B.C. PATEL, C. J.

(1). Petitioner has approached this Court by filing this petition, inter alia, praying that by issuance of appropriate writ, the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the act) bearing no. F. 15 (III) / 59/lsg and notification under Section 6 of thedated 12. 11. 1968 bearing No. F. 4 (98)/65-Landh be quashed and set aside and the respondent be directed to denitrify the land in question.

(2). After the issuance of the notifications, as aforesaid, award has been made which was challenged before this Court by filing civil writ petition No. 1589/86. This petition was dismissed. It may be noted that the petitioner had no right or title to file the petition, as the land at the relevant time stood in the name of his father and the petition was also filed by his father. The contention raised before the Court is that the application under Section 48 (1) of theis made to the Lt. Governor for denotifying the land in question. On notice being issued, Suresh P. Padhy has filed an affidavit on behalf of the DDA and has pointed out as under:

"6. That these Khasra numbers were the subject matter of CWP 1539 of 1986 titled Kashmir Chand Godha v. UOI and Ors. By that writ petition the acquisition proceedings were challenged on the ground of delay for acquiring the land in question. The petition was dismissed on 20. 9. 2001. After the dismissal of the said petition, the present petition is untenable in law. The petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches and liable to be dismissed for this ground alone. It has been laid down in catena of cases that once acquisition proceedings are complete the land vests in State free from all encumbrances. It is pertinent to mention that large number of writ petitions, involving the same issues were dismissed by the Full Bench of this Honble Court on 14. 12. 1995 and the LP was also dismissed on 1,11. 1996. 7. That the acquisition became final when the possession is taken by the Collector. On taking over possession the land vest in government, free from all encumbrances. The Honble Supreme Court in catena of cases has laid down that after taking over possession of the land there is no provision under the to divest the title which was validly vested in the State. 8. That as per the land use plan of MPD-62 the land in question was indicated under the District Park. Further as per land use plan of mpd-2001 the land under reference is falling in the District Part. In the Zonal Plan of Zone F approved by the Government of India on 5. 6. 1998, the land use of area in question is District Park. The deponent craves leave to refer to the zonal plan, land use plan MPD-2001 and MPD-62 at the time of arguments. 9. That the land of Khasra No. 166 and 167 is required for road construction of Mehrauli/aurobindo Marg and the remaining land is to be used as recreational/regional park and partly for transportation. The road to be constructed by MCD and part of the road has already been constructed by them as per revised alignment. "

(3). It is also stated by the respondent that wider public interest is liable to be borne in mind while exercising the power of granting stay and injunction while entertaining writ petition. It is also required to be borne in mind that on account of proceedings initiated earlier the authorities could not take action in the matter.

(4). As against this, it is submitted that the land is in possession of the petitioner and therefore considering the provisions contained in Section 48 (1)of the Act, the application, which is made to the Lt. Governor is required to be disposed of first. Section 48 (1) reads as under: " (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. "

(5). The question, which is required to be determined, is whether possession was taken or not. It is contended before the Court that symbolic possession is no possession unless and until the person is actually dispossessed it cannot be said that possession is taken by the acquiring body. Our attention has been drawn to Annexure-1 (p. 218) to the counter filed by the respondent. It is dated 22. 9. 1986. It is clear that formal possession of land in Khasra No. 166 (3-06), 167 (3-11), 627/174 (0-18), 628/174 (1-00) total 8 Bighas 15 biswas of village Lado Sarai has been handed over to the appropriate authority. It is contended that the property is built up and it cannot be said that the possession thereof was taken. It is a big plot of land and by drawing Panchnama the possession was taken. It was contended before us that when possession is taken in such fashion, it cannot be said that the possession was taken. Reliance was placed on the case of Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat and Ors. , 1976 (1) SCC 700 [LQ/SC/1975/173] to say that symbolic possession is no possession. We indicate the Apex Court has stated in para 22 as under:

"it would thus be seen that a symbolical or formal delivery of possession as understood in law has the effect of dispossessing the judgment-debtor from his right or interest in the property. It does not dispossess the unactual possession in his own right not liable to be evicted under the decree or in pursuance of the auction sale. A symbolical or formal delivery of possession against the judgment-debtor is giving of actual possession of the property in the eye of law and has the effect of dispossessing him although as matter of fact he may have succeeded in resuming back possession as before shortly after dispossession. "

(6). It is required to be noted that in para 25, the Apex Court has laid down as under:

". . . Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by handing a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under Section 9 (1) of theis required. , When possession has been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land vests in the government. "

(7). It is also required to be noted that in a recent decision of the Apex court in Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1996) 4 SCC 212 [LQ/SC/1996/377] and in the case of Tamil Nadu housing Board v. A Viswam (Dead by LRs), 1996 (8) SCC 259 [LQ/SC/1996/335] has held as under:

"it is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17. 4. 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence of the panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession. "

(8). The aforesaid decisions were followed by the Division Bench of this court in Puran Singh and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, (1999) 78 DLT 412.

(9). The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Development authority v. Prasadi and Others, 2003 (69) DRJ. 751, [LQ/DelHC/2002/1896] LPA No. 562 of 2001 decided on 26. 9. 2002 had an occasion to examine similar question. In para 71, it is held as under:

". . . . . . . . the said report states that possession of 600 bighas of land has already been taken, this fact alone sufficiently would warrant the re-examination of the matter [refer: (1) General Manager, Telecommunication and Anr. v. Dr. Madan Mohan Pradhan and Ors. , 1995 (4)Supp SCC 268, (2) P. Chinnanna and Ore. v. State of A. P. and Ors. , 1994 (5) SCC 486 [LQ/SC/1994/715] , 3) Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust amritsar v. State of Punjab and Ors. , 1994 (6) SCC 212, (4) Sanjeevanagar Medical and Health Employees Co-operative Housing society v. Mohd Abdul Wahab and Ors. , (1993) 3 SCC 600, (5) Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shiv Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84 [LQ/SC/1993/72] and 6) Awadh bihari Yadava v. State of Bihar, (1995) 6 SCC 31 [LQ/SC/1995/859] ]".

(10). The Apex Court in the case of Executive Engineer Jal Nigam Central stores Division U. P. v. Suresha Nand Juyal, (1997) 9 SCC 224 [LQ/SC/1997/491] , also considered the question of symbolic possession taken by the Officers. Therefore, in view of what is stated hereinabove, it is not possible for this Court to agree with the submission of the learned counsel that possession is not taken. Suffice it so say that after symbolic possession is taken, if the petitioner is enjoying the possession, he is enjoying the possession as a trustee on behalf of the public at large and that by itself cannot be considered to be a ground to contend that possession is not taken. It is the duty of the person who is occupying the property to look after the property and to see that the property is not defaced or devalued by himself or by others. He cannot subsequently come to the Court to say that actual possession is not taken and therefore he should be protected and land be denotified.

(11). In the case of DDA v. Prasadi and Ors. , (supra) the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the question of de-notification. In para 71:

"we now revert to the most important aspect. It was the case of the respondents herein in the writ petition which was argued with all vehemence before us as well that the possession of the land was not taken by the DDA, and therefore, review of the earlier decision by the impugned decision dated 6th July, 1999 was clearly uncalled for. The learned Single Judge has accepted this submission and in fact dealt with this aspect at great length. While coming to the conclusion that no legal possession of the land was taken over by the DDA. While dealing with this aspect, it would be necessary to take note of certain factual events. "

The Court has pointed out that in such a situation legal possession is that the land owner had no right in the land after acquisition is complete.

(12). The Division Bench of this Court in a reported decision in the case of ajit Singh v. Union of India, (2001) 89 DLT 495 : 2001 (57) DRJ 335 (DB) (to which one of us, A. K. Sikri, J. was a party) pointed but in para 8 as under:

"8. Section 16 signifies culmination of the land acquisition proceedings. As it has happened in the present case, compensation has been received by the land owners and possession of the land has been taken over by the Government. The award was made in May, 1987 and possession of the lands was taken in pursuance thereof. It is settled law that once the land vests in the Government after its possession is taken over by it, the land becomes absolute property of the government. Thereafter even the Government does not have any power to denotify the land or to quash the notifications under which it had been acquired. The effect of taking possession under Section 16 is that a curtain is drawn so far as the land acquisition proceedings are concerned. The Government becomes absolute owner of the land, the land goes outside the purview of the land Acquisition Act. If later the Government has to pass on the title of the land to anyone else including its erstwhile owners, it can do so only by conveying the title by way of a sale deed or grant etc, i. e. the land thereafter has to be dealt with in accordance with ordinary civil law. "

(13). Thus, once there is vesting of land, it is for the Government to make use of the land. Even if the purpose is changed, others have no right because there is vesting. It is stated in the affidavit by the respondent that the, competent authority has placed the land at the disposal of the DDA. Thus land vests with the DDA and it is for the DDA to make use of the land for the purpose which is in the interest of the public at large.

(14). Learned counsel appearing for the DDA submitted that in the interest of justice and public interest, High Court should be slow in exercise of discretionary power. High Court must balance the competing interests of the parties. Learned counsel has placed reliance on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 134 [LQ/SC/1996/1959] and drawn our attention to para 10 of the judgment, where the Apex Court has laid down as under:

"10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "asian tigers", e. g. south Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernization. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interest of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the high Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is riot the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. we hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. "

(15). Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that such denotification orders are passed in the cases of other persons and thus others are given benefit and so far as the petitioner is concerned he is left out and discriminatory treatment is given by not deciding the application. This contention is meritless. In support, we adopt the reasoning given by a Division bench of this Court in Shanty Sports Club v. Union of India, 2001 (60) DRJ 16 [LQ/DelHC/2001/1403] , wherein this Court has pointed out as under:

"the learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the petitioners have been suspected to discrimination as certain other lands which were subject matter of acquisition have been denotified under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. We find no force in the contention since the land is still needed for the housing project. Similar argument advanced before the Full Bench in Rosanna begum v. Land Acquisition Collector for challenging the acquisition was rejected and it was held that there cannot be any question of discrimination merely because some of the lands were denotified in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Act, it seems to us that in case some land is wrongly denotified for showing favor to a party, such action of the State can be challenged. But a party cannot seek denotification of the land on the analogy of a case where State withdraws from acquisition on extraneous grounds as two wrongs cannot make a right. "

(16). Learned counsel also submitted that site of the road has been shifted and therefore there is no need of acquiring this land. Only a part of the land is required for the purpose of construction of road and the petitioner is ready and willing to give the same. On the contrary, on behalf of the DDA it has been pointed out in the affidavit that the land is required for district park as well as the road. Considering the contentions which are on affidavit, after acquisition proceedings are complete, the Court is of the opinion that the Court should not interfere in such matters and the petition is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 5000/ -. Interim order stands vacated.