1. The present civil review has been filed for reviewing the order dated 13.04.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 2162 of 2019, whereby the said writ petition was disposed of directing the petitioner to approach the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum constituted by the respondent-DVC under Section 42(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 2003") on the objection raised by the respondents that alternative remedy was available to it to approach the said Forum for adjudication of the issue raised by the petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submits that the review petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019 for issuance of direction upon the respondents to grant fresh electrical connection to the petitioner at its premises which the petitioner had acquired on auction through Bank of Baroda vide sale certificate dated 12.06.2018. Further prayer was made for quashing the letter dated 31.08.2018 issued by the Chief Engineer-I (Commercial), Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), Commercial Department, Kolkata, whereby a demand of Rs. 4,88,54,766/- was made from the petitioner towards the outstanding bill dues in respect of the acquired premises.
3. It is further submitted that an interlocutory application being I.A. No. 3538 of 2020 was filed on behalf of the petitioner in the said writ petition seeking direction upon the respondent-DVC to grant fresh electrical connection to the petitioner on the condition that it would deposit the alleged outstanding dues of the erstwhile consumer namely, M/s. Uday Vijay Steel Pvt. Ltd. under protest in monthly installments of Rs. 10,00,000/- which should be refunded/adjusted by the respondent-DVC against the energy consumption bills of the petitioner upon the final decision of the dispute with regard to its liability to pay the said dues.
4. It is also submitted that the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 13.04.2021 with following directions:
"(i) The petitioner shall file a complaint before the forum constituted by the respondent-DVC under Section 42(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 on the issue as raised in the present writ petition within one month from the date of the order. On filing of the said complaint, the said forum of the DVC shall admit the complaint and dispose of the same on merit in accordance with law expeditiously.
(ii) The petitioner shall pay the first installment of Rs. 25,00,000/- against the dues of the erstwhile consumer/occupant of the premises in question i.e. Rs. 4,88,54,766/- (as has been stated by the respondent-DVC in paragraph 17 of reply affidavit to I.A. No. 3538 of 2020) by 23rd April, 2021. On depositing the said installment of Rs. 25,00,000/-, the respondent-DVC shall provide fresh electric connection to the petitioner which shall be commenced from 7th May, 2021, subject to the compliance of other requirements/formalities by the petitioner.
(iii) The petitioner shall continue to deposit the rest monthly installments as well as the energy consumption bills raised against it by the respondent DVC.
(iv) After commencement of fresh electrical connection, the respondent-DVC shall raise the energy consumption bills separately from the dues of the erstwhile consumer/occupant of the premises in question which would be paid by the petitioner in terms with the order of this Court.
(v) The payment of the dues of the erstwhile consumer/occupant of the premises in question by the petitioner in terms with the present order shall be subject to the final outcome of the complaint as would be filed by the petitioner before the Dispute Redressal Forum of the respondent-DVC.
(vi) If the petitioner makes default in making the payment of monthly installments in terms with the direction of this Court, the respondent-DVC will be at liberty to take appropriate measures against the petitioner in accordance with law."
5. Learned counsel for the review petitioner further submits that during hearing of the writ petition, the respondents misled and misdirected this Court to dispose of the writ petition mainly on the ground of alternative remedy to approach the CGRF/Forum established by the respondent-DVC under Section 42(5) of the Act, 2003 by isolated/constricted interpretation of definition of "complainant" mentioned in Clause 2(d)(i) of the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Guidelines for Establishment of Forum for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumers, Electricity Ombudsman and Consumer Advocacy) Regulations, 2020 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations, 2020") without due consideration of the other definitions as mentioned in the said Regulations, 2020 or the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Guidelines for Establishment of Forum for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumers and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations, 2011") which were applicable to the petitioner at the time of filing of the writ petition as well as the provisions of the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations, 2015") which is a complete code for supply of electricity in the state of Jharkhand.
6. It is also submitted that Clause 11.7 of the Regulations, 2020 specifically restricts the appearance of an advocate for presenting the case of a party before the Forum which is gravely prejudicial to the petitioner as its partner is not qualified to effectively present the case before the Forum wherein complex questions of law and interpretation of statutes are involved.
7. It is further submitted that the definition of the "Complainant" has remained unchanged since the first Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Guidelines for Establishment of Forum for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumers and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations, 2005 and this Court has passed judgements in several writ petitions on similar issues in favour of the bonafide auction purchasers holding that the distribution licensees have no right to claim previous dues of the erstwhile owner of the concerned premises. Since the copies of the Regulations, 2011 or 2020 were not placed at the time of hearing of the writ petition, this Court was unable to appreciate as to what kind of "Complaint" as defined in Clause 2(e) of the said Regulations can be taken up before the Forum. For that, the intention of the Legislature cannot be understood merely by reading the definition of "Complainant" in isolation, rather should be read conjointly with the definition of other terms like 'complaint', 'consumer', 'consumer dispute', 'defect', 'deficiency', 'restrictive trade practice' and 'unfair trade practice' as mentioned in the Regulations, 2011 as well as in harmonious construction with the relevant provisions of the Regulations, 2015.
8. Learned counsel for the review petitioner further contends that Regulations, 2020 has expanded the definition of "complaint" since there were 6 sub-clauses in Clause 2(e) of the Regulations, 2011, whereas there are 8 sub-clauses in Clause 2(e) of the Regulations, 2020, but it still does not cover the issues of arbitrary and illegal demand of the respondents in claiming the past dues of the erstwhile owner of the concerned premises. This Court while passing the order dated 13.04.2021 inadvertently missed out certain material facts mentioned in the paragraph-14 of the supplementary affidavit dated 22.02.2021 filed on behalf of the petitioner in I.A. No. 3538 of 2020, wherein it had strongly refuted the question of maintainability of the writ petition raised by the respondents. Moreover, in paragraph-17 of the said supplementary affidavit, the petitioner had specifically prayed for disposal of I.A. No. 3538 of 2020 in similar terms with that of the order dated 23.09.2019 passed in I.A No. 7172 of 2019 [filed in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019] and not the present writ petition. Thus, the said averment of the petitioner was missed out by this Court while passing the order dated 13.04.2021. The petitioner had also submitted a brief note on the maintainability of the writ petition comprising of relevant precedents of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and several other High Courts on the similar subject on email address of this Court, however, the hard copies of the same could not be placed during the virtual hearing on 13.04.2021 and, therefore, this Court did not have the overview of these judgements wherein the similar writ petitions were held to be maintainable.
9. It is lastly submitted that Clause 6.10(a) of the Regulations, 2015 mandatorily stipulates that if the concerned premises has come into legal possession of a new occupant who has no nexus with the previous owner, the distribution licensee shall provide electrical connection without realization of arrears/dues of the premises payable by the erstwhile consumer. Admittedly, the petitioner has no nexus with the erstwhile consumer and as such, it is not duty bound to clear the previous dues of the erstwhile consumer.
10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that by filing a review petition, the petitioner cannot reopen the matter to argue the case on merit. The petitioner has failed to show sufficient ground for review of the order dated 13.04.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019. In course of argument of the writ petition, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner did not argue the case on merit, rather he himself had submitted that the petitioner was ready to approach the forum created by the DVC under Section 42(5) of the Act, 2003 and had requested the Court for making interim arrangement in the matter.
11. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the order dated 13.04.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019.
12. Before coming to the merit of the case of the review petitioner, it would be appropriate to refer some of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to the scope of entertaining a review petition.
13. In the case of "Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak Sharma & Ors.", reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, [LQ/SC/1979/73] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"3........ It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case of "Parsion Devi & Ors. Vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors.", reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, [LQ/SC/1997/1361 ;] the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case of "Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Mawasi & Ors.", reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200, [LQ/SC/2012/526] has held as under:
"27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:
"19. Review literally and even judicially means re-examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216)
'... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. ... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.'
Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:
'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.'
Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:
"32. ... It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.
It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule'. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record' or some ground analogous thereto."
29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed:
"11. ... A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe:
"3. ... But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed:
"9. ... An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC ... A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words:
"56. ... Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised."
34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed:
"13. ... The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."
35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.
22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision."
16. It has consistently been held in the aforesaid judgments that a review petition cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". The power of review may be exercised on discovery of such new or important matter or evidence which, even after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found as well as on any such analogous ground.
17. Reverting back to the present case. To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the review petitioner, the relevant part of the order dated 13.04.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019 is quoted hereinbelow for the ready reference in the present case:
"5. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, while referring to the said supplementary affidavit, submits that the petitioner is a registered partnership firm of Mr. Shyam Kumar Agarwal and Mr. Deepak Raj Mangalam, businessmen having no nexus or relationship whatsoever with M/s. Uday Vijay Steel Pvt. Ltd-the erstwhile owner of an industrial unit situated in the Industrial Area, Bokaro ("industrial premises") or its Promoters/Directors-Mr. Uday Shankar Prasad, Mr Amarnath Singh and Mr. Suresh Kumar Sharma. The petitioner has become legal occupant of the concerned premises through publicly advertised E-Auction Sale conducted by an Authorised Officer of the Bank of Baroda ('Mortgagee') for Rs. 3.10 Crores in accordance with law under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [in short to be referred as "the Act, 2002"] proceedings to recover its huge unpaid debts from M/s Uday Vijay Steel Pvt. Ltd. ('Mortgagor'). The auction-sale of the concerned premises was made free from all encumbrances known to the Bank vide Sale Certificate dated 12.06.2018 issued as per Appendix-V read with Rule 9(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. The auction sale of the concerned premises by the Authorised Officer of Bank of Baroda under the Act, 2002 was duly confirmed by the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi which was pleased to dismiss the appeal preferred by the erstwhile owner, vide its order dated 28.09.2018 in S.A. No. 19 of 2018. The petitioner, vide its letter dated 06.08.2018, applied to the respondent-DVC for fresh electrical connection under Para 6.10(a) of the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2015 (hereinafter to be called "the Regulations, 2015"). The respondent-DVC, vide its letter dated 31.08.2018, replied that the power supply to the concerned premises would be provided only after payment of the outstanding dues of Rs. 4,88,54,766/- of erstwhile owner claiming that NOC had not been obtained from the respondents as per clause 5.3.3 of the Regulations, 2015. It is further submitted that the petitioner continued to follow up with respondent-DVC and also furnished letter dated 18.02.2019 issued by the Bank of Baroda authenticating the sale certificate issued to the petitioner. However, the respondent-DVC, vide its letter dated 28.02.2019 again informed that new connection in the industrial premises might be considered once the issue of recovery of outstanding dues was settled. The petitioner again submitted representations to the respondent vide its letter dated 11.03.2019 and 27.03.2019 bringing to notice that its case falls squarely within the four corners of clause 6.10(a) of the Regulations, 2015 and the respondent DVC is under mandatory duty to provide fresh electrical connection to the petitioner. However, when the petitioner's representations remained unresponded, the petitioner preferred the present writ petition seeking direction to the respondents for providing fresh electrical connection under clause 6.10(a) of the Regulations, 2015 without realizing past dues of the erstwhile owner of the concerned premises.
6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submits that on 03.09.2019, during course of hearing of I.A. No. 7173 of 2019 filed by the petitioner in the present writ petition and on 23.09.2019, during course of hearing of I.A. No. 7172 of 2019 filed in another writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019 (Mangalam Ispat Vs. DVC & Ors.) having similar dispute, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners of both the writ petitions submitted that in order to commence production in the Units, the petitioners were ready to pay monthly installments of Rs. 25,00,000/- against the previous dues of erstwhile owner along with the current bill(s) subject to the outcome of the writ petitions. Pursuant to the reply filed by the respondent-DVC giving its concurrence for providing fresh connection on payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- per month, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.09.2019 passed in I.A. No. 7172 of 2019 of W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019, directed the petitioner of the said case to make payment of monthly installment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the respondent-DVC subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. Since the present petitioner did not have such financial means to pay said amount in installments to respondent-DVC in the wake of certain family medical emergencies, it did not press I.A. No. 7173 of 2019 filed in the present writ petition and accordingly, vide order dated 23.09.2019, the said interlocutory application was dismissed as not pressed. However, after having arranged financial support and in order to start production in the concerned premises, the petitioner of the present writ petition filed I.A. No. 3538 of 2020 showing its readiness and willingness to pay monthly installments of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the respondent-DVC against the previous dues of erstwhile owner subject to the final adjudication of the dispute in question. The said interlocutory application was taken up by this Court on 06.07.2020 and the respondent-DVC sought two weeks' time to file its reply. Subsequently, the petitioner being in grave need of electricity supply to start production so as to generate revenue, submitted letter dated 16.12.2020 to the respondent-DVC showing his willingness to make payment of monthly installments of Rs. 25,00,000/- against the past dues of the erstwhile owner subject to the outcome of the present writ petition. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner lastly submits that the present writ petition may be disposed of in terms with the order dated 23.09.2019 passed in I.A. No. 7172 of 2019 in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019.
7. Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-DVC, raises an objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition. It is submitted that the word 'complainant' has been defined under regulation 2(d) of (Guidelines for Establishment of Forum for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumers, Electricity Ombudsman and Consumer Advocacy) Regulations, 2020 which has been framed by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission in exercise of the power conferred under Sections 42 and 181 of the Electricity Act, 2003. It is further submitted that in view of Section 2(d) (i) of the Electricity Act, 2003, the word 'complainant' includes "applicants for new connection" and as such the petitioner has efficacious/alternative recourse of approaching the Dispute Redressal Forum created by the DVC under Section 42(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003. However referring to paragraph-12 of the reply affidavit to I.A. No. 3538 of 2020, he submits that if the petitioner is ready and willing to make payment as per the undertaking which was recorded in the order dated 03.09.2019 passed in the present writ petition, the respondent-DVC has no objection in granting fresh electrical connection to the petitioner subject to outcome of the dispute as may be decided by the Forum.
8. So far as the issue of maintainability of the present writ petition is concerned, Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, fairly submits that the petitioner is though ready to approach the forum created by the respondent-DVC under Section 42(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003, yet since the adjudication of dispute in question may consume some time, this Court may also make interim arrangement in terms with the order dated 23.09.2019 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019 as the present case is also similarly situated."
18. It appears that in the order dated 13.04.2021, this Court recorded the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that there being no nexus or relationship of the petitioner with the erstwhile owner, it was not liable for the previous dues. The factum of disposal of I.A. No. 7172 of 2019 filed in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019 (Mangalam Ispat Vs. DVC & Ors.) is that the petitioner of the said case was directed to make payment of monthly installment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the respondent-DVC, subject to the final outcome of the writ petition and the said direction was also recorded in the order dated 13.04.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019. It was further recorded in the said order that the petitioner being in grave need of electricity supply to start production so as to generate revenue, had submitted letter dated 16.12.2020 to the respondent-DVC showing his willingness to make payment of monthly installments of Rs. 25,00,000/- against the past dues of the erstwhile owner, subject to the outcome of the present writ petition. In course of argument of the said writ petition, learned Senior Counsel who was appearing on behalf of the petitioner prayed before this Court to dispose of the writ petition in terms with the order dated 23.09.2019 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in I.A. No. 7172 of 2019 filed in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019.
19. It further appears that in paragraph-8 of the order dated 13.04.2021, this Court recorded the submission of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was ready to approach the forum created by the respondent-DVC under Section 42(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 and in the meantime, he prayed for an interim arrangement in terms with the order dated 23.09.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2089 of 2019. This Court having considered the submissions of the parties, disposed of W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019 with the directions as mentioned in paragraph-4 of the said order. Thus, the writ petition was disposed of with certain arrangement having taken into consideration the consensus arrived at between the parties at the time of hearing. The petitioner thus failed to press the writ petition on merit. It might be possible that the petitioner had objected the claim of the respondents with regard to maintainability of the writ petition by filing a supplementary affidavit, however, the said issue was not raised in course of argument and as such, all those points were not taken note of in the order dated 13.04.2021. The petitioner by filing the present review petition and inter alia citing various provisions of the Regulation, 2020 as well as the Act, 2003 is trying to convince this Court that the writ petition filed for fresh electrical connection was maintainable.
20. I am of the view that under the review jurisdiction, this Court cannot hear the claim of the petitioner on merit as the same would amount to assuming the jurisdiction of the appellate court. If the petitioner was not satisfied with the impugned judgment dated 13.04.2021, it should have filed an appeal against the said order. I do not find any mistake or error apparent on record so as to entertain the present review petition. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to press any new and important fact or evidence which, even after exercise of due diligence, was not within its knowledge or could not be produced by it at the time the order dated 13.04.2021 was passed.
21. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has also put reliance on a judgment rendered by learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of "Shivam Builders and Developers through one of its partners Nikesh Singhania Vs. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director and Others" reported in , whereby the writ petition filed for a direction to grant fresh electrical connection has been held maintainable. I am of the view that the judgement of the learned Division Bench will not be applicable to the case of the review petitioner as the said judgment (L.P.A No. 08 of 2022) has been rendered after filing of the present review petition. The petitioner also cannot rely on the order passed in L.P.A No. 08 of 2022 for review of the order dated 13.04.2021 which was passed on the consensus of the parties.
22. One of the grounds for review of the order dated 13.04.2021 as raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of Clause 11.7 of Regulations, 2020, the appearance of advocate on behalf of the parties is restricted before the Forum which will cause serious prejudice to the petitioner's case since the issue involved is primarily technical and legal in nature.
23. To counter the said argument, learned counsel for the opposite parties submits that the earlier provision of Clause 11.7 of Regulations, 2020 has been deleted by the Jharkhand State Electricity Regulatory Commission (Guidelines for Establishment of Forum for Redressal of Grievances of the Consumers, Electricity Ombudsman and Consumer Advocacy) (First amendment), Regulations, 2022 which provides that a complainant, distribution licensee or any other person who is a party to any proceedings before the Forum may either appear in person or authorize any person who may be an advocate (within the meaning of the Advocates Act, 1961) to present his/her case before the Forum and to do all or any of the acts for the purpose. Thus the said contention raised by the petitioner is also not tenable.
24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any ground for reviewing the order dated 13.04.2021 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 2162 of 2019.
25. The review petition is accordingly dismissed.
