1. This Second Appeal arises out of a proceeding initiated by the appellant under S.22 of Act 31 of 1958 for setting aside a court sale of properties held on the 18th Mithunam 1112, and confirmed on the 11th Mithunam,1119. The properties were purchased by the decree-holder. After he died, his legal representatives assigned their interest in the properties to the respondent in the year 1120. The appellant, who was one of the judgment-debtors, made the application under S.22, in the year 1134 (1959 A.D.) and though she succeeded in the first court, she lost in appeal before the Subordinate Judge, who dismissed her application under the 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of S.22, which reads:

"Provided further that this sub-section shall not affect the rights of bona fide alienees of the purchaser deriving rights before 20th November, 1957".

The two courts below have held the respondent to be a bona fide purchaser of the properties for value. I see no ground to disturb these concurrent findings, notwithstanding the clause relied on, in the assignment in favour of the respondent, which excluded the liability of the transferor for any defect in title.

2. But learned counsel for the appellant has, by C.M.P. 5917 of 1961 sought permission to raise an additional ground in this appeal that the proviso extracted above, is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. I am inclined to grant the prayer to raise the ground, and allow the petition. But I am satisfied after hearing counsel, that there is no substance in the contention. The contention was, that the classification introduced by the proviso has no rational relationship to the object of the enactment and is bad as discriminatory. That object is to provide for the relief of indebted agriculturists, in the manner and to the extent provided by it. S.22 is one of the provisions in relief of indebtedness and enables an agricultural judgment-debtor to set aside a court sale of immovable property held in execution of a decree against him, subject to certain limits. These limits areas prescribed by sub-section (1) of S.22, including the provisos to it. The limit imposed by the proviso, is that while granting relief to an agricultural judgment-debtor, the right of a bona fide alienee who has derived his right before the 20th November 1957 at least, may be protected. There is no compelling reason why an agricultural judgment-debtor should be benefitted at the expense of or be preferred to a bona fide alienee of the category mentioned. It may be, that in the case of some of them they might have paid much more for the transfer to them, than what their transferor had paid at the court sale. The classification has also a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by Act 31 of 1958, for, while agricultural judgment-debtors should be granted relief, such relief should not injure bona fide alienees of a certain category at least. It was only such relief, that was intended to be granted; this is not discrimination.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent appeared to me to be right in his submission, that if the proviso were ;to be struck down, the appellant could not claim any relief under S.22, because, as stated, the relief intended to be granted under S.22 was conditioned by the proviso. I accept the argument that the proviso is an inseparable part of S.22.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Rajasthan v. Mukan Chand AIR. 1964 SC. 1633 [LQ/SC/1964/51] where the exclusion of certain debts under S.2(e) of the Rajasthan Jagirdars Debt Reduction Act (9 of 1957) was held to be violative of Art.14. The object of that Act was to reduce the debts secured on every land which had been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952. In dealing with the contention the Supreme Court observed, that

"the Jagirdars capacity to pay debts had been reduced by the resumption of his lands and the object of the Act was to ameliorate his condition. The fact that the debts are owed to a government or local authority or other bodies mentioned in the impugned part of S.2(e) has no rational relationship with the object sought to be achieved by the Act."

It was for this reason, that the exclusion of such debts by S.2(e) was held to be unconstitutional. This case has no application when, the relationship is clear, and the right conferred by S.22 is itself subject to the safeguard afforded by the proviso. I hold that the argument of discrimination hardly arises. This second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Dismissed.