S. RANGANATHAN, J.

( 1 ) SECTION 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to simply as

s. 5), confers original jurisdiction on the High Court of Delhi in the following terms:

Jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi: (1) The High Court of Delhi shall have, in respect

of the territories for the time being included in the Union Territory of Delhi, all such

original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately

before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories by the High

Court of Punjab. (2) Notwithstanding anything. contained in any law for the time

being in force, the High Court of Delhi shall also have in respect of the said

territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds

fifty thousand rupees. "this Civil Revision petition raises the interesting question as

to whether, in view, of the above provision, after the coming into existence of the

Delhi High Court, an application under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations

Act, 1951 (hereinafter briefly referred to as the Act), where the amount remaining

due to the Financial Corporation concerned exceeds Rs. 50,000. 00, should be filed

only in the High Court and not in the Court of the District Judge or Additional District

Judge as before.

( 2 ) A brief factual background may also be necessary as some reference to the

factual position was also made in the course of the arguments. The Parkash Playing

Cards Manufacturing Company, (the Petitioner) had been advanced considerable

amounts of money by the Delhi Financial Corporation (the Corporation ). A sum of

Rs. 67,196. 92 and further interest is claimed by the Corporation as payable by the

petitioner. The Corporation therefore, made an application under Section 31 of the

Act before the District Judge which was registered as Civil Suit No. 79 of 1976 and

assigned for disposal to the Additional District Judge. On 12-10-1976 the Additional

District Judge passed an order in favour of the Corporation for the amount claimed

and directed that the same should be paid in monthly instalments of Rs. 2,000. 00

each commencing from 31-12-1976. The Court also drew up a decree in terms of

the order. Dissatisfied with the order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the

Delhi High Court which was registered as F. A. O. No. 15/77. There was a

compromise in the High Court, the order of the lower court was confirmed but the

terms of payment were altered in respects which are not now material. The

petitioner not having paid its dues, the Corporation filed an application in Suit No.

79/76 for execution of the "decree" passed in the suit, as modified by the High

Court, which has been treated as an execution matter in the suit. It is at this stage

that the petitioner put forward an objection for the first time that the "decree"

sought to be executed had not been passed by a competent court on the ground

that only the High Court could have entertained and dealt with the application under

Section 31 as the monetary claim of the Corporation was in excess of Rs. 50,000.

This contention has been rejected by the Additional District Judge and hence the

present revision.

( 3 ) IN order to succeed in his contention, the petitioner must first show that the

proceedings initiated by an application under Section 31 of the Act constitute a "suit"

the value of which exceeds Rs. 50,000, within the meaning of Section 5. For a

proper understanding of the nature and scope of the proceedings outlined in

Sections 31 and 32, it is first better to have broad perspective of the object and

purposes of the Act itself. The Act was enacted by Parliament with a view to

enabling State Governments to establish Finance Corporations for enhancing the

pace of industrialisation by providing credit on easy terms tor setttng up industrial

concerns and/or for expanding the activities of the existing industrial concerns. As a

considerable part of the funds of the Corporation are Government or public funds,

the Act provides certain speedy procedures to avoid prolonged litigation and also

confers wide powers on the Corporation which will enable it to realise the amounts

due to it quickly. Section 25 enables the Financial Corporation to carry on and

transact any of the businesses set out therein, which include guaranteeing on such

terms and conditions as may be agreed upon: (I) loans raised by industrial concerns

which are repayable within a period not exceeding 20 years and are floated in the

public market; or (ii) loans raised by industrial concerns from Scheduled Banks or

State Co-operative Banks. It can also underwrite the issue of stocks, shares, bonds

or debentures by an industrial concern. The Corporation can either guarantee the

loans raised by the industrial concern or may even itself grant a loan on such terms

and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Corporation and the industrial

concern. Section 29 confers upon the Corporation in case of default by the industrial

concern, the right to take over the management or. possession or both of the

industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise

the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation and

any transfer of property made by the Corporation in exercise of the power conferred

by Section 29 will vest in it all rights in the property transferred as if the transfer

had been made by the owner of the property. Section 30 empowers the Corporation

to call for the immediate repayment of the entire loan or advance from the industrial

concern superseding the earlier instalment basis agreed upon. Section 31 prescribes

a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Corporation which is without

prejudice to its right of direct action under Section 29 of the Act or Section 69 of the

Transfer of Property Act. It comes into operation where an industrial concern: (I) In

breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance

or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee

given by the Corporation; or (ii) Otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its

agreement with the Corporation; or (iii) Where the Corporation requires an industrial

concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under Sec. 30 and

the industrial concern fails to make such repayment. It enables the Corporation to

apply to the District Judge within the limit of whose jurisdiction, the industrial

concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business praying for one or

more of the following three reliefs: (A) for an order for the sale of the property

pledged etc. as security for the loan or advance; or (b) for an ad interim injunction

restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant

or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of

the Board, where such removal is apprehended. Sub-clause (2) provides that the

application shall state: (A) the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial

concern to the Corporation; (b) the ground on which the application is made; and

(c) such other particulars as may be prescribed. No other particulars have, however,

been prescribed as denned in the Act. Section 32 is important for the purposes of

the present case and needs to be extracted in full: Section 32. Procedure of District

Judge in respect of applications under S. 31 (1) When the application is for the

reliefs mentioned in Clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 31, the District

judge shall pass an ad interim order attaching the security, or so much of the

property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise in his estimate an

amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to

the Financial Corporation, together with the costs of the proceedings taken under

Section 31, with or without an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial

concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. (2) When

the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section

31, the District Judge shall grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial

concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment and issue a

notice calling upon the industrial concern to show cause, on a date to be specified in

the notice, why the management of the industrial concern should not be transferred

to the Financial Corporation. (3) Before passing any order under sub-section (1) or

sub-section (2), the District Judge may, if he thinks fit, examine the officer making

the application. (4) At the same time as he passes an order under sub-section (1),

the District Judge shall issue to the industrial concern a notice accompanied by

copies of the order, the application and the evidence, if any, recorded by him calling

upon it to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why the ad interim

order of attachment should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed. (5) If

no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under subsections

(2) and (4), the District Judge shall forthwith make the ad interim order absolute

and direct the sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the

industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or confirm the injunction. (6) If cause

is shown, the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the Financial

Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. (7) After

making an investigation under sub-section (6), the District Judge may (a) confirm

the order of attachment and direct the sale of the attached property; (b) vary the

order of attachment so as to release a portion of the property from attachment and

direct the sale of the remainder of the attached property; (c) release the property

from attachment; (d) confirm or dissolve the injunction or (e) transfer the

management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or reject the

claim made in this behalf: Provided that when making an order under Clause (c), the

District Judge may make such further orders as he thinks necessary to protect the

interests of the Financial Corporation and may apportion the costs of the

proceedings in such manner as he thinks fit: Provided further that unless the

Financial Corporation intimates to the District Judge that it will not appeal against

any order releasing any property from attachment, such order shall not be given

effect to, until the expiry of the period fixed under sub-section (9) within which an

appeal may be preferred or, if any appeal is preferred, unless the High Court

otherwise directs until the appeal is disposed of. (8) An order of attachment or sale

of property under this section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the

manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment or sale of

property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decreeholder. (8a) An order under this section transferring the management of an

industrial concern to the Financial Corporation shall be carried into effect, as far as

may be practicable, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for

the possession of immovable property or the delivery of movable property in

execution of a decree, as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. (9)

Any party aggrieved by an order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) may,

within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the High Court and upon

such appeal the High Court, may, after hearing the parties, pass such orders

thereon as it thinks proper. (10) Where proceedings for liquidation in respect of an

industrial concern have commenced before an application is made under sub-section

(1) of Section 31, nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the Financial

Corporation any preference over the other creditors of the industrial concern not

conferred on it by any other law. (11) The functions of a District Judge under this

section shall be exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a city civil court

having jurisdiction, by a Judge of that Court and in the absence of such Court, by

the High Court and (b) elsewhere also by an Additional District Judge or by any

Judge of the principal court of Civil jurisdiction. "

( 4 ) IT is in pursuance of the above provisions that the respondents filed the

application before the Additional District Judge which, it is now said, should have

been filed in this High Court. The first contention of Shri Andley is that the word

suit has not been defined anywhere and that in the context of a legislation

conferring jurisdiction on a High Court it should be given a very wide and liberal

interpretation and that there is no reason to restrict the scope of its ambit by

excluding an application of the present type. He points out that though a suit is

normally instituted by filing a plaint, the word plaint is not defined anywhere,

further Section 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure also permits the institution of a suit

in any other prescribed manner. In a proceeding under Section 32, the Court has to

go into all questions of fact and law that may be raised by the mortgagor. in

defence to the application made by the Corporation. He may take up any plea such

as that the deed has not been executed by it, that the deed (loan), has not been

advanced as stated in the document; that the document is liable to be set aside on

grounds of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation; that the entire or a substantial part

of the money had been paid back and so on. He can raise all the pleas which are

open to a mortgagor in a mortgage suit brought against him by the mortgagor.

When any such claim is put forward by the mortgagor, the court has to decide the

same in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent

possible. In other words, the court has to adjudicate upon issues on the same lines

as in a regular suit instituted by the Corporation to enforce the mortgage. Though

the section purports to restrict the nature of the reliefs claimable by the Corporation,

before the Court can pass any order granting or revising or rejecting any part of the

claim of the Corporation, it has necessarily to adjudicate upon all the issues raised

by the mortgagor including issues relating to the genuineness, validity and extent of

the claim. He, therefore, contends that though this is framed as a petition seeking

summary relief, it is in fact nothing short of a suit filed by the Corporation for

recovering the amounts due to it under the mortgage.

( 5 ) THE argument of learned counsel appears plausible and attractive but I do not

think it can be accepted. The word suit has no doubt not been denned anywhere

and is a word of very wide import. The dictionary meanings of the word are so

comprehensive as to take in any request to any person, in particular, to a Court of

Law or tribunal for redress. In law, it means, vide Mukherjee, Law Lexicon, p. 529.

"suit. suit in its common parlance is a term of wide amplitude. Broadly, a "suit" is a

proceeding in a court of justice for the enforcement of a right denoting a legal

proceeding of a civil kind. It is a proceeding in a Court according to the forms of law

to enforce the remedy to which a party deems itself entitled. Lord Coke defines a

suit to be "actio nihil aliud est quam jus prosequendi in judicio quod alicui debetur"

meaning "an action is nothing else than the right of pursuing in a court of justice,

that which is due to one". Blackstone simply says that a "suit" is a legal demand of

ones rights. In its generic sense, a "suit" is the pursuit or prosecution of some

claim. The term "suit" in its comprehensive sense may be treated as applying to any

original proceedings in a court of justice by which a party pursues the remedy which

the law grants him. The modes of proceedings may be various depending upon the

different stages in the litigation, that is, proceedings in the original court, court of

appeal, proceedings in the nature of review or revision and execution proceedings.

The legal signification of the word "suit" is very broad, and the term has also a

much narrower meaning when it is examined in the procedural sense. "however, it is

seen that the expression derives colour from its setting and has been interpreted in

different ways in different legislative contexts. In Kirpa Singh (AIR 1928 Lah 627), a

Full Bench of the Lahore High Court pointed out that the words "suit, proceeding"

and words of a similar connotation "have different meanings in different statutes

and it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which would be

applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be examined in

reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in

with it". The word has received a liberal interpretation in the context of Section 9 of

the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts vide Harikishan Lal v. Peoples Bank,

AIR 1936 Lah 608 and Peoples Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardul Singh, AIR 1961 Pandh

87 where the High Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction to transfer

proceedings in miscellaneous and company matters to itself. Again in construing

beneficial provisions of a legislation like the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 (See

Balram Singh v. Dudh Nath, AIR 1949 All 100) or the Usurious Loans Act (See Public

Prosecutor v. Basheer AIR 1966 Mad 325 [LQ/MadHC/1964/320] ) where the object is to relieve certain

classes of people in all proceedings of civil character, the word is given a very wide

interpretation. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that every judicial

proceeding cannot be termed a suit (see Premnaths case AIR 1963 Punj 62) and

that the word "ordinarily" meant and apart from some context must be taken to

mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint (Hansraj Guptas

case AIR 1933 PC 63 [LQ/PC/1932/93] ).

( 6 ) I do not think the context of Section 5 warrants the wide interpretation. This

section makes provision for the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction by the

High Court. In this context, what it provides for is clearly in regard to ordinary civil

suits in the normal connotation of the term, the provision being that, if the value of

their subject-matter exceeds Rs. 50,000 they should be filed in the High Court

instead of the District Court. Such suits are initiated by the filing of a plaint (Order

IV, Rule 1 ). It should contain several details and particulars one of which is value of

the subject-matter (vide Order VII, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code ). An application

under Section 31 carries the little information provided for in Section 31 (2) and

does not contain the several details prescribed for a plaint under the Code of Civil

Procedure. No doubt, Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code permits the initiation of

a suit in a manner other than by the filing of a plaint but it should be in a manner

prescribed in the rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure, (see Ss. 2 (16)

and 2 (18) ). For example, one may refer to the filing of an application under Order

33 which will itself amount to the institution of a suit when permission is accorded to

the applicant to sue as an indigent person, (Order XXXIII, Rule 8 of the Civil

Procedure Code ). But an application under Section 31 of the Act cannot be treated

as a suit by virtue of the language of Section 26, Code of Civil Procedure. Again an

application under Section 31 available to the Corporation is in addition to its right of

regular suit, if it wishes to file one, on the basis of the mortgage. In an application

under Section 31, the Corporation cannot ask for a personal decree against the

mortgagors, seek relief against the guarantors, or implead all parties that may be

necessary to effectively dispose of all the claims of the Corporation against the

mortgagors. It is a provision for a quick and expeditious but limited relief and it

would not be correct to describe the value of the property mortgaged or the amount

due and outstanding to the Corporation on a mortgage as the "value of its subject

matter. "

( 7 ) THAT an application under Section 31 cannot be properly described as a suit is

clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gujarat State Financial

Corporation case (AIR 1978 SC 1765 [LQ/SC/1978/220] ) relied on by Shri Baweja, though that case

was decided in the context of the Court-fees Act. In that case, the Corporation had

filed several applications under Section 31 (1) against several industrial concerns,

and paid a fixed court fee of 65 paise on each of them on the basis of Article 1 (c) of

Schedule II of the Bombay Court-fees Act. This was upheld by one District Judge on

the ground that it was in the nature of an execution application. But other District

Judges and, on revision, the High Court accepted the contention of the State that

the application would be governed either by Article 1 of Schedule I as it was in the

nature of a plaint or at any rate by Article 7 of Schedule I which provided for an ad

valorem court-fee on an application made for obtaining substantive relief which is

capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss

because to all intents and purposes the application was one for recovery of the

outstanding claim of the Corporation. The Supreme Court reversed this decision.

After surveying the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act, the Court dealt with

the claim for ad valorem court-fee under Article 1 of Schedule I on the basis that the

application is a plaint and observed:"section 31 (1) prescribes a special procedure

for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporation. The Corporation is to make

an application for the reliefs set out in Section 31 (1 ). The reliefs that a Court can

grant under Section 31 (1) are the sale of the property mortgaged, etc, to a

Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance; transfer of the

management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, restraining the

industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment

from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board of

the Financial Corporation. An application for such a relief is certainly not a plaint in a

suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. On a breach of

an agreement by an industrial concern the Corporation can seek one or more of the

three reliefs set out in S. 31 (1 ). If the Corporation seeks the relief of transferring

the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation it could

hardly be said that the application purports to be a plaint for recovering the

mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. It would be inappropriate to say

that on analogy an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to a suit by a

mortgagee to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. At any rate,

in an application under Section 31 (1) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for

a decree for its outstanding dues. It can make an application for one of the three

reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money decree, or decree for recovery

of outstanding loan or advance. Section 31 (1) of the Act, in the circumstances,

therein set out, permits the Corporation to seek one or more of the three reliefs

therein stated. It is difficult to comprehend that merely the form of relief would

attract one or the other Article of Court-fees Act. If relief of sale of mortgaged

property is sought which permits an argument that the application is nothing but a

suit for realising mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and, therefore, ad

valorem court-fees is payable, then what would be the nature of the application

when instead of sale of mortgaged property the relief asked for is transfer of the

management of the industrial concern or an interim injunction restraining the

industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment

from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board In

the last mentioned two cases the relief is incapable of any monetary evaluation.

The High Court got over this difficult question by merely observing that this need

not be answered in the petitions before the High Court. Frankly speaking, they shed

some light on the nature of the proceedings contemplated by Section 31, and

Section 32 of the Act clearly points to the conclusion that the proceedings are not in

the nature of a money recovery proceedings. Article 1 of Schedule I would,

therefore, not be attracted and we must say in fairness to Mr. D. V. Patel, learned

counsel for the respondent State of Gujarat who specifically stated that the

application would not fall under Article 1 of Schedule I but it would be governed by

Article 7 of Schedule. "it was then urged that, in an application under Section 31,

whatever the nature of the relief claimed, the substance of the matter was that the

Corporation was seeking to recover the loan by the sale of the mortgaged property

and thus sought to make a monetary gain or prevent a monetary loss. Dealing with

this, the Court observed :"what then is the nature of proceedings contemplated by

Section 31 (1) if it is not a suit by the mortgagee for recovery of mortgage money

by sale of mortgaged property Section 31 would to some extent provide a clue to

this question. On an application under S. 31 (1) being made it is obligatory upon the

Court to make an interim order attaching the security with or without interim

injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its plant,

machinery or equipment without the permission of the Board of the Corporation. If

the relief claimed in the application is transfer of the management of the industrial

concern to the Corporation it is obligatory upon the District Judge to grant an ad

interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its

machinery, plant or equipment. In either event a notice notifying the industrial

concern to show cause why the order should not be made absolute is required to be

served upon the industrial concern. It was said that if cause is shown by the

industrial concern it is obligatory upon the District Judge to investigate the claim of

the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provision contained in the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. The

contention is that once an industrial concern shows cause and contests the

application of the Corporation there arises a lis between the parties which would

include the investigation of the monetary claim of the Corporation and per se it

would be a suit between the mortgagee and the mortgagor in which the ultimate

relief is sale of mortgaged property for repayment of the mortgage money. Sub-sec.

(6) of Sec. 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed. The

claim of the Corporation is not the monetary claim to be investigated though it may

become necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of

the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim does not involve all

the contentions that can be raised in a suit. The claim of the Corporation is that

there is a breach of agreement or default in making repayment of loan or advance

or instalment thereof and, therefore, the mortgaged property should be sold. It is

not a money claim. The contest can be that the jurisdictional fact which enables the

Corporation to seek the relief of sale of property is not available to it or no case is

made out for transfer of management of the industrial concern. Sub-section (7) of

Section 32 prescribes what reliefs can be given after investigation under sub-section

(6) is made, and it clearly gives a clue to the nature of contest under sub-section

(6), sub-section (8) of Section 32 only prescribes the mode and method for

executing the order of attachment or sale of property as provided in the Code of

Civil Procedure. Sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) of Section 32 read together would give

an opportunity to the industrial concern to appear and satisfy the District Judge that

the situation envisaged by Section 31 (1) has not arisen and the relief should not be

granted. In the absence of a provision giving such an opportunity to the industrial

concern to whose detriment the order is required to be made a serious question

may arise about the constitutional validity of the procedure prescribed under Section

31 (1) inasmuch as it would be violative of principles of natural justice and that too

in a proceeding in a Court of Law. The provision contained in sub-section (6) does

not expand the contest in the application made under Section 31 (1) as to render

the application to be a suit between a mortgagee and the mortgagor for sale of

mortgaged property. If that were so, the Corporation would not be limited to

specified reliefs only and if the contract permits it may seek to enforce personal

liability of mortgage which it cannot enforce in an application under S. 31 (1 ). It

may be, as contended by Mr. Patel, that in the ultimate analysis the result would be

that the property will be sold for repayment of the loan or advance taken by the

industrial concern from the Corporation but it could not be said that it is a

substantive relief claimed by the Corporation which can be valued in terms of the

monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss as envisaged by Article 1 of Schedule

I of Court-fees Act. The substantive relief in an application under Section 31 (1) is

something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree

at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. We are unable to appreciate the

view taken by the High Court that the proceeding is not in the nature of execution of

a decree because the question of enforcement of the order of attachment or sale

would only arise after the same is made absolute under sub-section (7 ). One has to

look at the whole conspectus of provisions in Section 32 coupled with the nature of

relief sought under Section 31 (1) and it becomes clear that special provision is

made for certain types of reliefs that can be obtained by a Corporation by an

application under Section 31 (1) which could not be styled as substantive relief tor

repayment of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. Nor can it be said to

be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of

monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The form of the application, the

nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry

contemplated by sub-section (6) of Section 32 and the nature of relief that can be

granted and the manner of execution clearly show that the application under Section

31 (1) is neither a plaint as contemplated by Article 1 of Schedule I nor an

application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by Art. 7 of Schedule I of

Court-fees Act. "it is no doubt true that the Court was considering a taxation matter

but that consideration, in my view, will not affect the Courts analysis of the nature

of the application and the observations that it is not in the nature of a plaint and

that its subject matter is not capable of valuation in terms of money. Shri Baweja

also pointed out that the language of Section 32 (6) itself indicates the limited scope

of an application under S. 32. According to him, it is open to a respondent

Corporation in such an application to take only such pleas as are relevant to the

reliefs asked for by the Corporation and that the scope of the enquiry in such an

application cannot be enlarged to that of a regular suit for recoveries of money due

under the mortgage. Section 32 (6) advisedly used the word investigate which

should be interpreted in the same manner as the same expression used in the

context of Order XXI, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as it stood before the

recent amendments ). That provision has been interpreted (vide Nalinkant

Bhanushanker Dave v. Hiralal Amratlal Parekh AIR 1959 Bom 87 [LQ/BomHC/1957/84] ) to contemplate

only a summary investigation and parties will be referred to a separate suit if an

adjudication on the basis of title etc. becomes necessary. Shri Baweja referred me to

the recent amendments to those provisions and the Statement of the Objects and

Reasons therefor (vide Chitaley, Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Edition, Vol. 3, page

980) and pointed out that the amendment was intended to avoid the multiplicity of

suits that became necessary under the unamended provision. There is a great force

in this argument, particularly in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court. I

am, therefore, of opinion that the first contention of Shri Andley cannot be accepted.

( 8 ) SHRI Andley pointed out that an application for leave to institute a suit under

Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application for permission to file a suit

in forma pauperis under Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Code and an application to

file an award under the Arbitration Act are filed before the High Court where they

relate to matters in dispute of the value of more than 50,000 rupees. He submitted

that, on the same analogy, even applications of the nature under consideration

would and should be filed only in the High Court. These analogies do not help the

petitioner. The language of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear

that the application for leave is to be obtained of the court in which the suit is to be

instituted. The application under Order XXXIII for permission to sue as an indigent

person contains all the particulars to be set out in a plaint (Rule 2) and where it is

granted is deemed to have been instituted on the date when the application was

presented (Rule 8 and Rule l5a ). Section 20 of the Arbitration Act specifically

provides for the registration of an application thereunder as a suit and read with

Section 2 (c) makes it clear that the application has to be filed in the Court where a

suit would be filed with reference to the subject matter of the arbitration. In this

context, Shri Baweja pointed out that if these arguments were correct, application

for a succession certificate under Section 37 of the Indian Succession Act,

applications under the Guardians and Wards Act or Hindu Guardianship Act for

appointment of a property guardian and many other similar applications which are

now being filed in District Courts would be liable to be filed only in the High Court if

the value of the property in question exceeds Rs. 50,000. It is not necessary to say

anything about these matters for, as already pointed out, such analogies, which

have to be considered on the terms of the specific enactment, are of no help in

deciding the issue here.

( 9 ) THERE was also considerable discussion on the interpretation of S. 32 (11) of

the Act. Section 31 directs that an application under the section should be filed in

the Court of the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial

concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its activities. Shri Andley points

out that the word "district Judge" does not exclude the High Court if one has regard

to the definition of "district Judge" as contained in the Civil Procedure Code. On the

other hand, as rightly pointed out by Shri Baweja, the expression should be

understood as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3 (17) of which

reads:"district Judge: (17) "district Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil

Court of Original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its

ordinary or extraordinary original Civil jurisdiction. "and so understood, it does not

contemplate an application being filed in the High Court. Now we turn to S. 32 (11 ).

This sub-section, as it stands at present, has been extracted earlier but it has

undergone some amendments. In 1951, when the Act as enacted, Section 32 (11)

was in the following terms: the functions of a District Judge under this section shall,

in a presidency town, be exercised by the principal Judge of the City Civil Court, if

any, having jurisdiction or by the High Court. "in 1962, the sub-section was

amended to read as follows:" (II) The functions of a District Judge under this

section shall be exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a City Civil

Court having jurisdiction by a Judge of that court and in the absence of such court,

by the High Court and (b) elsewhere, also by an Additional District Judge. "then,

again it was amended in 1972 to read as at present. This sub-section proceeds on

the basis that normally the application has to be filed in the District Court as

generally understood (not the High Court) and then seeks to clear up the difficulties

in certain cases by carrying out certain exceptions originally, there was only clause

(a) to the effect that in a presidency town, the application should be filed in the city

civil court but that it could be filed in the High Court if there was no city civil court.

So far as other places are concerned, there was originally no- special provision and

the application could be filed only before the District Judge. Then, an exception was

introduced to allow an application being placed before the Additional District Judge.

Some difficulties appear to have been felt necessitating a further amendment. It is

not clear what these difficulties were. Perhaps there were some cases where, in the

place where the industrial concern had its business, the principal court of civil

jurisdiction was only a court inferior to the District Court and the sub-section thus

required the application to be filed before the District or Additional District Judge in

a distant place. The amendment thereupon seems to have been made to enable the

application being filed before the District Judge, the Additional District Judge or any

other Judge of a principal Civil Court having jurisdiction over the place of business.

The trend of these amendments indicates that the petition is to be filed in a High

Court only in the circumstances mentioned in the amended clause (a ). Section 32

(9) also shows that the Act contemplates an application before the District Court

with an appeal to the High Court. The reference to "principal court of Civil

judisdiction" in clause (b) cannot, in the context, be construed as a reference to the

High Court. Perhaps, even if one reads the clause that way, the language that the

powers shall "also" be exerdsable by such a court only means that a party can file

the petitions in the High Court also; this will not, however, deprive the District Judge

of the jurisdiction he has under the main Section 31. If that be so, having regard to

the principle of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that Section 5

also does not apply for reasons already discussed, the plea of the appellant that the

disposal of the petition by the Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction

cannot be upheld. In my view, therefore, the terms of Section 32 (11) cannot help

the present petitioner for having the order under Section 32 declared a nullity and

so not capable of execution.

( 10 ) SHRI Andley laid some emphasis on the fact that the application under

Section 31 had been registered as a suit and that the appeal to the High Court had

also been registered as a first appeal and disposed of on that basis. The

registrations in the above manner were purely administrative acts, not based on any

statutory provision and cannot estop the respondents from putting forward their

legal contention, just as the appellant cannot be estopped from raising the present

plea on the ground of its not having raised the same earlier in the "suit" or in the

"appeal".

( 11 ) FOR the above reasons, I uphold the order of the learned Additional District

Judge and dismiss this revision petition. I make no order as to costs.