Wort, J.This is a very hard case for the appellants and from whatever point of view I look at it, I find it impossible to accept the argument of Mr. Mukharji appearing on behalf of the defendants-appellants. The plaintiffs are the landlords who brought an action to eject the defendants having served them with a notice to quit. A previous action had been brought in which the landlords had treated the defendants as tenants-at-will, but the Courts had rightly held that the defendants were not tenants-at-will and that a notice to quit was necessary. Hence this action out of which this appeal arises. Now the defendants purchased the house which they now occupy from the defendants-second party. It would appear that the defendants-second party took an oral lease of this land about four years ago and erected this house thereon. The purchase was made by the first party-defendants from the second party in 1922 and about the time of the purchase the defendants got from the plaintiffs an order which reads as follows:

Order for the purchase of Dih land (land for residential use) to Shiboy Mahton and others of village Barh, pargana Ghayaspore, etc. etc., by Jugeshwari Prasad Singh, the malik and karta of the family, resident of village Gonawan. As prayed for, permission is given to you to purchase a residential house from Sham Lal Modi, son of Sanichar Modi. You do purchase the said residential house quite willingly with my permission and pay Rs. 25 as salami for recognizing you and registering your name. Hence an order in writing is given for future reference. Dated 3rd Jaith 1329 Fs.

2. Now Mr. Mukharji does not contend, and it is impossible to contend, that under that document he got a lease in perpetuity or a lease for any period for that matter. It was merely a permission to purchase the interest of defendants-second party. It is not dissimilar to a license to sublet in cases where there is a covenant not to assign or sublet. Even had the defendants been minded to bring an action for specific performance against the plaintiffs, I very much doubt whether they could have succeeded as there is no contract Which might be described as a lease of the land for any period, much less a lease in perpetuity. But Mr. Mukharji contends that in the events which have happened the plaintiffs are estopped now from ejecting the defendants or, to put it in other words, they are estopped from saying that the defendants are not entitled to remain as tenants of this house in perpetuity. Reliance was placed on the decision in Forbes v. Ralli 1925 PC 146 . Mr. Ameer Ali who delivered the opinion of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council applied the principle of Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) 1 HL 129 and there held that the defendants were entitled to a permanent lease having regard to a representation made by the plaintiff dated 31st December 1903. Now whatever may be said about the application of the principle laid down in Forbes v. Ralli 1925 PC 146, it seems to me to be a case which is very clearly different from the one which is before me. There had been a lease dated 22nd June 1894 in that case, and the manager of the defendant apparently being uncertain as to what was the nature of that lease, wrote to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs had made a representation which their Lordships of the Privy Council described as an estoppel:

Referring to your conversation of this morning with Mr. Forbes and myself, I write at your request to say that the lease executed by Mr. C. Acatos, dated 22nd June 1894, is a permanent lease and gives you the right to erect buildings, but it does not entitle you to hold at fixed rate.

3. Reference was made to that authority in the well-known decision of Ariff v. Jadunath Mazumdar 1931 PC 79 where Lord Russell states:

Reference is made by the learned Judge to the case of Forbes v. Ralli 1925 PC 146 before this Board, but that decision was based upon an estoppel grounded upon a statement of fact.

4. Now as I look at the matter, at the very highest the appellants case can be put in this way: that by the order dated 3rd Jath 1329 Fs, the appellants were allowed to purchase all the interest which the defendants-second party had. From one point of view the case in my judgment could not be stated to be as favourable to the appellants as that; but assuming that they had the authority from the landlords to purchase the interest of defendants second party, what had the defendants second party Apparently they had gone on the land and erected the building on this oral lease. Now it would be impossible for me to say that they had a lease in perpetuity, as Section 107, T.P. Act, would have been in their way, and for myself I cannot distinguish the position of defendants second party and therefore of course defendants first party, if their rights were co-extensive, with the position of Ariff had gone into possession on an oral agreement under which the proprietor had agreed to give him a lease in perpetuity. Ariff alleged that on that representation he put up the buildings and was put to great expense, and it was contended in that case that the proprietor was estopped. Lord Russel in dealing with the case made this statement:

In truth this case, when the true facts are appreciated, is simple enough. The acts of the respondent are all referable to a verbal contract which was enforceable against the appellant at the time when the respondents expenditure was incurred and for long afterwards. Unfortunately for the respondent, he allowed his right to enforce his contract to become barred, with the result that he can only resist the appellants claim to possession by seeking to establish a title, the acquisition of which is forbidden by the statute. The statute disables him from contesting the appellants right to possession.

5. Assuming in favour of the appellants that the rights of defendants first party and those of defendants second party are the same, I cannot help saying that the actions of the defendants are referable to the verbal contract whatever that may have been. Again assuming that defendants first party had purchased the rights of defendants second party, they might have had a right to specific performance, but it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are estopped in any way now from saying in their action that they are entitled to eject the defendants on one months notice. As I have said, it is a hard case for the defendants, but that can in no way influence my view on the question of law which arises. The appeal in my judgment fails and must be dismissed with costs, but the appellants may have leave to appeal under the Letters Patent.