The only question that is raised in this second appeal, is, whether the notice terminating the tenancy of the appellant is valid and in accordance with law.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the notice simply refers to the month of tenancy, but does not specify what exactly is the month of tenancy. The notice is issued on 10.1.1983. The relevant portion of the notice states as follows:

Please take notice that the lease of the running concern in your favour is hereby terminated with the next ensuing month of tenancy and you are hereby required to surrender vacant possession of the running business together with all the fixtures, machineries, furniture, fittings and the other articles in the same condition in which you took them on lease.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the notice stops with saying ensuing month of tenancy, without specify ing whether it is in the English calendar month or different tenancy month. According to him, it is admitted that the lease commenced on 15.5.1975 and the month of tenancy is from 15th of every month to 14 of the next calendar month. Hence, he contends that the notice not having specified the month in which the tenancy is terminated is bad in law. This contention is without any substance. What all Sections 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires, is a notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy. In this case, the notice specifically states that the termination is with the ensuing month of tenancy. That satisfies the requirement of the Section, and hence the notice is quite valid. If, according to the appellant, the month of tenancy is from 15th of one month to the 14th of the next month, then the notice is clear that the termination is with the 14th of February, 1983. If, according to the appellant, the month of tenancy is the next English Calendar month, then the notice terminates the tenancy on 28th February, 1983. Hence, the first contention urged by learned counsel fails.

4. The next contention put forward by learned Counsel is the lease is for manufac turing purposes, and a notice of six months should have been given under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, as the plaintiff has not proved any contract to the contrary. Learned Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar v. Jagadish Chandra 1 wherein it has been held that if the document of tenancy is not validly registered, then the tenancy must be presumed to be month to month tenancy or yearly tenancy in accordance with the purpose of the tenancy. According to learned counsel, in this case the purpose of the tenancy is to manufacture, and therefore, it should be taken to be years of tenancy.

5. Factually, this contention is met by learned counsel for the respondent by pointing out that there is a specific plea in the plaint that the tenancy was on monthly basis, In paragraph 3 of the plaint, it is stated that the property was taken on lease on monthly basis. In this case when there is a specific plea that it is a lease on monthly basis by the defendant, that was not countered or contradicted by the defendant in his written statement. Hence, it is not open to the defendant to contend that tenancy was yearly tenancy. There is no law which prevents a lease for manufacturing purposes being on monthly basis and when that plea is not denied by the defendant, then it is not open to the appellant to contend that it is a year to year tenancy and notice of six months should be given to him.

6. Secondly, the lease is not one of immovable property simpliciter . S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply only to lease of immovable property. In this case, it is specifically stated in Ex. A-3, the notice, that the lease was of a running concern. In the plaint also, it is stated that it is a running concern that was leased out. This was not contradicted by the defendant. The lease being one of a running business, it cannot be contended that it is a lease of immovable property and the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable thereto. I am of the view that S. 106 of the Act is not available to the defendant in this case, and the lease has been terminated properly by Ex. A-3 notice issued prior to suit. In these circumstances, the contentions put forward by learned counsel for the appellant are rejected, and the second appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent agrees that the appellant may be given three months time for vacating the premises on condition that the appellant files an affidavit of undertaking. The appellant is granted time till 30.11.1990 to vacate the premises and hand over the entire property to the respondent on condition that the appellant files an affidavit in this Court on or before 24.7.1990 undertaking to vacate the premises and hand over possession on or before 30.11.90 without driving the respondent to execution proceedings.