Roe, J.The property in dispute in this case was for the most part ancestral estate of Bachcha Chowdhary, who died in 1271. He had two wives Subast and Sasiman. Subast died in 1285. Sasiman is still in possession of the estate. In 1910 and 1911 Sasiman executed the following deeds:

2. A deed of gift, dated 7th November 1910.

3. A mokarari patta, dated 7th November 1910.

4. A deed of gift, dated 1st January 1911.

in favour of her sisters son and grandchildren and her husbands sisters grandchildren and great grand-children, and of the family idol and sundry priests thereof. The property thus alienated belonged in part to the original estate and was in part property acquired in the names of Subast and Sasiman before the death of Bachcha Chowdhary, and in part property acquired in their names since Bachcha Chowdharys death. The plaintiffs as reversioners to the estate of Bachcha Chowdhary asked that all these deeds be set aside as being null and void as against (hem. Defendants Nos. 20 and 21 are admitted by the plaintiffs to be equal reversioners with the plaintiffs. They admit the plaintiffs title and associate themselves with them in the cause of action. The principal defendants in their written statement set forth, firstly, that the plaintiffs are not Bachcha Chowdharys reversioners; secondly, that the suit is barred as res judicata; thirdly, that the plaint is a deliberate misrepresentation of the true facts.

5. The plaintiffs wish it to be believed that the only title of Sasiman is that of an ordinary Hindu widow.

6. The facts as alleged by the defendants are that on the 15th Jeith 271 Bachcha Chowdhary made a deed of gift in favour of his wives, by which they acquired an absolute right of proprietorship with a right of alienation; that a year before Subasts death she made a Will divining her entire interest in the property to Sasiman; and that the obligees of the deeds of 1910 and 1911 acquired a valid title by those deeds.

7. On these pleadings eighteen issues were raised. These may bo summarised as follows:

a. Is the suit one maintainable by plaintiffs

b. Is the suit barred by limitation

c. Is the cause of action res judicata

d. Did Bachcha Chowdhary convey to his widows an absolute estate

e. Is the property acquired in the names of the widows before and after their husbands death a part of the estate of Bachcha Chowdhary

8. These several issues with one minor exception have been decided in the plaintiffs favour. A decree has been made that all dealings by the widows with the ancestral estate, and with acquisitions made subsequent to the death of Bachcha Chowdhary, are void as against the reversioners. It has also been decreed in favour of the defendants that the acquisitions made prior to 1271 were made from the private purse of Bachchas wives and were their property to deal with as they pleased.

9. Against this decree both sides appealed. The appeal of the plaintiffs has been in argument abandoned. On the defendants appeal the five points set forth are again pressed.

10. The question of res judicata and the circumstances in which it is raised have been clearly set forth in the judgment of the lower Court; it is clear that the former suit was disposed of in the absence of both plaintiffs and defendants. It is not necessary to elaborate the point further. The first issue was upon the pleadings without substance. It derived substance only from the argument adduced in the lower Court when the evidence of both sides had been recorded. The clear intention of the parties was to raise the issue whether the plaintiffs were in fact the reversioners to the estate of Bachcha Chowdhary. The defendants alleged that there were living agnates of Bachcha Chowdhary nearer in degree than the plaintiffs. Issue 7 ran:

11. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants third party (Nos. 20 and 21) are reversioners of Bachcha Chowdhary

12. The learned Subordinate Judge has set forth in his judgment under issues Nos. 2 and 7 the evidence on this point. He shows that the evidence was conclusive that the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 20 and 21 were Bachcha Chowdharys heirs-apparent. Nothing has been said in appeal to suggest that this decision was wrong. Indeed it was so obvious that this must be the decision that the defendants Vakils were driven to shift their ground when arguing the case in the lower Court. Having unsuccessfully attempted to show in evidence that the plaintiffs were not Bachcha Chowdharys reversioners, they attempted in argument to show that it was not a question of reversion to that estate but of inheritance to the stridhan estate of Sasiman. Their attempt to confuse the learned Subordinate Judge succeeded to this extent that he was induced to enter upon a short dissertation upon the shashtras and their preference for the husbands kinsmen to the widows kinsmen as heirs to stridhan property of a widow governed by the Mithila Law.

13. Without suggesting that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in entering upon a discussion of this point, I must decline to be drawn into such speculations.

14. The moment that a declaratory suit can be shown to turn upon a complicated question of law or fact as to who are reversioners or heirs to the property in suit, the suit itself ceases to be one which it is indiscreet to admit u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act. On the pleadings no such complicated question was raised. The suit was in itself a plain suit for a declaration that Sasiman Chowdhrani had no right of disposal in the properties covered by the deeds detailed in the plaint. The defendants should not be permitted even in the original Court to defeat a sound cause of action by an attempt to confuse the issues and far less so in appeal. The observations of the Judicial Committee in the case of Isri Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain 10 C. 324 ; 10 I.A. 150 ; 13 C.L.R. 418 7 Ind. Jur. 557 ; 4 S P.C.J. 459 ; 5 Ind. Dec. 217 are peculiarly applicable to the present case.

15. The plain cause of action is the assertion by Sasiman of absolute estate with power of alienation in the ancestral properties of Bachcha Chowdhary. If she had such power the plaintiffs have no cause of action. In the case of Sures Chandra Palit v. Lalit Mohan Dutta 31 Ind. Cas. 405 ; 20 C.W.N. 463 ; 22 C.L.J. 316 it was conceded at the Bar throughout the litigation that if the woman had an absolute estate, the heir to it was her sisters son. But I have never heard nor seen it suggested that a womans life-estate, whether taken by inheritance, by Will or by gift, is stridhan. The plain issue involved is; did Subast and Sasiman acquire during the lifetime or at the death of Bachcha Chowdhary anything more than a life-estate It was the plaintiffs case that the ladies succeeded to the estate by inheritance. The defendants have proved the deed by which Bachcha Chowdhary transferred the estate to them. The questions involved are, did the deed of the 15th Jeith 1271 convey any absolute estate Was possession under the deed duly delivered to the widows The deed has been translated as follows:

As I, the declarant, have no issue, I have, to obtain bliss in the next world, caused to be sunk several ponds, and have constructed, a temple of Sri Murli Manohar ji within the compound of my own house at a considerable cost. I often remain ill, although at present I am well. Still on account of having no child, and placing no certainty in life, I intend to go on pilgrimage to Kashi, and other places, therefore, I, the declarant, of my own accord and free will in order to avoid future disputes and to perpetuate my name, gave all the mouzahas consisting entire (16 annas) or only share, both ancestral and purchased thika properties, and all goods and assets, articles of copper and silver, elephants, oxen, she-buffaloes, and all other properties, to both my first and second wives, Musammat Subast Chowdrain, and Musammat Sasiman Chowdhrain, who after my death will be heirs to all the moveable and Immovable properties. It is desired that they, the said Musammats, by holding possession and occupation of all the moveable and Immovable property should pay the Government revenue thereof, and they should collect rent of and keep watch over the mouzahas whether they are entire or shares, and scattered lands, orchards, oxen, and elephants, etc., and they should give alms and charities. The said Musammats after my death shall have in every way full power and all proprietary rights over all the moveable and Immovable properties, and they should, under the deed executed by me, pay annualy Rs. 360 to Musammat Lachmin Chowdhrain, widow of my brother Dular Chowdhary, until her death for her maintenance, and by this deed the said Musammats should get their names recorded in the Government sherishta in the columns of proprietors.

16. A more accurate translation of the clause beginning: The said Musammats after my death"--would be: "And in respect of all the moveables and immovables after my death all and complete rights, the power of a landholder in every circumstance, accrues to the said Musammats." The Urdu words which I have translated accrues" are "hasil hai." The Urdu word which I have translated "of a landholder" is "malikiat." There is no such word in the language. Either the long a is a mistake or the word is a manufactured word. The point has been pressed at some length in the argument. It is not to my mind material. "Milkiat" or "malikiat" would equally imply something appertaining to a malik. The word "malik" means literally one who holds milk or land. The translation, with the amendments which I suggest, represents the terms of the deed.

17. In Sures Chandra Palit v. Lalit Mohan Dutta (15) will be found an exhaustive digest of the principles upon which documents should be interpreted. When there is no double intendment there is no room for interpretation. Is there in this suit document a double intendment It is a rule universally accepted by commentators that where a Hindu makes to a woman a gift of Immovable property, he should be presumed to confer a life-estate only unless the contrary appears from the terms of the gift. The word gave does not, therefore, in itself imply the creation of an absolute estate. The manner in which the gift shall operate is defined:

It is desired that the said Musammats by holding possession and occupation of all the moveable and Immovable properties should pay the Government revenue thereof and they should collect rent of and keep watch over the mouzahas whether they are entire, or shares and scattered lands, orchards, oxen and elephants, etc., and they should give alms and charities.

18. Nothing in the nature of an absolute estate is conveyed by these words. In the second part of the deed there is in reality but little uncertainty. It is urged for the appellants that the words "all and complete rights, the power of a landholder in every circumstance" imply an absoulte estate. But they must be read with hasil hai. Does the executant mean that by this instrument these powers accrue to the ladies or does he mean that as his heirs these powers will vest in them Nowhere in the document does the executant suggest that he is making a Will. Earlier in the document he has stated that the ladies are his heirs. The lady Sasiman herself did not understand that she had taken the estate under a Will. When in 1877 she was required to register her name under the of 1876 she stated (Exhibit 7) that her right to registration came to her by inheritance, that she entered into possession of the property by virtue of the deeds of gift executed by Bachcha Chowdhary in 1271 and by Musammat Subast Chowdhrain in 1285 and that the share to be registered is, by inheritance, the milkiat right of the petitioner. Musammat Subast Chowdhrain (Exhibit B12) states that Bachcha Chowdhary, having conveyed his property by gift dated Jeith 1277 to herself and Musammat Sasiman, died in Aswin 1273. "After the death of our husband I, the defendant, and Musammat Sasiman Chowdhrain got into possession in equal shares under the said deed of gift of all the moveable and Immovable properties."

19. Further, it is to be noted that in Bachcha Chowdharys deed the motive for the deed is not affection for his wives but a desire to avoid disputes likely to arise during his absence on pilgrimage and secure the perpetuation of his name and the continuance of the alms and charities which he was in the habit of giving. Such desire would be fulfilled by giving his wives the power to manage his property during his lifetime, making them custodians of his estate until upon his death they succeed to a fuller power by inheritance. And that in my view is the plain meaning of the deed. The ladies shall collect the rents, pay the Government revenue and watch over the property for the last years of the executants life which he intends to spend chiefly on pilgrimage. They shall not get their names registered, as holders of the lard until after his death, when under the ordinary rules of the Mitakshara they will have full power to deal with the property as maliks or landholders.

20. The plain intention of the deed is to convey only very limited powers to the donees for the lifetime of the executant and to declare them his heirs after his death in accordance with the ordinary rules of succession. No absolute estate was conveyed. No stridhan was created. The property remains the ancestral estate of Bachcha Chowdhary. The plaintiffs as without question the reversioners are entitled to a declaration that the alienations of Musammat Sasiman will not operate beyond her lifetime. The question of limitation as discussed by the learned Sub-Judge seems to have been restricted to the half share given to Musammat Sasiman by Musammat Subast. The document executed by Musammat Subast was in effect a Will, of which Probate was never taken. The execution of such a document in favour of the heir-at-law can hardly constitute in the heir-at-law adverse possession. But as I understand Mr. Pughs argument, exception is now taken to an assertion of title by the reversioners more than twelve years after the registration of Musammat Sasimans name as absolute owner by virtue of deeds of gift executed by Bachcha Chowdhary and Subast Chowdhrain. In this argument there might have been some force if it was shown that the plaintiffs had notice of Musammat Sasimans applications for registration. There is nothing on the record to suggest that they had such notice. And if they had such notice, the entry of the words By inheritance in khata No. 5 would defeat the contention that the application was an assertion of adverse title. Upon all the grounds urged in support of Appeal No. 266 of 1914 the appellants must fail. The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

21. In Appeal No. 64 of 1915 the properties in dispute are properties acquired by the widows since the decease of Bachcha Chowdhary described in Schedule III of the plaint. The learned Sub-Judge has given reasons (printed at page 555) for his decision that these properties must be deemed a part of the estate of Bachcha Chowdhary. The suggestion in appeal is that the two ladies had great affection for the children of their sisters and their husbands sisters, that Subast made in 1285 an attempt to make provision for them and that Sasiman has by her gifts of 1910 and 1911 shown that she too wished to provide for them. We are asked to infer that these acquisitions were made for their benefit. But if that was always her intention, particular care would have been taken to keep a separate account of the acquired properties. Musammat Sasiman says herself (page 586) that she does not recollect whether separate accounts were kept, and no genuine accounts are produced to settle the question. In villages in which she held shares both as a part of Bachcha Chowdharys estate and as an acquisition subsequent to his death, she certainly made no distinction between the income of the acquired and the ancestral shares. She was on the 9th December 1912, the date of her examination on commission, certainly a very old woman (P.P. 525, et seq). Had she really had any acute desire to benefit her sisters and sisters-in-laws descendants, she would have given expression to that desire before her faculties failed. I agree with the learned Sub-Judge that there is nothing to show that she wished to keep separate from the ancestral estates the acquisitions from savings. The case is not distinguishable in any particulars from the case of Isri Dutt Koer v. Hanshutti Koerain (14). I find it impossible to find otherwise than that the properties detailed in Schedule III were accretions to the estate of Bachcha Chowdhary. This appeal should also be dismissed with costs.

Chapman, J.

21. I agree. On the plaint as framed the plaintiffs clearly had locus standi. If the property was not alienable by the widows, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs were the heirs. If the property was alienable the plaintiffs suit failed in any event.

22. I agree with my learned brother as to the meaning of the deed and I am confirmed in this view by the fact that in my opinion there was no trustworthy evidence that Subast, or Sasiman entered into possession under the deed...

23. As regards the word malik, I trust that a word in such common every day use in this part of the country will not be converted by the decisions into a technical term of conveyancing.