S.S. Nijjar, J.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have gone through the record of the case.

2. The petitioner joined the Haryana State Electricity Board (now known as Haryana Vidyut Parsaran Nigam Limited), on 1.4.1966 as Apprentice Assistant Engineer. He was, thereafter, appointed as Assistant Engineer on 1.10.1966. Thereafter, the petitioner has earned promotions on different posts. In May, 1978, he was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer. The service record of the petitioner is stated to be excellent. On 12.1.1996, the petitioner was served a charge-sheet, Annexure P-1. It was alleged that due to the negligence and lack of supervisory check of the petitioner, works executed through the contractor, the Board had to suffer huge loss and that he being the over all head of the division has permitted the payment of huge excess amounts.

3. The petitioner submitted a reply to the charge-sheet on 17.4.1996. We may also notice that on the basis of the report of the Committee constituted vide office order dated 26.12.1993 by the Board, the charge-sheets were issued to 27 persons, including the petitioner. In his reply, the petitioner had submitted detailed objections to the preliminary enquiry report. After considering the reply of the petitioner, the enquiry officer was appointed. Regular departmental enquiry was conducted under Rule 7 of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment and Appeal) Regulations, 1990. Enquiry was conducted against 13 officers including the petitioner. Of these officers, three were Executive Engineers, nine were Sub Divisional Officers and one was Assistant Executive Engineer. Request of the petitioner for change of the Enquiry Officer was rejected. On 14.3.1999, a Show Cause Notice was issued to the petitioner wherein it was proposed to remove the petitioner from service. A sum of Rs. 8,56,880.10 was also proposed to be recovered from the petitioner. The reply of the petitioner was sought within 21 days. In the Show Cause Notice reference had been made to two enquiry reports, i.e. 24.6.1998 and 24.1.1999. It is also stated by the petitioner that only enquiry report dated 24.1.1999 was supplied to him alongwith the Show Cause Notice. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the Show Cause Notice on 9.4.1999. An amount of Rs. 8,56,880/- was also ordered to be recovered from him by order dated 28.5.1999, Annexure-6. Without considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, he was ordered to be removed from service. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the aforesaid order on 22.6.1999. The Board of Directors rejected the appeal of the petitioner on 6/7.1.2003, Annexure P-12, in the light of the decision of the Board dated 27.4.2001. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted an appeal to the Chairperson which was also dismissed.

4. Mr. Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry report had been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority without granting any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In the Show Cause Notice dated 14.2.1999, it is clearly stated that the Punishing Authority agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer is of the firm view that the petitioner has thrown all norms to winds and has caused a financial loss to the Board (now Nigam) to the tune of Rs. 8,56,880.10. According to the learned counsel, the entire proceedings from the stage of the enquiry proceedings are liable to be quashed as the Enquiry Report had been accepted without supplying a copy of the Enquiry Report to the petitioner. The enquiry report was sent to the petitioner only alongwith the Show Cause Notice. Therefore, the action of the respondents is clearly contrary to the law laid down in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, 1994(1) Recent Services Judgments 443. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if an opportunity of hearing had been granted to the petitioner, he would have pointed out that the enquiry report is based on no evidence as not even a single prosecution witness was examined. Therefore, grave prejudice has been caused to the petitioner.

5. On the other hand, it is submitted by Mr. Girish Agnihotri, learned counsel for the respondents that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner at all. The petitioner has been duly heard. Remanding back the case to the Disciplinary Authority would be just a ritual. There would be no effect on the punishment imposed on the petitioner. Learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner has not even pleaded the prejudice which has been caused to him by non-supply of the enquiry report before the issuance of Show Cause Notice.

6. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We are unable to accept the submissions made by Mr. Agnihotri. The law has been settled by the Supreme Court in the ECILs case (supra). In para 30 of the aforesaid judgment, it is observed as under :-

"30. Hence, the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows :-

(i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject.

(ii) xx xx xx

(iii) xx xx xx

(iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khans case (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceedings or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence, question (iv) is answered accordingly.

(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence, to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be involved nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether, in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after furnishing the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employ to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice".

7. Mr. Agnihotri had also emphasised the observations made in paragraph 31 of the judgment aforesaid, which are as follows :-

"31. Hence, it all cases where the Inquiry Officers report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunals comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunal which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing by employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the re-instatement and to what benefits, if any, and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a re- instatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law".

8. Mindful of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, we have examined the entire record. We are of the considered opinion that it would not be possible to come to a conclusion that grave prejudice has not been caused to the petitioner by non-delivery of the Enquiry Report.

9. In view of the above, we allow the present writ petition. Orders dated 28.5.1999, Annexure P-5 and 6/7.1.2003, Annexure P-12, are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be re-instead in service for the purpose of continuation of enquiry proceedings in accordance with law laid down by the Supreme Court, as noticed above. The respondents shall be at liberty to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. No costs.