Dipak Misra, J.

1. Invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the non-applicant/petitioner has called in question the pregnability of the order dated 2.2.2000 passed by the First Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Panna, in Claim Case No. 1 of 1999.

2. The facts as have been unfolded are that the petitioner is the insurer of Commander Jeep No. MP-16-A-4539 which was registered and insured as a private car and insurance policy covered the period from 3.12.1997 to 2.12.1998. The non-applicant is the owner of the said jeep and it was being plied as a taxi on 28.8.1998 when it met with an accident. The survey was conducted by the petitioner company. The non-applicant filled up the claim form in respect of loss caused to the vehicle and demanded indemnification for loss suffered by him because of the damage caused to the vehicle. The insurance company after appreciating the claim of the non-applicant communicated to him by letter dated 2.2.1999 that his claim for damage caused to the vehicle was not payable by the insurer. Feeling aggrieved by the same the non-applicant preferred an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the) and claimed damages for a sum of Rs. 74,306 which according to him was to be indemnified by the insurer. The insurance company at the outset filed an objection as to the maintainability of the claim under Section 166 of the. The Tribunal took up the preliminary objection and rejected the same. The said order is the cause of grievance of the insurer revisionist.

3. Mrs. Amrit Ruprah, learned counsel for the insurance company petitioner has submitted that the Tribunal has erred in law by opining that own damage claim of an owner is tenable before the Tribunal under Section 166 of the. It is also submitted by her that the Tribunal has not discussed the various provisions of the and passed a cryptic order which is vulnerable. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this court to Sections 165 and 166 of theand has submitted that on a conjoint reading of these two sections it is plain as noon day that the claim in respect of the damages to the owner insured does not lie before the Claims Tribunal. She has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court rendered in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v, P.N. Vijaiwargiya .

4. Resisting the aforesaid submission Mr. Vivek Rusia, learned counsel for the non-applicant has contended that the language employed under Section 166 of theshould be given a broader meaning to achieve the purposes of the. It is also his submission that after Sub-section (1) of Section 110 was amended by Amending Act 56 of 1969, the Tribunal has got the jurisdiction to award damages in respect of property and that would cover the property of the owner insured also. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Central Road Trans. Corporation Ltd. v. Orissa State Commercial Trans. Corporation and Kamal Kusha v. Kirpal Singh 1987 ACJ 709 (J&K).

5. To appreciate the rival submissions advanced at the Bar it is apposite to refer to relevant part of Section 165 of the. Act which reads as under:

165. Claims Tribunals.--(1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both.

Mrs. Ruprah has given immense emphasis on the language damages to any property of a third party so arising. In this context, I may refer to the relevant part of Section 166 of thewhich reads as under:

166. Application for compensation.--(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made--

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.

6. Mr. Vivek Rusia, learned counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the language employed in Sub-section (1) (b) by the owner of the property would include in its ambit and scope the owner/insured. Mr. Rusia has also submitted that the concept of bodily injury has to be understood in a broad spectrum so that a person sustaining loss in respect of his own property can also maintain an application under Section 166 of thebefore the Claims Tribunal. On a proper scrutiny of Section 166 of the Act, it appears that an application for compensation can be filed arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165. Thus Section 166 has to be conjointly read with Section 165 which provides claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death of or bodily injury to person arising out of the use of the motor vehicles or damages to any property of a third party so arising or both. On a reading of both the provisions in a harmonious manner it is perceptible that they lay down in categorical terms filing of application before the Tribunal in respect of damages caused to the properties of a third party. Though Mr. Rusia laboured hard to bring home the point that Sub-section (1) (b) of Section 166 should be given a distinct and independent meaning and should be interpreted to include the owner of the property, I am of the considered opinion the said submission has no force in as much as Sub-section (I) (b) refers to owner of the property and in the context of both the provisions it would mean the third party and not the insured.

7. Now, I shall refer to the decisions cited at Bar. In the case of Central Road Trans, Corporation Ltd. , a Division Bench of High Court of Orissa came to hold that by virtue of amendment brought into existence by Amending Act 56 of 1969 the owner of the property was able to maintain an application under Section 110-A of the old Act for grant of damages. In the case of Kamal Kusha 1987 ACJ 709 (J&K), a Division Bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court held as under:

A plain reading of Section 110 would make it manifestly clear that bodily injury or damage to property arising out of a motor accident or both could be made subject-matter of claim before the Claims Tribunal. That would mean that in respect of both injuries whether it be to property or to person claim can be preferred under the provisions of Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act. The words or both occurring in Section 110 are of a great significance. It would covertly mean that compensation can be claimed for one of the injuries in the Section. The section takes care of injuries to person arising out of the use of motor vehicle or to any property of a third party or both. After the words motor vehicle, the amendment has used damage to any property of a third person, disjointly and one can prefer claim in respect of injury to property notwithstanding the fact that bodily injury was not sustained by the said person. It is not necessary that one must sustain bodily injury, then alone he can apply to the Tribunal and in the said application he can then claim damages to any property of a third party. Such a meaning would make the intent and purpose of the section absurd. Section 110- A only says that claim can be made by the person who has sustained the injury. The injury would not mean that it would be the bodily injury alone and not injury to the property. The word the preceding the injury has reference to the injury of a kind mentioned in Section 110, which has no reference to the bodily injury. The qualification to the injury is that it must fall within the ambit and scope of the injury which is mentioned in Section 110 and no other injury...According to the dictionary meaning of the word injury it means damage or hurt done or suffered by a person or thing. The word injury is of large import.

...Therefore, it will be doing violence to the language of Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act if the injury which is an actionable wrong is related only to bodily injury and any claim for damage to property is made non-actionable, if the two claims do not co-exist. Claim for damage to property cannot be made dependent on the claim for bodily injury. The two claims are independent and the two can be independently claimed or jointly claimed, as the case may be.

8. Giving emphasis on the aforesaid ruling it is submitted by Mr. Rusia that bodily injury should not be given a restricted meaning. It is his submission that if it is not done, violence shall be caused to the language employed in the provision. I have bestowed my anxious consideration on the ratio laid down in Kamal Kushas case : 1987 ACJ 709 J&K and I am of the opinion that in the aforesaid case it has only been decided that to entertain an application for damages to property one need not suffer a bodily injury or hurt to his person. The person can file an application for damages in respect of property alone. It is also worth noting that in that case the court was dealing with a case of third party. In the case of P.N. Vijaiwargiya (MP), a Division Bench of this court answered a reference holding that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in all circumstances to entertain a claim for damage to property simpliciter where a claim for bodily injury or death is also preferred or preferable by a third party.

In the said decision in para 10, the Division Bench of this court expressed the view as under:

(10) The claim for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death or bodily injury may relate to the insured and/or third person. However, the claim for compensation involving damage to any property to be entertainable before the Claims Tribunal must relate to a third party only and not the insured. The proviso provides for an option lying with the claimant. Where claim for compensation in respect of damage to property exceeds rupees two thousand which would necessarily be of a third party (and not the insured), the claimant may have it adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal or may have it referred to a civil court for adjudication. Where the claim does not exceed rupees two thousand it has to be tried by the Claims Tribunal. Section 110F bars the jurisdiction of civil court where the claim is entertainable by a Claims Tribunal and a Claims Tribunal has been constituted for that area.

9. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it becomes crystal clear that only a third party can maintain an application in respect of damages to the property before the Accidents Claims Tribunal. As far as the owner/insured is concerned he cannot maintain an application in respect of claim of his own damages under Section 166 of the.

10. In view of my preceding analysis the order of the Tribunal is indefensible and accordingly the same is set aside.

11. In the result the civil revision succeeds and is hereby allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.