Navaniti Pd. Singh, J.The present Writ application has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer to declare that the respondents (Union of India in the Ministry of Food Processing Industries and the Industrial Development Commissioner, Department of Industry, Govt, of Bihar) are not justified in denying the petitioner, the grant envisaged under the assistance to Food Processing Industries as declared by Ministry of Food Processing Industries, Govt, of India and for a direction to the respondents to disburse the grant to the petitioner as promised under the said policy. The respondents in the Writ application are Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Food Processing Industries, Joint Secretary of the said Ministry and the Secretary-cum-Industrial Development Commissioner, Government of Bihar, Patna. Respondents have appeared and filed their counter affidavits and reply thereto has been filed by the petitioner.

2. With the consent of the parties the Writ application has been taken up for hearing and final disposal at the stage of admission itself.

3. The facts are not in controversy. The petitioner-company is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and is a private limited company. It was incorporated in the financial year 1999-2000. Its object, inter-alia appears to be of setting up of a food processing unit and it decided to set up a modern rice mill. It is the case of the petitioner that Govt, of India announced a policy to give assistance under various schemes for setting up Food Processing Industries in the Ninth Plan period 1997/2002. Govt, of India made various advertisements pursuant to the said policy promising an outright grant of 25% of the cost of capital equipment and Technical Civil Works worth Rs. 50 lakhs whichever is less as envisaged assistance to proposal for setting up, expansion or modernisation, inter alia, of grain milling units. The objective was to grant financial assistance for setting up such project with latest technology which enhances recovery, improves quality, ensures by-product utilisation and other benefits leading to substantial value addition. In the policy statement it is stated that the grant is not given merely for running conventional units without substantial value addition or innovation. Under the terms and conditions it was provided that the project should be recommended by the State Nodel Agency. In the present case State Nodel Agency for Bihar is the Industrial Development Commissioner, Department of Industry, Govt, of Bihar. The scheme and the advertisement are annexed as Annexures 1, 2 and 3 to the Writ application. It is the further case of the petitioner that being allured by the said assistance policy the petitioner-company decided to set up a modern rice mill. Having set up the rice mill it obtained permanent registration as a Small Scale Industry from the Govt, of Bihar. It applied for term loan and working capital loan to the State Bank of India, Daudnagar, Aurangabad who appraised the project and ultimately by their letter dated 15.5.2002 (Annexure 7) sanctioned Cash Credit Limit against hypothecation of stock to the extent of Rs. 35.20 lakhs and Medium Term Loan to the extent of Rs. 15 lakhs. While appraising the proposal, State Bank of India took into account the total project cost being Rs. 61 lakhs. The petitioner then alleged to have applied on 22.7.2002 to the State Nodel Agency for grant as promised by Union of India. This application is said to have been sent through State Bank of India, Daudnagar Branch (Annexure 8). Under the said application it was clearly stated that the project is under production since May, 2002. State Bank of India, then seems to have forwarded by their letter dated 23.1.2003 the said application to the Industrial Development Commissioner, Govt, of Bihar, the State Nodel Officer under the said policy. State Bank of India by its letter dated 25.2.2003 also appears to have forwarded the application of the petitioner dated 22nd July, 2002 to the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Food Processing Industries, Govt, of India. It is the further case of the petitioner that Govt of India vide its communication dated 8th December, 2003 wrongly refused to provide financial assistance under the said scheme (Annexure 14).The grounds given by Union of India were firstly, that the application was not recommended from the State Nodel Agency arid that the project had already been implemented before submission of application, as such the proposal could not be proceeded with. This communication of Govt, of India is under challenge on the ground that the petitioner having set up the unit pursuant to promise by Govt, of India for providing assistance to Food Processing Industries, the petitioner could not be denied the same.

4. State filed the first counter affidavit stating that Govt, of India in the Ministry of Food Processing Industries by their letter dated 11.12.2002 clarified that grants were meant for setting up Food Processing Units and not for unit which had already been set up and gone into commercial production before applications were made. In the said counter affidavit of the State it was stated that the application of the petitioner was forwarded by the State Bank of India, Local Head Office at Patna to the State Nodel Agency on 25.1.2003 whereas the unit had gone into production on 17.2.2002 and in view of the scheme the unit was not found eligible for grant and accordingly the bank and the petitioner were informed by letter dated 7.2.2003. The aforesaid communication of the Govt, of India or for that matter the letter from the office of the State Nodel Agency were not annexed to the counter affidavit and as such this Court ordered the same to be. annexed and brought on record by way of affidavit. The same was done subsequently. The petitioner denied having received any such letter from the State authority. The Govt, of India lastly filed its counter affidavit. In the said counter affidavit the stand taken was the same i.e. the unit having gone into production even prior to its application was thus not eligible for the grant. It also stated that from the application submitted by the company it was clear that no fund requirement from the Ministry of Food Processing Industries has been projected in the means of finance in the project which shows that the company had sufficient resources of its own and did not require the assistance by way of the grant.

5. In order to substantiate that unit having gone into production before applying for the grant were not liable to get the financial assistance, Govt, of India filed as Annexure A the Scheme.

6. The question now arises for consideration is whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant as envisaged under the scheme and whether its denial by Govt, of India on the plea that units having already gone into production were not entitled to the grant is correct or not.

7. Mr. S.D. Sanjay, learned counsel appearing in support of the writ application submitted that the petitioner had set up the rice mill keeping in view the assistance as promised. The petitioner complied with terms and conditions and its application was wrongly not forwarded by the State Nodel Agency to the Govt, of India. With reference to the scheme as originally propounded for the Ninth Plan period, he submitted that there was no condition therein which stated that financial assistance would not be given to unit which had already gone into production. In his submission this was clear from the scheme as annexed by Govt, of India as Annexure A which was for the Tenth Plan period and the said specifically mentioned this disentitlement clause. His submission was that Ninth Plan Scheme being silent on this aspect and this aspect being specially mentioned in subsequent Tenth Plan Scheme, it should be inferred that its omission in the earlier scheme was conscious omission and subsequently the scheme was modified to add a disentitlement clause.

8. On the other hand, on behalf of the Union of India and for the State Mr. P.K. Sinha and Mr. K. Ravish submitted that the scheme as originally propounded by the Govt, of India was an assistance scheme for setting up of new industrial unit and not for units already set up. Their submission, in short, was that what was implicit in the earlier scheme was made explicit in the later scheme. Admittedly as the petitioner had gone into production with effect from 17.2.2002, as per its certificate of registration (Annexure 5) granted by the State Government or since May, 2002 as per petitioners own application dated 22.7.2002 (Annexure 8) and their applications for the first time being made on 22.7.2002 they were not entitled to the grant as envisaged under the said scheme. It is the correctness of the two rival submissions that has to be judged by this Court.

9. Before proceeding further I think it appropriate to deal with law of interpretation relating to these aspects of the matters. The Apex Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India Vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others, has held thus:

"Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, pharases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Au as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the Court construed the expression Prize Chit in Srinivasa and we find no reason to depart from the Courts construction.

10. It is, therefore, necessary to advert to the policy behind the said grant in order to ascertain the intention behind the policy and then to apply the same to various other provisions thereof.

11. In the case of Union of India and others Vs. M/s. Wood Papers Ltd. and another, , a case dealing with certain tax incentive for promoting industrial development the Apex Court held thus:

"In fact an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principle requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exception provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction."

12. From this judgment it would be seen that before a person claims entitlement he must establish strictly that he falls within the four corners of the incentive scheme. Here the provision have to be strictly construed. Once it is found that a subject is qualified for availing the incentive then for the purpose of implementing the same, it has to be liberally construed in favour of the subject and in furtherance of object of promoting industrial growth.

13. Keeping in view the aforesaid two principles of law of interpretation, in my view, the policy is clear. In the policy statement as well as in the advertisement as annexed to the writ application it is clearly predicated that financial assistance is to be extended to proposals for setting up units. In my view it means that it is an outright grant in absence of which the unit could not be set up. It is for persons who are needy for financial assistance by way of grant and not for those managed to set up the unit on their own. It is in this context that the text of policy has to be read and understood. I may mention that this assistance is by way of grant meaning thereby that there is no requirement for the unit to repay or refund the same. The grant is to the extent of 25% of the capital equipment and civil work, virtually being 25% of the project cost. This is not like subsidy, which is subsequently granted to subsidise the cost of setting up the unit and is generally commensurate to asset created. In my view, the submissions on behalf of the respondents is correct that what was implicit in the earlier scheme was made explicit in the later scheme. It is not that its omission was delebrate in the earlier scheme and a disqualification was freshly enacted in the later scheme. In my view the earlier scheme itself predicated that before setting up, an application had to be made for the grant of which provision had to be shown in the project estimate. In other words, it is a grant to help set up an industry and not for industries which were already set up without requiring this assistance by way of grant.

14. In the present case, it is clear that the petitioner had gone into production on 17.2.02 as per the industrial department registration certificate (Annexure 5) which is sought to be explained by the petitioner as trial production. Even if that is not taken to be production, on petitioner own showing in his first application to the Nodel Officer, as envisaged under the scheme which was made on 22.7.2002 (Annexure 8) in which he has himself stated that it is in production since May, 2002. It can, therefore, be safely assumed that if the earlier date of 17.2.2002 was trial production it came into full fledged commercial since May, 2002 and made its application under the scheme for the first time on 22.7.2002 i.e. after having gone into commercial production without seeking the grant. Even as per the said application while disclosing figure with regard to means of finance no where it was shown that one of the means of financing unit was the grant which was being sought for. In other words, the unit never contemplated receiving the grant as a part of its means of finance. It was not dependant on the grant for its setting up. In my view, therefore, the unit was clearly ineligible for the grant, which was for units to be set up and not for units which could stand up and wore set up without grant. The petitioner is thus not entitled to the grant.

15. Other submission of Mr. Sanjay is based on the principle of promissory estoppel. It is now well established that the plea of promissory estoppel is based on factual matrix of a promise by one party and altering position subsequently based on such promised by the other party. In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner had decided to set up the unit being allured by the assistance scheme under the policy. There is nothing to show that but for the said allurement the company would not have taken a decision to set up the unit. In my view there is cogent material to the contrary that the unit was contemplated to be set up without government grant and the unit having been set up, it came across the said policy and then took a chance to apply for the grant. This I say because in the project appraisal by the State Bank of India nothing is said about availability of grant which as per petitioners own showing was a substantial amount. Further in its own application dated 22.7.02 in means of finance the availability or expectation to receive the grant was not shown. These two important facts and events clearly show that availing grant was afterthought after the unit was set up and not before the unit was set up. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioner tried to refer to petitioners letter dated 6.2.2002 (Annexure 4) to show that it had requested for the grant before it went into trial production on 17.2.02. I have perused the said letter and it does not support the contention of the petitioner. It is not addressed to the State Nodel Agency nor the Govt, of India. It is addressed to the General Manager, District Industry Centre, Aurangabad. If the petitioner intended to avail of the grant as envisaged under the policy, the advertisement itself made it clear to whom applications had to be made. This was not such an application. Further this application dealt with request to make available subsidy payable at the level of the General Manager, District Industry Centre in respect of the State Government, Central Government subsidy scheme without specifying any such specific scheme. This is material because for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel facts must be clear and unambiguous. I therefore find that the said principle of promissory estoppel or the rule enact in respect thereof has no application to the facts of the present case and Govt, of India is not bound to give financial assistance by way of grant to the petitioner under its scheme aforesaid. I, therefore, find no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.