1. The 3rd defendant in O.S. No. 284 of 1123 of the Court of the District Munsiff of Irinjalakuda, an assignee of the verumpattom rights under an oral lease, is the appellant in this second appeal. The first respondent is the plaintiff in the suit who sought eviction under the provisions of S. 8(1)(f) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, on the strength of a melpattom deed of 1116, Ext. A, granted to him by the jenmi of the property concerned. The courts below have concurrently held that the requirements of sub-s. (1)(f) of S.8 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, have been satisfied and directed the surrender of the holding.



2. The relevant portion of S. 8(1) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, reads as follows:

"No suit for eviction of a verumpattomdar from his holding or any portion thereof shall lie except on the following grounds -

(f) that at the end of the agricultural year the jenmi or any intermediate land-lord requires the holding or part thereof, except the kudiyiruppu, bonafide for building residential quarters for the use of himself or for any member of his family or tarwad or thavazhi who has a beneficial or proprietory interest therein and the contentions urged before us are:

(1) That the sub-section insists on a demand for surrender at the end of an agricultural year and in the admitted absence of such a demand the suit should have been dismissed;

(2) That a melpattomdar is neither a jenmi nor an intermediate land-lord and hence not one of those who can seek eviction under the provisions of S. 8(1)(f) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118; and

(3) That in any case a notice to quit was essential to sustain the action.

3. Contention No. (1) The controversy till now has been whether the words "requires the holding bonafide" meant a genuine desire on the part of the jenmi or an actual necessity under which he laboured. Under S. 20(5) of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1939, prior to the amendment effected by the Malabar Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1945, a land-lord was entitled to eviction if he required the holding bonafide for his own cultivation. The question as to whether the words "requires the holding bona fide" meant that the jenmi may resume occupation if there was a genuine intention to cultivate or whether he should show a real need to do so came up for consideration in A.I.R. 1942 Madras 242 Narikkal Chathan v. Kesavan Namboodiri. Leach, C.J., quoted with approval the following passage from an unreported judgment of King, J.

"The expressionbona fide cannot apply to a state of circumstances but only to the statements or intentions or actions of a human being. All therefore that is necessary in my opinion is for the Court to decide whether, when the land-lord demands or asks for or sues for any land on the ground that he wishes to cultivate it himself, his statement that he wishes to cultivate it himself is a statement made bona fide."

and said :

"If the Court is convinced that the jenmi has really the intention of cultivating the land he is entitled to be put into possession of it. The fact that he has sufficient land under cultivation elsewhere to provide for the needs of himself and his family matters not."



4. The Malabar Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1945, substituted the words "needs" for "requires" and no case has been brought to our notice where the effect of the change has been the subject of judicial consideration.



5. In XXXVIII Cochin 233 Krishnaswami Iyengar, C.J., in dealing with S. 8(1)(f) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, adopted the view of the Madras High Court and said:

"I am of opinion that the construction placed upon the corresponding words of the Malabar Tenancy Act is correct and should be applied to the same words occurring in our Statute. What the Statute lays down as a condition of the land-lord having the power to evict is that he must require the holding bona fide. The use of the word bona fide which qualifies the verb "requires" means that the state or attitude of the land-lords mind when he seeks to evict the tenant is to be the subject-matter of the investigation. Does he genuinely, that is truly and honestly want the property or does he while really not wanting the property pretend that he wants it That the property is about a mile away, that he has other lands nearer his homestead in his own possession and that the extent of the land required by him is too extensive, are circumstances which a court may well take into account for ascertaining the state of the land-lords mind and the genuineness of his demand. If even then the court finds that he honestly and truly wants the property on his own view of his requirements, it is not for the court to say that he can get on without the property equally well, or that some other property would be equally good or even better. The judgment of the land-lord if it is bona fide in the sense explained, must be allowed to prevail and is not to be overridden by that of the court however correct it may be on the question whether there is a real necessity for the land. In other words, the court is not to decide whether the land is really necessary for the land-lord or not but must allow the decision of the land-lord to prevail if that decision is real and genuine. In the one case the question is the fact of real necessity and in the other state of the land-lords mind, viz., whether his requiring the property is a real and genuine feeling."

6. According to Mr. Mahalinga Iyer, learned counsel for the appellant, the words "requires the holding bona fide for building residential quarters" mean "demands the surrender of the holding bona fide for building residential quarters" and "at the end of the agricultural year" in the sub-section indicates the point of time at which the demand should be made. It is not possible to accept this contention. As we understand the section all that it means is that if a land-lord requires the holding for the purpose specified, except the tenants kudiyiruppu, at the end of the agricultural year applicable to the tenancy, but not during its currency, he is entitled to file a suit for eviction.

7. Contention No. (2). This contention is based on a misconception as to what happens when a melpattom is granted. There is no definition of the term Jenmi" [land-lord] or "intermediate land-lord" in the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118, and so we must proceed on the basis of the ordinary meaning of those terms. A melpattom is nothing but a concurrent lease, that is, a lease which commences before the expiration or other determination of a previous lease of the same premises to another person. Such a lease operates as an assignment of the reversion during such time as the two leases run concurrently and entitles the lessee to the rent reserved in the previous lease and to the benefit of the covenants therein contained.



8. The only further question that can arise is whether a melpattomdar can be considered as an assignee of the reversion until there has been an attornment by the tenant in possession. In A.I.R. 1939 Lahore 49 Daulat Ram v. Haveli Shah it has been held that an attornment by the lessee to the lessors assignee is not necessary under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or of any law in force in the Punjab. We also are unaware of any provision, statutory or customary, prevailing in this State which makes an attornment necessary in such cases.



9. It follows that a melpattomdar as the assignee of part of the reversion can claim eviction under the provisions of S. 8(1)(f) of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, 1118.



10. Contention No. (3). Whether a tenant is entitled to a notice to quit or not depends on his status. In the case of a tenancy-at-will no formal notice to quit is necessary and a mere demand for possession will suffice. As stated in A.I.R. 1925 Patna 256:

"Now it is settled both in England and in India that in the case of a tenancy-at-will no formal notice is required but a demand for possession is sufficient."

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1. We must assume in this case that the tenancy with which we are concerned is a tenancy-at-will and that there has been a demand for possession. The averments in the plaint are to that effect and there has been no controversy on the subject in either of the courts below.

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2. In the light of what is stated above this Second Appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.