(Prayer: Appeal (disposed of on 11-1-1946) against the order of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Narsapur, dated 12-7-1944 and made in unregistered App. No. of 1943 sought to be preferred against the order of the Court of the District Munsif of Bhimavaram, dated 31-3-1942 in C.M.P. No. 382 of 1941 in O.S. No. 51 of 1932 etc.)

Wadsworth, J.

The appellant in the appeal who is also the petitioner in the civil revision petition was a debtor who applied to the Court of the District Munsif of Bhimavaram for relief under the provisions of Madras Act IV of 19

38. The application was dismissed on a legal ground and as there was then no right of appeal under the Act, the debtor moved this Court in revision. By the time the revision petition came to be heard here, Madras Act IV of 1938 had been amended and a right of appeal had been given under the n ew S. 25-A which provides that an order of the kind by which the petitioner was aggrieved should be subject to appeal as if it was an order falling under S. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The revision petition having been rejected on the ground that an appeal lay, the debtor moved the Subordinate Judge of Narsapur to excuse the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and to admit an appeal against the original order of the District Munsif. The learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed the application to excuse the delay and has consequently rejected the appeal. Against the order refusing to excuse the delay the present revision petition is preferred and against the dismissal of the appeal the present second appeal is preferred.

The only ground on which the learned Subordinate Judge has rejected the application to excuse the delay is on the strength of a contention based on S. 29 of the Limitation Act. S. 29(2) provides that where a special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of S. 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed there for in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any perio d of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law (a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22 shall apply and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. The learned Subordinate Judge has read this provision of law as having enacted that none of the excluded provisions shall apply to any suit, appeal or application under any special or local law. This is clearly erroneous. All that S. 29(2) lays down is that where a special or local law prescribes a special period of limitation, the excluded provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. For instance, it has been held that under S. 20 of Madras Act IV of 1938 a special period of limitation is laid down for the filing of an application under S. 19 by a person who has obtained a stay under S. 20, and consequently S. 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be applied to extend the period there for prescribed under the special law. In S. 25-A newly introduced into this Act, though a right of appeal is given, no period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act is indicated. Therefore the provisions of S. 29(2) have no application so as to exclude the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act from being applied to appeals under the special law. In this view we allow the civil revision petition and the civil miscellaneous second appeal and remit both the application under S. 5 and the appeal to the lower Court for disposal on the merits.

The petitioner is entitled to his costs in this Court in this civil revision petition. No separate costs in the appeal.