Henry Thoby Princep, J.

1. The petitioner, who is a peon attached to the Office ofthe Superintendent of the Salt Department in the district of Muzafferpore hasbeen convicted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. The first question that we have to consider on this ruleis whether the petitioner is a public servant within the terms of Section 21 ofthe Indian Penal Code. It is contended by Mr. Abdur Rahim that he does not fallwithin the terms of the last portion of Clause 9 of that section, whichdeclares that "every officer in the service or pay of Government" isa public servant, because he is not an officer. The case of Reg. v. RamajiravJivbajirav (1875) 12 Bom. H.C.R. 1. is cited as authority for this. The learnedJudges in that case had to consider whether a lessee from Government was on theconditions of his lease a public servant, and, in doing so, they consideredgenerally the meaning of the term "officer." It was there held thatan officer means "some person employed to exercise, to some extent and incertain circumstances, a delegated function of Government. He is either armedwith some authority or representative character, or his duties are immediatelyauxiliary to those of some person who is so armed." The meaning which weare asked to put on these words seem to us to be too narrow as applied to the presentcase. The peon who has been convicted as a public servant is in service and payof the Government, and he is attached to the Office of the Superintendent ofthe Salt Department. The exact nature of his duties is not stated, because thisobjection was not taken at the trial, but we must take it that, from the natureof his appointment, it was his duty to carry out the orders of his officialsuperior, who undoubtedly is a public servant, and in that capacity to assistthe Superintendent in the performance of the public duties of his office. Inthat sense he would be an officer of Government, although he might not possiblyexercise "any delegated function of the Government." Still his dutieswould be immediately auxiliary to those of the Superintendent who is soarmed." We think that an "officer in the service or pay ofGovernment" within the terms of Section 21 of the Penal Code is one who isappointed to some office for the performance of some public duty. In this sensethe peon would come within Section 21, Clause 9.

3. Our attention has been drawn to The Queen v. ArayiI.L.R.(1888) 7 Mad. 17 in which the learned Chief Justice held that a peon of aManager of an Estate under the Court of Wards is not a public servant. Thegrounds for that opinion are not stated; and it may be that the learned ChiefJustice would have gone so far as to hold that a Manager of an Estate under theCourt of Wards is not a public servant. Mr. Abdur Rahim, we may here state,contends that such a Manager is a public servant, and, as authority for that,he relies on the case of Queen-Empress v. Mathura Prasad :I.L.R(1898) . 21 All. 127 in which it was held by Mr. Justice Aikman that aManager of an Estate employed under the Court of Wards is a public servant. Wefind ourselves unable to agree with that case, or to concur with the groundsupon which the learned Judge arrived at that conclusion. With every deferenceto his opinion we think that the grounds stated are sufficient for the contraryopinion which we hold. The fact that the Legislature has thought proper in ActXVII of 1885 specially to declare that a Manager of an Estate under the Courtof Wards in the Central Provinces is a public servant seems to us to show thatit was considered that, as under the existing law such person did not comewithin that term, it was necessary to provide for this. We may also point tothe fact that in all legislation for the management of encumbered estates, acognate subject, the Legislature has thought proper specially to declare that aManager is a public servant, and we may add that, under the terms of thedefinition contained in Section 21 of the Penal Code, the Manager of an Estateunder the Court of Wards is not, in our opinion, a public servant. The point,however, is relevant for the purposes of the case before us only in so far asit meets the contention of the learned Counsel, that the case of The Queen v.Aram I.L.R(1883) . 7 Mad. 17 is in point, and here we would only repeat thatthe learned Chief Justice in that case gives no reason for his opinion, and itmay be that he would also have held that the Manager was not a public servant.

4. It is next contended by Mr. Abdur Rahim that, on thefacts found, no offence has been committed. We are, however, of opinion thatthe facts found indicate that the object of the illegal gratification was torender a service to the persons paying it, and that therefore an offence underSection 161 has been committed. The rule is, therefore, discharged.

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Nazamuddin vs.Queen-Empress (09.07.1900 - CALHC)