B. Sudershan Reddy, J.

1. The petitioners invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly pray for issuance of a writ of certiorari calling for the records pertaining to the judgment of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short "the Special Court"), dated 28-9-1995 passed in L.G.C.No.84 of 1994 and quash the same.

2. Before we proceed to consider the various submissions made challenging the legality and propriety of the decision of the Special Court, it may be necessary to notice the relevant facts leadings to the filing of these writ petitions.

3. The first respondent - Sri Ganapathi Cooperative Housing Society filed application as against the petitioners herein before the Special Tribunal under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 seeking declaration of title of an extent of ac 1.38 gts out of total extent of ac 9.26 gts in S.No.73 of Marredpally village, Secunderabad Mandal, Hyderabad district and also for declaring the petitioners herein as land grabbers under the provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short " the"). The respondent Nos.2 to 7 herein were subsequently added as the applicants vide the orders of the Tribunal made in I.A.No.931 of 1992, dated 26-6-1992 and the similar order made in I.A.No.757 of 1992. Initially the respondent No.1 alone filed the application invoking the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal under the provisions of the said Act.

4. The Special Tribunal, having regard to the extent of the land alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners and the value of the land thereof, transferred the case to the Special Court for its disposal in accordance with law.

5. The case of the respondents is that one Ghulam Mohammed Khan was the true and absolute owner and pattedar of an extent of ac 9.26 gts in S.No.73, Marredpally village, Secunderabad Mandal, Hyderabad district (for short "the said land"). The said Ghulam Mohammed Khan, in about 1960 or 1961, divided the said land into several plots after obtaining the necessary permissions and sold them under registered sale deeds to various individuals who formed themselves into Sri Ganapathi Cooperative Housing Society (for short "the Society"). The said society is not registered under the provisions of the A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964.

6. The Government proposed to acquire the said land for a public purpose. The society filed writ petition No.6464 of 1979 challenging the land acquisition proceedings and the same was dismissed on 3-8-1981. The respondent No.2 herein filed writ appeal No.538 of 1981 and the same was allowed by this Court. The Government again issued fresh notification under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the respondent No.1 - society filed writ petition No.8267 of 1984 in this Court which was allowed in part on 23-1-1986.

7. The case of the respondents is that the petitioners herein are real estate dealers who do speculative business in land. It is alleged that they have forged and fabricated documents claiming as if they had entered into an agreement with Ghulam Mohammed Khan in respect of the said land and in the process made an attempt to withdraw the compensation amount awarded in respect of ac 7.24 gts of land acquired out of the said total extent of ac 9.26 gts.

8. It is specifically stated and asserted that the society and its members are in occupation of the balance extent of Ac 1.38 gts. The petitioners never claimed to be the owners of the land, which was notified for acquisition, at any point of time until the notification was issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.

9. It is further alleged that the petitioners herein tried to occupy the same and made the construction of the buildings thereon with the assistance of unsocial elements. Since the whole controversy centres around this aspect of the matter, it may be appropriate to notice the pleadings as stated by the respondents in their application:

While so, the respondents herein wantonly and deliberately with muscle power is trying to occupy the same and made the construction of the buildings thereon with the assistance of unsocial elements, thereby grabbing the land of the members of the applicant therein. All the applicants herein made a complaint to the police which is herewith filed, but however, they refused to interfere as it is a matter of civil nature.

10. The respondents herein accordingly prayed the Tribunal:

To declare the respondents as land grabbers in respect of the land admeasuring ac 1.38 gts in S.No.73, Marredpally village, Secunderabad Mandal, Hyderabad district, more fully described in the earlier paras and consequently grant perpetual injunction restraining the respondent, their agents, servants or any person claiming title under them from interfering with the application schedule land and direct to pay compensation in an amount double the value of the application schedule land which is valued about Rs.11/2 crores and pass such other further orders as this Honble Tribunal deems fit and property in the circumstances of the case.

11. The respondents herein have also prayed for grant of an interim injunction restraining the petitioners herein, their agents, servants and others claiming title under them from either interfering or raising any structures or making or altering the application schedule land, pending disposal of the application.

12. The petitioners herein submitted detailed counter inter alia denying the allegations levelled against them in the application. The petitioners specifically pleaded that the respondent No.1 - society is not in existence and is not a legal person to maintain any proceedings against them.

13. The case of the petitioners is that the 2nd petitioner purchased the said entire extent of ac 9.26 gts of land in S.No.73, Marredpally village, Secunderabad Mandal, Hyderabad district from the said Ghulam Mohammed Khan and others under an agreement of sale dated 5-2-1960 and the possession was delivered under the said agreement of sale on 5-2-1960 itself. The 2nd petitioner filed O.S.No.817 of 1986 on the file of the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad for declaration of title in respect of the said land against the said vendors and after contest the suit was decreed on 30-10-1986 declaring the title of the 2nd petitioner and also an injunction against the original owners.

14. They have also denied the allegation that they have forged and fabricated documents as alleged by the respondents herein. It is also specifically pleaded that the petition schedule land as claimed by the society is unidentifiable and the alleged society was and is never in possession of the same at any time. It is also the case of the petitioners that the remaining extent of land after the acquisition of an extent of ac 7.22 gts continued to remain in actual possession and enjoyment of the petitioners and 29 others as absolute owners and they have undertaken the development for construction of residential houses and commercial complex in lawful manner.

15. The Special Court framed the following issues and additional issues for its consideration:

1. Whether the applicant is the owner of the schedule property

2. Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning of A.P. Act 12/1982

3. To what relief

Additional Issues:

1. Whether the first applicants society is competent to file this petition

2. Whether the applicants 2 to 6 can join together and file a single petition as in this case

3. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to entertain this application on the basis of the contention raised by R1 and R2

16. The Special Court, upon appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the respondent Nos.2 to 7 are the owners of the application schedule land. The Special Court further concluded that the petitioners herein are in occupation of a portion of the application schedule land by enclosing a compound wall without any legal entitlement. In view of those findings the Special Court held that the petitioners herein are land grabbers within the meaning of Section 2 (d) and (e) of the. The petitioners were accordingly directed to vacate the application schedule land and deliver its vacant possession to the respondent No.1 - society within two months from the date of the judgment so as to enable the respondent No.1 to put the respondent Nos.2 to 7 in possession of the sites purchased by them under Exs.A5 to A9 - sale deeds.

17. Sri E.Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the judgment of the Special Court is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned senior counsel contended that going by the pleadings and the very case set up by the respondents herein, no relief could have been granted by the Special Court in their favour. It is submitted that the identity of the land is not established by the respondents in any manner whatsoever. It is also contended that the respondents herein virtually prayed for grant of a decree of declaration of title and perpetual injunction which cannot be granted by the Special Court. The whole application filed by the respondents herein is misconceived and not maintainable in law. The petitioners, according to the learned senior counsel, under no stretch of imagination, could have been declared as land grabbers. It is also contended that the Special Court committed procedural irregularity in taking cognizance of the case and for that reason alone the entire judgment under review is liable to be set aside.

18. Sri Vilas V. Afzalpurkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents - applicants submitted that there is no dispute whatsoever with regard to the identity of the land in question. The mistake, if any, in the description of the application schedule land is immaterial since the petitioners knew as to what they were required to answer as is evident from the counter filed by them in the proceedings before the Special Court. The dispute centered around ac 1. 38 gts of land only situated in S.No.73 of Marredpally village and the writ petitioners have pleaded to be the owners of that particular piece of land as is evident from their counter. Improper description of the application schedule land has not resulted in any prejudice whatsoever to the defence set up by the petitioners in the case. It is also submitted that the writ petitioners never raised their objections as regards the identity of the land. Inaccuracy, if any, in describing the application schedule land cannot vitiate the whole of the decision of the Special Court.

19. The learned counsel further contended that the petitioners herein have no title whatsoever in the land and lawful entitlement thereto. Even going by the very plea set up by them it is submitted that the whole of the claim of the petitioners is based upon an agreement of sale purported to have been executed by the original owners and the decree of declaration of title obtained by the petitioners as against the legal representatives of the original owner based on the said agreement of sale is of no consequence. Agreement of sale cannot confer any title upon any person in respect of any immovable property.

20. Before we undertake to critically examine each of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side, we propose to make it clear that this Court does not exercise any appellate jurisdiction over the orders/judgments passed by the Special Court. It is not open for this Court to reappreciate the evidence and material available on record in order to substitute the findings for that of the Special Court. Such a course is not permissible in law. This Court merely exercises supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 in order to judicially review the decision of the Special Court. This Court may in appropriate cases interfere only when it is satisfied that the Special Court excluded any relevant material from consideration and also interfere if the findings are recorded relying upon any irrelevant material. An error of law committed by the Special Court is also a ground for interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. In KONDA LAKSHMAN BAPUJI v GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH1 the Supreme Court, after elaborate survey and analysis of the very provisions of the, observed that:

Mere allegation of an act of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. In both Section 7(1) and Section 8(1) of thethe phrase any alleged act of land grabbing is employed and not act of land grabbing. It appears to us that it is designedly done by the legislature to obviate the difficulty of duplication of trial, once in the courts under the and over again in the ordinary civil court. The purpose of the is to identify cases involving allegations of land grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the are nonetheless civil courts which follow the Code of Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary civil courts. For the purposes of taking cognizance of case the special court is required to consider the location or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the land involved or in the interests of justice required and to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner (sub-section (1)(a).

22. The Supreme Court, while construing the expression land grabber in clause (d) of Section 2 of theand land grabbing in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act, observed:

The term grabbing is not a technical term or a term of art. So it has to be understood in its ordinary common meaning.

23. The Court ascertained various meanings assigned to the term grab and observed that it has a broad meaning - to take unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly - and a narrow meaning of snatching, forcibly or violently or by unscrupulous means. It has held:

... Having regard to the object of the and the various provisions employing that term we are of the view that the term "grab" is used in the in both its narrow as well as broad meanings. Thus understood, the ingredients of the expression "land grabbing" would comprise (i) the factum of an activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement, and (ii) the mens rea/intention - "with the intention of/with a view to" (a) illegally taking possession of such lands, or (b) enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or (c) to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental, or (ii) lese and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorized structures.

A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression "land grabber" it must be shown that: (i)(a) he has taken unauthorisedly; unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land belonging to the Government or a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreement or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorized structures; or (ii) he has given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon; or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the abovementioned acts; or (v) that he is the successor-in-interest of any such persons.

It must be borne in mind that for purposes of taking cognizance of case under the, existence of an allegation of any act of land grabbing is the sine qua non and not the truth or otherwise of such an allegation. But to hold that a person is a land grabber it is necessary to find that the allegations satisfying the requirements of land grabbing are proved.

24. The expression land grabbing according to Strouds Judicial Dictionary (at page 1410) is:

Land grabbing and a land grabber are familiar words to Irish ears; and their meaning is well understood. They imply that land is acquired by dishonest, discreditable, or oppressive methods. The idea is neither novel nor peculiar to this country. The woe of the Hebrew prophet fell on those that join house to house, that lay filed to filed; and Massinger in his best known comedy held up to odium the man who to increase possessions and annual rents had all men sellers and himself the only purchase. ...

25. It is thus clear that an act of land grabbing involves taking of any land belonging to Government, etc., or any other private person unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, either forcibly, violently, unscrupulously or otherwise but without any lawful entitlement. Taking possession of the land without any lawful entitlement thereto is the sine qua non to hold a person to be a land grabber. It may be noted, to make out a case that a person is a land grabber the applicant must aver and prove both the ingredients - the factum as well as the intention. Unless a person unauthorisedly and without any lawful entitlement thereto enters or intrudes into a land forcibly or otherwise, he cannot be held to be a land grabber. The emphasis is on taking possession without any lawful entitlement.

26. Various contentions urged may have to be appreciated in the backdrop of the law declared by the Supreme Court in KONDA LAKSHMAN BAPUJIs case2. We shall first take up the contention as to whether the application satisfies the ingredients in law in order to declare the petitioners to be the land grabbers

27. In the entire application there is no allegation of the petitioners taking possession of the application schedule land either forcibly or otherwise without any lawful entitlement thereto. On the other hand, the allegation is that the petitioners "wantonly and deliberately with muscle power is trying to occupy the same and make the construction of the building thereon with the assistance of unsocial elements, thereby grabbing the land of the members of the applicant herein". It is precisely for the said reason the respondents in their application filed before the Tribunal prayed for "grant of perpetual injunction restraining the petitioners herein, their agents, servants or any person claiming title under them from interfering with the application schedule land". It is a clear case where there is not even an allegation of land grabbing. There is no allegation of dispossession - forceful or otherwise of the applicants from the application schedule land.

28. There is no dispute whatsoever that an extent of ac 7.24 gts out of the total extent of ac 9.26 gts situated in S.No.73 of Marredpally village has been acquired for a public purpose. Yet the respondents - applicants in their application filed before the Tribunal specified the entire extent of ac 9.26 gts as the application schedule land. Boundaries of the entire extent of land are accordingly shown. No doubt in the prayer portion the respondents - applicants prayed to declare the petitioners as land grabbers in respect of land admeasuring ac 1.38 gts only. But the details in respect of the land alleged to have been grabbed are not described in the application. In the circumstances, the conclusion that the respondent - applicants failed to set up specific and precise claim in their application is inescapable. Making allegation of land grabbing and characterising a person as a land grabber is fraught with serious consequences. The application shall contain a precise, specific and definite allegation of any land grabbing or alleged act of land grabbing since an alleged act of land grabbing is held to be sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. At any rate, the allegations must be specific and definite. The details of the land alleged to have been grabbed also must be specifically stated. There should be no room for any fishing and roving enquiry. The applicant must aver and prove the factum as well as the intention to grab the land without any lawful entitlement thereto.

29. In the instant case the very prayer is to declare the ownership of the respondents and a perpetual injunction restraining the petitioners herein from interfering in the lawful possession and enjoyment of the application schedule land by the respondents.

30. The question as to whether the relief, injunctive in its nature, could be granted by the Special Court is not res integra but is squarely covered by a decision rendered by this Court in SYEDULLA v SPECIAL COURT UNDER A.P. LAND GRABBING (PROHIBITION) ACT3. This Court observed:

The legislature has intentionally omitted conferring the jurisdiction on the Special Court/Tribunals to try cases and grant injunctive relief arising out of attempts to grab lands on the ground that if such jurisdiction is also conferred, the object of bringing out this enactment to try and dispose of the cases of land grabbing as expeditiously as possible would get frustrated and the Special Court/Tribunals would also be like any other civil courts flooded with several cases. The legislature never intended to confer the jurisdiction on the Special Court/Tribunals to try cases and grant injunctive reliefs arising out of attempts to grab lands. That being so, assumption of such a jurisdiction upon itself by the Special Court/Tribunals is without authority.

31. Another Division Bench of this Court in writ petition No.13427 of 1998, dated 30-12-2002, took similar view and held:

The proceedings in the nature of declaration of title and perpetual injunction restraining the individuals from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner in a given case would not lie before the Special Court or a Special Tribunal. The Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, are equally conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing. Mere attempt to interfere with ones possession and threat to enter into possession itself would not be enough to attract the provisions of Section 7A or 8 of the, as the case may be. In such a situation, the aggrieved individual has to approach the civil courts and seek an appropriate relief of declaration of title and injunction. .... Unless there is certain act of land grabbing by a land grabber dispossession the person in possession without any lawful entitlement alone would attract the jurisdiction of the Special Court and the Special Tribunals under the provisions of the.

32. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, relied upon the decision in SRI BHAVANARISHI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIEITY REP BY ITS PRESIDENT v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & OTHERS rendered in writ petition Nos.11640, 11658 and 14462 of 2002, dated 26-8-2002 and contended that the Special Court may even entertain an application for declaration of title and perpetual injunction. The decision, in our considered opinion, does not lay down any such principle as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents. The facts are not clearly evident from the order made in the said writ petitions. The Division Bench relied upon the decision of another Division bench in R.KOMARAIAH v SPECIAL COURT, HYDERABAD4 in which it is held that the Special Court has jurisdiction to grant reliefs of declaration of title and also recovery of possession and that once the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. Adverting to the decision in R.KOMARAIAHs case the Division Bench observed:

The Division Bench further held that the complaint filed in the Special Court regarding land grabbing cannot be rejected simply on the ground that a suit has been filed by the petitioner in a civil court and an ex parte injunction was obtained. In a latest decision of the Supreme court reported in KONDA LAKSHMANA BAPUJI, the Apex Court opined that an attempt to grab the land also falls within the ambit of Section 2 (d) and (e) of the Act, and therefore, the Special Court or the Special Tribunal have got jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed under Section 8 (1) of the.

33. The Division Bench has not dealt with the question as to whether the Special Court is empowered and competent to grant the relief in the nature of injunction in order to protect ones own possession and as to whether a person in possession can invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court for the grant of such relief. On the other hand, the Division Bench relied upon the decision in R.KOMARAIAHs case (4 supra) in which it is held in categorical terms that "it needs to be emphasized that if a person enters into the land owned by another without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegality taking possession of such land, it satisfies the necessary conditions to constitute such act as land grabbing and to hold the person guilty of such land grabbing as a land grabber. The Court in the said decision noticed the fact that the applicant before the Special Court in her pleading has clearly stated that she purchased the scheduled land under a registered sale deed dated 4-4-1968 and she has also referred to the title held by her vendor and the vendors vendor. In the application she specifically alleged that the writ petition - respondent taking advantage of the absence of the applicant or her husband from the city of Hyderabad, trespassed into the scheduled land and grabbed the same under the ex parte ad hoc temporary injunction claimed to have been obtained in a suit. Thus, it was a clear case where the applicant therein invoked the jurisdiction of the Court after the land was grabbed under the guise of an ex parte temporary injunction granted by the civil court. The allegations made therein clearly attracted the definition of land grabbing.

34. In KONDA LAKSHMAN BAPUJIs case ( supra) the Supreme Court observed that mere allegation of an act of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. Both in Section 7A(1) and Section 8(1) of thethe phrase "any alleged act of land grabbing" is employed and not "act of land grabbing". It is clarified by the Supreme Court to the effect: It must be borne in mind that for the purposes of taking cognizance of a case under the, existence of an allegation of any act of land grabbing is the sine qua non and not the truth or otherwise of such an allegation.

35. In the whole of the judgment it is nowhere stated that an attempt to grab land also falls within the ambit of Section 2 (d) and (e) of theand, therefore, the Special Court or the Special Tribunal have got jurisdiction to entertain a complaint filed under Section 8(1) or under Section 7A(1) of the Act, as the case may be.

36. In such view of the matter, we hold that the decision upon which reliance is placed is not an authority for the proposition that the Special Court/Special Tribunal is conferred with jurisdiction to try cases and grant injunctive relief arising out of attempts to grab land.

37. In such view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the application filed by the respondents herein before the Tribunal which was later transferred to the Special Court is misconceived. The Special Court ought not to have taken cognizance of the case under the. The application filed by the respondents - applicants ought to have been summarily dismissed.

38. Now we shall take up the next contention urged by the learned senior counsel relating to the identity of the land alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners herein. In the original petition filed by the respondents the entire extent of ac 9.26 gts situated in S.No.73, Marredpally village, Hyderabad is mentioned as against the column "extent". The boundaries as against column No.12 are also given for the whole of the extent of ac 9.26 gts. In the prayer portion a declaration is sought as against the petitioners herein declaring them to be the land grabbers in respect of the land admeasuring ac 1.38 gts only in S.No.73, Marredpally village, Hyderabad district. It is specifically stated in categorical terms that the lands admeasuring ac 1.38 gts that remained after acquisition of an extent of ac 7.24 gts continue to be in possession "of the society and its members". Admittedly, the boundaries of that extent of ac 1.38 gts of land situate in S.No.73 of Marredpally village are not furnished in the original petition filed by the respondents before the tribunal. The Special Court records a finding to the effect that the "applicants 2 to 7 and other purchasers of plots lying in the lay out of the application schedule land in S.No.73, who are members of the first applicant - society are owners of the application schedule land and not the 2nd respondent".The application schedule land, as has been noticed, is the total extent of ac 9.26 gts and not ac 1.38 gts in respect of which relief has been claimed by the respondents/applicants in the original petition. The confusion is writ large and apparent on the face of the record.

39. The findings recorded by the Special Court are totally at variance with the pleadings and averments made in the application filed by the respondents/applicants. Crucial statements and admissions made in the evidence of P.W.1 have been totally ignored and the same amounts to refusal to take the relevant evidence into consideration by the Special Court. In the evidence it is categorically admitted by one of the applicants (P.W.1) that the registered sale deeds marked Exs.A5 to A9 relating to the plots purchased by the members of the 1st applicant society are only with regard to a portion of the petition schedule land but not with regard to the entire petition schedule land in the original petition. It is also admitted that no documents are filed to prove that the applicants in the original petition were in possession of any portion of the petition schedule land. It is further admitted that the boundaries of ac 1.38 gts of land are not given in the petition. It is also stated that no documents are exhibited or filed regarding the identity of the extents purchased by the applicants P2 to P7 (respondents/applicants 2 to 7) in the land grabbing case. We have referred to these portions of the evidence not with a view to reappreciate the evidence and substitute the findings for that of the Special Court. We have referred to those relevant portions in evidence in order to highlight that the Special Court failed to take the said portions of relevant evidence into consideration in recordings its findings.

40. It is thus clear that the respondents-applicants miserably failed to establish the identity of the land alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners herein. In fact there is no allegation of land grabbing. The applicants in law are required to prima facie prove that the land alleged to have been grabbed is a land owned by the applicants and only thereafter a presumption arises that the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land is a land grabber and the burden of proving that land has not been grabbed by him is on such person. The initial burden to establish prima facie title lies on the applicant invoking the jurisdiction of the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be. No such burden has been discharged in the instant case since there is all round confusion with regard to the identity of the land itself which is alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners.

41. In K.KRISHNA v SPECIAL COURT UNDER A.P. LAND GRABBING (PROHIBITION) ACT5 a Division Bench of this Court observed that:

If a finding of fact is based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari though it cannot be challenged on the grounds of insufficiency or inadequacy of relevant and material evidence. If the findings of fact are based on no evidence or based on conjectures and surmises and no reasonable man would, on given facts and circumstances, come to the conclusion reached by the quasi-judicial authority on the basis of the evidence on record, such findings can be interfered in exercise of the power of judicial review.

42. In the said decision also the Court found that it is not possible to locate the land in question inasmuch as the applicants therein failed to clearly establish the identity of the land.

43. In ABDUL KHUDDUS & ORS v STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANR6 a Division Bench of this Court while adverting to the nature and scope of Section 10 of theobserved that from a plain reading of Section 10, it is abundantly clear that the initial burden is on the complainant whether it is a government of a private person, to prima facie prove that the land grabbed belonged to it/him. If such burden is discharged satisfactorily, then what follows is the presumption that the land is grabbed and that the alleged land grabber shall prove that the land in question has not been grabbed by him.

44. In the instant case the respondents/applicants miserably failed to make out even a prima facie case that the land alleged to have been grabbed belongs to them. They have miserably failed to establish the identity of the land alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners.

45. We shall now proceed to consider as to whether the Special Court committed any error in taking cognizance of the case.

46. In order to consider the said question that falls for consideration a brief survey of the provisions of the may be necessary. Section 3 of thedeclares land grabbing in any form unlawful; and any activity connected with or arising out of land grabbing shall be an offence punishable under the.

Section 4 prohibits land grabbing. Any person who on or after the commencement of the continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant of a grabbed land belonging to the Government or other private person shall be guilty of an offence under the and whoever commits the act of land grabbing shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with a fine which may extend to Rs.5,000/-. Sections 7A and 8 of the deal with the powers of the Special Tribunal and the Special Court respectively and it is necessary to notice them.

7-A. Special Tribunals and its powers, etc.:- (1) Every Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases not taken cognizance of by the Special Court relating to any alleged act of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of the land grabbed whether before or after the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 1987 and brought before it and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit:

Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Tribunal, any case brought before it is prima facie frivolous, or vexatious it shall reject the same without any further enquiry:

Provided further that if, in the opinion of the Special Tribunal any case brought before it is a fit case to be tried by the Special Court it may for reasons to be recorded by it transfer the case to the Special Court for its decision in the matter.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, a Special Tribunal shall, in the trial of cases before it, follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

(3) An appeal shall lie, from any judgment or order not being interlocutory order of the Special Tribunal, to the Special Court on any question of law or of fact. Every appeal under this sub-section shall be preferred within a period of sixty days from the date of judgment or order of the Special Tribunal:

Provided that the Special Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of sixty days.

(4) Every finding of the Special Tribunal with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing, and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Tribunal with regard to the determination of the title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land:

Provided that the Special Tribunal shall by notification specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification shall state that any objection which may be received by the Special Tribunal from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein will be considered by it: Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee property objects to the Special Tribunal taking cognizance of the case, the Special Tribunal shall not proceed further with the case in regard to such property: Provided also that the Special Tribunal shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the last.

(5) It shall be lawful for the Special Tribunal to pass an order in any case decided by it, awarding compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession, which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct the re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits so awarded and cost of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue if the Government are the owner or as a decree of a Civil Court, in any other case: Provided that the Special Tribunal shall, before passing an order under this sub-section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard and consider every such representation and evidence.

(6) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 1987 as would have been within the jurisdiction of a Special Tribunal, shall stand transferred to the Special Tribunal, having jurisdiction, as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based had arisen after such commencement.

(7) Every case brought before the Special Tribunal shall be disposed of finally by the Special Tribunal, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of its having been brought before it.

(8) The Special Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for purposes of review.

8. Procedure and powers of the Special Court:- (1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit; (1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter: Provided that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the Special Court shall be final.

(2-A) If the Special Court is of the opinion that any case brought before it, is not a fit case to be taken cognizance of, it may return the same for presentation before the Special Tribunal: Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry" Provided further that if on an application from an interested person to withdraw and try a case pending before any Special Tribunal the Special Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case to be withdrawn and tried by it, it may for reasons to be recorded in writing withdraw any such case from such Special Tribunal and shall deal with it as if the case was originally instituted before the Special Court. (2-B) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to try all offences punishable under this Act. (2-C) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But additional evidence, if any, adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the abetment thereof before the Special Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence or oath in disproof of the charge made against him or any person charged together with him in the criminal proceeding:

Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceeding.

(3) x x x

(4) Every case under sub-section 91) shall be disposed of finally by the Special Court, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of institution of the case before it.

(5) x x x

(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land:

Provided that the Special Court shall, by notification, specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification, shall state that any objection which may be received by the Special Court from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein will be considered by it: Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee property objects to the Special Court taking cognizance of the case, the Special Court shall not proceed further with the case in regard to such property: Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the, served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the land.

(7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice. It may award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of the land grabbed which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits, so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court, in any other case to be executed by the Special Court: Provided that the Special Court shall, before passing an order under this sub-section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard, and consider every such representation and evidence.

(8) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the Constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand transferred to the Special Court as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based and arisen after the constitution of the Special Court.

47. Be it noted that the Special Tribunal as well as the Special Court are conferred with jurisdiction to reject any application filed before it if such application in its opinion is prima facie frivolous or vexatious. The Special Tribunal and the Special Court, as the case maybe, are required to reject the same without any further enquiry. Every finding recorded by the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and the persons who committed such land grabbing, every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land.

48. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 16 of themade the rules known as A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (for short "the Rules"). The Rules provide for procedure for making application before the Special Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 7A of theand as well as under sub-section (1) of Section 8 before the Special Court. Every application to be filed before the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, shall contain a statement in concise form all the material facts of the claim made thereunder and shall be accompanied by true copies of all the documents duly attested on which the applicant proposes or is likely to rely. The petitioner shall file copies in the Court to be verified by the Mandal Revenue Officer or by the officer authorized by the Court in this behalf and as many copies as are required for service on all the respondents. Rule 6 provides for verification of application. It provides that every application filed may be referred for local inspection or verification or both by the Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area or by any other officer of the Government authorized by the Court in this behalf. The Mandal Revenue Officer or the other officer to whom the application has been referred shall make or cause to be made an inspection or verification or both as soon as may be practicable and shall submit a full and complete report within two weeks from the date of receipt of order with reference to revenue records and facts on ground as to the following:

(i) the correctness of the statements made in the application with regard to columns 1 to 15 and 19 in form-I;

(ii)the facts relating to ownerships, actual possession and use of the land concerned; and

(iii) such other particulars and information as would be useful to the Court to arrive at a correct decision on the claims made in the application.

Provided that the said report is not required to be submitted in respect of the application filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer.

49. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 mandates that the Mandal Revenue Officer or the other officer to whom the application has been referred shall furnish copies of the extracts of the Government records to show the survey number and the sub-division number and proof of possession, ownership and use of the land and the payment of dues to the Government. Rule 7 provides that the Special Court shall before taking cognizance of the case under the give notice in Form II A by publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh gazette as is required under the first proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the. The objections, if any, received from any person including the custodian of evacuee properties within the period specified therein shall have to be considered by the Special Court. Rule 8 provides that the Special Court and the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, shall cause a notice in Form 3B, of taking cognizance of the case under the as is required under the third proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the.

50. A bare reading of the Rules and the second and third provisos to Section 8 of themake it clear that a comprehensive procedure is prescribed for taking cognizance of a case by the Special Court, either suo motu or on an application filed by the applicant. Taking cognizance of a case under the provisions of the is not a formality. The Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, is required to make a detailed threshold scrutiny even before taking cognizance of a case under the provisions of the. It is bound to reject any application filed before it if in its opinion such application, prima facie, is frivolous or vexatious one. In law it is bound to reject the same without making any further enquiry. Such frivolous or vexatious applications are required to be rejected even before taking cognizance of the case under the provisions of the.

51. In order to enable the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, to form its opinion as to whether any application filed before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious the Special Court or the Special Tribunal is required to refer the application for local inspection or verification or both, by the Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area or by any other officer of the Government authorized by the Court in this behalf. There is a laudable object sought to be achieved by such reference of an application filed before the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be viz., threshold scrutiny when an application is made in order to decide as to whether the application filed is a frivolous or vexatious one requiring to be rejected without making any further enquiry. The Mandal Revenue Officer in law is required to make an inspection or verification or both and submit a full and complete report to the Court as to the correctness of the statements made in the application with regard to columns 1 to 15 and 19 in form I comprising of the details of classification of the land, survey numbers and sub-divisional numbers, extent, boundaries of the survey numbers, value of the land, etc., and also facts relating to ownership, actual possession and use of the land concerned. The Mandal Revenue Officer is also required to furnish copies of the extracts of the Government records to show the survey numbers and sub-division numbers and proof of possession, ownership and use of the land and payment of dues to the Government. These are all the relevant factors that may have to be taken into consideration for the purposes of taking cognizance of a case under the provisions of the.

52.The scrutiny itself is with reference to authentic entries made in public documents and record of rights maintained by the competent authorities under various statutes or instruments having force of law.

53. Rule 7 of the Rules says that the Special Court shall before taking cognizance of the case under the give notice in form II A by publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Thereafter a notice to persons interested in land is also required to be issued in form III A by the Special Court after taking cognizance of the case under the to be served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the land. It is only thereafter the Special Court shall give notice to the land grabber in form IV providing him an opportunity to file written statement and adduce evidence if any in the matter.

54. It is thus clear that the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, is required to issue notices in the prescribed forms before taking cognizance and as well as after taking cognizance.

55. It is not as if the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be automatically sets the law in motion against the respondents the moment an application is made under sub-section (1) of Section 8 before the Special Court or under sub-section (1) of Section 7A before the Special Tribunal. The first step required in the process is to refer the application for local inspection or verification or both by the Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area or by any other officer of the government authorized by the Court. Such officer is bound to submit the report for the perusal of the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be. Thus, even before taking cognizance of the case the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be, give notice in the prescribed forms by publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh gazette. The objections if any received pursuant to the said notice have to be considered. Then the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, may take cognizance of a case or reject the application without any further enquiry if in its opinion the application is prima facie frivolous or vexatious. These are the various steps involved and required to be taken by the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, for the purposes of taking cognizance. Every step that is required to be taken right from the stage of referring the application for local inspection or verification till the service of notice against the alleged land grabber, is mandatory in nature. The Rules provide an opportunity to all persons interested, to file their objections.

56. The Rules mandate that notice is required to be issued to all persons who are knowor believed to be interested in the subject matter of the proceedings. Such a notice is necessary in view of provision declaring that every finding of the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and the persons who have committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such matter. Such notices even before the substantial enquiry into the matter begins are required to be issued evidently to avoid and prevent the unscrupulous elements obtaining collusive orders from the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be. Be it noted that the finding of the Special Court and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. Precisely for that reason the notices in the prescribed form have to be issued to the persons interested or known to be interested even before taking cognizance of a case. Likewise, the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, is required to specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under the. The notification to be issued specifying that fact shall state that any objections which may be received by the Special Court from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein will be considered by it.

57. The question that falls for consideration in the instant case is as to whether taking cognizance of a case under the provisions of the at the instance of an applicant is a mere formality or does it require an intense application of mind by the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be even for the purposes of taking cognizance of a case.

58. The expression "cognizance" means judicial examination of a matter. The Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be, are prevented from taking cognizance of frivolous or vexatious application. The application, if, in the opinion of the Special Court, is prima facie frivolous or vexatious the same shall have to be rejected without making any further enquiry. The requirement, therefore, in law is that every application filed shall have to be scrutinized in order to decide as to whether the same is frivolous or vexatious one. Unless the Court comes to the conclusion that it is a fit case to be taken cognizance of, it cannot proceed further in the matter. In order to decide as to whether the application filed prima facie is frivolous or vexatious and in order to enable the Special Court to form its opinion the Court may look into the report of the Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over the area since such report essentially contains the details of the correctness of the statements made in the application and the facts relating to ownership, actual possession and user of the land concerned, etc. It is in this background the verification of application and submission of the report by the Mandal Revenue Officer or the authorized officer, as the case may be, are to be considered as mandatory requirements. In the absence of such report the Court may not be in a position to form its opinion in order to decide as to whether the application filed is a fit case to be taken cognizance of. The objections preferred by the interested persons if any pursuant to notice issued in accordance with the Rule 7 may also have to be taken into consideration for the purposes of forming the opinion by the Special Court that it is a fit case to be taken cognizance of.

59. We have carefully perused the proceedings sheet of the case in hand. The application was initially filed before the Special Tribunal (Chief Judge, City Civil Court). The application has not been sent for the verification of the Mandal Revenue Officer, as is required under Rule 6 of the Rules. Straightaway notices were directed to be issued and also for publication of notices in the Andhra Pradesh gazette. The proceedings sheet does not disclose as to when and on what basis the case has been taken cognizance of by the Special Tribunal. Even before the notices were published in the official gazette the petitioners herein appear to have filed their appearance pursuant to the notice issued by the Special Tribunal. The record does not contain any report submitted by the Mandal Revenue Officer. It is thus clear that there is no formation of opinion to take cognizance of the application filed by the respondents herein. We do not intend to hold that any detailed order is required to be passed by the Special Court or the Special Tribunal as the case may be, even at the time of taking cognizance of the case. But the proceedings sheet should disclose application of mind by the Special Court or the Special Tribunal, as the case may be reflecting formation of opinion to take cognizance of the application. The report required to be submitted by the Mandal Revenue Officer, after local inspection and verification of the contents of the application and such other relevant material that may be available on record may form the basis for formation of opinion to take cognizance of the application under the provisions of the. In the absence of such report it may not be possible for the Special Court to form its opinion in the matter for taking cognizance of the case unless an overwhelming material including the authentic revenue records extracts of which the Mandal Revenue Officer would have furnished upon verification of application in the normal course, as is required, is made available for the perusal of the Special Court for its consideration.

60. However, such report is not required to be submitted in respect of the application filed by the Mandal Revenue Officer.

61. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that assumption of jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondents herein is totally vitiated for the reasons of non-compliance of the provisions of the and the Rules made thereunder. Consequently the whole of the decision is vitiated.

62. The lack of application of mind by the Special Tribunal at the threshold stage before which the application has been initially filed is writ large on the face of the record. The order dated 10-2-1994 by the Special Tribunal holding that this is a fit case to be tried by the Special Court reads:

The respondents are contesting the I by filing a counter. The property involved in this I is vast extent of land viz., ac 9.22 gts in S.No.73 of Marredpally village. The value of the land is given by the petitioners as Rs.11/2 crores even in the year 1991. .... Considering the vast extent of the land and value of the land and prime location of the same, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

63. The Special Tribunal proceeded on the ground that the whole of the extent of ac 9.22 gts of land is the subject matter of the application. In the relief portion the respondents - applicants prayed for grant of injunction only for an extent of ac 1.28 gts. It is thus clear that the Special Tribunal, while assuming jurisdiction to try the case, was not even aware as to what is the extent of the land involved and alleged to have been grabbed by the petitioners herein. Had the Special Tribunal sent the application for verification, had the Mandal Revenue Officer submitted a comprehensive report and had the Special Tribunal applied its mind one does not know whether it would have taken cognizance of the case.

64. During the course of hearing this writ petition Sri Vilas V. Afzalpurkar, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that during the pendency of the application in the Special Court the petitioners herein grabbed the land admeasuring ac 1.28 gts by dispossessing the respondents herein therefrom under the guise of the decree obtained by them in O.s.No.817 of 1986 from the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. But this submission runs counter not only to the contents of the application but also to the findings recorded by the Special Court.

65. However, interest of justice requires that the respondents herein should not be precluded from availing the remedies that may be available to them in law if they have lost possession during the pendency of the land grabbing case in the Special Court. The remedies of the respondents herein to recover the land which they claim to have lost during the pendency of the land grabbing case in the Special Court are left open.

66. We may hasten to add that we have not expressed any opinion whatsoever with regard to the right, title and interest of any of the parties to the proceedings. Since we have left the remedy of the respondents open and get their claim adjudicated in accordance with law the findings recorded by the Special Court shall not operate not only against either of the parties but also against any person or authority interested or having claim in the land. The interest and claim of any person or authority or the Government, as the case may be, would have surfaced had the Special Court referred the application for verification in accordance with law by the Mandal Revenue Officer. During the course of hearing of the writ petitions the learned Advocate-General contended that the entire land in S.No.73 of Marredpaly village belongs to the government. We do not propose to express any opinion whatsoever. We also make it clear that the observations if any made in this order shall have no bearing whatsoever upon the proceedings pending under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is needless to observe that we have not expressed any opinion about the legality of the decree and judgment in O.S.No.817 of 1986 obtained by the petitioners.

67. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment of the Special Court is set aside subject to the observations made hereinbefore. The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated. There shall be no order as to costs.