1. Spens, C.J.:—Some of the appellants and the predecessors-in-title of the other appellants obtained a decree in ejectment against the respondents, on the 8th February 1940; and it was confirmed on appeal on the 15th May 1940. When the decree-holders applied for execution of this decree, on the 4th June 1940, the defendants filed an application asking for stay of proceedings in terms of s. 3 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act (Bengal Act IX of 1940) which had come into force on the 30th May 1940. The decree-holders contended that this Act was ultra vires and inoperative; but this contention was overruled by the lower courts as well as by the High Court at Calcutta. Against this decision of the High Court this appeal has been preferred.

2. The reasons for the decision pronounced by the High Court in this case will be found in an earlier judgment of a Special Bench of that Court [Shrimati Sukumari Debi v. Rajdhari Pandey. The opera-tiveness of the Bengal Act which did not receive the consent of the Grovernor-Greneral was impugned on the ground that some of its provisions (including s. 3) were repugnant to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to execution of decrees and that to the extent of such repugnancy the Bengal Act was void under s. 107 (1) of the Government of India Act. This contention was met by the High Court by two answers: (1) that the Bengal Act was covered by entries Nos. 2 and 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act and that therefore s. 107 had no application to the case; and (2) that even if, as contended, the Act should be held to fall under entry 4 of List III, its operation was saved by s. 4 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code. Both these grounds have been challenged before us on behalf of the appellants. In the view we take on the second ground, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the first.

3. Assuming that the impugned Act is legislation in respect of “civil procedure” (entry 4 in List III), s. 107 (1) only enacts that the existing Indian law, viz., the Civil Procedure Code, shall prevail as against the provincial legislation and that the provincial law shall be void to the extent to which any of its provisions are repugnant to any provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that s. 3 of the impugned Act, in so far as it directs that all proceedings for ejectment even in execution of decrees shall be stayed for a number of years, is repugnant to O. XXI, r. 24, of the Civil Procedure Code which directs that the Court shall issue its process for the execution of the decree once the prescribed preliminary measures have been taken. But this rule of the Code must be read subject to s. 4 (1) which saves any special power conferred by or under any other law for the time being in force. When it is so read, no question of repugnancy between the Civil Procedure Code and the impugned Act will arise — see Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia.

4. It was faintly argued that even on the terms of s. 3 of the Bengal Act, the order of the Courts below was not justified, as the section is limited to proceedings against a “tenant” and a person against whom a decree in ejectment had been passed could no longer be spoken of as a tenant. As pointed out by the High Court, it is clear from the tenor of the section that the word “tenant” is there used in the popular sense, that is of a person who was a tenant before the decree in ejectment was sought or obtained against him.

5. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.