BIBHAS RANJAN DE, J.

1. This writ petition assailed the order No. 509 dated 02.02.2023 with following substantive prayers:

“(a) A Writ of and/or Order and/or direction in the nature of Mandamus thereby setting aside and quashing illegal and arbitrary Order No. 509 dated 02.02.2023 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, North and Middle Andamans, North and Middle Andamans, thereby rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for permission to operate the quarry allotted to him, in contradistinction with treatment of identically situated persons vide reference number 46-56/ DC (N&MA)/ QP/Vol.II /2020/1155 dated 11.05.2021 issued by the Assistant Commissioner (HQ), North and Middle Andamans thereby communicating extension of the lease deed of the said Naresh Halder, and directing the respondent authorities to act fairly in accordance with law by issuing similar Orders in favour of the petitioner;

(b) A Writ of and/or Order and/or Direction in the nature of Mandamus identical to that issued in favour of the Naresh Halder, in the matter of W.P.No. 17 of 2021 by Order dated 24.02.2021 passed by this Hon‟ble Court, thereby inter alia directing the respondents to obtain final report from the Department of Mining, IIT Kharagpur to ascertain the amount of extractable minor minerals and to permit the petitioner to extract the much of minor minerals at his allocated Block through extension of the earlier lease, and to re-pay the additional amounts of payment along with interest of 12% per annum to the petitioner in respect of the amount of minor minerals that he would not be allowed to extract;

(c) A Writ of and/or Order and/or Direction in the nature of Certiorari calling on the respondents and each one of them to certify and remit the records of the case to this Hon‟ble Court such that conscionable justice may be done to the case;

(d) Pass Appropriate Directions(s)/Order(s);

(e) Issue Rule Nisi in terms of Prayers (a), and (b) hereinabove;

(f) Pass an Interim Order in terms of prayer (a) and (b) above thereby inter alia directing the Administration to immediately remove the block allotted and leased to the petitioner from the general pool of blocks being put up for re-auction, so as to ensure that the same is not encumbered or allotted afresh, thereby defeating the purpose of the petitioner‟s prayers and fair treatment on par with Naresh Halder;

(g) Pass an Interim Order in terms of prayer (a) and (b) above thereby inter alia directing the Administration to immediately permit the petitioner to operate the quarry on a temporary basis on accordance with the lease agreement earlier made by and between the petitioner and the Administration, for use of the specifically allotted block in the 2019 tender process in the interests of fairness;

(h) Pass ad-interim Order(s) in terms of the above interim Orders;

(i) Make the Rule absolute if no cause or insufficient cause is shown.

(j) Pass suitable Order(s) as to Costs, including legal expenses;

(k) Pass such other and/or further order or orders, and/or direction or directions as may seem fit and proper.”

2. By this writ application petitioner claims for setting aside of the order impugned along with a direction upon Administration to remove the block allotted and leased to the petitioner from the general pool of blocks being put for re-auction.

3. According to petitioner’s case that the petitioner along with others including one Naresh Halder had participated in the e-auction of quarries for Minor Minerals in the North and Middle Andaman District in 2019. Petitioner being successful bidder, was allotted Block H, Harinagar village, Maybunder Tehsil for extraction of 1200 CBM of stone AND A lease agreement was entered into between the petitioner and Deputy Commissioner, North and middle Andaman. Accordingly, the petitioner had made deposits towards the total bid amount, performance guarantee amount and royalty amount towards operation of the said quarry which were accepted by the Administration.

4. In course of study by IIT Kharagpur, it was found that in most of blocks, there was far lesser amount of material available for extraction than the 1200 CMB permitted in terms of the lease agreements. Accordingly, the quarry activities in respect of those blocks was put on hold despite payment of all requisite amounts.

5. Petitioner prayed for being permitted to extract at least the amount of 5950 CBM from the allotted quarry site and for refund of the excess money paid by him towards the rest of 1200 CBM. Similar prayers were made by other lease holders including one Naresh Halder. But Administration did not respond to the representation of the petitioner and others.

6. Petitioner preferred a writ petition (WP No.141 of 2020) before this Court which was deposed on 21.10.2020 directing consideration and disposal of the petitioner’s representation.

7. Meanwhile the said Naresh Halder had also preferred a writ petition (WP No. 17 of 2021) which was disposed of on 24.02.2021 directing the respondents to obtain final report from the department of mining, IIT Kharagpur to ascertain the amount of extractable Minor Minerals and to permit that petitioner to extract Minor Minerals accordingly at Block B and further directing the process to be completed within eight weeks from date and directing the respondents to repay the additional amount of performance guarantee along with interest of 12% per annum to Naresh Halder.

8. Petitioner ultimately found that entire process of re-auction was being restarted in respect of various blocks including the block allotted and leased to the petitioner in 2019 for a period of one year for which petitioner had made full payment but he was not allowed to operate the same.

9. Petitioner received a reply from Assistant Commissioner (HQ), North and Middle Andaman which informed him that there was no provision to cancel or refund the amount towards the leases, which was not the petitioner’s prayer in the first place, and asking him to participate in fresh auction process. Same officer issued a letter to Naresh Halder also communicating that the competent authority had extended his lease agreement and was permitting him to continue to operate the quarry allotted and lease to him. Even the Chief Secretary accepted that the cases were identical and similar treatment should be given to the petitioner and directed Deputy Commissioner to immediately take up the matter and pass and urgent order and the petitioner should be treated the same way as Naresh Halder.

10. The Deputy Commissioner deliberately delayed the matter and sat on the file for next eight months despite specific direction to hear and dispose of the matter. Finally he passed and order impugned after eight months claiming that quarry plan had expired in October, 2022 and on other grounds denied the right of the petitioner, which is a complete violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

ARGUMENT ADVANCED

11. Mr. Deep Chaim Kabir, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner has filed his written notes of argument reiterating the facts narrated in the writ application. Mr. Kabir has contended that Naresh Halder signed the lease on 12.02.2020, which expired on 12.02.2021. Despite the fact he was given and extension on 11.05.2021 i.e. for three months after it expired. There was no reason why the expiry of lease period of one year should be considered to deny the petitioner while there was no impediment in case of Naresh Halder.

12. Mr. Kabir has submitted that base price that existed at the time of this writ petition specifically mentioned in the tender dated 24.02.2023 being 21.50 Lakhs. So there was no base price to calculate the difference in bidding amount was completely a mala fide excuse created to deprive the petitioner, when that price had already been fixed, when this order was passed and publicized few weeks after the rejection on the fake ground that there was no base price.

13. Mr. Kabir has stated that both the Chief Secretary and Deputy Commissioner himself observed that petitioner and Naresh Halder were similarly situated. Therefore, petitioner should have been allowed to operate the quarry by extending the lease as was done for Naresh Halder. The base rate was also clearly mentioned at the time of filling the writ petition leaving no difficulty in establishing the appropriate price and there was no lose in revenue.

14. Mr. Kabir has further contended that alternative remedy though raised at the belated stage, cannot be an absolute bar to the writ jurisdiction of Hon’ble Court where such blatant violation of fundamental right is occurring which is written large on the face of the records. Mr. Kabir alleged that there was no reason why this Hon’ble Court treated two litigants differently causing a further inequality between identically situated individuals, for which petitioner is pursuing litigation in third round over four years.

15. Mr. Kabir has contended that the Rule 42 of A&N Minor Minerals Rules 2012 mandates for revision to lie to Lieutenant Governor by the aggrieved person by an order under the rules. But this impugned order is not one under the rules, rather Chief Secretary directed the Deputy Commissioner to satisfy why they should not be treated similarly and no statutory powers was exercised at the time of passing order by Deputy Commissioner. This Court also directed an administrative decision to be made for which alternative remedy does not lie as the petitioner asked for enforcement of fundamental rights through parity and Article 14 which is not within the revisional jurisdiction of Lieutenant Governor.

16. Before parting with Mr. Kabir explained the situation in the same line of the Hon’ble Courts thereby litigants cannot be advised to go in appeal from Caesar to Caesar’s wife. In support of his contention Mr. Kabir relied on following cases:

i. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd vs. The excise and Taxation officer-cumAssessing Authority and others, reported in AIR 2023 SC 781

ii. Harbanslal Sahnia and others vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd others, reported in AIR 2003 SC 2120

iii. Ram and Shyam Company vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1147

iv. Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 2114.

17. Per contra, Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents has argued that this Hon’ble Court sitting on writ petition No. WPA 140 of 2022 passed the order dated 29.04.2022 and at time this Court was of cognizant of the order dated 24.02.2021 passed by this Hon’ble Court in writ petitioner No. WP 017 of 2021 in case of Naresh Halder and inspite of that no mandatory order was passed. Writ petitioner accepted the same by not challenging the order dated 29.04.2022 passed by the Hon’ble Court. From that point of view petitioner cannot claim relief on the ground of ‘parity’ or ‘similar situation’.

18. Mr. Chakraborty has stated that Chief Secretary by his order dated 11.06.2022 directed the Deputy Commissioner to ascertain whether the case of the petitioner and Naresh Halder were similarly situated and in that case petitioner’s should be treated at par with the case of Naresh Halder. And alternatively direction for refunding bidding amount along with performance guarantee deposited by the petitioner.

19. Mr. Chakraborty has drawn my attention to the impugned order dated 02.02.2023 and submitted that the order was passed with detailed reasons for not considering the similar situation and petitioner was allowed to refund the bidding amount and performance guarantee. At this stage petitioner has no right to challenge the reasoned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner as the petitioner doesn’t have any vested right with respect to quarry. That apart lease agreement dated 12.02.2022 did not confer any ownership or perpetual right in respect of quarry materials upon the writ petitioner. And according to lease agreement (Clause 17) it is stipulated that in the event of expiry or premature termination, the quarry materials lying at the quarry would become absolute property of the Administration.

20. Mr. Chakraborty has argued that quarry leases are guided by paramount consideration of public interest and no private party can claim any legal or vested rights to quarry or a mining lease. In support of his contention he relied on the following decisions:

i. M.P. Ram Mohan Raja vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2007 (9) SCC 78.

ii. State of Kerala Vs. Kerala Rare Earth and Minirals Ltd., reported in 2016 (6) SCC 323.

iii. Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 2012 (11) SCC 1.

21. Mr. Chakraborty has further submitted that even going by the price in auction conducted on 28.03.2023 when compared with the eauction in which the writ petitioner was successful there is considerable price difference. It is further submitted that even assuming that the writ petitioner case is accepted in its entirety, the writ petitioner cannot be allowed to operate quarry based on an auction granted four years back.

22. It is further submitted by Mr. Chakraborty that the petitioner has been permitted to participate in other tenders despite the fact that grant or one tender would automatically disqualify the allottee from participating in other tenders albeit petitioner has not been successful.

23. Before parting Mr. Charaborty has submitted that present writ petition was filed claiming specific performance of contract which is not specifically enforceable by its nature.

MY VIEW

24. In Godrej Sara Lee Ltd (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraphs 2 to 8:

“2. Two questions emerge for decision on this appeal. First, whether the High Court was justified in declining interference on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy of appeal to the appellant under section 33 of the VAT Act, which it had not pursued. Should the answer to the first question be in the negative, we would next be required to decide whether to remit the writ petition to the High Court for hearing it on merits or to examine the correctness or otherwise of the orders impugned before the High Court.

3. It appears on a perusal of the order under challenge in this appeal that the appellant had questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (ST)-cum-Revisional Authority, Kurukshetra (hereafter „the Revisional Authority‟, for short) to reopen proceedings, in exercise of suo motu revisional power conferred by section 34 of the VAT Act, and to pass final orders holding that the two assessment orders, both dated 28th February, 2007 passed by the ETO-cum-Assessing Authority, Kurukshetra (hereafter „the Assessing Authority‟, for short) for the assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 suffered from illegality and impropriety as delineated therein, viz. that the Assessing Authority erred in levying tax on mosquito repellant (a product manufactured by the appellant) @ 4% instead of 10%. Keeping in view the objection raised by counsel for the respondents that without exhausting the remedy of appeal provided by section 33 of the VAT Act “it would not be permissible to entertain this petition” and upon consideration of the decision of this Court reported in (1975) 2 SCC 436 (Titagarh Paper Mills v. Orissa State Electricity Board) based on which it was contended on their behalf that where any right or liberty arises under a particular Act then the remedy available under that Act has to be availed, the High Court was of the opinion that there can be no presumption that the appellate authority would not be able to grant relief sought in the writ petition; hence, the writ petition was dismissed and the appellants were relegated to the appellate remedy.

4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper.

5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows:

“10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ***”

6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under:

(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;

(ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice;

(iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or

(iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged.

7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11.

8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.”

25. Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) handed down following principles in paragraph 7:

7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks1.) The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners‟ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.

26. In Ram and Shyam Company (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court laid down following principles in paragraphs 10 to 20

“10. Turning to the merits of the case, the arguments covered a much larger canvas than was anticipated when the hearing opened. It was submitted that India being a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic, the property of the Union or of the State is socialist property which would imply that it is community property and every citizen of this country has vital interest in its effective use and legitimate disposal.

11. It was never disputed nor could it have been disputed that minerals vest in the State. The minor minerals vest in the State where the land from which they are to be extracted is situated and minerals other than minor minerals vest in the Union. “Minor minerals” have been defined in The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, to mean “building stones, gravel, ordinary clay, ordinary sand other than sand used for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a minor mineral”. Minor minerals vest in the State in which the land is situated. The first respondent State of Haryana notified that an auction would be held for mineral quarries of Faridabad District. The appellant gave his bid at the auction so notified. It is an admitted position that his was the highest bid. Anyone conversant with auction would not be naive enough to believe that one can go on raising his own bid. His was the highest bid in the amount of Rs 3,87,000 p.a. Though the Presiding Officer accepted the bid of the appellant, being the highest bid at the auction, yet the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by clause (4) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 30 declined to confirm the same presumably under the belief that the highest bid did not represent the adequate lease rent which the State Government was entitled to get. The right of the State Government not to confirm the bid as also its action of not confirming the highest bid of the appellant is not questioned. Therefore, various decisions laying down that the Government is not bound to accept the highest bid, to which our attention was drawn by Mr P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the fourth respondent are of no relevance in this case. This Court in Trilochan Mishra v. State of Orissa, State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh and State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal held that the Government is under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no rights accrue to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. The Court also observed that the Government had the right, for good and sufficient reason, not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. In Vijay Bahadur Singh case4 the Court further observed that the power conferred on the Government by the Act to refuse to accept the highest bid, cannot be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be variety of other good and sufficient reasons to reject the same. The appellant has no grievance that even though his was the highest bid, the same was not accepted nor Mr Sorabjee on his behalf contends that the highest bid of the appellant was rejected on grounds which are either irrelevant or extraneous. This aspect therefore need not detain us any more.

12. Let us put into focus the clearly demarcated approach that distinguishes the use and disposal of private property and socialist property. Owner of private property may deal with it in any manner he likes without causing injury to any one else. But the socialist or if that word is jarring to some, the community or further the public property has to be dealt with for public purpose and in public interest. The marked difference lies in this that while the owner of private property may have a number of considerations which may permit him to dispose of his property for a song. On the other hand, disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficient activities by the availability of larger funds. This is subject to one important limitation that socialist property may be disposed at a price lower than the market price or even for a token price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is for augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State is under an obligation to secure the best market price available in a market economy. An owner of private property need not auction it nor is he bound to dispose it of at a current market price. Factors such as personal attachment, or affinity, kinship, empathy, religious sentiment or limiting the choice to whom he may be willing to sell, may permit him to sell the property at a song and without demur. A welfare State as the owner of the public property has no such freedom while disposing of the public property. A welfare State exists for the largest good of the largest number more so when it proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated to eradication of poverty. All its attempt must be to obtain the best available price while disposing of its property because the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot in the arm. Financial constraint may weaken the tempo of activities. Such an approach serves the larger public purpose of expanding welfare activities primarily for which the Constitution envisages the setting up of a welfare State. In this connection we may profitably refer to Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India in which Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed:

“It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norms which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences etc. must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory.”

13.At another place it was observed that the Government must act in public interest, it cannot act arbitrarily or without reason and if it does so, its action would be liable to be invalidated. It was further observed that the object of holding the auction is generally to raise the highest revenue. The Government is entitled to reject the highest bid if it thought that the price offered was inadequate. But after rejecting the offer, it is obligatory upon the Government to act fairly and at any rate it cannot act arbitrarily. Following this line of thought, in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K while upholding the order of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir dated April 27, 1979 allotting to the second Respondent 10 to 12 lakhs blazes annually for extraction of resin from the inaccessible chir forests in Poonch, Reasi and Ramban Divisions of the State for a period of 10 years on the terms and conditions set out in the order, observed as under:

“Where any governmental action fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness and public interest discussed above and is found to be wanting in the quality of reasonableness or lacking in the element of public interest, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid. It must follow as a necessary corollary from this proposition that the Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State; such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest. The government, therefore, cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it, unless of course there are other considerations which render it reasonable and in public interest to do so.” (emphasis supplied)

At one stage, it was observed that the Government is not free like an ordinary individual, in selecting recipient for its largesse and it cannot choose to deal with any person it pleases in its absolute and unfettered discretion. The law is now well-settled that the Government need not deal with anyone, but if it does so, it must do so fairly and without discretion and without unfair procedure. Let it be made distinctly clear that Respondent 4 was not selected for any special purpose or to satisfy any Directive Principles of State Policy. He surreptitiously ingratiated himself by a back-door entry giving a minor raise in the bid and in the process usurped the most undeserved benefit which was exposed to the hilt in the court. Only a blind can refuse to perceive it.

14. Approaching the matter from this angle, can there be any doubt that the appellant whose highest bid was rejected by the Government should have no opportunity to improve upon his bid more so when his bid was rejected on the ground that it did not represent adequate market consideration for the concession to extract minor mineral. A unilateral offer, secretly made, not correlated to any reserved price made by the fourth respondent after making false statement in the letter was accepted without giving any opportunity to the appellant either to raise the bid or to point out the falsity of the allegations made by the fourth respondent in the letter as also the inadequacy of his bid. The appellant suffered an unfair treatment by the State in discharging its administrative functions thereby violating the fundamental principle of fairplay in action. When he gave the highest bid, he could not have been expected to raise his own bid in the absence of a competitor. Any expectation to the contrary betrays a woeful lack of knowledge of auction process. And then some one surreptitiously by a secret offer scored a march over him. No opportunity was given to him either to raise the bid or to controvert and correct the erroneous statement.

15. What happened in this case must open the eyes both of the Government as well as the people at large. How an uncontrolled exercise of executive power to deal with socialist property in which entire community‟s interest was sacrificed so as to cause huge loss to the public exchequer would have gone unnoticed but for the vigilance of the appellant who no doubt is not altruistic in its approach but its business interests goaded it to expose the unsavoury deal. Conceding that on weighty and valid considerations, the highest bid can be rejected by the State, one such consideration which can be foreseen is that the highest bid does not represent the adequate market price of the concession, yet before giving up the auction process and accepting a private bid secretly offered, the authority must be satisfied that such an offer if given in open would not be outmatched by the highest bidder. In the absence of such satisfaction, acceptance of an offer secretly made and sought to be substantiated on the allegations without the verification of the truth, which was not undertaken, would certainly amount to arbitrary action in the matter of distribution of State largesse which by the decisions of this Court is impermissible. Even though repeatedly, this Court has said that the State is not bound to accept the highest bid, this proposition of law has to be read subject to the observation that it can be rejected on relevant and valid considerations, one such being that the concession is to be given to a weaker section of the society who could not outbid the highest bidder. In the absence of it the approach must be as clearly laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore. In that case, the appellant and the fourth respondent were rival liquor contractors for the sale of the liquor contract for the year 1953-54 in the State of Mysore. The contract was auctioned by the Deputy Commissioner under the authority conferred upon him by the Mysore Excise Act, 1901. The appellant‟s bid was the highest and the contract was knocked down in his favour subject to formal confirmation by the Deputy Commissioner. The fourth respondent was present at the auction but did not bid. Instead of that he went direct to the Excise Commissioner and made a higher offer. The Excise Commissioner cancelled the sale in favour of the appellant and directed the Deputy Commissioner to take action under the relevant rule. The latter accepted the tender of the respondent. The appellant moved the High Court for a writ of mandamus which was dismissed. In appeal by the certificate, it was urged on behalf of the State that the Deputy Commissioner acted within the ambit of his powers under the relevant rule which gave him an absolute discretion either to reauction or to act otherwise and no fetters are placed upon the “otherwise” method. The court negatived this contention observing that arbitrary improvisation of an ad hoc procedure to meet the exigencies of a particular case is ruled out. Therefore, the grant of the contract to the fourth respondent was wrong. Repelling the contention that a writ petition at the instance of the appellant would not be maintainable, the Constitution Bench observed as under:

“The next question is whether the appellant can complain of this by way of a writ. In our opinion, he could have done so in an ordinary case. The appellant is interested in these contracts and has a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Here we have Thimmappa who was present at the auction and who did not bid — not that it would make any difference if he had, for the fact remains that he made no attempt to outbid the appellant. If he had done so it is evident that the appellant would have raised his own bid. The procedure of tender was not open here because there was no notification and the furtive method adopted of setting a matter of this moment behind the back of those interested and anxious to compete is unjustified. Apart from all else, that in itself would in this case have resulted in a loss to the State because, as we have said, the mere fact that the appellant has pursued this writ with such vigour shows that he would have bid higher. But deeper considerations are also at stake, namely, the elimination of favouratism and nepotism and corruption: not that we suggest that that occurred here, but to permit what has occurred in this case would leave the door wide open to the very evils which the legislature in its wisdom has endeavoured to avoid. All that is part and parcel of the policy of the legislature. None of it can be ignored. We would therefore in the ordinary course have given the appellant the writ he seeks. But, owing to the time which this matter has taken to reach us (a consequence for which the appellant is in no way to blame, for he has done all he could to have an early hearing), there is barely a fortnight of the contract left to go. We were told that the excise year for this contract (1953-54) expires early in June. A writ would therefore be ineffective and as it is not our practice to issue meaningless writs we must dismiss this appeal and leave the appellant content with an enunciation of the law.”

16. Facts of no two cases are alike, but if one attempts to compare the situation, the conclusion is inescapable. Appellant‟s bid was the highest bid. It was in the amount of Rs 3,87,000 p.a. Respondent 4 approached the Chief Minister with a slightly higher bid of Rs 4,50,000 per year. This was granted without any reference to the appellant to raise his bid. Such a thing, if allowed to pass once is bound to be repeated because this method is open to the abuse of favouritism and nepotism and the loss of revenue in this case to the State is enormous. What happened in the Court staggered everyone. Learned Attorney General Shri L.N. Sinha, who questioned the competence of the Court to deal with the matter when he witnessed the rising crescendo of the auction in the Court and the bid reached Rs 12 lakhs per year, he quietly left the Court frankly stating that he does not wish any contention to be raised on behalf of the State of Haryana. Apprehension voiced by the Constitution Bench has literally come true in this case. This view of the Constitution Bench was reaffirmed in Nand Kishore Saraf v. State of Rajasthan the only distinguishing feature of the case being that the highest bid of the appellant was rejected and the contract was given to Dharti Dan Shramik Theka Sahkari Samiti Ltd., a cooperative society of the workmen. Though the Court did not so specifically state, it upheld the rejection of the highest bid of the appellant on the ground that the benefit of the concession was given to a cooperative society formed by the weaker section of the society and thereby it serves the public purpose as set out in Article 41 of the Directive Principles of the State Policy. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati, J. observed as under:

“A pragmatic approach to social justice compels us to interpret constitutional provisions, including those like Articles 32 and 226, with a view to see that effective policing of the corridors of power is carried out by the court until other ombudsman arrangements — a problem with which Parliament has been wrestling for too long — emerges. I have dwelt at a little length on this policy aspect and the court process because the learned Attorney-General challenged the petitioner‟s locus standi either qua worker or qua citizen to question in court the wrongdoings of the public sector although he maintained that what had been done by the Corporation was both bona fide and correct. We certainly agree that judicial interference with the administration cannot be meticulous in our Montesquien system of separation of powers. The court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the Directorate of a Government company has acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its wisdom, the court cannot, as a super-auditor, take the Board of Directors to task. This function is limited to testing whether the administrative action has been fair and free from the taint of unreasonableness and has substantially complied with the norms of procedure set for it by rules of public administration.”

In a concurring opinion, Chandrachud, C.J. observed that sales of public property, when the intention is to get the best price, ought to take place publicly.

17. In State of U.P. v. Shiv Charan Sharma this Court observed that public auction with open participation and a reserved price guarantees public interest being fully subserved.

18. Even though later on, learned Attorney General did not invite us to examine any specific contention on behalf of the State of Haryana, it may in passing be stated that with regard to transactions with the State, the principle enunciated in Section 55(5)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act would apply with greater vigour. Proceeding along it was submitted that if that is accepted and if it appears to the Court that the State of Haryana did not appear to have full appreciation of the value of the property and the other party i.e. Respondent 4 by reason of its profession was aware of the same and the resulting transaction is materially unfair, then such a case falls outside the principle enunciated by the decisions of this Court, on which reliance was placed on behalf of Respondent 4. We consider it unnecessary in the facts of this case to examine this aspect.

19. The position that emerges is this. Undoubtedly Rule 28 permits contract for winning mineral to be granted by the Government by auction or tender. It is true that auction was held. It is equally true that according to the State Government, the highest bid did not represent the market price of the concession. It is open to the State to dispose of the contract by tender. Even here the expression “tender” does not mean a private secret deal between the Chief Minister and the offerer. Tender in the context in which the expression is used in Rule 28, means “tenders to be invited from intending contractors”. If it was intended by the use of the expression “tender” in Rule 28 that contract can be disposed of by private negotiations with select individual, its validity will be open to serious question. The language ordinarily used in such rules is by public auction or private negotiations. The meaning of the expression “private negotiations” must take its colour and prescribe its content by the words which precede them. And at any rate disposal of the State property in public interest must be by such method as would grant an opportunity to the public at large to participate in it, the State reserving to itself the right to dispose it of as best subserve the public weal. Viewed from this angle, the disposal of the contract pursuant to the letter by the fourth respondent to the Chief Minister is objectionable for more than one reason. The writer has indulged into allegations, the truth of which was not verified or asserted. The highest bidder whose bid was rejected on the ground that the bid did not represent the market price, was not given an opportunity to raise his own bid when privately a higher offer was received. If the allegations made in the letter influenced the decision of the Chief Minister, fair-play in action demands that the appellant should have been given an opportunity to counter and correct the same. Application of the minimum principles of natural justice in such a situation must be read in the statute and held to be obligatory. When it is said that even in administrative action, the authority must act fairly, it ordinarily means in accordance with the principles of natural justice variously described as fair play in action. That having not been done, the grant in favour of the fourth respondent must be quashed.

20. Apart from various considerations herein examined if any other view is taken in the facts and circumstances of this case, it may provide a classic example of ostrich burying its face in sand and declining to see the reality.

27. In Radha Krishan Industries (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraphs 23 to 28 as follows:

“23. We shall now review the position of law on the questions before us.

C.1. Maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court

24. The High Court has dealt with the maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying on the decision of this Court in CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. the High Court noted that although it can entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must not do so when the aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy available in law. However, certain exceptions to this “rule of alternate remedy” include where, the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the law or acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or has resorted to invoke provisions, which are repealed; or where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Applying this formulation, the High Court noted that the appellant has an alternate remedy available under the GST Act and thus, the petition was not maintainable.

25. In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted :

“14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.

15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.” (emphasis supplied)

26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool, in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., this Court noted that :

“7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies : (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the appellants‟ dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.” (emphasis supplied)

27. The principles of law which emerge are that:

(i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.

(ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.

(iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where :

(a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution;

(b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice;

(c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or

(d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.

(iv). An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.

(v). When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion.

(vi). In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.

28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad, Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India among other decisions.”

28. In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court held in paragraphs 2 to 5 as follows:

“2. The prayers in the writ petitions filed by the appellants before the High Court also differ. However, principally the reliefs prayed for by the appellants in their writ petitions were for quashing

(i) the decision of the Department of Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand contained in the Letter dated 13-9-2005 whereby the State Government sought to withdraw the recommendation for grant of mining lease made in favour of the appellants in the subject iron ore bearing areas in Mauza Ghatkuri, West Singhbhum District, Jharkhand;

(ii) the order of the Ministry of Mines, Government of India whereunder the said Ministry returned the recommendation made by the Government of Jharkhand in favour of each of the appellants;

(iii) for declaring the Notifications dated 21-12-1962 and 28-2-1969 issued by the Government of Bihar and the Notification dated 27-10-2006 issued by the Government of Jharkhand null and void; and

(iv) directing the respondents to proceed under Rule 59(2) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short “the 1960 Rules”) for grant of mining lease to each of the appellants in the iron ore bearing areas in Ghatkuri as applied.

The Bihar Land Reforms Act

3. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short “the 1950 Bihar Act”) came to be enacted by the Bihar Legislature to provide for the transference to the State of the interest of proprietors and tenure-holders in the land of the mortgagees and lessees of such interest including interest in mines and minerals and other matters connected therewith. It came into force on 25-9- 1950. Chapter II of the 1950 Bihar Act deals with vesting of an estate or tenure in the State and its consequences. The State Government has been empowered under Section 3 to declare that the estates or tenures of a proprietor or tenure-holder, as may be specified in the notification(s) from time to time, to become vested in the State.

4. Section 4 provides for consequences of vesting of an estate or tenure in the State. Section 4 has undergone amendments on few occasions. To the extent it is relevant, Section 4 of the 1950 Bihar Act reads as follows:

“4. Consequences of the vesting of an estate or tenure in the State.—

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contract and notwithstanding any non-compliance or irregular compliance of the provisions … on the publication of the notification under sub-section (1), of Section 3 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 3- A, the following consequences shall ensue and shall be deemed always to have ensued, namely—

(a) Such estate or tenure including the interests of the proprietor or tenureholder in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure … as also his interest in all subsoil including any rights in mines and minerals whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether been worked or not, inclusive of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats) shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.”

5. The brief facts relating to each of these appeals may be noticed now.”

29. Kerala Rare Earth and Minerals Ltd. (supra) observed in paragraphs 32 as follows:

“32. In grant of mining lease of a property of the State, the State Government has the discretion to grant or refuse to grant any prospective licence or licence to any applicant. No applicant has a right, much less vested right, to the grant of mining lease for mining operations in any place within the State. No one has a vested right for grant of mining lease (vide M.P. Ram Mohan Raja v. State of T.N. and State of T.N. v. Hind Stone). The State has a discretion to grant or refuse to grant any mining lease. No person can claim any right in any land belonging to the Government or in any mines except the rights created under the MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules. But the State Government being a public authority, its acts are necessarily regulated by rules and regulations.”

30. In M.P. Ram Mohan Raja (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court handed down the following principles in paragraph 13:

“13. Now, coming to the merits of the writ petition we find that the Rule was already repealed on 27-6-1996 and the ground reality had also changed. So far as grant of mining and mineral lease is concerned, no person has a vested right in it. There is no quarrel on the legal proposition that if certain rights have been decided on the basis of the law which was obtaining at that time, that will not nullify the judicial decision unless the bases are taken out. In the present case, the Rule under which the writ petitioner sought direction for consideration of his application has already been repealed within the time-frame directed by the High Court. Therefore, the basis on which the order was passed has been totally knocked out. Rule 39 on the basis of which direction was given was not in existence. Therefore, it could not have been possible for the authorities to have acceded to the request of the writ petitioner. More so, no one has a vested right in mineral lease. In this connection it will be more useful to refer to a decision of this Court in State of T.N. v. Hind Stone. Their Lordships in the aforesaid case observed as follows:

“The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8-C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long prior to the date of GOMs No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C did not exist.”

31. Having heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties to this writ petition and also having gone through the entire facts in terms of arguments advanced before this Court I am of the following opinions:

31.1 All the cases relied on behalf of petitioner except Ram and Shyam Company (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court held that alternative remedy has been consistently held by the Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or the proceeding are wholly without jurisdiction or vires of the Act is challenged.

31.2. In Ram and Shyam Company (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with an issue of refusal of the offer of appellant being highest bidder without giving him any opportunity of hearing, rather offer of the respondent No.4 was accepted which has denied equality of opportunity to the appellant in the matter of distribution of State largesee. That apart the issues dealt with in other cases are not identical to that of ours.

31.3. The cases relied on behalf the respondents handed down the principles that so far as grant of mining and minerals lease is concerned no person has a vested or legal right to the grant or renewal of mining lease.

31.4. It is not disputed that Naresh Halder was given an extension on 11.05.2021 i.e. three months after it expired and that was the issue raised by the petitioner that the petitioner was refused prayer for further extension after expiry of the lease agreement.

31.5. Coordinate Bench of this Court dealt with a writ application being No. WPA/140/2022 taking note of the order dated 24.02.2022 whereby another Coordinate Bench of this Court disposed a writ application being No. WP No. 017 of 2021 filed by said Naresh Halder handing down an order directing the respondent authority to permit the petitioner (Naresh Halder) to extract that much of minor minerals from the Block B. But the Coordinate Bench dealing with WPA/140/2022 at the instance of the petitioner (M.S.Raja), disposed of the writ petition directing the authority to indicate whether the petitioner and Naresh Halder deserve equal treatment or not and such order was passed within a period of one month from the date of recommendation of the order, but mandatory before any eauction with respect to site Block H under survey No. 4/1/P area 0.25 hectors situated at Harinagar village, Mayabunder Tehsil, North and Middle Andaman District. The Chief Secretary, Andaman and Nicobar Administration also directed the Deputy Commissioner, North and Middle Andaman to analysis all facts and the detail hearing in respect of Shri M.S.Raja and Shri Naresh Halder and to ascertain whether both cases deserve equal treatment from point of view of rule of law equity and fairness.

31.6. Therefore, both the order passed by the Hon’ble Coordinate Bench in WPA/140/2022 and passed by the Chief Secretary, Andaman and Nicobar Administration it appears that Deputy Commissioner, North and Middle Andaman was directed both way judicially and administratively to ascertain whether the case of the petitioner M.S. Raja and Naresh Halder are situated similarly or not.

31.7. It is not disputed that Deputy Commissioner sat over the matter for a considerable period and thereafter he complied with the direction of this Court and that of the Chief Secretary by passing the impugned order dated 02.02.2023 accepting that both the petitioner and Naresh Halder are situated similarly. But Deputy Commissioner, ultimately refused the prayer for extension of lease on the ground that there was no base prise at the time of passing order in terms of market value, leading to revenue loss.

32. It is true that petitioner has neither any legal right nor any vested right over the minor minerals owned by the state. At the same time it is true that both the petitioner and one Naresh Halder were allotted two blocks (H & B) under respective lease agreement. It is also true that lease agreement was extended in case of Naresh Halder even after expiry of the lease agreement. But that was not allowed in respect of the petitioner herein who claimed his right in view of the liberty of principle of parity on 09.06.2020 and that was ultimately disposed of on 02.02.2023. Right of the petitioner, in my view, cannot be refused in terms of principles of natural justice and parity under Article 14 of the constitution of India.

33. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the order No. 509 dated 02.02.2023 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, North and Middle Andaman District stands set aside. Accordingly, Authority shall extend the lease as extended in case of Naresh Halder. Deputy Commissioner, North and Middle Andaman District is directed to dispose of the matter preferably within six weeks from date after exercising all the procedure prescribed therefor, applying latest base price subject to adjustment of amount already paid by the petitioner.

34. With the aforesaid observation the present writ petition stands disposed of.

35. Parties to act on a server copy of this judgement duly collected from the official website of the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta.

36. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, shall be supplied to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.