be prescribed and to that eitent only for loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a passenger as a result of such untoward incident.

26. A plain reading of Section 124-A indicates that an obligation is cast on the railway administration to pay the compensation prescribed to a passenger who has died or injured on account of an untoward incident in the course of working a railway. That the railway must fulfll its obligation to pay the compensation can also be gathered from the language of Section 125 of the Railways Act. Clause (b) of Section 125 of the Railways Act provides that an application may be made to the Claims Tribunal, even by any agent duly authorised by such person in this behalf apart from the other categories of person prescribed, obviously with the object that the victim or his dependents are entitled to the fruits of the compensation and that the applicants/dependents should not be deprived from compensation merely on technicalities. The object obviously is that the compensation should reach the passenger or dependent of a victim in respect of such an untoward incident within the meaning of Section 124-A of the Railways Act.

27. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), an application may be entertained after the period of specifed in sub-section (1) if the applicant satisfes the Claims Tribunal that he had sufcient cause for not making the application within such period. In the conteit of appeals u/s.173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Supreme Court in the case of Brahampal Alias Summay (supra) construed the word “may” in the second proviso to Section 173. In this conteit, it would be proftable to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the decision in Brahampal Alias Summay (supra). Their Lordships also construed the term “sufcient cause”. Paragraphs 9 to 19 relevant for a decision in the present case read thus:-

"9. While keeping in view, the general nature of the legislation, it is pertinent for us to have a look at Section 173 of the Act which reads as under:

173. Appeals. — (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-fve thousand rupees or ffty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court:

Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the eipiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfed that the appellant was prevented by sufcient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.

(emphasis supplied)

10. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the eipiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfes the Court that there eiists sufcient reason behind the delay.

11. Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion. 1 It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion.2 “It is used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it could not be done”.3

12. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 of the Act, conferred sufcient discretionary powers upon the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. The pertinent issue before us relates to what the eitent of such discretionary power is.

13. In order to understand the eitent of conferment of power by the usage of the word “may”, we may observe Ofcial Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166, [LQ/SC/1977/80] wherein this Court held:

“10. The principle laid down above has been followed consistently by this Court whenever it has been contended that the word “may” carries with it the obligation to 1 Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519 2 Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, (1982) 1 SCC 159 3 Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 Supp (3) SCR 973 eiercise a power in a particular manner or direction. In such a case, it is always the purpose of the power which has to be eiamined in order to determine the scope of the discretion conferred upon the donee of the power. If the conditions in which the power is to be eiercised in particular cases are also specifed by a statute then, on the fulflment of those conditions, the power conferred becomes anneied with a duty to eiercise it in that manner” (emphasis supplied)

14. This Court has frstly held that purpose of conferment of such power must be eiamined for the determination of the scope of such discretion conferred upon the court. [refer to Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120 [LQ/SC/1962/235] ; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd ., (1970) 2 SCC 806] [LQ/SC/1970/365] . Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests that such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities.

15. Secondly, it has been held that if the specifc conditions wherein the power could be eiercised is also provided in the statute, then the Court must eiercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specifed by the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfed that there eiisted “sufcient cause”.

16. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term “sufcient cause” as a condition precedent for the granting of the discretionary relief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit of ninety days. Although this Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act , 1963 does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but it is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufcient cause” under the Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. This Court in the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321, [LQ/SC/2008/1424] observed that:

“13.…The words “sufcient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation” should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words “sufcient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fdes, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” (emphasis supplied)

17. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, [LQ/SC/2010/648] wherein this Court held that:

“25. We may state that even if the term “sufcient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has defnite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.

Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to eiplain the delay by showing sufcient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” (emphasis supplied)

18. The Court in the above-mentioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufcient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there eiists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.

19. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 [LQ/SC/2012/354] wherein the Court held that:

“23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the eiercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What colour the eipression “sufcient cause” would get in the factual matrii of a given case would largely depend on bona fde nature of the eiplanation. If the court fnds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fdes, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the eiplanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate eiercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” (emphasis supplied)”

28. Drawing support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Brahampal Alias Summay (supra), I have no hesitation in applying the principles enunciated by Their Lordships while construing the word 'may' and the eipression 'sufcient cause' in Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act while considering the application for condonation of delay in fling the claim application for compensation. The use of the word 'may' in Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 confers sufcient discretionary power upon the Tribunal to entertain the application even beyond the period of one year. The eitent of eiercising such discretionary power is settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Brahampal Alias Summay (supra). The purpose of Section 124-A of the Railways Act is to compensate the victims and their dependents. The Tribunal is conferred with the discretion to entertain the application even beyond the period of one year prescribed so as to ensure that the substantive justice is not trumped by the technicalities. Obviously, the discretion is to be eiercised in the manner specifed in the statute itself. Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides that the Tribunal has power to condone the delay if it is satisfed that there eiisted 'sufcient cause'. The words 'sufcient cause' for not making the application within the prescribed period should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic and liberal manner depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in mind the benefcial and benevolent intent in inserting Section 124-A in the Railways Act providing compensation. As cautioned by the Supreme Court, it needs to be emphasized that even though the liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in condoning the delay, in construing what constitutes 'sufcient cause' while condoning the delay, the Court has to be mindful of the fact that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and cause shown for delay does not lack bonafdes, in which case it may condone the delay. Further, if the eiplanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it will be a legitimate discretion not to condone the delay.

29. Section 124-A of the Railways Act was inserted on 01/08/1994 in Chapter XIII with an object of providing compensation on account of 'untoward incident' in the course of working a railway. The Court, while considering whether sufcient cause is made out for condoning the delay, is not supposed to take a pedantic or hyper-technical view, but is eipected to adopt a justice oriented approach while considering the application for condonation of delay. If the delay is gross and no satisfactory eiplanation is forthcoming, it may refuse to eiercise its discretion in condoning the delay.

30. In the present facts, the delay is of 3 years, 9 months and 15 days (1380 days). The appellant has in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the application for condonation of delay demonstrated the cause which prevented him from approaching the Tribunal within the period prescribed. In my opinion, having regard to the fact that sufcient cause was shown, the Tribunal while testing the cause should have adopted a liberal approach in the present facts. Learned Counsel for the appellant on instructions submitted that the appellant will not claim interest upto the date of fling of the application before the Tribunal, if in the fnal analysis, the appellant succeeds in getting compensation. The statement deserves to be accepted. In my view, the delay is not such that the same does not deserve to be condoned, even after the appellant has given up his right to claim interest for the delayed period apart from the cause shown in the application which I regard sufcient.

31. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the railway which is in the conteit of commercial claim under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Commercial Courts Act, 2015 in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers And Contractors Private Limited, reported in (2021)-6-SCC-460 will have no application in view of the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brahampal Alias Summay (supra). The other decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the railway is in the case of Bruesh Kumar & Ors. V/s. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (2014)-II-SCC-351 has no application in the present facts. The factual situation in Bruesh Kumar (supra) was that there was inordinate delay of more than 10 years and on getting impetus from other litigants who had approached appellate court promptly and succeeded in getting similar relief, Bruesh Kumar approached the Court. The said decision also does not advance the cause of the railway.

32. The appeal deserves to be allowed.

Hence, the following order:-

ORDER

(i) The Appeal is accordingly allowed.

(ii) The impugned judgment dated 26.06.2018 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Nagpur Bench in Claim Application No.MA/NGP/0013/2018 is quashed and set aside.

(iii) The delay in fling the claim application before the Tribunal is condoned.

(iv) The claim application be heard on merits.

(v) It is made clear that I have not made any observations on merits of the contentions.

(vi) The contention on maintainability of the application on the plea that the applicant is not a dependent within the meaning of Section 123(b) of the Railways Act is kept open to be decided by the Tribunal on its own merits afresh without being infuenced by the observations made by me or by the Tribunal in the impugned Judgment.

(vi) No order as to costs.