Edward Chamier, C.J.This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors against an order of the District Judge of Gaya, confirming an order of the Munsif of Gaya, whereby the present appellants application to have the sale of their Immovable property set aside was dismissed. The only question which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether, as contended by the appellants, the application for execution in pursuance of which the sale was held was barred by limitation. It appears that the decree was passed on June 20th, 1905, and that the first application for execution was made in August 1906, and was dismissed in February 1907. A second application for execution was made in July 1909, and the property of the appellants was sold on December 14th, 1909. The appellants applied to have the sale set aside and the sale was set aside on February 12th, 1910. The present application for execution was made on December 10th, 1912. If the present application for execution is treated as an original application for execution and as being governed by Article 182 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, it is barred by limitation, for the application was made more than three years after any of the dates specified in the third column of Article 182. Both Courts below have treated the application as one made in continuation of the second application. In this Court it is contended that the present application is neither in form nor in fact an application made in continuation of the second application. The application recites the first application, the dismissal of that application, the making of the second application, the sale of the property on December 14th, 1909, and the fact that the sale was set aside in February 1910, and it asks the Court to issue a notice and take proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 66, that is to say, prepare a proclamation of sale and thereafter sell identically the same property as that which was sold in December 1909. So far as the form of the application is concerned, I see no difficulty whatever in treating it as a request made to the Court to take up the previous application and take proceedings to bring the property to sale. It is said that the Court cannot hold that this application is one made in continuation of the previous application, because the previous application was in fact dismissed. There is before us a copy of the order sheet in execution file No. 222 of 1909, which shows that immediately after the order setting aside the sale the Court wrote the following words: No steps taken. Dismiss the execution case." It is said that it is impossible to continue an application which has been dismissed. It appears to me that the words in question were not intended to do more than strike the execution case off the file, for the Court could not have expected the decree-holder, immediately on hearing the order of the Court setting aside the sale, to present another application for execution. I am not prepared to hold that the Courts below were wrong in treating the present application as one made in continuation of the previous application. It may often happen that proceedings taken upon an application for execution remain pending in an Original Court or Court of Appeal for several years and may result in an order setting aside a sale of Immovable property many years after the application for execution was presented and many years after any of the dates indicated in the third column of Article 182 of the first Schedule to the Limitation Act. This has often been pointed out by the Courts and in order to get over the difficulty, some Courts have held that a subsequent application should be treated as an application made in continuation of the application made before the sale and other Courts have held that such an application is governed by Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and that the decree-holder is entitled to three years from the date on which the sale is set aside within which to make a further application. It seems certain that the Legislature could not have intended that further execution of a decree should be prevented by the fact that execution proceedings remained pending in the Courts for many years. In the present case as the third application was one asking the Court to sell the identical property which had been sold before, I think that we should hold that the application was one made in continuation of the previous application. I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

Jwala Prasad, J.

2. I agree.