Per Nivedita P. Mehta, J.

1. By the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking issuance of a direction against respondent nos. 1 and 2 to grant pPQp>:BHC-GoA:546-DB remuneration and other benefits applicable to the petitioner as a Member of the District Consumer Forum; in terms of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2019”) with effect from 20.07.2020. The petitioner has sought her relief as prayed under prayer clauses (A) and (B) in the petition.

2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith at the request and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. The petitioner is a legal professional who was enrolled in the Bar after obtaining practice Sanad dated 08.01.1992. In view of qualifications possessed by the petitioner, the petitioner was selected by respondent No.1 vide order dated 25.07.2013 under the provisions of Section 10(1)(a) and (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as a sitting member of the Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, South Goa District for a period of five years on a part time basis with an honorarium of Rs.100/- per day. The honorarium was subsequently revised to Rs. 500/- per working day and after October 2013, the amount was revised to Rs. 800/- per day. The petitioner took charge on 29.07.2013. Thereafter vide judgment dated 24.01.2017 in Writ Petition No.534 of 2016, this court directed the State Government to appoint Presidents and Members on a fulltime basis on or before 30.06.2017. Accordingly, fresh advertisements were published and the petitioner was appointed afresh after the selection process as a Member of the Ge2§:BHC-G0A:546-DB District Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission vide letter dated 30.06.2017 on a fulltime basis with a consolidated remuneration of Rs. 25,000/-.

4. Vide office memorandum dated 01.09.2016, the State Government sanctioned an additional incentive remuneration at the rate of Rs. 2000/- fixed per month to non-judicial members of the North Goa and South Goa District Consumer Forum. Subsequently vide order dated 16.10.18, the remuneration of the petitioner was enhanced to Rs. 40,000/- per month. The petitioner was paid Rs. 1,37,200/- as arrears of per day sitting fees as per her entitlement under the enhancement of fees vide order dated 28.05.2019.

5. The Central Government notified the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 with effect from 20.07.2020 and in terms of this act, the petitioner was entitled to a pay scale of a Dy. Secretary of the State Government and other allowances as admissible.

6. The petitioner continued in the post of as a sitting member of the Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, South Goa District from 29.07.2013 until she superannuated on 26.12.2021.

7. The petitioner vide letter dated 13.12.2021 made@02$:BHC-Goa:546-DB representation to respondent No.1 stating therein that the Act, 2019 came into force on 20.07.2020 and the petitioner is entitled for the pay and allowances as applicable to the other members of South Goa District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. On 09.02.2023, respondent no. 1 duly replied to her representation stating therein that the petitioner was not eligible to the revised pay scale. The Act, 2019 only provided for the members appointed immediately before the commencement of the Act shall continue to hold office until the completion of her term as Section 31 of the Act only grants protection for the completion of the term and does not provide that salary and allowances or other service conditions shall be governed by the provisions of the Act, 2019.

8. The respondents filed their affidavit in reply, re-iterating their position in the reply dated 09.02.2023 to the representation of the petitioner and stated that Section 31 of the Act does not provide that salary and allowances, or other service conditions shall be governed by the provisions of the Act, 2019.

9. Mr. C. Almeida learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that as per Section 31 of the Act, 2019 the members who were already in service at the district level were allowed to continue till the completion of their term and in view of Rule 3(2) and 3(4) of the Consumer Protection (Salary, Allowances and Conditions of Service of President and Members of the Sifz5:BHC-Goa:546-pB Commission and District Commission) Model Rules, 2020 (hereinafter referred to as “Model Rules, 2020”) framed by the Central Government under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been discharging her duties and work similarly to those members of the District Commission appointed under the Act, 2019. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the salary and allowance in terms of Rule 3 of the Model Rules, 2020 and differentiating the petitioner from other co-members who were appointed as regular full time members under the Act, 2019 amounts to breach of Article 14 and Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India and contends that the petitioner is entitled for salary and allowance at par with the other members for same work and same work hours. In view thereof, the petitioner claims to be entitled to receive pay equivalent to the pay at the minimum of the scale of the Deputy Secretary of the State Government with an annual upward revision of the pay of a member at the rate of 3%.

11. Mr. Prashil Arolkar, learned Additional Government Advocate submits that reliance placed by the petitioner on Section 31 - transitional provisions of the Act, 2019 is totally misconceived as it only contemplates that, those who were appointed under #PR5:BHC-G0A:546-DB old Act of 1986 would continue to perform duties till the new appointment is made under the Act, 2019 and the petitioner cannot interpret it for the claim to pay/salary at par with the members of the District Commission appointed under the Act, 2019.

12. The Additional Government Advocate further submits that Section 107 (3) of the Act, 2019 specifically mentions that “particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal’. A bare perusal of Section 6(c) of General Clauses Act, 1897 would clearly spell out that the repeal act shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed. Learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not applicable in the present Case.

13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

14. Section 31 of the Act, 2019 provides a Transitional provision as under:

‘31. Transitional provision.- Any person appointed as President or, as the case may be, a member of the District Commission immediately before the — 2025:BHC-GOA:546-DB commencement of this Act shall hold office as such as President or, as the case may be, as member till the completion of his term for which he has been appointed”.

15. Section 31 of the Act, 2019 protects the service of the petitioner who was appointed prior to coming into force of the new Act till the completion of her term. It is not in dispute that the nature of the duties, responsibilities, functions and authority of the petitioner are the same and identical to those members who have been appointed under the Act, 2019. We are of the view that nongranting of similar or equal pay to the members who have been allowed to continue by virtue of the transitional provision under Section 31 of the Act, 2019 amounts to treating equals, unequally, which would be discriminatory, as the nature of duties, responsibilities, functions and authority of the petitioner is same and identical. 

16. Weare not inclined to accept the submission of the learned Additional Government Advocate that merely because of some difference in the qualification criteria prescribed for appointment as member under the Act, 2019, the petitioner is not entitled to the same salary as a member who is appointed under the Act, 2019. The transitional provision enables the existing member to continue till the completion of her term prescribed under the old Act. Such provision cannot be read in a manner having the effect of depriv2A>:8HC-G0A:546-DB member of the salary and allowances as the member appointed under the Act, 2019.

17. To deprive the petitioner of the benefit under the Act, 2019, no legitimate foundation has been made out by the respondents. In our view, considering the nature of the functions that a member of the commission discharges, different eligibility criteria prescribed by the Act, 2019 cannot be a relevant criterion to deprive the petitioner of the benefits claimed. There is nothing on record to even remotely indicate that merely because there is some variance in the eligibility prescribed for appointment, the duties and responsibilities of the post are not qualitatively similar or comparable. It is the very same post on which the petitioner has continued. We cannot comprehend a situation where the post of member which discharges similar duties and functions as a person appointed later albeit under the Act, 2019 is paid much more salary and allowances than the petitioner because her appointment was under the old Act, factually claimed in view of the transitional provision.

18. Rule 3(2) and 3(4) of the Model Rules, 2020 provides for the salaries and allowances of the President and Members of the District Commission which is reproduced as under:

“4, Salaries and allowances payable to President and members of the District Commission.-

(1) ..............

(2) A Member shall receive a pay equal to the pay at the minimum of the scale of pay of a Deputy Secretary of the State Government and other allowances as admissible to such officer.

(3) .............

(4) There shall be an annual upward revision of the pay of the President and member at the rate of 3%.”

19. Section 102 of the Act, 2019 is extracted hereunder for convenience: -

“102. Power of State Government to make rules.-

(1) The State Governments may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act:

Provided that the Central Government may, frame model rules in respect of all or any of the matters with respect to which the State Government may make rules under this section, and where any such model rules have been framed in respect of any such matter, they shall apply to the State until the rules in respect of that matter is made by the State Government and while making any such rules, so far as is practicable, they shall conform to such model rules.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:—

(a) .................

(b) .................

(c) .................

(d) .................

(e) .................

(f) .................

(g) .................

(h) the salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and conditions of service of, the President and members of the District Commission under section 30.....”

20. It is an admitted fact that the State Government did not make rules to provide salaries and allowances to the members in terms of Section 30 of the Act, 2019. In terms of Section 102 of the Act, 2019 and the Model Rules, 2020 framed by the Central Government are applicable to the members of the Commission. In terms of Model Rules, 2020, the member shall receive pay equal to the pay at the minimum of the scale of the Deputy Secretary of the State Government and other allowances as admissible to such officer.

21. The cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are stated hereinafter.

i) Vijay Kumar L. Vs, State of Assam and others, WP(C) 5223/2022 decided on 05.06.2024, the Gauhati High Court was dealing with a similar issue as is involved in the instant petition. The observation in paragraph 32 being are relevant and extracted hereunder for convenience:

 “32. In the present case, there is no dispute that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the petitioners, though appointed on part time basis, are the same as are being discharged by full time members of the District Forum. It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on full time basis. It is the case of the respondents that petitioners would not be entitled to pay parity as they were appointed and re-appointed under the old Act and Rules and as such they are regulated by the terms of the appointment order. It is the further case of the respondents that for placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected, on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a part time basis, cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay-scale. But it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners were appointed without regular selection process. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work' would be applicable to the petitioners so as to vest in them the right to claim equal pay and allowances at par with the minimum of the pay- scale of full-time members holding the same post as the petitioner could able to establish that they are rendering same duties, functions, responsibilities and authority with that of the full-time members of the District Forum.”

ii) Mr. Auroliano de Oliveira @Auro Vs. State of Goa, WP No.322 of 2023 decided on 23.10.2024, in this matter the Court was dealing with the same issue as is involved in the present petition wherein one of us ( M. S. Karnik, J) was a party. 

22. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar and others Vs Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger and others; (2019) 18 SCC 301. Paras 87 and 96 of the said judgment read as thus:-

“87. In order to consider the applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work’, one of the fundamental aspects to be considered is nature of duties. As was rightly submitted by Mr. Kabil Sibal and Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned Senior Advocates, the nature of duties performed by Niyojit Teachers are certainly same or similar to those performed by the Government Teachers. As a matter of fact, both the sets of teachers are teaching in the same school and teaching same syllabus. The pointers placed by Dr. Singhvi in his submission as well as the example given by him evidently show that there is no distinction or difference as regards nature of duties performed and _ responsibilities discharged by the Niyojit Teachers. Some of the Niyojit Teachers have also been acting as Headmasters. However, the Rules in question viz. the 2006 Rules clearly indicate that the method of recruitment of Niyojit Teachers was completely different from the one under which Government Teachers were recruited. The Selection Committee contemplated under the provisions of the 2006 Rules comprised of officials at the Panchayat or Block levels. The selection was also at local levels and not through Bihar Public Service Commission or Schools Selection Board.

The distinction brought out in that behalf by the State in Para 13 of its supplementary counter- affidavit filed in the High Court clearly shows the difference in mode of recruitment. It is thus clear that the mode of recruitment and the standards of selection were different but the nature of duties performed by the Niyojit Teachers have been absolutely identical. Could there be a distinction between these two streams of teachers. We may, therefore, at this stage see the development of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work’ and whether it admits of any qualifications or exceptions.

96. Analysis of the decisions referred to above shows that this Court has accepted the following limitations or qualifications to the applicability of the doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’:-

96.1. The doctrine of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not an abstract doctrine.

96.2. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ has no mechanical application in every case.

96.3. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, makes a difference.

96.4. The application of the principle of equal pay for equal work’ requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job.

96.5. Thus, normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere.

96.6. Granting pay scales is a purely executive function and hence the court should not interfere with the same. It may have a cascading effect creating all kinds of problems for the Government and authorities.

96.7 Equation of posts and salary is a complex matter which should be left to an expert body.

96.8. Granting of pay parity by the court may result in a cascading effect and reaction which can have adverse consequences.

96.9. Before entertaining and accepting the claim based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, the Court must consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment.

96.10. In a given case, mode of selection may be considered as one of the factors which may make a difference.”

23. In the aforesaid ruling, the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the contention of the State that the post of Assistant Teacher in the regular cadre is a dying cadre, therefore, the legal position that emerges from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the cadre of the Assistant Teacher and the Teachers appointed against the post of Panchayat Shikshak/Block Shikshak forms two different cadres. The Hon’ble Court took a view that the strength of the cadre which is dying cannot be enhanced and therefore, the judgment cannot be termed as relevant in the facts of the case at hand.

24. Their Lordships in State of Punjab and others Vs. Jagjit Singh and others, (2017) 1 SCC 148 have laid down the following principles to determine parity in principle of equal pay for equal work. A portion of the judgment has been extracted hereunder for convenience:-

"42.2. The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a "different department" vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’. Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government (see - the Randhir Singh case, and the D.S. Nakara case).

42.3, The principle of "equal pay for equal work’, applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see - the Randhir Singh case). For equal pay, the concerned employees with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see - the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case, the Mewa Ram Kanojia case, the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case and the S.C. Chandra case).

42.4. Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay, and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of "equal pay for equal work’ (see - the Randhir Singh case, State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked, merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature.

42.5. In determining equality of functions and responsibilities, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work, it is necessary to keep in mind, that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of pay-scales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see - the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case and the State Bank of India case). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of "equal pay for equal work' (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, and the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers' Union case).

42.6. For placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected, on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis, cannot claim to be placed in the regular payscale (see - the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case).

42.7. Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as - "selection grade’, in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as - merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia).

42.8. If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a- vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude, that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see - the Mewa Ram Kanojia case, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy). In such a cause, the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, cannot be invoked.

42.9. The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as the subject post. Pay-scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see - Union of India v. Pradip_Kumar Dey, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case).

42.10. A comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, cannot be made, where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see - the Harbans Lal case). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see - Official Liquidator v. Dayanand).

42.11. Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of "equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable. And also when, the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see - the State Bank of India case).

42.12. The priority given to different types of posts, under the prevailing policies of the Government, can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different payscales. Herein also, the principle of "equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable (see - State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association).

42.13. The parity in pay, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, cannot be claimed, merely on the ground, that at an earlier point of time, the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same payscale. The principle of "equal pay for equal work’ is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see - State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspectors Association).

42.14. For parity in pay-scales, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, equation in the nature of duties, is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see - Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur). 

42.15. There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay-scales, between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e., between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see - the Hukum Chand Gupta case), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar.

42.16. The principle of "equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable, where a differential higher payscale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see - the Hukum Chand Gupta case).

42.17. Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organization, and another set of employees of a different organization, there can be no question of equation of pay-scales, under the principle of "equal pay for equal work’, even if two organizations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organizations, is with different entities, which are independent of one another, the principle of “equal pay for equal work’ would not apply (see - the S.C. Chandra case, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case).”

25. No doubt, the petitioner was appointed under the old Act, However, the petitioner pointed out that as per Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, 2019, she should be allowed to continue to work as a member of the District Commission. The petitioner was performing duties similar to the other members of the District Commission and therefore, was entitled to the pay and allowance at par with the other members of the District Commission appointed under the Act, 2019. The petitioner was discharging duties similar to that of the members of the District Commission appointed under the Act, 2019. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submissions canvased by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the petitioner is not entitled to the relief similar to the member appointed under the Act, 2019.

26. In view of the discussion above and in light of the settled position of law, the petitioner is entitled to the minimum pay scale and allowances in terms of the Model Rules, 2020 as the duty, function and responsibilities were the same with those members who were appointed as per the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 and the Model Rules 2020. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ would be applicable to the petitioner. The respondents are directed to grant all the consequential benefits accrued in favour of the petitioner as the Member of the District Consumer Forum at par with the members appointed under the Consumer Protection A@6:8HC-G0A:546-DB 2019.

27. The writ petition is allowed and the same is accordingly disposed of. The rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.