Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

The plaintiffs are the appellants. The 1st plaintiff is a speculative purchaser from the 2nd plaintiff of the 2nd plaintiffs alleged rights in the plaint property. The 2nd plaintiff is the son of one Kairath Khan who was the owner of the plaint lands. This suit is brought for the redemption of the usufructuary mortgage (Ex.A.) of these lands made by Kairath, Khan in the year 1858. The plaintiffs case is that the defendants 15 to 20 who represented a Matam have succeeded one Velayudham Pillai in the trusteeship of that Matam and that that Velayudham Pillai was a sub-mortgagee 2 or 3 degrees removed from the original mortgagee under Ex. A. The trustees contention was that the former trustee Velayudham Pillai was the owner of the lands in 1874 and was not a sub-mortgagee thereof and that the Matam has been in possession as owner since 1874.

Both the Lower Courts found that the plaintiffs case that Velayudham Pillai was the sub-mortgagee deriving title from the original mortgagee of 1858 was false and that the Matam had become the owner in 1874. The first finding is a question of fact and cannot be disputed in second appeal. The second finding, namely, that Velayudham Pillai (representing Matam) had become the owner in 1874 was attacked on the ground that the assertion of Velayudham Pillai in Ex. I, a document of 1874, that he was the owner was not admissible in evidence. The subsidiary contention was that the recital in that document that he had become the owner by purchase from Kairath Khan was also not admissible in evidence. As I understand the judgment of the Lower Courts, they held on the 1st point that the assertion of title as owner found in Ex. I, and also implied by that transaction of mortgage itself is admissible under Sect. 13 of the Evidence Act and on the second point that the statement which forms the recital in Ex. A as to how the title was acquired is also admissible under Sect. 32 C1.7 of the Evidence Act the person making that st atement by way of recital, that is, Velayudam Pillai, being now dead. Sect. 13 (omitting the words immaterial for the present) is: Where the question is as to the existence of any right, any transaction by which the right in question was asserted is relevant. One of the instances in the illustrations is where the question is whether A has a right to a fishery, the mortgage of the fishery by As father is a relevant fact. It seems to me that under the above section, the mortgage by Velayudham Pillai in 1874 claiming right as owner is a relevant fact which can be considered in deciding the question of ownership in 1874. It must, of course be admitted that such assertions in recent documents and after disputes arose are almost of no value, but it cannot be held that they are irrelevant as evidence of the title asserted. Usually of course when the document in which the title is asserted is not an old document, courts very properly do not act on such assertions alone and require other and much better proof of title. But as I said, that does not affect the question of relevancy of the document in proof of the title asserted. I shall not deal in detail with the numerous English and Indian cases quoted by Mr. Devadoss on this point and I shall refer only to one case of this Court, namely, the case in Rama Iyengar v. Mannar Iyer (23 M.L.J., 327) decided by Mr. Justice Sundara Aiyar and myself. I think that I remember well that the judgment in that case was pronounced by Mr. Justice Sundara Aiyar and I need not say that his learning both as regards the English and Indian case law and precedents was much more extensive than mine. He felt no hesitation in stating in that judgment that transactions by a party dealing with the property to which he lays claim are important evidence of his title, and sometimes they constitute the only evidence available, In this case, the Lower Courts, having regard to the assertion of title having been made so long ago as 1874 and to some other circumstances have given great weight to the assertion of title in Ex. I. Sitting in Second Appeal, I am not entitled to consider whether the evidence was sufficiently strong for the Lower Appellate Court to hold the title of the Matam as proved thereby.

I shall briefly consider the other subsidiary question whether the recitals as to how Velayudham Pillai got title are also evidence even though it is unnecessary to consider this point as this point also has been fully argued before us. I think that Sect. 32, Cl. 7 of the Evidence Act makes the statements made by a deceased person in respect of relevant facts themselves relevant if those statements are contained in a document which relates to any transaction mentioned in Sect. 13 that is, a transaction in which an assertion is made of a right or title which is a relevant question in the suit, those statements being relevant in proof the facts contained in the statements.

In the result, I would dismiss the Second Appeal with costs of respondents 15, 17, 18 and 20.

Spencer, J. - I entirely agree.