1. The writ petition is filed by a former employee of Canara Bank, who has been dismissed from service after conducting a disciplinary enquiry on the basis of the charge sheet issued against the petitioner. Brief facts of the case are as follows:

2. The petitioner, after completing three years at Mangalore Branch of Canara Bank as Manager, was transferred to Kerala and posted at Puthiyatheru Branch at Kannur. While working at the Cheruvathoor Branch in the year 2016, he was suspended from service as per Ext.P1 dated 22.11.2016, and proceedings were issued by the 4th respondent. Thereafter, a charge memo was issued to the petitioner as Ext.P2 by the 4th respondent, who is stationed at Mangalore in Karnataka. The petitioner filed a reply to the memo of charges and dissatisfied with the reply; enquiry was initiated by appointing a Divisional Manager as enquiry officer. The enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and submitted Ext.P3 enquiry report dated 27.11.2017. The petitioner filed Ext.P4 objection dated 28.12.2017 against the findings of the enquiry officer. The 4th respondent, without considering the objections submitted to the enquiry report and without issuing a show cause notice, imposed a punishment of dismissal from service as per Ext.P5. Aggrieved by Ext.P5, the petitioner filed (Ext.P6) appeal before the 3rd respondent, but the appellate authority, by Ext.P7 order, dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the appellate order, a review petition was also filed before the 2nd respondent, which was also rejected along with a letter dated 03.11.2020. Challenging the dismissal of the appeal, the petitioner approached this Court with the following prayers.

"i.Declare that the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the petitioner is illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable;

ii.issue an order setting aside Exhibit P3, Exhibit P5, Exhibit P7 & Exhibit P8; iii.issue an order directing the respondent to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuously in service with all consequential benefits.

iv.exempt the petitioner from producing the English Translation of Malayalam Exhibits produced along with this writ petition and the petitioners further undertake that they are ready and willing to produce English Translation of Malayalam documents as and when required;

v.award cost to the petitioner;

vi.issue any other writ order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case;

3. A counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the respondents in which a preliminary objection is raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, as the entire cause of action arose outside the State. The action for dismissal of the petitioner was after issuing a charge memo, conducting disciplinary proceedings, and rejecting the appeal as well as the review petition by the competent authorities, who are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, a perusal of Exts.P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 would make it amply clear.

4. The petitioner was transferred to Puthiyatheru Chirackkal Branch on 27.07.2015, and from there, he was transferred to Cheruvathur Branch on 16.08.2016. While he was working in the said branch, the petitioner was issued with Ext.P1 suspension order by the Assistant General Manager (Circle Office), Mangaluru, and the charge sheet was served on the petitioner on 17.04.2017 by the HRM Section Mangaluru, and the enquiry was conducted by the disciplinary authority who was also stationed at Mangaluru. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was considered by the appellate authority, Human Resources Wing, Head Office in Bangaluru. The Review Petition was also rejected by the reviewing authority. The punishment of dismissal was served on the petitioner through the office where he was working in Kerala. Merely because notices are served on the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court will not give him a cause of action to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the writ petition on the grounds that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

5. Heard Sri.M.Sasindran, counsel for the petitioner as well as the counsel for the respondents.

6. The counsel for the petitioner argues that Clause(2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India confers the power by Clause(1); to issue directions, orders, or writs to any Government, authority or persons may also exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Therefore, since all the notices including the suspension order, charge sheet, order of dismissal, and order of the appellate authority as well as the review order were received by the petitioner while working the Cheruvathur Branch in Kerala and therefore part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and therefore the petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

7. The counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argues that the rights from Ext.P1, P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 are considered and issued in the State of Karnataka. Merely because the petitioner was stationed at Cheruvathur Branch, Kasaragod in Kerala, will not give rise to part of the cause of action for invoking territorial jurisdiction. He relied on the decision reported in the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Nakul Deo Singh v . Deputy Commandant (1999 KHC 647) and argued that the receipt of communication of the appellate authority’s order was in Kerala would not confer jurisdiction in the High Court of Kerala as the action complained took place out of the territorial jurisdiction of Kerala High Court and also the fact that the appeal was dismissed by an authority located outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. He mainly referred to paragraphs 21 and 22, which read as follows.

21. It is now settled after the decision of the Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore v State of M.P. (AIR 1990 SC 10 [LQ/SC/1989/443] ) that when there is an appeal against the original order even in a service dispute, there is a merger of the original order in the appellate order and the decision rendered by the appellate authority whether it be of dismissal, reduction, allowance or modification of the order of the original authority, a cause of action accrues to the aggrieved person to challenge the appellate order since the order of the original authority merges in the order of the appellate authority. What furnishes the cause of action is the rejection of the appeal by the appellate authority. Communication of that order though the order become effective only on such communication to the aggrieved person only furnishes the aggrieved person with a right of action. Receipt of the communication is not a fact in the bundle of facts constituting the cause of action. Even though only on receipt of the order the aggrieved person may be able to challenge that order, receipt of the order cannot be said to be a fact forming the cause of action. For, the cause of action arises on the appeal being dismissed by the authority outside the jurisdiction of the court. The fact that until an order is published or made known, the order does not became effective since it will be open to the authority to change his mind before releasing the order, is not a ground to hold that the communication of the order also forms part of the cause of action to the aggrieved person. The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by him to an appellate authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is dismissed by the appellate authority, the merger in the decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a Writ Petition under Art 226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal.

22. In the cases before us, consequences of the order of the original authority were suffered by the respective petitioners outside the State. One was dismissed and the other was reduced in rank. Thereafter they filed appeals before the appellate authority whose offices are in Delhi. One of the petitioners had come back to his native place in Trivandrum on his losing the job and from there, he received the copy of the order dismissing his appeal. In the other, after suffering reduction in rank from outside the State, the petitioner had obtained a transfer to the State within the jurisdiction of this court He had also suffered the punishment while he was outside the territory of this High Court Mearly because he was working in Kerala at the time when he received the copy of the appellate order dismissing his appeal cannot be said to be part of the cause of action to challenge the appellate order. In both these cases therefore we have no hesitation in holding that no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this High Court. The objection raised in that behalf by the respondents is well founded.

He also relied on the Full Bench decision of this court in Indian Maritime University v. Viswanathan [2014 (4) KLT 798 (F.B.)] in which Nakul Deo Singh’s case cited (supra) also considered and held in paragraphs 28 and 30, which reads as follows:

28. Thus, law is settled that in view of the provisions contained in Art. 226(2) of the Constitution of India, a Writ Petition can be maintained in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an integral part of the cause of action has arisen. Though the expression "cause of action” is not defined either in the Constitution or in the Code of Civil Procedure, it has to be understood in the light of S.20(c) of the CPC and it means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for a petitioner or a plaintiff to seek relief in a court of law. It is also the settled principle of law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise to cause of action and service of that communication, though is necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the service of the order gives rise to a right of action.

30. In this context, we should also make reference to paragraph 27 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., where, the Apes Court has held that challenge can be maintained against an order passed by the original authority and the appellate authority where the seats of the original authority and appellate authority are situated and the Apex Court did not mention that such challenge is possible at the place where orders are served. Therefore, irrespective of whether it is the disciplinary authority’s order or appellate authority’s order, service of order does not give rise to any part of the cause of action to an aggrieved person.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision reported in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India and Others (2014 KHC 4507), the judgment of the Apex Court, and argues that the Apex Court had occasion considered the issue regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the courts. In the said case, the appellant was working in the Shipping Corporation of India, and his registration as an employee was cancelled, and he was found permanently unfit for sea service due to medical reasons. At that time, the employee was residing in Bihar, and he sent letters seeking financial claims. The Shipping Corporation of India rejected his application and held that he was not entitled for disability compensation. The writ petition was filed in Patna High Court which was dismissed on the ground that no cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court. The Apex Court, in that case, held that all the causes of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court, where the employee received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. The Apex Court, in that case, held that the High Court of Patna has jurisdiction because the letter of refusal from claiming disability compensation was received by him within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court, and so the cause of action arose on receipt of the letter of refusal. The representation sent was from his home in Bihar claiming disability compensation, and the representation was replied to his home address in Gaya, rejecting his claim for disability compensation. After he was declared unfit, he returned back to his home in Bihar and all the claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya, which were entertained by the respondents, and the decisions on those representations were communicated to him at his address in Bihar. The appellant was also suffering from serious heart muscle disease and breathing problems, which forced him to stay in his native place. Taking all these facts together, the Apex Court held that the Patna High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. He also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Shanti Devi @ Shanti Mishra v. Union of India and Others (2020 KHC 6632). That was a case in which the deceased petitioner was continuously receiving his pension for many years in his savings bank account in the State Bank of India, Darbhanga, and the stoppage of the pension of the petitioner affected him at his native place, he is being deprived of the benefit of pension which he was receiving from his employer. So, when there is a stoppage of pension, it gives cause of action for the petitioner to approach the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction it is situated. In the said facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court held that part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Patna and held that it is maintainable.

9. Coming to the facts of this case, it can be seen that all the proceedings were initiated and conducted within the State of Karnataka, and merely because he was working in the Branch of Kerala, notices were issued to the petitioner to inform him about the proceedings initiated; otherwise, it would be a violation of the Principles of Natural Justice. Merely letters received, including the rejection of the appeal, will not give rise to the cause of action for the petitioner to approach this court. Cause of action though not defined anywhere in the constitution nor in the C.P.C., would mean the bundle of facts which can cause to enforce the legal injury for relief in a court of law. The cause of action means every fact which gives, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. It gives the plaintiff the right to claim against the defendant. In the case laws relied on by the counsel for the petitioner the disability compensation as well as the pension was stopped which gave raise for a cause of action in the place where he was residing as integral part of the cause of action arose there. Therefore, the dictum cannot be applied to the facts of this case.

As mentioned earlier, Exts.P1, P2, P3, P5, P7, and P8 are all issued by authorities who are placed in the State of Karnataka and have been held by the Apex Court as well as the Full Bench of this court in Nakul Deo Singh’s case cited (supra), mere receipt of a letter will not give rise to a cause of action for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

Therefore, taking into consideration the above-mentioned decisions of the Apex Court, as well as this Court, I am of the considered opinion that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition, and therefore, without going into the merits, this writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable.