1. Heard Sri Radhakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri D.C. Jagadeesh, for petitioner. Perused the case papers.

2. Petitioner, is a covered establishment under Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short ‘the EPF Act’) filed an appeal before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (for short ‘CGIT’) -cum- Labour Court, questioning the correctness of the order dated 26.06.2019 passed by respondent No.1 herein under Section 14-B of the EPF Act, 1952 raising a demand of Rs.8,08,539/- on the ground that payment of contribution by the covered establishment for the period from July 2017 to February 2018 was belatedly made or remitted said appeal having been filed on 20.03.2020 was accompanied by an interlocutory application seeking for condonation of delay of 143 days in filing the appeal. The CGIT – Appellate Tribunal by an order dated 31.12.2020 passed in EPF No.42/2020 dismissed the appeal on the ground that EPF Rule being a special statute, the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 has no application and as such appeal filed beyond the period of 120 days prescribed under EPF Rules was held not maintainable. Hence, this writ petition.

3. It is the contention of Mr. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for petitioner that CGIT has committed a serious error in dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation and not considering the fact that tribunal is empowered to condone the delay in exercise of powers vested under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 if there are sufficient cause and in the instant case, petitioner had made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay and thereby Tribunal could not have dismissed the application and consequently the appeal. He has prayed for impugned order being set aside and delay being condoned and has prayed for a direction to the tribunal to adjudicate the matter on merits and in accordance with law.

4. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioner, we notice that appeal, which was preferred by the petitioner before CGIT – Labour Court was questioning the order passed under Section 14-B of EPF Act. Said appeal had been filed under Section 7-I of the EPF Act. A plain reading of sub-Section (1) of Section 7-I, would indicate that any person aggrieved by an order specified therein including the order passed under Section 14-B, would be entitled to present an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Sub-Section (2) of Section 7-I of the EPF Act envisages that such an appeal filed under sub-Section (1) should be in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed.

5. This prescription as indicated under sub-Section (2) of Section 7- I is traceable to the Rules framed under sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the EPF Act. By virtue of said power appropriate Government has enacted Employees Provident Funds Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 and insofar as it relates to the manner, mode and method in which appeal is to be filed could be traced under Rule 7. For the purpose of convenience, we extract Rule 7 herein below:

“Fee, time for filing appeal, deposit of amount due on filing appeal.—

(1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of Rupees five hundred to be remitted in the form of Crossed Demand Draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the station where the seat of the said Tribunal situate.

(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.

Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extend the said period by a further period of 60 days.

Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless he has deposited with the Tribunal a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75% of the amount due from him as determined under Section 7- A.

Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under Section 7-O.”

6. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 enables the aggrieved person to file an appeal within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order. The first proviso to sub- Rule (2) of Rule 7, empowers the Tribunal to condone the delay on being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period and by extending the said period by a further period of 60 days. Thus, mandate of Rule 7(2), is that an appeal could be filed by the aggrieved person within 60 days from the date of notification / order and if for any reason such appeal could not have been presented within a period of 60 days, an application can be filed seeking condonation of delay which period can be extended up to 60 days. In other words, total period for entertaining the appeal by the appellate Tribunal as prescribed under sub-Rule (2) is 120 days.

7. Sri Radhakrishna, learned counsel for petitioner has vehemently contended that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked and despite there being longer delay, if sufficient cause is shown such delay could be condoned and the same has not been done by the tribunal and as such, order of the tribunal is amenable from correction / revision by this Court in exercise of power vested under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

8. When a special statute prescribes the limitation, the provisions of Limitation Act cannot be read into such special enactment. Even if there is no specific exclusion of Limitation Act, it would be well within the domain of this Court to examine as to whether the special act itself provides for limitation and if the answer is in the affirmative no further exercise is to be undertaken and such statute has to be read within the said four corners only.

9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of PATEL BROTHERS vs STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHERS reported in (2017) 2 SCC 350 [LQ/SC/2017/27] while examining the application on sub- Section (2) of Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 with reference to Assam Value Added Tax act, 2003 has held that Section 81 of the VAT Act prescribes a limitation period of 60 days within which revision petition can be preferred and Section 84 therein provides applicability of the Limitation Act to the extent of section 4 and 12 in computing the period of limitation. Hence, it came to be held that Legislative intended only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act out of Sections 4 to 24 to be applicable under VAT Act and thereby excluding the applicability of other provisions. Hence, it came to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable or in other words, it stands excluded by necessary implication. It has been further held therein as under:

“20. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act. The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84 thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that the Legislature intended only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act, applicable under the VAT Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other provisions.

21. Judgment in the case of Mangu Ram would not come to the aid of the appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under the Cr.P.C. from which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman Shukla's case. On the contrary, in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying object of the appears to be not only to shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there under. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of the language employed in section 84.”

10. In the case of OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED vs GUJARAT ENERGY TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITED AND OTHERS reported (2017) 5 SCC 42 , [LQ/SC/2017/327] in applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 or condonation of delay beyond maximum statutory period of 60 days plus 60 days as prescribed under Section 125 of Electricity Act, 2003 came up for consideration and it came to be held by Apex Court that Electricity Act, 2003 being a special statute or special Legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963, prescription with regard to limitation has to have binding effect and same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. In conclusion it came to be held the delay beyond 120 days as prescribed under Section 125 of Electricity Act, 2003 cannot even be condoned under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It has been further held that limitation for filing the appeal or revision which has been fixed by the Legislature cannot be expanded by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If the limitation is statutorily filed under act the delay cannot be condoned. It has been further held:

"6. The two-Judge Bench placed reliance on Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 70 [LQ/SC/2007/1564] and Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 791 and came to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for maintaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the tribunal beyond the period of 120 days in view of the prescription under Section 125 of theand the proviso appended thereto. In that context, the Court held:-

"Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory."

15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay's case or in Union Carbide Corporation's case with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg & another v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996 [LQ/SC/1962/360] . Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corporation's case. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra) lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the emphasizing on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution. 19. Another aspect needs to be adverted to. Mr. Agrawal submits that when the delay in review was condoned by this Court, the appellant should not be permitted to raise a preliminary objection. Suffice it to say, it is not an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is to be entertained by the Court. We are singularly concerned with entertaining of an application for condonation. If the delay is statutorily not condonable, the delay cannot be condoned. There is no impediment to consider the preliminary objection at a later stage. That will be in consonance with the statutory provision. Needless to say, the order passed by this Court condoning the delay has to be ignored and we do so.”

11. Under similar circumstances, Apex Court while considering as to whether the delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 34, of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has held Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in which an application challenging the arbitral award is filed under Section 34.

12. Keeping these authoritative principles in mind when we have a relook at sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7, of EPF Rules, it would clearly indicate that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Central Government or any other Authority under the who is empowered to file an appeal has to file such an appeal within 60 days from the date of issue of such order. If for any sufficient reason, or cause appeal could not have been filed within the period of 60 days, it would still be open to present further appeal beyond the period of 60 days and within an outer limit of 60 days, In other words appeal can be filed beyond 60 days but within 120 days from the date of issuance of order and subject to sufficient cause being shown for not filing within 60 days.

13. In other words, an aggrieved person is required to give sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within 60 days or the reason for filing the appeal after 60 days and before 120 days. To this limited extent only the Legislature has consciously held, that delay can be condoned and not beyond 120 days. In fact, the Legislature has clearly, unequivocally and in specific terms held that outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. As such, neither by consent nor by extending the Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 delay could be condoned by the Appellate Tribunal, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which itself is inapplicable particularly when Rule 7(2) itself prescribe the limitation within which an appeal is required to be filed.

14. In the instant case, order of Commissioner came to be passed on 26.06.2019. The affidavit supporting the application does not specify or indicate as to when the said order has been received by the petitioner. However, petitioner in the Appeal Memorandum has clearly admitted that order challenge dated 26.06.2019 has been received on 30.06.2019. When 60 days is reckoned from the said date i.e., 26/06/2019 it would expire on 25.08.2019. Appeal was required to be filed under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7, on or before 25.08.2019. However, said appeal came to be presented on 20.03.2020 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay. Further, period of 60 days as provided under first proviso to sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 when reckoned from 26.08.2019 would expire on 25.10.2019. Appeal in question having been filed on 20.03.2020, there is delay of 147 days. In view of the fact that second proviso to the rule not enabling or empowering the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay beyond 120 days, appeal has been rightly dismissed by the tribunal as not maintainable.

15. We do not find any error either on facts or in law having been committed by the tribunal calling for our interference. No other good ground is made out to entertain this writ petition.

16. For the reasons aforesaid, we proceed to pass the following order:

ORDER

(1) Writ petition is dismissed.

(2) Order dated 31.12.2020 passed in EPF No. 42/2020 by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Bengaluru, vide Annexure-C, stands confirmed.