Prakash Gupta, J. - The instant civil first appeal under section 96 CPC filed by the defendant-appellant is directed against the judgement and decree dated 16. 11. 2009 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jaipur (hereinafter "the trial court") whereby the learned trial court partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent.

2. The facts leading to the instant first appeal can be briefly summarised as thus: That the plaintiff-respondent is a private limited company doing business in the name of M/s Shrerit Auto Private Limited. The plaintiff-respondent purchased a plot bearing no B-19, Govind Marg, in front of Dusshera Garden, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur (hereinafter "the plot"). The purported use of the said land was residential" and the plaintiff-respondent applied to the defendant-appellant to get the same converted to "commercial". It was stated in the plaint that the defendant-appellant took the decision to allow the conversion of the said plot from residential to commercial on 8th September, 2003. It was further stated in the plaint that the rates of conversion charges prevailing at that time for such conversion was 40% per meter of the reserved price of the residential plot and on the said date, the reserved price of the plot was Rs. 2550 per sq. meter. However, due to the inaction of the employees of defendant-appellant, the notice/information regarding permitting the conversion of land from residential to commercial was not given to the plaintiff-respondent till as late as 31st August 2005, and by that time, the applicable conversion charges were hiked to 7650 per sq. meter, with the result that plaintiff-respondent who had to pay Rs. 12,69, 275 as conversion charges, was now required to pay Rs. 38,39,229. Certain other allegations regarding lease money having been wrongly charged were also made in the plaint. Though the plaintiff-respondent paid the entire conversion charges as demanded by the defendantappellant, it later filed the present civil suit to recover the excess amount paid along with interest of 18% thereon.

3. The defendant resisted the suit by filing written statement wherein it is stated that on making application by the plaintiff for changing the land use from residential to commercial, notification regarding change of land use and accordingly the lease money was settled again and advance commercial lease money for half year from September, 2005 to February, 2006 was calculated to Rs. 4,79,904/-, Rs. 606/- was charged as residential lease money and interest of Rs. 282/- charged. It was then mentioned that the fact regarding not giving notice for settling the lease money was wrong as the plaintiff defendant deposited the amount of conversion charges after obtaining challan form from the office of the defendant. It was also mentioned that the conversion charges were charged at the rate of 40% of the residential reserved price which was Rs. 7650/- per sq. meter. It was then mentioned that in the meeting of the Finance Committee held on 10. 3. 2006 it was decided that if the plaintiff company has any objection regarding the rate of amount charged from it, it can file its representation so that decision can be taken after hearing it. But no such representation was filed by the plaintiff company and it has deposited the amount. It was then mentioned that after 1. 9. 2007 the plaintiff company did not deposit the amount of lease money which comes to Rs. 4,97,904/-. In relation to the lease money it was further submitted that on conversion of the land from residential to commercial the lease money was decided as per the rate prevalent at the relevant time which was deposited by the plaintiff without any protest which is not refundable. The conversion charges were also recovered at the rate of 40% of the reserved price which at the relevant time was Rs. 7650/- per sq. meter and thus, Rs. 38,39,3229/- was rightly charged. Thus, it was prayed that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed. That on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following five issues:-



4. That from the side of plaintiff (PW. 1) Krishan Kumar was examined and as many as 14 documents were produced. In defence (DW. 1) K. B. Mishra was examined.

5. After hearing both sides and considering the testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court decided issues no. 1 and 4 against the plaintiff-respondent while issues no. 2 and 3 were decided in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendantappellant. Aggrieved by the judgement of the trial court regarding issues 2 and 3, the defendant-appellant has preferred this first appeal

6. Mr. L. L Gupta, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has put forward a number of contentions. Firstly, the learned counsel contended that the trial court failed to consider the provisions of the Rajasthan Nagar Palika (Change of Land Use) Rules, 2000 (hereinafter "the rules of 2000"). As per Clause (ka) of Rule 12 (i) of the said rules, conversion charges for change of land use from residential to commercial has to be charged at the rate of 40% of the reserved price of the residential plot. The counsel further contended that though the rules of 2000 do not explicitly mention which of the two rates i. e. the rate as existing on the date of decision of the committee or the rate as applicable on the date on which the order permitting change of land use is communicated, is to be applied, the proforma attached to the rules of 2000 makes it clear that it has to be the latter. Secondly, the counsel contended that there is no provision in the rules of 2000 which makes it mandatory for the defendant-appellant to communicate the decision of its committee regarding change of land use immediately. There being no time-limit specified in the rules of 2000, the defendant-appellant cannot be compelled to communicate the decision so taken immediately. Third, the learned counsel also contended that the plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove as to which of the two rates i. e. the rate as existing on the date of decision of the committee or the rate as applicable on the date on which the order permitting change of land use is communicated, is to be applied. Since the plaintiff-respondent failed to cite any rule or bring any circular, it failed to prove its case. Fourth, the learned counsel also contended that though, (D. W. -1), in his cross-examination admitted that a decision was taken by the committee to approve the change in land use, the same was not published in any Gazette till as late as 23. 09. 2005. Thus, from the mere statement of the witness, it cannot be concluded that the conversion charges were payable on the rate prevailing on the date of decision of the committee. Fifth, counsel also relied on Section 25 (4) of the JDA Act, 1982 to contend that any change in the plan made by the authority would come into effect either from its date of publication or from such date as the Authority [Nagar Nigam] may fix by notice. Sixth, the counsel also submitted that though the committee had taken the decision permitting land use but this court had stayed the change of use on 29. 05. 2004 in D. B. Civil Writ 513/2004, because of which no land could be converted during the said period.

7. On the other hand, Mr. R. K. Daga, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent supported the judgement of the trial court. Mr. Daga laid specific emphasis on the crossexamination of D. W. 1 to support his contentions.

I have heard the counsel for both the parties. The issues that arise for consideration in the instant first appeal are two fold:

1. which of the two rates i. e. the rate an existing on the date of decision of the committee or the rate as applicable on the date on which the order permitting change of land use is communicated, is to be applied for calculating the conversion charges as chargeable from the plaintiff-respondent

2. Was the plaintiff-respondent entitled to 18% interest on the sum, as given by the trial court

ISSUE 1

So far as arguments advanced with regard to the applicability of Rules of 2000 & Section 25(4) of JDA Act, are concerned such plea was neither taken in the written statement nor, was it raised before the trial court. It has been raised for the first time in the present appeal. However, I would still deal with these arguments.

8. As regards the first issue, the first argument put forth by the counsel for the petitioner is that as per the proforma attached to the Rules of 2000, the rate for conversion as existing on the date of communication of the decision of the committee is to be applied. The counsel further contended that the plaintiffrespondent has not been able to cite any rule in support of its contention that the rates as existing on the date of decision by the committee would be applicable. After considering the arguments of both sides, I am of the view that this argument by the defendant-appellant does not hold water because the proforma attached to the rules of 2000 nowhere states or mentions which of the two rates is to applied.

9. The second argument of the counsel for appellant is that there is nothing in the rules of 2000 which makes it mandatory for the defendant-appellant to communicate the decision of its committee regarding change of land use immediately. This argument is also devoid of substance. The defendant-appellant being an institution carrying out activities in public interest, it is their bounden duty to be responsible and act in a timely manner. If this argument is accepted, it would result in situations where the citizens would have to pay higher rates than the rates prevailing on the date of decision by the committee just because the committee decides to defer the matter and wait for the applicable charges to be increased.

10. The third contention of the defendant-appellant is that the plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove that the charges/rates applicable for conversion would be the ones prevailing at the time of decision by the committee. This argument cannot be sustained. A bare perusal of the decision of the Committee relied upon by the plaintiff-respondent shows that the rates applicable for change of land use would be the ones prevailing at the time of decision of the committee. Further, it is also conceded by (D. W. 1) K. V. Mishra in his cross-examination that the decision by the committee permitting the conversion of the suit property from residential to commercial was taken in 2003 and a notification regarding the same was also issued as evident from Exhibits 5 and 6. Not only this, (D. W. -1) also conceded in his cross-examination that the plaintiff-respondent has deposited the amount under protest. Thus, the argument of the defendant-appellant that the plaintiffrespondent would be estopped from recovering the same since it had deposited it without protest would be of no avail.

11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant is that the defendant-appellant had not communicated the decision of its committee owing to an order passed by a division bench of this court in D. B. Civil Writ 513/2004, wherein the court had put a stay on conversion of land use. After thoughtful consideration, I am of the opinion that this argument would be of no help to the defendant-appellant. Indisputedly, the concerned committee had taken a decision permitting change of land use of the suit property way back in 2003. The counsel has not been able to give explain as to why the said decision was not communicated to the plaintiff-respondent, till 29. 05. 2004 i. e. the date on which this court had stayed change of land use. Further, I am saddened and also a bit peeved after going through the written arguments submitted by the counsel for the defendant-appellant. In his written arguments, reference has been made to Plot SB-39 and SB-52, regarding which decision was taken by the Committee of the defendant-appellant on 23. 02. 2004. I do not see how the said decision is relevant for our purposes, especially when the land in question in the instant case is B-19 situated on Goving Marg. Counsels appearing on behalf of public institutions and government departments are expected to proof-read the contents of their pleadings before relying on them in a court of law. A small error can cause the concerned public exchequer a huge sum of money. Public institutions and government departments, being custodians of public money are not expected to squander public money away in frivolous litigation.

12. Having said that, the last argument taken by the Learned counsel of the defendant-appellant is related to Section 25(4) of the JDA Act, 1982. The counsel contended that any change in the plan made by the authority would come into effect either from its date of publication or from such date as the Authority [Nagar Nigam] may fix by notice. For the sake of convenience, Section 25 of the JDA Act is reproduced below:

"Every modification made under the provisions of this section shall be published and the modification shall come into operation either on the date of publication or on such date as the Authority [Nagar Nigam, Jaipur or any other body or Committee] may fix by notice published in the official Gazette whereupon the modified plan shall come into operation to all intents and for all purposes of this Act. "

13. Though a lot of emphasis has been laid by the counsel on this section, I do not see how this section is relevant for the purposes of the present controversy. The above quoted section does not in any manner clarifies as to which rate would be charged upon charge of land use. The only thing the section provides for is the date on which the change in plan, an approved by the committee would become effective. Thus, this argument also deserves to be brushed aside.

ISSUE 2

The next issue that arises for consideration is whether the trial court was right in awarding interest at the rate of 18% to the plaintiff-respondent. After perusing the record and hearing the arguments of the counsels, I am of the view that the trial court erred in awarding interest at such a high rate. The learned trial court allowed 18% interest to be paid only on the premise that the defendant-appellant had charged the interest at the same rate from the defendant-appellant. However, the trial court failed to consider that the defendant-appellant has charged interest only on the lease money and not on conversion charges. Since the plaintiff-respondent had not been charged 18% interest on conversion charges, the same cannot now be awarded to the plaintiff-respondent. However, in the facts and circumstances, the respondent is entitled to 6% interest per annum on amount refundable for land conversion charges, instead of 18% interest per annum. Thus, the judgment and decree of the trial court is modified accordingly and consequently, the appeal is partly allowed.

The parties shall bear their own costs.