Jaspreet Singh, J.

1. These are a batch of two appeals filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. One appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company bearing F.A.F.O. No.260/2000 being aggrieved against the award dated 29.02.2000 passed in Claim Petition No.176/1997, wherein a sum of Rs.4,34,000/- along with 12% interest has been awarded in favour of the claimants-respondents. The other appeal bearing F.A.F.O. No.283/2000 has been filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of the award dated 29.02.2000 and in this view of the matter that both the appeals have been clubbed together and heard and are being decided by this common judgment.

2. Since, the Insurance Company has preferred an appeal assailing the award itself, accordingly, first the Court proposes to hear and decide the said appeal and thereafter shall consider the appeal of the claimaints for enhancement if at all any cause subsists subject to the decision of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company.

3. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the instant two appeals are being noticed hereinafter.

4. On 18.11.1996 at around 08:30 PM, Vinod Kumar Misra, who was a Field Officer of the National Insurance Company Limited was returning from his Village to his house in Barabanki. While, he had reached a place called 'Sagar Ka Bagh' in Village Bhayara, an unknown vehicle, whose registration number was revealed later as UP-6882, a Matador, was being driven rashly and negligently and it hit Vinod Kumar, who was on his motorcycle bearing UP-41-6296. On account of the said accident, Vinod Kumar died on the spot and the driver of the offending Matador fled with the vehicle. It is also a case of the claimants that some persons, who had seen the accident had noted the number of the offending vehicle and conveyed the information of the accident to the family of the deceased. The brother of the deceased thereafter on 19.12.1996 got an FIR lodged. It is on account of the death of Vinod Kumar Misra that a Claim Petition No.176/1997 came to be filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Barabanki.

5. The claim petition was contested by the owner of the vehicle as well as the Insurance Company by filing their written statements. Significantly, the written statement filed by the owner and driver did not dispute the accident but categorically raised a plea that it was the negligence of the motorcyclist which led to his death. It was also pleaded that the Matador was driven carefully and at a reasonable speed and it cannot be said that the Matador was the cause of the accident, apart from the fact that the Matador was duly insured and the driver also possessed a valid licence.

6. On the exchange of the pleadings, the Tribunal framed eight issues and after noticing the evidence, both oral and documentary, returned a finding that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving by the driver of the offending Matador which caused the death of Vinod Kumar. It also concluded that the vehicle in question was duly insured and the driver had a valid licence.

7. The Tribunal thereafter went ahead to compute the compensation and it noticed that the gross income of the deceased was Rs.9,763/-. However, after taking into consideration various deductions, it arrived at a net income of Rs.6,382/- per month, but it further found that since the wife of the deceased has already been granted compassionate appointment, consequently, for the purpose of assessing loss of income, it finally adopted an amount of Rs.3,600/- per month and thereafter it deducted 1/3 towards personal expenses taking the amount lower to Rs.2,400/- per month. Considering the age of the deceased, it applied a multiplier of 15 and adding a sum of Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses awarded a total sum of Rs.4,34,000/- along with 12% interest per annum in favour of the claimants-respondents by means of the award dated 29.02.2000.

8. Mrs. Pooja Arora, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that it is a clear case of false implication of the vehicle in question.

9. To elaborate the aforesaid submissions, it is is pointed out that the brother of the deceased had promptly got an FIR lodged wherein it was stated that the accident was caused by an unknown vehicle. The police had investigated the matter and placed a final report wherein it could not find the involvement of the said Matador. The claimant witness No.1, who was the wife of the deceased and the claimant witness No.3 Pushpendra Kumar, the brother of the deceased were admittedly not an eye witness nor did they make any statement regarding the involvement of the particular Matador.

10. In the aforesaid circumstances wherein there was no clear averment regarding the involvement of the Matador, but later merely on the basis of a statement made, by claimant-witness No.2 Radhey Shyam, that the vehicle in question has been falsely implicated. Even if the statement of Radhey Shyam is seen, it would reveal that it is full of discrepancies and contradictions. Considering the aforesaid, there was clear doubt regarding the involvement of the Matador and thus this aspect has been incorrectly considered by the Tribunal and for the said reason no liability could be fastened on the Insurance Company.

11. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, Insurance Company, that the Matador was a commercial vehicle and it did not have the requisite permit. In absence of the permit, it would be deemed that the said vehicle was being driven without complying with the policy conditions.

12. It has also been urged that even the name of the driver of the Matador was included in the claim petition, after an amendment, and thus overall circumstances would indicate that the claimants were not aware of the involvement of the Matador and its driver and it is only at a late stage the vehicle has been implicated and so also the driver. Accordingly, the Insurance Company could not be made liable for the award and alternatively it has been pleaded that even if at all the vehicle did not have a permit at least the recovery right ought to have been granted to the appellant Insurance Company which has not been done which is also not correct and for all the aforesaid reasons it has vitiated the award.

13. It is lastly urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal has grossly erred in awarding on interest @ 12% per annum relating to an accident which took place in the year 1996 and as such the grant of interest is on a much higher side which also needs to be reconsidered and appropriately modified. It is accordingly urged that the award deserves to be set aside after allowing the appeal.

14. Shri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the claimants-respondents combating the aforesaid submissions has urged that the claim petition has to be decided on the touchstone preponderance of probabilities. In the instant case, the deceased was travelling on a motorcycle and was hit by an unknown vehicle. The said accident took place in the night of 18.11.1996. The FIR was lodged next morning and even though the police had filed a final report yet it was pleaded that the claimants had filed a protest petition. Thus, it cannot be said that the vehicle in question was implanted merely because the police in its investigation could not clearly identify and fix the involvement of the Matador.

15. Taking his submission forward, Shri Ahmad submits that the claim petition came to be filed on 08.07.1997 i.e. after about 7 months. It is also to be noticed that the final report was filed sometimes in January, 1997 but post this period, the claimants had received mere information from Shri Radhey Shyam, who was examined as claimant witness No.2 and his testimony was crucial for the reason that he was an eye witness to the accident, who had noted the number. The said witness was cross-examined by the Insurance Company but no adverse material could be elicited from his testimony.

16. Learned counsel for the claimants-respondents has also urged that the owner and the driver of the offending vehicle filed their written statement wherein the factum of the accident was admitted. The only denial was in respect of the negligence inasmuch as it was pleaded in the written statement that the Matador was being driven safely and at a reasonable speed but rather it was the motorcyclist who was rash and negligent which caused the accident. It is submitted that insofar as the accident is concerned, the same is admitted by the owner and the driver of the offending vehicle.

17. Now the issue as to who is the negligent could best be amplified from the testimony of the driver, who was examined as the sole witness on behalf of the respondent-owner but there is no clear evidence to suggest that he was not negligent especially his testimony was to be tested in light of the deposition given by the eye witness Radhey Shyam, who was examined as claimant witness No.2.

18. It is taking note of the aforesaid circumstances and considering the evidence available on record that the Tribunal has returned a finding that it was the offending Matador which was involved in the accident and the driver of the Madator was rash and negligent which led to the death of Vinod Kumar. Thus, where there is ample evidence available on record, it cannot be said that on account of minor discrepancy, the evidence of the claimant-witness can be brushed aside nor it can give rise to any presumption or inference that the vehicle was falsely implicated and planted.

19. Learned counsel for the claimants-respondents further submits that the Matador is a light motor vehicle and is used generally as delivery vans it does not require any permit. There is no evidence on record led either by the Insurance Company to state that the vehicle involved in the accident was being utilized as a commercial vehicle and/or it required a permit. In absence of such pleadings and evidence, this ground has been raised only at the appellate stage which does not have any basis and consequently the Insurance Company is definitely liable.

20. Learned counsel for the claimants-respondents further urged that the rate of interest as awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper and in the facts and circumstances, the appeal of the Insurance Company deserves to be dismissed.

21. The Court has considered the rival submissions and also perused the material on record.

22. At the very outset, it will be worthwhile to notice certain decisions of the Apex Court namely (i) Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation (2009) 13 SCC 530 [LQ/SC/2009/842] ; (ii) Sunita & Ors. vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., (2020) 13 SCC 486 [LQ/SC/2019/270 ;] and (iii) Anita Sharma and others v. New India Assurance Company Limited and another, (2021) 1 SCC 171 [LQ/SC/2020/821 ;] .

23. The Apex Court in Sunita (supra) has held under:-

"11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant’s predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a postmortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition.

14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant’s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3.

15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside.

23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case, this Court in Parmeshwari vs. Amir Chand (2011) 11 SCC 635 [LQ/SC/2011/166] noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated 7 (2011) 11 SCC 635 21 the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paras 12 & 13 and observed thus: (Parmeshwari case, SCC p. 638)

“12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.

13. The other so-called reason in the High Court’s order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is “a device to grab money from the insurance company”. This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted. …”

24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal (1980) 3 SCC 457 , [LQ/SC/1980/132] wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458-59).

“3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take 8 (1980) 3 SCC 457 [LQ/SC/1980/132] special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider nofault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.”

25. In Dulcina Fernandes (2013) 10 SCC 646 , [LQ/SC/2013/1154] this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant’s eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi. In paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509 , has been adverted to as under: (Dulcina Fernandes case, SCC p. 650) “8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10)

‘10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.

* * *

(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. …

(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.’

9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519)

‘10. … We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.’”

In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes, the Court opined that nonexamination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability.”

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"22. It is thus well settled that in motor accident claim cases, once the foundational fact, namely, the actual occurrence of the accident, has been established, then the Tribunal's role would be to calculate the quantum of just compensation if the accident had taken place by reason of negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle and, while doing so, the Tribunal would not be strictly bound by the pleadings of the parties. Notably, while deciding cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability and not the strict standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt which is followed in criminal cases."

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"38. Reverting to the question of adequacy of compensation amount determined by the Tribunal, the appellants have not assailed the order of the High Court rejecting their appeal. Further, in their appeal before the High Court (SBCMA No. 581 of 2017), the limited grievance was about deduction of income tax from the calculated income. That ground is unsustainable in light of the decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 [LQ/SC/2017/1578] : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] . We cannot permit the appellants to widen the scope in the present appeal, much less pray for enhanced compensation. We are instead inclined to restore the award passed by the Tribunal as it has determined the just compensation amount, keeping in mind all the relevant parameters including the apportionment thereof between the family members of the deceased. Upholding that award would be doing complete justice."

24. The Apex Court in Anita Sharma (supra) in Paragraphs No.17, 21 and 22 held as under:-

"17. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellantclaimants' hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometres away in an altogether different State. Close to the facts of the case in hand, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [ Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 [LQ/SC/2011/166] : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] , viewed that : (SCC p. 638, para 12)

“12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v. Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.

* * *

‘15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.’”

(emphasis supplied)

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21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role of courts while examining evidence in accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyse the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant's version is more likely than not true.

22. A somewhat similar situation arose in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 [LQ/SC/2013/1154] : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] wherein this Court reiterated that : (SCC p. 650, para 7)

“7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 [LQ/SC/2009/842] : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .)”

(emphasis supplied)"

25. From a perusal of the aforesaid decisions, it would be clear that the Tribunal is not required to go into a deep scrutiny of facts and evidence to return a finding which is beyond reasonable doubt. All what the Tribunal is required to undertake while holding an enquiry in a petition dealing with motor accident claim case is to ascertain whether the foundational facts as pleaded have been made out or not and that too is to be sifted on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Once the foundational facts leading to the claim have been proved then the Tribunal is required to move ahead and compute the compensation.

26. In the aforesaid backdrop if the facts of the present case are scrutinized in light of the averments made by the learned counsel for the respective parties it is no doubt true that the FIR was lodged on 19.12.1996 and it did not mention about the Matador in question. But what is striking in the instant case is that the claim petition came to be filed on 08.07.1997 i.e. almost after 7 months of the accident. While filing the claim petition, the claimants had impleaded the owner and the driver indicating that they were owner and driver of Matador bearing No.UP-J-6886 merely because the name of the driver was amended in the cause title of the claim petition will not give rise of any adverse inference that the entire incident has been cooked up.

27. Another important aspect i.e. revealed from the record, is the fact, that upon issuance of the notice by the Tribunal the owner and the driver filed their written statement and admitted the accident. It is not the case of the owner and the driver that the Matador in question i.e. Matador bearing No.UP-J-6886 did not belong to the owner or that the said vehicle was not being driven by the driver in question or that it did not meet with an accident.

28. In this backdrop another fact which needs to be seen is that a person who was a lone rider of the motorcycle meets with an accident in the highway at about 08:30 in the night in the month of November and the information regarding his death is conveyed to his family by an acquaintance and merely upon lodging of the FIR, the vehicle number is not mentioned it will not give rise to any presumption of the incident being false.

29. The claimants in order to discharge their burden examined Radhey Shyam, who stated that he was travelling in a milk van and was behind the motorcycle of the deceased. He had witnessed the said accident which was caused by the Matador bearing No.UP-J-6886. It is also categorical case of the claimant witness Radhey Shyam that he informed Shri Kalpnath Jain regarding the accident and also to convey the same to the family of the deceased. It has also been clearly stated by Radhey Shyam that he had informed the number of the Matador after about a month to Shri Pushpendra, the brother of the deceased. This was also corroborated by the Pushpendra in his examination and was also reiterated in his crossexamination. Smt. Sunita, the wife of the deceased was also crossexamined on the aforesaid point and she also clearly stated that the number was informed to her by her brother-in-law (Pushpendra), who had received the information from Radhey Shyam. She further stated that upon the loss of her husband and with minor children at her hands she was hugely disturbed and she did not remember the dates with precision.

30. Having noticed the evidence of the claimant witnesses No.1, 2 and 3 in tandem, it would indicate that the factum of the accident is not denied by the owner and driver. The issue of involvement of the Matador and that it is falsely implicated as raised by the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company does not have much strength to stand for the reason that once there is an admission of the owner and the driver of the Matador that it was involved in the said accident as well as in light of the evidence on record, the fact of the involvement stands proved and all the other submissions of the appellant is pure hypothesis.

31. The evidence led by the claimant established and covers the incident and how they received the information. There is nothing adverse in the cross-examination of all the three witnesses which could cast a doubt over their testimonies or their credibility.

32. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to read the evidence of the claimant-witnesses with a fine tooth comb to fish out discrepancies and contradictions which is perhaps not a correct manner to evaluate the evidence in a motor accident claims case. The dictum of the Apex Court in Sunita (supra), Bimla (supra) and Anita Sharma (supra) clearly lays down the parameters as to how the evaluation of the evidence is to take place and applying the principles to the facts of the instant case, this Court is clearly of the opinion that the findings returned by the Tribunal does not suffer from any error and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company that the Matador has been falsely implicated is misconceived and accordingly is turned down.

33. Considering the second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company, it would be found that there is no material to suggest that the Matador was being utilized as commercial vehicle, merely because the insurance policy was that of commercial nature will not imply that the vehicle was employed for a commercial purposes for which any permit was required. Even otherwise it has not been pointed out for a Madator, which is otherwise registered as a light motor vehicle, under what circumstances a permit is required. The question whether it was used for commercial purposes cannot be answered in abstract as there is nothing either in the pleadings or in evidence that it was being utilized as commercial vehicle and that it required a permit.

34. The Apex Court in Fahim Ahmad and others v. United India Insurance Company Limited and others, (2014) 14 SCC 148 [LQ/SC/2014/308] held as under:-

"5. A perusal of the records shows that, at the time of the accident, a trolley was attached with the tractor, which was carrying sand for the purpose of construction of underground tank near the farm land for irrigation purpose(s). However, merely because it was carrying sand would not mean that the tractor was being used for commercial purpose and consequently, there was a breach of the condition of policy on the part of the insured. There is nothing on record to show that the tractor was being used for commercial purpose(s) or purpose(s) other than agricultural purpose(s) i.e. for hire or reward, as contemplated under Section 149(2)(a) (i)(a) of the said Act.

6. Although the plea of breach of the conditions of policy was raised before the Tribunal, yet neither any issue was framed nor was any evidence led to prove the same. In our opinion, it was mandatory for Respondent 1 Insurance Company not only to plead the said breach, but also substantiate the same by adducing positive evidence in respect of the same. In the absence of any such evidence, it cannot be presumed that there was breach of the conditions of policy. Thus, there was no reason to fasten the said liability of payment of the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal on the appellants herein."

35. Thus, for the aforesaid reason, this Court is unable to accept the second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that on account of lack of permit, the award could not be passed against the Insurance Company.

36. The third submission regarding the rate of interest, this issue will be taken up along with the appeal filed by the claimants-respondents for enhancement and shall be appropriately dealt with at a later stage.

37. In the aforesaid backdrop, now this Court proposes to take up the appeal for enhancement filed by the claimants and Shri Adnan Ahmad, learned counsel for the claimants has primarily assailed the award seeking enhancement on the ground that the Tribunal has grossly erred in making unnecessary deductions in the income of the deceased inasmuch as it was a clear case that the deceased was a Development Officer with the National Insurance Company Limited and was drawing a sum of Rs.9,763/- per month. It is urged that the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal in making the deductions is not backed by any legal provision or principles of law.

38. Having noticed the aforesaid submissions, this Court is apparently of the view that the Tribunal has erred in making the deductions from the salary of the deceased. In this regard, the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sebastiani Lakra and others v. National Insurance Company Limited and another, (2019) 17 SCC 465 [LQ/SC/2018/1338] throws light on the issue as to what kind of deductions can be made from the salary of the deceased as well as of the accrual can be deducted while computing the compensation. This issue was also considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Nasreen Jahan and others v. Garima Pandey, F.A.F.O. No.1118 of 2009 and also in National Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Deepali Pal and others, 2015 (33) LCD 1933. [LQ/AllHC/2015/1344]

39. For ready reference, the relevant Paragraph No.12 to 16 of the report in Sebastiani Lakra (supra) are reproduced as under:-

"12. The law is well settled that deductions cannot be allowed from the amount of compensation either on account of insurance, or on account of pensionary benefits or gratuity or grant of employment to a kin of the deceased. The main reason is that all these amounts are earned by the deceased on account of contractual relations entered into by him with others. It cannot be said that these amounts accrued to the dependants or the legal heirs of the deceased on account of his death in a motor vehicle accident. The claimants/dependants are entitled to “just compensation” under the Motor Vehicles Act as a result of the death of the deceased in a motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the natural corollary is that the advantage which accrues to the estate of the deceased or to his dependants as a result of some contract or act which the deceased performed in his lifetime cannot be said to be the outcome or result of the death of the deceased even though these amounts may go into the hands of the dependants only after his death.

13. As far as any amount paid under any insurance policy is concerned whatever is added to the estate of the deceased or his dependants is not because of the death of the deceased but because of the contract entered into between the deceased and the insurance company from where he took out the policy. The deceased paid premium on such life insurance and this amount would have accrued to the estate of the deceased either on maturity of the policy or on his death, whatever be the manner of his death. These amounts are paid because the deceased has wisely invested his savings. Similar would be the position in case of other investments like bank deposits, share, debentures, etc. The tortfeasor cannot take advantage of the foresight and wise financial investments made by the deceased.

14. As far as the amounts of pension and gratuity are concerned, these are paid on account of the service rendered by the deceased to his employer. It is now an established principle of service jurisprudence that pension and gratuity are the property of the deceased. They are more in the nature of deferred wages. The deceased employee works throughout his life expecting that on his retirement he will get substantial amount as pension and gratuity. These amounts are also payable on death, whatever be the cause of death. Therefore, applying the same principles, the said amount cannot be deducted.

15. As held by the House of Lords in Parry v. Cleaver [Parry v. Cleaver, 1970 AC 1 : (1969) 2 WLR 821 : 1969 ACJ 363 (HL)] the insurance amount is the fruit of premium paid in the past, pension is the fruit of services already rendered and the wrongdoer should not be given benefit of the same by deducting it from the damages assessed.

16. Deduction can be ordered only where the tortfeasor satisfies the court that the amount has accrued to the claimants only on account of death of the deceased in a motor vehicle accident."

40. The Apex Court in Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan and others, (2013) 7 SCC 476 [LQ/SC/2013/526] also had on occasion to consider what can be deducted from the salary of the deceased and the relevant paragraphs No.18 to 23 of the aforesaid report is reproduced as under:-

"18. The first issue is “whether provident fund, pension and insurance receivable by the claimants come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction”.

19. The aforesaid issue fell for consideration before this Court in Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [(1999) 1 SCC 90 [LQ/SC/1998/973] : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] [LQ/SC/1998/973] . In the said case, this Court held that provident fund, pension, insurance and similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. are all a “pecuniary advantage” receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as “pecuniary advantage” liable for deduction. The following was the observation and finding of this Court: (SCC pp. 111-12, para 35)

“35. Broadly, we may examine the receipt of the provident fund which is a deferred payment out of the contribution made by an employee during the tenure of his service. Such employee or his heirs are entitled to receive this amount irrespective of the accidental death. This amount is secured, is certain to be received, while the amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is uncertain and is receivable only on the happening of the event viz. accident, which may not take place at all. Similarly, family pension is also earned by an employee for the benefit of his family in the form of his contribution in the service in terms of the service conditions receivable by the heirs after his death. The heirs receive family pension even otherwise than the accidental death. No co-relation between the two. Similarly, life insurance policy is received either by the insured or the heirs of the insured on account of the contract with the insurer, for which the insured contributes in the form of premium. It is receivable even by the insured if he lives till maturity after paying all the premiums. In the case of death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the sum to the heirs, again in terms of the contract for the premium paid. Again, this amount is receivable by the claimant not on account of any accidental death but otherwise on the insured's death. Death is only a step or contingency in terms of the contract, to receive the amount. Similarly any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death but all these have no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. How could such an amount come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction. When we seek the principle of loss and gain, it has to be on a similar and same plane having nexus, inter se, between them and not to which there is no semblance of any co-relation. The insured (the deceased) contributes his own money for which he receives the amount which has no co-relation to the compensation computed as against the tortfeasor for his negligence on account of the accident. As aforesaid, the amount receivable as compensation under the Act is on account of the injury or death without making any contribution towards it, then how can the fruits of an amount received through contributions of the insured be deducted out of the amount receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount under this Act he receives without any contribution. As we have said, the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount receivable under the life insurance policy is contractual.”

20. The second issue is “whether the salary receivable by the claimant on compassionate appointment comes within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as ‘pecuniary advantage’ liable for deduction”.

21. “Compassionate appointment” can be one of the conditions of service of an employee, if a scheme to that effect is framed by the employer. In case, the employee dies in harness i.e. while in service leaving behind the dependants, one of the dependants may request for compassionate appointment to maintain the family of the deceased employee who dies in harness. This cannot be stated to be an advantage receivable by the heirs on account of one's death and have no correlation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned on account of accidental death. Compassionate appointment may have nexus with the death of an employee while in service but it is not necessary that it should have a correlation with the accidental death. An employee dies in harness even in normal course, due to illness and to maintain the family of the deceased one of the dependants may be entitled for compassionate appointment but that cannot be termed as “pecuniary advantage” that comes under the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act and any amount received on such appointment is not liable for deduction for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

22. The third issue is “whether the income tax is liable to be deducted for determination of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act”.

23. In Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 [LQ/SC/2009/869] : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] [LQ/SC/2009/869] this Court held: (SCC p. 133, para 20)

“20. Generally the actual income of the deceased less income tax should be the starting point for calculating the compensation.”

This Court further observed that: (SCC p. 134, para 24)

“24. … Where the annual income is in taxable range, the words ‘actual salary’ should be read as ‘actual salary less tax’.”

Therefore, it is clear that if the annual income comes within the taxable range, income tax is required to be deducted for determination of the actual salary. But while deducting income tax from the salary, it is necessary to notice the nature of the income of the victim. If the victim is receiving income chargeable under the head “salaries” one should keep in mind that under Section 192(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 any person responsible for paying any income chargeable under the head “salaries” shall at the time of payment, deduct income tax on estimated income of the employee from “salaries” for that financial year. Such deduction is commonly known as tax deducted at source (“TDS”, for short). When the employer fails in default to deduct the TDS from the employee's salary, as it is his duty to deduct the TDS, then the penalty for non-deduction of TDS is prescribed under Section 201(1-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, in case the income of the victim is only from “salary”, the presumption would be that the employer under Section 192(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has deducted the tax at source from the employee's salary. In case if an objection is raised by any party, the objector is required to prove by producing evidence such as LPC to suggest that the employer failed to deduct the TDS from the salary of the employee. However, there can be cases where the victim is not a salaried person i.e. his income is from sources other than salary, and the annual income falls within taxable range, in such cases, if any objection as to deduction of tax is made by a party then the claimant is required to prove that the victim has already paid income tax and no further tax has to be deducted from the income."

41. In Manasvi Jain v. Delhi Transport Corporation Limited and others, (2014) 13 SCC 22, [LQ/SC/2014/463 ;] the Apex Court held as under:-

"7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court. It is not in dispute that the deceased was getting an amount of Rs 26,924 as monthly salary and Rs 11,140 was being deducted under various heads such as GPF, house rent, GIS and income tax. After taking into account these deductions, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the net salary of the deceased is Rs 15,784 and awarded a total compensation of Rs 10,25,176, including Rs 5000 towards funeral expenses and Rs 10,000 towards mental agony. The High Court did not interfere with the judgment of the Tribunal.

8. This Court in Shyamwati Sharma v. Karam Singh [Shyamwati Sharma v. Karam Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 378 [LQ/SC/2010/679] : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 626 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] [LQ/SC/2010/679] , while considering the issues of deduction of taxes, contributions, etc., for arriving at the figure of net monthly income, held that: (SCC p. 380, para 9)

“9. … while ascertaining the income of the deceased, any deductions shown in the salary certificate as deductions towards GPF, life insurance premium, repayments of loans, etc. should not be excluded from the income. The deduction towards income tax/surcharge alone should be considered to arrive at the net income of the deceased.”

(emphasis supplied)"

42. In Kalpanaraj and others v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, (2015) 2 SCC 764, [LQ/SC/2014/457] it has been observed by the Apex Court in Paragraph 8 and 9:-

"8. It is pertinent to note that the only available documentary evidence on record of the monthly income of the deceased is the income tax return filed by him with the Income Tax Department. The High Court was correct therefore, to determine the monthly income on the basis of the income tax return. However, the High Court erred in ascertaining the net income of the deceased as the amount to be taken into consideration for calculating compensation, in the light of the principle laid down by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava, (2008) 2 SCC 763 [LQ/SC/2007/1529 ;] : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550] [LQ/SC/2007/1529 ;] . The relevant paragraphs of the case read as under: (SCC pp. 768-70, paras 14-15)

“14. The question came for consideration before a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy [2007 AIHC 1921 (Mad)] wherein it was held: (AIHC pp. 1927-28, para 7) ‘7. … Income tax, professional tax which are deducted from the salaried person goes to the coffers of the Government under specific head and there is no return. Whereas, the general provident fund, special provident fund, LIC contribution are amounts paid under specific heads and the contribution is always repayable to an employee at the time of voluntary retirement, death or for any other reason. Such contributions made by the salaried person are deferred payments and they are savings. The Supreme Court as well as various High Courts have held that the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act is statutory and that the deferred payments made to the employee are contractual. Courts have held that there cannot be any deductions in the statutory compensation, if the legal representatives are entitled to lump sum payment under the contractual liability. If the contributions made by the employee which are otherwise savings from the salary are deducted from the gross income and only the net income is taken for computing the dependency compensation, then the legal representatives of the victim would lose considerable portion of the income. In view of the settled proposition of law, I am of the view, the Tribunal can make only statutory deductions such as income tax and professional tax and any other contribution, which is not repayable by the employer, from the salary of the deceased person while determining the monthly income for computing the dependency compensation. Any contribution made by the employee during his lifetime, form part of the salary and they should be included in the monthly income, while computing the dependency compensation.’

15. Similar view was expressed by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S. Narayanamma v. Govt. of India [2002 AIHC 2633 : (2002) 1 APLJ 473] holding: (AIHC p. 2636, para 12)

‘12. In this background, now we will examine the present deductions made by the Tribunal from the salary of the deceased in fixing the monthly contribution of the deceased to his family. The Tribunal has not even taken proper care while deducting the amounts from the salary of the deceased, at least the very nature of deductions from the salary of the deceased. My view is that the deductions made by the Tribunal from the salary such as recovery of housing loan, vehicle loan, festival advance and other deductions, if any, to the benefit of the estate of the deceased cannot be deducted while computing the net monthly earnings of the deceased. These advances or loans are part of his salary. So far as house rent allowance is concerned, it is beneficial to the entire family of the deceased during his tenure, but for his untimely death the claimants are deprived of such benefit which they would have enjoyed if the deceased were alive. On the other hand, allowances, like travelling allowance, allowance for newspapers/periodicals, telephone, servant, club fee, car maintenance, etc., by virtue of his vocation need not be included in the salary while computing the net earnings of the deceased. The finding of the Tribunal that the deceased was getting Rs 1401 as net income every month is unsustainable as the deductions made towards vehicle loan and other deductions were also taken into consideration while fixing the monthly income of the deceased. The above finding of the Tribunal is contrary to the principle of “just compensation” enunciated by the Supreme Court in the judgment in Helen case [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 [LQ/SC/1998/973] : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] [LQ/SC/1998/973] . Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 [LQ/SC/1979/240] : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996] [LQ/SC/1979/240] held that determination of quantum must be liberal and not niggardly since law values life and limb in a free country “in generous scales”.’”

(emphasis supplied)

9. In the light of the principle of law laid down by this Court in the Indira Srivastava case [National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Indira Srivastava, (2008) 2 SCC 763 [LQ/SC/2007/1529 ;] : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 744 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 550] [LQ/SC/2007/1529 ;] mentioned supra, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in making deductions under various heads to arrive at the net income instead of ascertaining the gross income of the deceased out of the annual income earned from his occupation mentioned in the income tax return submitted for the relevant Financial Year 1994-1995."

43. Another decision of the Apex Court relevant to adjudge the aforesaid issue is Reliance General Insurance Company Limited v. Shashi Sharma and others, (2016) 9 SCC 627 [LQ/SC/2016/1249] and the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid report are reproduced as under:-

"17. Be that as it may, the term “compensation” has not been defined in the 1988 Act. By interpretative process, it has been understood to mean to recompense the claimants for the possible loss suffered or likely to be suffered due to sudden and untimely death of their family member as a result of motor accident. Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be just and adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should be passed on to the claimants in the matter of award of compensation. Section 168 of the 1988 Act makes the first principle explicit. Sub-section (1) of that provision makes it clear that the amount of compensation must be just. The word “just” means—fair, adequate, and reasonable. It has been derived from the Latin word “justus”, connoting right and fair. In para 7 of State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur [State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7 SCC 484 [LQ/SC/2003/749] : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1671] , it has been held that the expression “just” denotes that the amount must be equitable, fair, reasonable and not arbitrary. In para 16 of Sarla Verma v. DTC [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 [LQ/SC/2009/869] : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] [LQ/SC/2009/869] , this Court has observed that the compensation “is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit”. That, however, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as to what amount would be a just compensation.

18. The principle discernible from the exposition in Helen C. Rebello case [Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC, (1999) 1 SCC 90 [LQ/SC/1998/973] : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] [LQ/SC/1998/973] is that if the amount “would be due to the dependants of the deceased even otherwise”, the same shall not be deductible from the compensation amount payable under the 1988 Act. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that loss of income is a significant head under which compensation is claimed in terms of the 1988 Act. The component of quantum of “loss of income”, inter alia, can be “pay and wages” which otherwise would have been earned by the deceased employee if he had survived the injury caused to him due to motor accident. If the dependants of the deceased employee, however, were to be compensated by the employer in that behalf, as is predicated by the 2006 Rules—to grant compassionate assistance by way of ex gratia financial assistance on compassionate grounds to the dependants of the deceased government employee who dies in harness, it is unfathomable that the dependants can still be permitted to claim the same amount as a possible or likely loss of income to be suffered by them to maintain a claim for compensation under the 1988 Act."

44. From a perusal of the aforesaid relevant paragraphs of the said judgments, it would indicate that the Tribunal has grossly erred in making deductions from the salary of the deceased. All that is required to be deducted are the statutory deductions such as income too, but merely because the claimant Sunita had received compassionate appointment on the death of her husband would not give any leverage to the Tribunal to deduct any amount on account of the aforesaid fact.

45. The record would indicate that the salary slip which has been brought on record indicates that the gross salary was Rs.9,763/-, out of which deductions towards income-tax was @ Rs.1,000/- and other vehicle loan installments of Rs.1,298/- amongst other was being deducted. Apart from contribution towards General Provident Fund, the net sum of Rs.6,382/- was being paid to the deceased and the Tribunal has clearly erred in deducting an amount on account of grant of compassionate appointment to the claimant.

46. This Court further finds that after making the aforesaid unnecessary deductions, the Tribunal has further failed to deduct 1/3 towards personal expenses whereas the record would indicate that the deceased was survived by his wife and three minor children making the dependents to be four and in view thereof instead of 1/3, 1/4 ought to have been deducted. Since, the deceased was working as a Development Officer and had stable job and a proved income and looking at his age of 39 years, he would also be entitled to the benefits of future prospect. The Tribunal has meagerly granted a sum of Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses but has completely lost sight of the issue of grant towards consortium which was admissible to the claimants as upon the death of Shri Vinod Kumar Misra, his wife was deprived of spouse consortium whereas three minor children were deprived of parental consortium.

47. This aspect has been considered by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC Page 680. This was further considered and explained by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., vs. Nanu Ram, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1546 and the relevant portion thereof reads as under:-

"8.7 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is Loss of Consortium.

In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses ‘spousal consortium’, ‘parental consortium’, and ‘filial consortium’.

The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Rajesh and Ors. vs. Rajbir Singh and Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 54 [LQ/SC/2013/422] .

Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.”BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).

Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training.”

Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.

Consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognized that the value of a child’s consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child.

The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In case where a parent has lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of Filial Consortium.

Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Act.

A few High Courts have awarded compensation on this count. Rajasthan High Court in Jagmala Ram @ Jagmal Singh & Ors. vs. Sohi Ram & Ors 2017 (4) RLW 3368 (Raj) [LQ/RajHC/2017/1367] ; Uttarakhand High Court in Smt. Rita Rana & Anr. vs. Pradeep Kumar, 2014 (3) UC 1687; Karnataka High Court in Lakshman vs. Susheela Chand Choudhary, (1996) 3 Kant LJ 570 (DB). However, there was no clarity with respect to the principles on which compensation could be awarded on loss of Filial Consortium.

The amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under ‘Loss of Consortium’ as laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra).

In the present case, we deem it appropriate to award the father and the sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 40,000 each for loss of Filial Consortium."

48. Thus, this Court finds that apparently the Tribunal has erred in making the deductions from the salary, failed to provide future prospect and has completely ignored the issue of consortium. Apart from the fact that no amount has been granted towards the loss of estate and a meager figure of Rs.2,000/- has been awarded towards funeral expenses which is also not appropriate.

49. Learned counsel for the appellant at this stage has definitely submitted that the amount which has been granted is in context of time as the accident took place in the year 1996 and it is also submitted that though there can be a provision for grant of consortium as well as future benefits but nevertheless grant of compensation cannot be a bounty in the hands of the claimants. It is balancing the aforesaid aspect of the matter that it is urged that the compensation may be recomputed which could be just and fair and not a bonanza in the hands of the claimants.

50. Having taken note of the aforesaid submissions, this Court recomputes the compensation as under:-

Income = Rs.6,382/- per month

Add: Future Prospect added Net Income: Income after = Rs.2,500/- per month

deduction of 1/4 = Rs.8,882-2,220=6,662/- net income

Age = 39

Multiplier Thus compensation = 15

payable = Rs.6,662 x 12 x 15 = Rs.11,99,160/-

Conventional head of consortium, funeral expenses and loss of Estate = Rs.70,000/-

Thus, total compensation payable shall be= Rs.12,69,160/-

51. It is now well settled in a catena of judgments that the rate of interest, which has been approved by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Neeta W/o Kallappa Kadolkar & Ors. vs. Divisional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Kolhapur, (2015) 3 SCC 590 [LQ/SC/2015/56] ; Shashikala & Ors. vs. Gangalakshmamma & Ors., (2015) 9 SCC 150 [LQ/SC/2015/369] and Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association & Ors., (2011) 14 SCC 481 is 9% per annum.

52. In Neeta W/o Kallappa Kadolkar (supra), the Apex Court observed in Para-16, which read as under:-

"16. The appellants are also entitled to the interest on the compensation awarded by this Court in these appeals @ 9% p.a. along with the amount under the different heads as indicated above. The courts below have erred in awarding the interest @ 8% p.a. on the compensation awarded by them to the appellants without following the decision of this Court in MCD v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims Assn. [(2011) 14 SCC 481 [LQ/SC/2011/1381] : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 897 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 555 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 305] Accordingly, we award the interest @ 9% p.a. on the compensation determined in these appeals from the date of filing of the application till the date of payment."

53. In Sangeeta and others v. Krishan Kumar and others, (2019) 13 SCC 794, [LQ/SC/2018/1286] the Apex Court in Paragraph No.3 held as under:-

"3. We do not think that we need to issue notice for this purpose to the respondents. Hence, the appeal is partly allowed holding that the appellant shall be entitled to interest @ 9% p.a. on the entire amount of compensation granted by the High Court from the date of filing of the claim petition before the Tribunal. The amount already deposited by the Insurance Company will be duly adjusted."

54. However, as per Rule 220-A of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules, 1988, the rate of interest has been fixed at 7%, which is merely a guideline. However, looking into the totality of the circumstances and taking a holistic view, this Court finds that the ends of justice would be served if the interest is reduced to 9% per annum on the amount of compensation so recomputed and granted.

55. This Court at this stage is also of the opinion that since the accident is of the year 1996 and the amount which has been granted to the claimants by adding future prospect as well as the consortium which is an outcome of the interpretation given by the Apex Court which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the claimants-respondents and in the aforesaid circumstances, it will be just and proper that the rate of interest which has been granted by the Tribunal as 12% needs to be modified and accordingly the claimants-respondents shall be now entitled to a total sum of Rs.12,69,160/- which has been recomputed by this Court along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of its payment.

56. Any amount paid to the claimants-respondents shall be deducted from the amount so computed and the remaining shall be paid by the appellant Insurance Company to the claimants-respondents within a period of 60 days from the date a certified copy of this order is served on the Insurance Company.

57. Any amount which may have been deposited by the appellant Insurance Company before the Tribunal or before this Court in terms of the statutory deposit or in pursuance of any interim order passed by this Court while considering the appeal of the Insurance Company shall be remitted to the Tribunal to be released in favour of the claimants-respondents. The record of the Tribunal shall also be returned forthwith.

58. In light of the detailed discussions hereinabove, the award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Claim Petition No.176/1997 dated 29.02.2000 shall stands modified to the aforesaid extent and now the claimants-respondents shall be entitled to a total sum of Rs.12,69,160/- along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of application till the date of the payment.

59. As a result and subject to the aforesaid modification, the appeal filed by the appellant Insurance Company bearing F.A.F.O. No.260/2000 is partly allowed and the appeal filed by the claimants-respondents bearing F.A.F.O. No.283/2000 is also partly allowed. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.