A.M. Mir, J.The University of Kashmir floated an advertisement notice contained in AnnexurePI of the petition. This advertisement notice does not bear any number or date. However, applications for different posts were invited upto 31.8.1991 under the said Notification. Besides others, Department of Urdu figured at S.No. 36. Under the Notification three posts of Lecturers and one post of EditorcumLecturer were advertised. The petitioner applied for the post of Lecturer. He appeared in the interview, which was held at New Delhi on 22.1.1992. As many as 39 candidates had applied. Out of this lot, nine did not appear. A Selection Committee, duly constituted, in terms of Sec. 36 of the University Act (hereinafter called the Act), made some recommendations to the Syndicate. In the select list formulated by the Selection Committee, the petitioner also figured. When this list was placed before the Syndicate on 27.5.1992, the Syndicate resolved not to approve the recommendations made by the Selection Committee in respect of four posts in Urdu Department. The Syndicate also did not approve the recommendation of Miss Ruhi Maqbool as Lecturer in the Education Department. However, in the present case we are not concerned with Miss Ruhi Maqbool. She filed a separate writ petition before the Court. The grounds taken by the University were on different footing. The University failed to substantiate those grounds, as such she won the bout. I repeat that the two cases are different and here in the present case questions of law only arise. The petitioner was aggrieved of this decision of the Syndicate. Therefore, same was challenged by virtue of this petition.

2. The grounds taken before me by learned counsel for the petitioner are that the basis on which the Syndicate declined to approve the recommendations of the Selection Committee were not in existence. Mr. Shabir Ahmed, appearing for the petitioner, has contested both the grounds taken by the Syndicate on facts.

3. The counter filed by the respondentUniversity lays stress on the powers of the Syndicate and enforcibility of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee. Mr. R. Bazaz, appearing for the University, has been vehement enough in arguing that the power of appointment of the Lecturers lies with the Syndicate and not with the Selection Committee. The report of the Selection Committee is of a recommendatory nature. Such report has no binding force. It is for the employer to act or not to act upon such a report. According to him, the Syndicate is the Chief Executive of the University, therefore, it is the Syndicate alone which has the absolute power of appointment. The powers of the Selection Committee can never overlap with those enjoyed by the Syndicate.

4. I have considered the pleadings and also given anxious thought to the arguments advanced before me.

5. I in the first instance would like to refer to the scope of powers envisaged by the University statute visavis the Syndicate and the Selection Committee. Section 23, read with Sec. 24 of the Act gives us the scope and the constitution of the Selection Committees and powers enjoyed by the Syndicate. Section 23 lays down that the Syndicate shall be the Chief Executive Authority for matters which do not fall within the purview of powers of the University Council. Then it gives its constitution. Under Section 24 a threedimensional power has been first given to the Syndicate. One relates to the budget, other to drafting of statutes and the third holding control upon funds, property and assets of the University. In addition to these powers clause (d) of subsection (1) of Sec. 24 vests power of appointment of the teaching and nonteaching staff, to a certain level, in the Syndicate. It is pertinent for me to reproduce the text of this para, alongwith two of its provisos. Third proviso relates to appointments to be made by the Vice Chancellor on temporary basis. We are not concerned with that limb of the power here. Therefore, I delete the last one. Section 24(1)(d) reads as under :

"(d) save as otherwise provided in the Act to appoint officers (below the status of Joint Registrar and Deputy Librarian) and teachers (below the status of a Reader) and to define their duties :

Provided that no officer or teacher shall be appointed by a Syndicate until provision has been made for his salary in the approved budget of the University concerned :

Provided further that all appointment (permanent or temporary) to the posts of officers or teachers referred to in this section shall be made by the Syndicate on the recommendations of the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose in accordance with the provisions of section 36 of this Act on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the statute."

A birds eye view of this provision makes it clear that the Syndicate has the power of appointing teachers below the status of Readers. The second proviso calls upon the Syndicate to make appointments under this section on the recommendations of the Selection Committee in accordance with the provisions of section 36 of the Act. It is here that the substantial question arises.

6. Mr. Shabir Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the power of appointment vested in the Syndicate can be exercised only on the recommendations of the Selection committee. So far so good.

7. I agree that any appointment of teachers or any other appointment under the Act, to be done by the Syndicate, has to be made only on the recommendations of the Selection Committee. But this is not the same thing as to say that whenever a recommendation is made by the Selection Committee, the Syndicate is bound to make appointments. If we accept this anology, then the cart will be placed before the horse because in that case it will be equivalent to take away the powers from Syndicate and repose them in the Selection Committee. This is not the intention of the Act. Making of appointments is an administrative power and the same has to be exercised by the Syndicate only. What is the intention of the statute is that such power can be exercised only on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. That means, whenever appointments are to be made, recommendations must first come from the Selection Committee and it is then and then alone that the Syndicate can make appointments. The object is obvious. One team of experts headed by the Vice Chancellor (Selection Committee) puts all the eligible candidates to test and then makes a recommendation. The other team of experts (Syndicate) headed by the same ViceChancellor, examines the recommendations and either approves the list or declines to do so. The statute makes sure that at both the levels these experts must apply their minds and the effort of taking the best of the lot is ensured. However, the power of appointment lies only with the Syndicate and not with the Selection Committee. Therefore, what impliedly and expressly follows is that the Syndicate has the power to disagree with the Selection Committee.

8. Mr. Shabir Ahmed was very enthusiastic in describing the Selection Committee to be at a higher pedestal. Mr. Bazaz, on the other hand, stressed upon the size of the two foras. He pleaded that the Selection Committee comprises of six members whereas the Syndicate is constituted by eleven members. Hence the difference. Judges have great regard for all the academicians. We cannot give preference to some upon the others. We are bound by the statute itself. The power is very much circumscribed by the statute. Therefore, we cannot add or substract from these powers. Thus I repeat that the Syndicate alone has the power of appointment.

9. Even outside the purview of the University statute the apex Court of the country has delivered umpteen judgments wherein the rights of a person, who figured in the select list, recommended by the Selection Committee/Authority have been determined. In a judgment titled Union of India v. N.P. Dhamania (Civil Appeal No. 1794/88) reported in 1996 (Vol. 9) SCL page 21 : 1995(1) SCT 671 (SC); their lordships held that the recommendations made by a Selection Committee are only of an advisory nature and they cannot have a binding force. Their lordships relied upon an earlier judgment titled Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1995(1) SCC 122 and held that a person who figures in the list formulated by the Selection Committee, did not have an indefeasible right for appointment. In AIR 1990 SC 438 (Dalpataba Solunke Sahin v. B.S. Mahajan), the same position had been propounded with absolute clarity. In yet another case titled State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwa, (1973)(2) SLR page 137 (SC), their lordships held that even if a vacancy is available and the Selection Committee/Authority submits a list to the employer in which a person finds place, that person has no right of claiming appointment. This authority was relied upon by their lordships in Shankarasan Dash v. Union of India, 1991(2) SLR 797 (SC) : 1991(2) SCT 194 (SC); also. Last in the series, which I could easily lay hands upon, was Madanlal and others v. State of J&K, reported in A.I.R. 1995 SC 1088 : 1995(2) SCT 880 (SC) . Their lordships reiterated the position of law laid down in earlier decision and again held that by only figuring in the select list submitted by the Public Service Commission to the Government, the petitioner did not have any right to appointment.

10. Here in the present case we, in addition to the clear position of law laid down by the apex Court, have express provisions of the statute which I have already referred to above. Therefore, there is not even an iota of doubt in my mind that the petitioner cannot claim his appointment only on the basis that he figured in the select list, which was forwarded by the Selection Committee to the Syndicate.

11. However, the facts remain to be touched. The Syndicate has given the following reasons for not approving of the recommendations made by the Selection Committee :

1. That the interview should not have been held on 22.1.1992 at New Delhi because SrinagarJammu National Highway was blocked for some time;

2. That a fear psychosis prevailed during the period which, according to the Syndicate, must have stood in the way of more meritorious candidates to appear in the interview;

3. That seven point merit scale in the Masters Degree of the applicants was not adhered to though it was obligatory.

I, for making things more vivid and clear want the impugned para to be reproduced in its original form. It reads as under :

"The members were of the view that the interview ought not to have been held on 22nd January at Delhi because of the fact that National Highway was blocked for some time and psychological scare was created as a result of which it was found that more experienced and highly qualified candidates could not present themselves for the interview. Moreover, in some cases the noncompliance with 7 point merit scale in the masters degree of the applicants was not adhered to though it was requirement as per advertisement notification. As such it was resolved that the recommendations of the Selection Committee for appointment of Lecturer in Urdu and LecturercumEditor in Urdu, besides one in favour of Miss Roohi Maqbool, as Lecturer in Education be not approved."

I need not to elaborate the reasoning because this is more than elaborate. However, I deem it proper to place on record that 22nd January happens to be the core of winter season in Kashmir Valley. Often National Highway, linking Srinagar with Jammu, remains blocked. In addition to this, January, 1992 was a period during which militancy in the Valley was at its peak. Probably this has weighed with the Syndicate. Nine absentees out of 39 have perhaps made them to decline the approval.

12. Mr. Shabir Ahmed has placed on record a certificate from the Traffic Department showing that on 22.1.1992 National Highway was not blocked. He also submits that the very fact that 30 people out of 39 had participated shows that there was neither any scare not road blockade.

13. Whatsoever the case, perhaps this is not the Courts job to replace the finding of a highly august forum by its own wisdom. I always feel that courts should repose confidence in such agencies and authorities, who exercise statutory powers. The question as to whether or not the Court should replace the findings of the authorities by their own is too oft beaten to be elaborated here. One such authority alone will serve as a tip on the iceberg. In a case titled National Institute of Mental Health v. K.K. Rana, reported in A.I.R. 1992 SC 1808, their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the decision of the academic authorities should not ordinarily be interfered with by the Courts.

14. Psychological hang over referred to in the impugned decision, also cannot be brushed aside by the court, even if the factum of blockage of road must be correct.

15. Then the most important point is that of nonobservance of seven points merit scale formula. During the proceedings of the case I wanted to know as to what this formula is. Mr. Bazaz, appearing for the respondentUniversity has placed on record before me a clarificatory communication addressed by the University Grants Commission on 28.8.1998 in this behalf. According to this communication seven point merit formula is a grading formula introduced by the University Grants Commission by virtue of which the persons applying for certain posts will be rated in the following seven categories :

1. O = Outstanding;

2. A = Very Good.

3. B = Good.

4. C = Fair.

5. D = Satisfactory.

6. E = Poor.

7. F = Very poor.

Mr. Shabir submits that the petitioner possesses Ist Class Master Degree. That may be true but the grouse of the Syndicate was that the applicants had not been graded in accordance with this formula and grading was obligatory.

16. The cumulative purport of the impugned decision made by the Syndicate seems to be to have a fresh exercise by the Selection Committee after taking care of the three grounds contained in the decision/resolution. This object to me seems to be logical because their aim was only to attract best of the talent for manning teaching staff of the University. There is nothing bad in it. They have not picked up any body from the list and dropped any body. Had that been the situation, petitioners case would have been on a very strong footing.

17. Even on facts, I am told that subsequent to 1992 a fresh exercise was undertaken in 1996 and appointments to the post of Lecturer in Urdu Department of the University made. In fact the appointments of 1996 have been upheld by this Court in SWP No. 589/97 titled Nazir Ahmed Ganai and another v. University of Kashmir and others, decided on 7.3.1998. That judgment assumes finality, after the same was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court, in LPA No. 66/98, titled Gulzar Ahmed Padar v. University of Kashmir, decided on 20.7.1998.

18. In view of the aforementioned observations, I find the present petition not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed. Interim direction granted by this Court on 16.12.1992 shall stand vacated.

19. No order as to costs.