(1.) The application filed by the appellant before the Rent Controlling Authority under section 24 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (hereinafter called the Act) was dismissed by the Rent Controlling Authority. The appeal before the District Judge, Jabalpur, was also unsuccessful. Hence this second appeal.

(2.) In the application filed before the Rent Controlling Authority the appellant, who is the landlord, had prayed that the tenant be ordered to deposit the monthly rent of January 1966 without prejudice to the rights of the appellant. Both the lower Courts came to the conclusion that there was no provision under the Act conferring jurisdiction on the. Rent Controlling Authority to entertain the kind of application filed by the landlord.

(3.) Shri R. P. Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant, urged before me that sub-section (1) of section 24 of the Act makes it obligatory on the tenant to pay the rent to the landlord on the day he is bound to do so under the contract of tenancy or, in the absence of such a contract, by the 15th day of the month next following the month for which it is payable. Shri Tiwari says that when an obligation is created, there must be a provision for enforcing that liability; and if the Act is silent on that matter, the Courts have authority to supply the omission by proper interpretation of the statute. For this purpose, he referred to me Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) at page 227 wherein the case of R. v. Dowling1 is referred to. He, therefore, urges that though no specific provision has been made in the Act, by implication jurisdiction is conferred on the Rent Controlling Authority to entertain an application filed by a landlord to enforce the obligation created against the tenant.

(4.) I am afraid that the interpretation put on sub-section (1) of section 24 of the Act by Shri Tiwari is not correct. The obligation to pay the rent is always there on the tenant under the Transfer of Property Act. No new obligation is created by section 24 of the Act. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the tenant is bound to pay the rent immediately on the expiry of the tenancy month. What sub-section (1) of section 24 does is to enlarge the period for payment of rent upto the 15th of the next month. The provision is for the benefit of the tenant by giving him an additional period of 15 days when there is no specific contract. Therefore, the question of providing any special remedy for enforcing that obligation does not arise. The ordinary remedy of filing a suit before the civil Court is available to the landlord.

(5.) The facts of the case of R. v. Dowling, (1857) 8 E and B 605, were that under the Judgments Act, 1838, section 36, an insolvent prisoner for debt might be discharged from imprisonment, either upon his own petition, or upon the petition of any of his creditors. Section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1847, in abolishing the circuits of the Insolvent Commissioners, and transferring their jurisdiction to the county Courts, provided that "if an insolvent petitions", the insolvent Court should refer his petition to the Court of the district where he was imprisoned, but it emitted all mention of cases where the petitioner was a creditor. In these circumstances, it was held that if section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1847, was literally construed, it would involve unjust result, in that though a vesting order might be made and the debtor be deprived of his property, he would remain imprisoned. The words "if an insolvent petitions" were, therefore, interpreted to mean "if a petition be presented" and it was immaterial whether the petition was the insolvents or the creditors. It is obvious from the facts of the case and the decision thereon that an insolvent could be discharged from imprisonment either upon his own petition or upon the petition of his creditors. That right was not modified by section 10 of the Bankruptcy Act; it only provided for transfer of certain applications from one Court to another and, while providing for such transfers, inadvertently a provision was made which came in direct conflict with the provisions under the Judgments Act. In those circumstances, the Courts were called upon to interpret the law in such a way as to keep the rights of the parties intact. That is not the case here. The right under the Transfer of Property Act of recovering the rent through a civil Court has not been affected by sub-section (I) of section 24 of the Act. What sub-section (1) of section 24 does is to enlarge the time for payment of rent. That provision is for the benefit of the tenant and not for the landlord. No application for recovery of rent before the Rent Controlling Authority can, therefore, be filed.

(6.) Section 25 of the Act, again, makes provision for the benefit of the tenant. It provides that where the landlord refuses to accept rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred to in section 24 or refuses or neglects to deliver a receipt referred to therein or where there is a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the Rent Controlling Authority within the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner and such a deposit operates as a full discharge of the tenants liability to pay the rent to the landlord. Section 26 provides that if the rent is not deposited within 21 days of the time fixed under section 24 of the Act, the deposit shall not be deemed to be a valid deposit. It also provides that if any wrong statement is made by the tenant in his application for depositing the rent, the deposit shall not be considered to have been validly made unless the landlord has withdrawn the amount deposited before the date of filing an application for the recovery of possession of the accommodation from the tenant. From these provisions also it is clear that they are made for the benefit of the tenant so as to save him from ejectment on the ground of default. The landlords often times create a situation by which the rent gets accumulated. Section 12 of the Act provides that if a tenant fails to deposit the whole of the arrears within two months of the notice of demand, he is liable to be ejected. If, by machinations of the landlord, huge arrears are allowed to be accumulated, it may not become possible for the tenant to pay all the arrears within two months of the demand. Sections 25 and 26 provide for this facility to the tenant that he may deposit the amount when it becomes due before the Rent Controlling Authority and thus obtain a discharge from his liability to pay the rent. Properly interpreted, sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Act are for the benefit of the tenant and the landlord nowhere figures as a person in whose favour any right is created. No question of enforcing his rights, therefore, can arise before the Rent Controlling Authority.

(7.) For the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that the decision of the lower Courts is correct and no interference is called for. The appeal stands dismissed in limine.