WANCHOO, C. J.

This is an application by Thakur Naharsingh for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 132 and 133 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the Constitution against the judgment of this court, dated 23rd August, 1954, by which the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (No. VI) of 1952 was held to be valid, and the writ petition of the applicant challenging its validity was dismissed.



2. A number of points have been raised on behalf of the applicant; but the main contention is that the applicant is entitled as of right to file an appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (b). The relevant portion of Art. 133 (1) is as follows : - " (1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies : - (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involved directly or indirectly or some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value; or (c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "



3. The argument on behalf of the applicant in that the writ proceeding, in which the judgment, dated 23rd August, 1954, was given was a civil proceeding, and as such he is entitled to file an appeal to the Supreme Court, if his case in covered either by clause (a) or clause (b) of Art. 133 (1).

4. The first question, therefore, that arises is whether the Writ proceeding in question was a civil proceeding. If it was, Art. 133 (1) would apply, and if the applicant can bring his case under either of the clauses (a) and (b), he will be entitled to a certificate from this Court.



5. Under the rules of this Court, writ proceedings are dealt with in two chapters, namely, Chapter XXI and Chapter XXII. Chapter XXI deals with writs of Habeas corpus or with applications under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while Chapter XXII deals with all writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution other than a writ in the nature of the Habeas corpus. It is obvious from this distinction made in the Rules that writs of Habeas corpus are criminal proceedings, while all other writs are treated as civil proceedings in this court. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the writ application filed by the applicant in this Court, and decided on the 23rd of August, 1954, was a civil proceeding.



6. Art. 132 of the Constitution certainly shows that proceedings before a High Court may be civil, criminal or of other kinds, and in one case the Patna High Court has held in Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. vs. The States (1) that the decision given by the High Court under sec. 21 (5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act does not arise out of a civil proceeding. But that was not a case of a writ application (other than a writ of Habeas corpus), under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and it may have been possible to say that the case before the Patna High Court was not a civil proceeding on the ground that it arose out of a special provision in a taxing statute. But considering the division that has been made in the Rules of this Court about applications under Art. 226 in Chapters XXI and XXII, it seems to us obvious, that applications under that article must be treated in the High Court either as criminal proceedings, if they fall under Chapter XXI, or civil proceedings if they fall in Chapter XXII.



7. In this connection, we may also refer to Ramchandra Reddy vs. Shankarramma (2). In that case, it was held that the question whether a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution is a civil proceeding or not depends upon the nature of the proceeding. With respect we agree with this view, and considering the nature of the proceeding in this case, there can, in our opinion, be no doubt that it was a civil proceeding. Art. 133 (1) with, therefore, apply to such a proceeding.



8. The next question is whether the case is covered by clause (a) or clause (b) of Art. 133 (1). On this point, we have no doubt that the case is covered by clause (b), even if it is doubtful whether it is covered by clause (a). The writ application was with respect to a Jagir, the annual income of which was well over Rs. 20,000/- per year. There may be doubt as to the valuation of the sub-ject matter of the dispute in this Court, for the dispute as about the validity of the Rajas-than Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (No. VI) of 1952, and it may not be possible to value the subject-matter of the dispute in money. But there is no doubt that the judgment of this Court involved directly or indirectly a question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000/- and over. However, one may value a Jagir, which is admittedly not transferable property, it stands to reason that a Jagir with an annual income of over Rs. 20,000/- will have same value, and that value cannot, under any circumstances, be less than the annual income.



9. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that Art. 133 (l)ib) applies to this case, and the applicant is entitled to a certificate under that provision.



10. Let a certificate be granted under that provision giving leave to the applicant to appeal to the Supreme Court. .