1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner challenges the order of the Competent Authority under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 by which respondent No. 2 herein has been granted permission to file a petition for eviction against the petitioners herein before the Rent Controller Delhi

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that respondent No. 2 (landlord) filed an application before the Competent Authority on June 4 1971 for permission to evict the petitioners herein (tenants) from the premises comprising of a shop bearing No. 272 in Kara Pare Lal Chandni Chow Delhi of which petitioner No. 1 is a tenant under respondent No. 2 The application for permission set out the various grounds for eviction which were available to respondent No. 2 namely non-payment of arrears of rent sub letting substantial damage caused to the property and closure of business. According to respondent No. 2 petitioner No. 1 was a person of substantial mean sand his eviction would not create slums. This application was resisted by petitioner No. 1 on various grounds but it was admitted that petitioner No. 1 was residing at Jaipur where he was running a join Hindu family business which was running at a loss. With regard to the shop it was contended that he was carrying on the business of cloth commission agency in the said shop under the name and style of M/s Dodger Mal Krishna Lal. It was also averred that his business was running at a loss and he had a large family. In these circumstances of he is evicted he was bound to create slum.

3. The Competent Authority came to the conclusion that petitioner No. 1 had shifted from Delhi to Japer ands was not carrying on business here. In any case no cogent evidence was led by petitioner No. 1 that he was carrying on business at Delhi. In the circumstances it was not necessary to discuss the status of petitioner No. 1.

4. Mr. Arum Kumar appearing on behalf of the petitioners has urged that the order of the Competent Authority is liable to be set aside as he has failed to determine the only point that he was required to determine in proceedings under Section 19 of the Slum Act. It was contended that shifting of petitioner No. 1 to Japer and his having a business there was no relevant consideration for granting permission to respondent No. 2 to file an eviction petition against petitioner No. 1. My attention was invited to a decision of this Court in C.R. Abrol v. Administrator under the Slums Areas, C.W. 911 of 1969; C.W. 911 of 1969 decided on May 4 1970. It was held in this case that in the absence of any rules made under Section 19 (4) of the Slum Act only two considerations have been specified to be taken into account by the Competent Authority; namely (a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenants would be available to him if he were evicted and (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas. The two considerations were held to be alternative and not cumulative. Mr. Arum Kumar urged that inasmuch as Section 19 (4) of the Acts has been held to be mandatory and exhaustive in the case of C.R. Abrol and others and the Competent Authority has in so many words refused to determine the question of the status of the tenant the order is vitiated. Further it was not within the competence of the Competent Authority to base his finding on the respondent not being in possession of the premises and having shifted his business to Japer. There is force in what Mr. Arum Kumar has contended.

5. Mr. J.B. Goal appearing of behalf of the landlord has rested his case on certain observation made in a single bench decision of this Court in Said-Ud-Din v. Mahabir Singh,8(1972) DLT 167;.That was a case in which the tenant had challenged the order of permission granted to the landlord on the ground that the finding of fact was based on no evidence at all and in any case the finding was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the evidence before him. Deshpande J., has observed that there is what may be called primary facts found by the Competent Authority or the Financial Commissioner and secondary facts, which would be inferences from primary facts. Mr. Goal states that the primary facts found by the Competent Authority in the present case were that petitioner No. 1 had shifted to and was living at Japer. He was carrying on business at Jaipur and had failed to disclose that his income was from the business at Delhi. The assessment order, Annexure I produced by petitioner No 1 was wholly in respect of the business at Jaipur. The income from the Delhi business was not disclosed. From this inference were taken which may be called secondary facts; that inasmuch as petitioner No 1 was no longer in Delhi and had failed to show that he was even carrying on business in the shop in question at Delhi the question of determination of his status became irrelevant.

6. It is well settled that the High Court does not interfere under Article 226 or 227 unless there is such gross infirmity in the order that it must be stuck down. The power of superintendence is to correct manifest errors of law jurisdiction. This power is not to be exercised to further litigation or encourage litigants to take false pleas and technical objections so as to avoid the consequences of law. Taking an overall practical approach therefore, I am not inclining to interfere with the order of the Competent Authority. A careful study of the order of the Competent Authority would show that he declined to determine the status of petitioner No. 1 because there was no need to do so as the petitioner No. 1 was not established as being a person in possession of the shop in question or a person carrying on business at Delhi. If that be so his eviction from the shop in question cannot create a slum for there will be no occasion for him to take or make premises, for carrying on the business which he alleges he carries on in Delhi. The financial status of petitioner No. 1 was within his particular knowledge and his income from the Delhi business was for him to show. He failed to do so. He admittedly lives in Jaipur and carries on a joint Hindu family business there. In these circumstances it would have been idle formality to go into the question of the financial status of the petitioner in terms of the bench decision of this Court in C.R. Abrol and others case. The purpose of the Slum Act is to prevent creation of Slums and further the clearance of slums. The determination of financial status alone does not help in furthering the objectives of statute. If the Competent Authority comes to the conclusion on other relevant data that slums will not be created or that slums would be cleared by a proposed eviction there wouldbe no bar to the Competent Authority relying on such data.

7. I, accordingly dismiss this petition. There will be no order as to costs.