Chapman, J.This appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment. The plaintiff in the year 1902 had granted a lease of a village to one Chandar Nath Tewari. Chandar Nath Tewari has since died and has been succeeded by his widow, the present defendant. The plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1912 praying for ejectment on the ground that due notice to quit had been served upon the defendant. The defence was that the lease was a permanent one and that, therefore, the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed, The two lower Courts were both of opinion that the lease was from year to year; that notice had been served and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. The defendant now appeals to this Court

2. The question for our determination is whether the lease was permanent or not. At the time when the lease was granted, the plaintiff was in possession as successor to her husband who held a jagir of this village under the Maharaja of Chota Nagpur The lease recites that as her husband had died recently and that as she could not personally look after her affairs, she apprehended that her zemindari would be ruined and she accordingly granted a bemiadi patta. The lease recites that the lessee, his heirs and successors should hold possession of the property and have rights not merely in the surface" but also in the minerals; that the lessor shall have the right to use such trees as she may require and that the rent shall be payable to her and after her death to her daughter. The word "miad" is a word ordinarily used for the term of a lease. A bemiadi patta, therefore, means a lease without a term or in the words of the learned Subordinate Judge not for any definite period. That being so, it appears to me to be impossible to infer from the mention of mineral rights, or of the heirs and successors of the lessee, or of the heir of the lessor, that the lease was a permanent one. The learned District Judge was, no doubt, wrong in relying upon the evidence regarding the negotiations between the parties as indicating an expression by the lessor of an intention to grant only a temporary lease. We are satisfied upon the terms of the lease itself that it was not a permanent lease. Applying the principles in Section 100 of the Tenancy Act and having regard to the fact that the rent was payable yearly I am of opinion that the lease was one from year to year; due notice was found to have been given and the suit was rightly decreed. The appeal is dismissed with costs. The order of stay will now be discharged.

Roe, J.

3. I agree.