Rajesh H. Shukla, J.(Oral)The present Appeal from Order has been filed by the appellant-original defendant M/s. Bahuchar Gruh Udyog challenging the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar, below Exh. 5 in Civil Suit No.5 of 2011 dated 27th December 2011 on the grounds stated in the memo of the Appeal from Order.

2. The facts giving rise to the present Appeal from Order, briefly stated, are that the aforesaid Regular Civil Suit No.5 of 2011 came to be filed by the present respondent, original plaintiff, M/s. Talod Gruh Udyog with application Exh. 5 for temporary injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 r/w section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also under Section 135(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 for the prayer that the plaintiffs trade mark "Talod" has become distinctive and distinguishable in respect of its instant mix products by virtue of extensive and uninterrupted use since the year 1988 and therefore it requires statutory protection as per section 17 r/w section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and had filed a suit for infringement of registered trade marks No.659930 and 1378012 infringement of the copyright in the trade dresses of the trade mark labels and artistic works on the grounds stated in detail.

3. It has been contended that due to the popularity and distinctive reputation of the trade mark of the plaintiff, the original defendant has used an identical and/or deceptively similar mark "Talod" in the wrappers of "Mona Instant" in respect of the same products of instant mix deliberately, wilfully and with a mala fide intention and therefore has prayed for injunction. It is contended that such illegal, unlawful and unjustified acts of infringement of trade mark of the plaintiff is likely to cause prejudice and damage to the well-established trade and reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff which it has acquired since 1988 and therefore the statutory rights of the registration of the trade mark Talod cannot be used by the defendant. It is also contended that the defendant has continued its illegal act of imitation and infringement of the trade mark in spite of the civil suit filed by the plaintiff and though the defendant in their Notice of Opposition dated 13.9.2010 has categorically admitted that the disputed label mark Mona Instant Mix with the name Talod in logo form and the expression Vernacular Matter with the Gujarati script as adopted and used is identical and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs prior used and registered trade mark Talod would cause deception or confusion in the minds of public and may lead to passing off the goods of the defendant as that of the plaintiff.

4. The learned Principal District Judge, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar, on the basis of the material and after considering the rival submissions, passed an order dated 27th December 2011 granting injunction which has been assailed in the present Appeal from Order on the grounds stated in the memo of the Appeal from Order.

5. It has been contended, inter alia, that the trial court has erred in granting the injunction and passed the order disregarding the basic principles of trade mark law with regard to the geographical names, distinctiveness of a trade mark, concept of disclaimer in respect of a trade mark, associated trade marks, principles of comparison of trade marks and infringement and passing off in respect of a trade mark. It is contended that the trial court ought to have held that earlier Civil Suit No.5/2008 filed by the respondent was for the same prayer and having the same subject-matter in respect of infringement of trade mark for the same relief and therefore on the principles of res judicata the second suit is barred. It is contended that the trial court committed a grave error in not appreciating that the issue directly and substantially involved in the previous suit Civil No.5/2008 between the same parties was withdrawn and therefore no relief could have been granted.

6. It is also contended that the trial court has committed an error in considering that the second suit was based on subsequent registration of the trade mark label Talod. The trial court ought to have considered that all subsequent applications were associated with the earlier registered trade mark label Talod under No.1378012 in class-30 which is a subject-matter of disclaimer of the word Talod, which reads as follows:

"Applicants shall not claim exclusive rights on word "Talod" forming part of the mark".

It is contended that the trial court has failed to appreciate that the respondent had no prima facie case and it was subject to the disclaimer of the word Talod and therefore the respondent could not have claimed exclusive monopoly rights over the word Talod which is a geographical name and a geographical indication.

7. It is therefore contended that the trial court ought to have considered the basic criteria for grant of injunction, the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury and could not have granted injunction. Therefore, it has been contended that the trial court has erred in not appreciating that the registration of the trade mark of the respondent was subject to association of the prior registered trade mark No.1378012 with the disclaimer of the word Talod, which means that the word Talod is disclaimed by the respondents in all their subsequent applications. It is also contended that by the impugned order virtually the trial court has granted exclusive monopoly rights to the respondent for the use of word Talod which is admittedly a geographical name and thereby disregarded the provisions of section 9(1) of the Trade Marks Act.

8. It is also contended that the trial court has erred in failing to hold that the trade mark of the appellant is not Talod, but Mona Instant label and the use of the word "Vernacular Matter" is not added as a trade mark. It is also contended that the trial court ought to have given due consideration to the fact that the trade name of rival parties is different. The trade mark of the parties are Talod with the disclaimer of Talod and that of the appellant is Mona Instant with the word Talod written in small letters in Gujarati script and therefore the two rival labels with colour scheme are totally different visually, phonetically and therefore there is no question of any infringement or passing off.

9. It is also contended that the court below has failed to appreciate that the appellant has filed rectification proceeding in Chennai against registration of the trade mark Talod under No.1378012 in class-30 and therefore should have deferred the order and could not have granted the injunction.

10. The affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the respondent, original plaintiff Talod Gruh Udyog referring to the fact that ex-parte injunction was issued by the court below on 22.9.2011 which was extended and allowed by the impugned order dated 27.12.2011. It is contended that the impugned order is passed after considering the principles with regard to grant of injunction. It is contended that the respondent is engaged in business of manufacturing, marketing and selling a variety of instant mix preparations in the form of instant mix stated in detail which are food preparations under the name and style of Talod Gruh Udyog. It has been contended that by virtue of prior adoption and uninterrupted use of the trade name and trade mark Talod since the year 1988, the instant mix products have become highly distinctive and popular among the public and have acquired common law property rights which require statutory protection and therefore applications have been made as required under Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act and the registration of the label mark of Talod has been granted after due procedure. It is therefore contended that the applications have been made with the Registrar of Trade Marks on 23.3.2009 as stated in detail with trade mark labels and artistic work containing the word Talod for various types of instant mix preparations. It is stated that the appellant against whom a suit for injunction is pending has taken the plea that the labels are different and however, a notice of opposition against the grant of registration of trade mark Talod Instant Mix under Application No.1798695 has been filed and the appellant is taking a different stand in different proceedings. It is therefore contended that registration of the trade mark Talod Instant Mix in Hindi as well as in Gujarati with the label and trade mark (logo) Talod is an artistic work which require protection and therefore the aforesaid suit came to be filed.

11. It is contended that since the earlier suit was a composite suit for infringement of the trade mark, passing off and also for the copyright in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in L.P.A. No.877 of 2010 the suit has been withdrawn. It is also contended that the appellant is not residing at Talod, not carrying on the business at Talod and is not anyway connected or associated with the business or Talod and therefore there is no justification on his part to adopt or use an identical name Talod in logo or package. It is contended that no material is produced to suggest even remotely that Talod town is having any geographical indication with instant mix preparations.

12. It is, therefore, contended that the appellant is not entitled to challenge the legality, validity and propriety of the registration of the trade mark Talod as such contentions are misconceived and contrary to the scope and express provision of section 28, 29 read with section 31, 31 of the Trade MarkS Act. It is contended that the sole intention of the appellant who is having business at Mumbai using the mark Mona Instant in using the identical name Talod with logo and the label mark is misleading the people by Vernacular Matter and/or instant mix preparation. It is contended that the appellant has filed rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 against the registered trade mark (label) under No.1378012 before the Honble Intellectual Property Appellate Board which was fixed at Circuit Bench at Ahmedabad. However, an adjournment was sought and therefore no grievance could be made by the appellant for grant of injunction.

13. Learned counsel Shri T.N. Daruwalla appearing with learned advocate Shri P.P. Banaji for the appellant-original defendant referred to the papers at length and submitted that Civil Suit No.5/2008 has been filed by the respondent-original plaintiff herein for infringement of the trade mark "Talod" which as alleged is an artistic work with the word Talod and also resulting in violation of the Copyrights Act. Learned counsel Shri T.N. Daruwalla submitted that the issue involved in the present case is with regard to infringement of the trade mark as well as passing off and it seems that the learned trial court has committed an error while appreciating the facts. He submitted that the court below has failed to consider the aspect about the geographical name Talod. It was submitted that though Talod is a geographical name and a disclaimer is also given, the court below has failed to consider this aspect while granting injunction. He submitted that the matter in issue in Civil Suit No.5/2008 was directly and substantially an issue in the previous suit and therefore section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be attracted on the basis of the principles of res judicata.

14. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that since 1.4.1986 one Shri Kanubhai Rajgor, predecessor-in-title of Amrutbhai Karsanbhai Patel, had been trading as Bahuchar Gruh Udyog and had used the trade mark label Mona Instant With the word Talod along with the colour scheme and device of a woman for instant mix in class-30. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the said Kanubhai had applied for registration of Mona Instant in class-30 in April 2000 claiming user since 1986 for instant food included in class-30. He submitted that the appellant has, therefore, applied for registration of the trade mark Mona Instant label with device of a woman under No.1776473 for instant food mix in class-30 and it has been registered and is valid up to 21.1.2019.

15. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla referred to section 29 of the Trade Marks Act and referring to pages 34, 36 and 42 it has been submitted that the mark or label has to be considered as a whole and it is required to be considered whether a person of average intelligence is likely to be confused and the goods could be passed off or not. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that as observed in the order below Exh. 5 in Civil Suit No.5/2011, the court below has committed an error in observing that when the suit is with respect to infringement of a registered trade mark, the right is not absolute. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla however submitted that the right by way of registration of a trade mark is not absolute.

16. In support of his submission, Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Lupin Limited v. Johnson & Johnson, reported in 2013 (53) PTC 90 (Bom.) [LQ/BomHC/2012/1942] , and emphasised the observations in para 3 and 5 and submitted that it has been observed that the matter requires consideration. He further submitted that when the disclaimer is given, the right by registration of a trade mark is not absolute. He further submitted that the respondent-original plaintiff cannot claim exclusive right for the word Talod forming part of the mark as such registration of the word/trade mark was not at all absolute, but it was subject to disclaimer of the geographical name Talod. Therefore, learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the provisions of section 28 of the Trade Mark Act provide that the registration of trade mark shall, if valid, give the registered proprietor of the trade mark exclusive right to use the trade mark in relation to the goods or services and to obtain relief of infringement as provided by the Act.

17. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that, however, section 28(2) of the Act provides that such an exclusive right to use the trade mark under Section 28(1) shall be subject to the conditions and limitations. In other words, Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that as the disclaimer has been given, it is always subject to such limitation. He referred to the example of the word Khadder for khadi clothes and garments and submitted that can registration of the trade mark Khadder for khadi could be considered to be valid and absolute He has also referred to and relied upon the judgments in case of Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., reported in 2010(44) PTC 736 Delhi (DB). He referred to the observations made in para 6, 11, 16 and 19 of the judgment and emphasised the observations made in para 19 that the argument cannot be made to prevail that what cannot be done directly will be indirectly done. Again, referring to the conclusion in para 21, he emphasised that broad guidelines have been summed up by the High Court of Delhi. He has also referred to the judgment in case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. & ors., reported in 2009(41) PTC 336 (Delhi) DB.

18. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that Talod is a geographical name and has a different significance and nobody can claim exclusive right to use it as a registered trade mark. He therefore submitted that the court below was in error in holding that the respondent original plaintiff cannot be denied the right of using Talod because:

(i) it has been permitted to be registered by the Registrar of Trade Marks,

(ii) there is absence of any evidence on record that the other villagers of Talod were engaged in the business of preparation of khaman.

He submitted that the main contention of the appellant-original defendant that as Talod is a geographical name and geographical origin, the person like the respondent original plaintiff has no right to have a monopoly for use of such name to claim any such right for the use of his own products.

19. In support of his submission, he has referred to and relied upon various judgments which have been referred to in the written submissions like the judgment reported in 1978 (IPLR) 8 = AIR 1977 CAL 413 [LQ/CalHC/1977/176] (DB) regarding the use of word SIMLA for manufactured tobacco. Similarly, he has referred to the judgment reported in (1937) 54 RPC 327. He has also referred to the judgment reported in 11 RPC 517 High Court Chancery Division, and submitted that the order refusing such application was upheld.

20. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the object of the Legislature was to prevent a trader from acquiring monopoly in respect of the name of a place and thereby suggesting that the goods had a local origin or local connection which in fact they might not have. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla therefore submitted that initially when the application for registration of the word Talod Was made subject to the disclaimer that the respondent original plaintiff will not claim exclusive right for the word Talod, the subsequent marks have been ordered to be associated with the registered trade mark No.1378012 for which disclaimer has been given for the word Talod. He submitted that the subsequent registration of the marks of the plaintiff would be therefore subject to disclaimer for the word Talod which has not been appreciated by the court below.

21. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the court below has failed to consider the relevant criteria for grant of injunction like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. He again emphasised referring to the notes that,

(i) he has a proprietary right in the alleged registered trade mark with the word Talod in which a disclaimer has been given which has not been considered.

(ii) the court below has failed to consider that the appellant original defendant has been using identical mark or similar mark;

(iii) whether the similarity is of such nature which may make the public believe or confuse that the mark belongs to the plaintiff;

(iv) the principles of comparison of the marks as a whole with emphasis on such comparison, whether it is likely to cause any confusion or deception and the fact that the disclaimer had to be given by the plaintiff before the mark could be registered which has been ignored by the trial court.

22. He again submitted that the suit was not for passing off and has committed an error in the entire approach while deciding the issue involved in the suit. He submitted that the earlier suit was regarding passing off in relation to a label mark and thereafter the suit has been withdrawn and a fresh suit is filed, both for infringement as well as for passing off. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla has also referred to the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat reported in 2009(41) PTC 675 (Guj.).

23. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the submission made by the other side that the registration of a geogrpahical name has been watered down or diluted in the new Act of 1999 is incorrect. He pointedly referred to section 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) and submitted that it has made the geographical name of origin as a ground for refusal of registration as observed in the case of ITC Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks & anr. (supra). He submitted that on the contrary it provides for refusal of registration of such mark. He also referred to Ratlami save and submitted that it does not mean that any other person cannot make save in Ratlam. He also referred to Order No.17/2011 dt. 27.1.2011 in O.R.A. 180-182 of 2008 by I.P.A.B. in the case of Bisleri International v. Dadi Balsara & ors.

24. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that every household for instant mix like khaman is entitled to use the word Talod and nobody can prevent a trader from stating that khaman is made in Talod and thereby making use of the word Talod. He submitted that the respondent-original plaintiff has given a disclaimer to the Registrar of Trade Marks that they have exclusive right to use the word Talod and therefore any such suit which has been filed and injunction is granted is misconceived. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla has also referred to the judgment reported in 2009(41) PTC 336 (Del.) (DB), in the case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation & ors. Regarding the word Sugarfree adopted by the plaintiffs for a low calorie table top sweetner. He also referred to the judgment in the case of Lupin v. Johnson & Johnson, reported in 2013 (53) PTC 90 (Bom.) [LQ/BomHC/2012/1942] .

25. Therefore, learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that the word Talod used by the plaintiff is totally different from the geographical figure of oval shape used by the defendant. He emphasised that registration of the mark granted to the respondent-plaintiff does not authorise it to have exclusive right to use such word. He referred to the judgment in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. & anr. v. Girnar Exports & anr., reported in 2012(51) PTC 376 (IPAB). Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla submitted that registration of the mark granted to the applicant with the condition of non-exclusivity in respect of Red Label as words are common to the trade and therefore no exclusive right could be permitted. Similarly, Talod being a geographical origin or geographical area could not have been registered and merely because there is a registration in spite of disclaimer would not make any difference.

26. He, therefore, submitted that the registration granted in respect of subsequent applications which contain the word Talod without any condition is not correct and is contrary to the provisions of law (Trade Marks Act). He referred to the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Tube Investments of India v. Trade Industries, Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 35 [LQ/SC/1997/799] and submitted that in that case the marks were identical whereas in the present case the marks, phonetically and visually, are not identical as Talod and Mona Instant with the word Talod and device of a woman are completely different. Therefore, the said judgment will not have any application. He has also referred to the judgment in the case of Heinz Italia v. Dabur India Ltd., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2007/785] , and submitted that the appellant Heinz Italia used the word Glucon D and the respondent Dabur India launched Glucose D, a similar product with a deceptively similar pack. However, it has no relevance to the facts of the case. He also submitted that it will have to be read with reference to the judgment in the case of Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., reported in 2010 (44) PTC 736 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/2010/3722] (Low-Absorb). He has also referred to the judgment reported in the case of Ruston Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindhara Engg. Co., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1649 [LQ/SC/1969/330] , for diesel engine to support his submission with regard to the distinction between the registration, infringement of trade mark and passing off.

27. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Tushar Mehta appearing with learned advocate Shri Pratik Jasani for the respondent-original plaintiff referred to the papers at length and gave a brief background of the facts. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta submitted that two label marks have been registered for which he referred to the registration certificates under the Trade Marks Act which is produced on record with respective numbers and submitted that the label mark is having the word Talod. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta submitted that as provided under the scheme of the Act, once the registration has been granted, the respondent-original plaintiff is entitled to have the use of such mark exclusively and in case of any infringement thereof, the plaintiff is entitled to protect by injunction. He emphasised and submitted that if there is any error or if there is any objection for grant of such registration, the remedy is as provided under the Act by way of rectification application and until it is decided, the registered owner of the trade mark will be entitled to make use of the said mark and protect the same. For that purpose he referred to the provisions of section 57 r/w 124 & 125 of the Act and pointedly referred to the scheme of the Act. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha has also referred to the judgment of this High Court in the case of Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels Ltd., reported in 1999 (19) PTC 718 [LQ/GujHC/1998/813] , and submitted that once the registration of the trade mark is granted it would be valid for all purposes until either it is modified or removed. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha referred to section 17 of the Act and submitted that it provides for the effect and consequences of registration of the mark. He referred to the annexures and submitted that section 2(m) of the Act defines the word "mark". He also submitted that it means that the whole label or mark is registered and a part forming part of the label or mark cannot be claimed as exclusive right unless it is also registered separately.

28. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha submitted that the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is a self-contained code which creates rights, remedies and also imposes limitations within which such rights and remedies could be availed of. He submitted that the question is, can the defendant claim that registration of a mark may be ignored on any such ground or issues which he raises He submitted that then the right or privilege conferred by the registration of a trade mark for protecting such exclusive work or mark which has acquired reputation would be meaningless. He submitted that if the other party has any objection with regard to the registration of a mark on any ground, the remedy is provided in the statute itself. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha submitted referred to section 29 of the Act and submitted that section 29(2)(c) identify the goods or services which could be registered. He emphasised that section 29 (3) provides,

shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion.

Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha therefore submitted that once the mark is registered, the law provides for presumption that any use of such mark which has been registered is likely to cause confusion and therefore it prohibits the use of any mark which is offending the registered trade mark.

29. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Metha has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical, reported in AIR 1965 SC 980 [LQ/SC/1964/275] , and emphasised the observations made in para 13, 14. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of Sona Ana Pana Baulraj v. S.P. Vadivelu Nadar & Sons, reported in AIR 1965 Madras 33. He referred to section 103 of the Act and submitted that pendency of the rectification application for the trade mark would not be to disentitle the plaintiff having the registered trade mark from any relief. He has also referred to the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Wander Limited v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., reported in 1990 (Supp.-1) SCC 727, and emphasised the observations in para 14. It was submitted that the scope of discretion in the Appeal from Order to interfere and disturb the orders of the trial court is discussed that unless it is said to be perverse or contrary to the statutory provision or law, normally, the court would not disturb. He therefore submitted that if the view is possible or plausible, merely because a different view could be taken, it would not be a ground to disturb the discretionary order of the trial court.

30. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta has also referred to the background of facts to emphasise that once the registration has been granted in respect of series of such applications, the objections raised by the original defendant cannot be readily accepted. Even the registration of the mark containing geographical background could be granted and does not per se prohibit it. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta referred to the judgments in the case of Marico Ltd. v. Agro Tech Foods Ltd., reported in 2010(44) PTC 736 (Del.) (DB) and in the case of ITC Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks & anr., reported in AIR 1977 CAL 413 [LQ/CalHC/1977/176] (DB), to support his submission that the word indicating geographical area can have registration of mark. He submitted that in any case the appellant-original defendant can have recourse as provided under the law by way of rectification application which could be decided and till then as the registration is valid, it would remain and the original plaintiff, the respondent herein, would be entitled for protection of such mark. He therefore submitted that the order of injunction may be sustained considering the limited scope of exercise of discretion in appeal from order to disturb the discretionary order of the trial court.

31. Again, Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta pointedly referred to the provisions of the Act and submitted that when the Act provides a complete machinery or code for every remedy and the right coupled with the fact that the respondent original plaintiff is having registration of the mark with the word Talod in respect of the instant mix for a number of or series of products which has acquired a separate and distinct reputation in many parts of the world, such a right granted by registration of the trade mark cannot be ignored merely because an objection is raised. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta emphasised and pointedly referred to the overall market and the sale of products in different parts of the world including even registration of the mark in other countries.

32. In rejoinder, learned counsel Shri Daruwalla for the appellant-original defendant submitted that the issue is whether the plaintiffs label using the word Talod and mark Mona Instant used by the defendant with the word Talod infringes the registered trademark of the plaintiff. He emphasised that for that purpose the court has to consider whether the plaintiff has Talod as its registered trade mark. He submitted that since this very issue was joined in an earlier suit, the same issue cannot be re-agitated and the present suit would be barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of C.P.C. by provisions analogous to res judicata. He emphasised that the earlier suit was filed in the year 2008 regarding passing off and it was in relation to a whole label mark. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla referred to the papers and pointedly referred to the order at p. 50, 51 and submitted that it refers to the passing off and the trial court has erred in holding that earlier Civil Suit No.5/2008 was only for passing off and the present suit which has been filed in the year 2011 is based on registration of the trade mark and infringement of the trade mark. He pointedly referred to the papers including the affidavit-in-reply and submitted that the aspect of disclaimer has not been considered at all for which he again referred to the discussion in the judgment. He submitted that the discussion in the judgment refers to passing off and distinctiveness of the marks and similarity or dissimilarity of the two marks.

33. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla, however, submitted that the court below has failed to focus on the main issue whether the geographical name could be permitted as a registered trade mark. He emphasised and submitted that under the new Act of 1999, on the contrary, it provides for refusal of registration of the mark having a geographical name or area. He pointedly referred to section 9(1)(a) and section 9(1) (b) of the Act. He again referred to the judgment in the case of ITC Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and anr. (supra) And submitted that similarly the word Ratlami save does not mean that others cannot prepare and anyone can make the save in Ratlam. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla referring to the papers and a book by P. Narayanan on Trade Marks and Passing off (6th Edn.) p. 547-548 referred to the disclaimer. He submitted that in a mark of this nature the secondary meaning cannot be acquired which has been referred to by the other side like Yorkshire, Liverpool, Himalayan. He again emphasised that an application for rectification of registration of the mark raising objection is made and therefore when the disclaimer has been given by the respondent original plaintiff, it cannot now go back after having given the disclaimer for exclusive use of the word Talod. He referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 2012 (51) PTC 376 [LQ/IPAB/2012/1] in the case of Hindustan Unilever Limited and anr. v. Girnar Exports & anr. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Honble Apex Court reported in AIR 1997 SC 1398 [LQ/SC/1996/1949] in the case of Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co. & anr. and emphasised the observations made in para 20.

34. Similarly, he has also referred to a few other judgments like the judgments reported in AIR 1993 SC 1756 [LQ/SC/1993/351] , 2002(25) PTC 417 (Bom.), and 2007(35) PTC 40 (Del.). He has also referred to the judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical, reported in AIR 1965 SC 980 [LQ/SC/1964/275] , and submitted that in this case it is not a case with regard to the use of geographical name and he emphasised the observations made in para 13 and 14 to support his submissions. Finally, he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in 1974 (76) BLR 146, the judgments reported in (2007) 6 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2007/785] , AIR 1998 (Guj.) 247 [LQ/GujHC/1998/238] and also the judgment reported in 2010 (44) PTC 736 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/2010/3722] (para 4).

35. In rejoinder, learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta submitted that the controversy or the issue involved in the present case is whether the geographical name could be registered as trade mark under Section 9 of the Act. For that purpose, he referred to the Trade Marks Act, 1958 a well as of 1999 and submitted that the provisions of such registration in the subsequent Act of 1999 has been watered down in light of the development of law over a period of time for which he referred to the case of Liverpool, etc. Learned counsel Shri Mehta referred to section 22(9) and submitted that it provides for a trade description r/w section 103 and submitted that a false trade description is referred. He submitted that if the injunction is not granted in spite of registration of the trade mark, it would mean that the defendant has a right to commit infringement of the trade mark of the plaintiff even though it is registered, meaning thereby, the registration and the provisions of the trade mark and the underlying purpose for which such a statute has been enacted would lose its significance. He referred to section 59 and submitted that a rectification application can be filed. He also referred to section 124 and submitted that the law provides as to what would be the consequences or effect pending such proceedings where the validity of registration of the trade mark is questioned. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta pointedly referred to section 124(3) in support of his submission. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 1999 (19) PTC 718 [LQ/GujHC/1998/813] in the case of Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels Ltd.. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment reported in 2010 (44) PTC 736 (Del.) [LQ/DelHC/2010/3722] and emphasised the observations in para 15 and 16 that in the facts of the case the word is already used and therefore the facts are different. He also referred to the judgments reported in 2001 PTC (SC) 300 as well as the judgment in the case of Hem Corporation Pvt. Ltd. & ors. v. ITC Ltd., reported in 2012 (52) PTC 600 (Bom.) [LQ/BomHC/2012/985] , para 24 and 37, and also the judgment reported in 2012 (52) PTC 430 (Guj.) [LQ/GujHC/2012/384] in the case of Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Tulsidas Jesang & Sons and anr.

36. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the impugned order passed by the court below calls for any interference in the present Appeal from Order.

37. From the submissions made at length referring to the various aspects and the judgments and the pronouncements of the Honble Apex Court and other High Courts, whether the use of the word Talod, which has reference to a geographical name or area, can be said to be improper, though it has been a registered trade mark for the instant mix products of the respondent which it claims to be using for various instant mix products in India as well as abroad for which the details have been submitted. As rightly submitted by Sr. Counsel Shri Tushar Mehta, there is a difference in the earlier Trade Mark Act of 1958 and the subsequent Trade Marks Act 1999 considering the development of law by judicial pronouncements including the registration of trade mark having indication of a geographical name or origin.

38. Section 9(1)(b) of the Act provides that the trade mark which consists of the name of a geographical origin shall not be registered. However, the proviso further provides that an application for registration showing that it has acquired a distinctive character as a result of use or is a well-known trade mark, it would be registered and merely because it refers to a geographical name or indication by itself may not be a ground for not registering the trade mark. A useful reference can be made to a book by P. Narayanan on Trade Marks and Passing Off (6th edn.) and there is a reference to such products or names which have been registered as trade marks in respect of the goods or products though it has an indication or association with geographical name likes Himalayan, Liverpool etc.

39. Therefore, when learned counsel Shri Daruwalla has made a submission with much emphasis that the word Talod which is referring to a place or a geographical area could not have been registered as a trade mark of the respondent and cannot claim proprietary right in respect thereof, it is required to be examined in background of the facts in a given case. The broad proposition which he has canvassed deserves acceptance, but it has also to be considered qua the factual background like in the present case where the respondent has a registered trade mark for instant mix products with the word Talod in its entire label mark and also the word Talod itself has been registered for the purpose of its products as Talod Gruh Udyog. Therefore, again, the emphasis is on the name of the respondent Talod Gruh Udyog suggesting that these are products by Talod Gruh Udyog which may have the name of geographical indication like Talod. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, it has acquired a separate and distinct reputation when it has been registered as a trade mark not only in India but it has market for its products in many other countries. Therefore, the word Talod has a secondary meaning for the products of the respondent that he belongs to Talod. The name of the firm is Talod Gruh Udyog and the instant mix products have acquired a reputation with distinct name and goodwill.

40. On the other hand, the use of the word Talod along with Mona Instant Mix by the present appellant, original respondent, indicates that he wants to link his products with Talod though he does not have any origin from that area. Further, the products of instant mix which are marketed and sold by both the sides are not having any kind of association with the geographical area like Talod, like for example, Ratlami save as given by learned counsel Shri Daruwalla. Thus, when the word Talod is not claimed to be known or famous for the kind of products like instant mix which are sold and marketed by both the sides, it is the reputation and goodwill established by the respondent for the instant mix products of the respondent as Talod Gruh Udyog.

41. A useful reference can be made to the observations made in the judgment by the High Court of Calcutta in the case of ITC Ltd. v. The registrar of Trade Marks and anr. (supra) regarding the use of the word SIMLA for manufactured tobacco. The same is also required to be considered with the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Lupin Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson (supra). If both these judgments are considered, it makes it clear that in both the cases reference to the geographical indication or name like SIMLA refers to the product and it was known for such kind of product and therefore nobody can claim an exclusive right to use such geographical name which has its own importance for particular type of product like tea. In the instant case, the word Talod is not famous, it has never been focused as a hub or wellknown place for the manufacture or trade of instant mix.

41.1. Further, reliance has been placed by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta on various names or marks having geographical indications like Liverpool, Cambridge, Kerala Malted Whisky, Vienna, Kashi, Jai Bharat Foundry, Mumbai Indians, Bharatiya Chai, Mysore Electrical and Electronics Pvt. Ltd., Cambridge Readymades, Portico New York Bedsheet, etc. He therefore submitted that it has to be read with reference to the provisions of the statute like Trade Marks Act, 1999 which does not totally prohibit registration of such a mark.

42. Further, as could be seen from the Trade Marks Act 1999, it is a complete code providing for the procedure and mechanism and for any such grievance, the rights and remedies are available. The registration of a valid trade mark in favour of the party gives a right to that party to have an exclusive use of such mark, and so long as it is not taken out, modified, corrected pursuant to a proper remedy under the Act, it will continue to have a right in favour of the party which is the owner of such proprietary rights or registered trade mark. Therefore, when the respondent is having the registered trade mark with the word Talod, it cannot be brushed aside or overlooked merely because an objection is raised that the authority has registered the trade mark containing a geographical name Talod and therefore it should be ignored. If that is so, it would make the other provisions of the Act redundant which provide for an appropriate remedy under the Act by making necessary application for the grievance made by others.

43. Chapter IV of the Act refers to the Effect of Registration. Section 28 provides a right which is conferred by registration with regard to exclusive right to use the trade mark by the person who is having proprietary right of such trade mark. Section 29 provides for infringement of the trade mark, and as rightly emphasised by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mehta for the respondent, section 29(3) provides " in any case falling under clause (c) of sub-section (2), the court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public." Clause (c) of section 29(2) provides with regard to the identity of the trade mark and the goods, and as discussed herein above, the items of both the appellant herein and the respondent are identical i.e. instant mix and when the word Talod is also sought to be used by the appellant, it may have the possibility of confusion with the products of the respondent who is doing the business in the name and style of Talod Gruh Udyog. Therefore, such presumption has been provided. It is well-accepted that in such cases of proprietary right in respect of the marks, the registered owner of the trade mark has a valuable right in the form of registered trade mark for the purpose of using it in connection with the goods which has acquired a reputation and goodwill. The use of the word Talod is an essential feature in respect of the mark of both the appellant and the respondent.

44. Chapter VII of the Act refers to "Rectification and Correction of the Register". Section 57 read with rule 92 of the Rules refers to "power to cancel or vary registration and to rectify the register" which has provided that on an application made in the prescribed manner to the Appellate Board or to the Registrar by any person aggrieved, it can be considered as provided in the said section. Further, a detailed procedure has also been provided in such cases providing for the remedy and till such a decision is taken after following the procedure, the right of the registered trade mark are maintained and therefore the injunction which has been granted does not call for any interference.

45. Another facet of the submission which has been emphasised by learned counsel Shri Daruwalla which has also been recorded while recording his submissions is with regard to the disclaimer and whether the similarity is of such a nature that it is likely to cause confusion with the mark of the respondent and what would be the criteria for the purpose of deciding the similarity between the two marks or the labels by the appellant as well as the respondent. Learned counsel Shri Daruwalla has referred to these aspects at length trying to point out the points of difference that it is not likely to cause any confusion or deception and therefore the use of the word Talod by the appellant which is a geographical name cannot be objected and the injunction which has been granted by the court below has been a misconception.

46. Moreover, the submission made by learned counsel Shri Daruwalla as to whether the similarity of the products or the mark is likely to cause confusion and the principles of comparison of mark is required to be considered. Though he has emphasised referring to the label marks trying to suggest the point of distinction or dissimilarities, it is well accepted that while considering the similarity, whether the goods of one party is likely to be confused and passed off or not with the mark or the label of the other has to be compared as a whole. Again, the criteria for the purpose of injunction in case of infringement and passing off would be different, though in both the cases when the goods are similar, the aspect of similarity or dissimilarity between the two products as well as the marks as a whole are always considered. In other words, in an action for alleged infringement of a registered trade mark it has to be seen whether the mark of the defendant is identical with the registered mark of the plaintiff. If it is identical, the question does not arise. Even if it is not identical, it has to be considered whether it is deceptively similar and/or likely to cause confusion in relation to the goods for which the plaintiff has got his mark registered. It is at this stage the approach in case of infringement of the registered trade mark and in case of passing off would differ. In case of infringement of a trade mark if it is prima facie shown that the mark of the defendant is similar or the moment it is prima facie suggested by the registered owner of the trade mark that it has a resemblance with his mark or the product, he may be entitled for injunction.

47. On the other hand, in case of passing off it may require a closer scrutiny before injunction is granted considering various aspects of comparison of mark as a whole. It is required to be considered whether one is likely to be passed off as goods of another and whether it is likely to cause confusion in the minds of unwary customers of average intelligence. Again, for that matter, while comparing the two marks, it has to be considered as a whole and with the added matter or mark itself it could be pointed out that the mark of the defendant is not similar and could be distinguished, the defendant may escape the liability with added matter suggesting that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from that of the plaintiff.

48. Thus, the criteria in case of an infringement action and in case of passing off would have a difference and the criteria for comparison with the two marks whether it is infringement action or passing off may be similar which could be considered in light of the observations made by the Honble Apex Court in the judgment the case of Ruston and Hornby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1649 [LQ/SC/1969/330] as well as in the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, reported in AIR 1965 SC 980 [LQ/SC/1964/275] . In the facts of the case, it is the use of the word Talod with prominence used by the appellant which is focused as discussed above. Therefore, the submissions made by learned counsel Shri Daruwalla cannot be readily accepted.

49. A useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories (supra). The aspect with regard to the Registrar refusing to register the trade mark Yorkshire has been considered with reference the provisions of the relevant statue and it has been observed,

".It was therefore contended that the word Yorshire had lost its primary geographical significance and had become 100 per cent distinctive of the applicants goods. In dismissing the appeal, Lord Simon the Lord Chancellor observed:

".He took the view which I share that the Court of Appeal had in the Liverpool Cable case, (1928) 46 RPC 99, rightly interpreted the opinion of Lord Parker in the W. and G. case."

".The action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of "the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods". In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendants mark is likely to deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiffs and the defendants mark is so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and the court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiffs rights are violated. Expressed in another way, if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the getup, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark would be immaterial; whereas in the case of passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff."

50. A useful reference can also be made to the observations made by the Honble Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Heinz Italia and anr. v. Dabur India Ltd. (supra) where it has been observed referring to the criteria to be applied that the test is whether the particular mark has obtained acceptability in the market so as to confuse the buyer as to the nature of product he was purchasing. It is observed that in passing off again similarities rather than dissimilarities have to be noted. It is required to be mentioned that in the present case it is a case of infringement by the registered owner of the trade mark. Similar contention with regard to the use of generic word like glucose was raised that it could not be appropriated by anybody and even if its exclusive use could be justified, the decision could be arrived at only after the evidence has been recorded. The Honble Apex Court referring to the various aspects including the facts had granted injunction.

51. One more aspect which requires consideration which has been much emphasised by learned counsel Shri Daruwalla for the appellant is regarding the disclaimer and associated applications for registration of a trade mark with the word Talod. As it has been clarified that the earlier suit has been for passing off and pursuant to the order of the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal, the suit has been withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh suit and in fact the Registrar has granted the registration of the mark Talod as provided in section 9 the statutory presumption cannot be brushed aside. In other words, though it was a disclaimer given, but subsequently when the mark has been registered, the statutory provision would apply and at this stage in spite of the registration the earlier disclaimer cannot be accepted finally. It is not in dispute that the application for rectification is pending before the Registrar and it may be considered while deciding such application for rectification, but the registration of the trade mark with the word Talod cannot be brushed aside.

52. As referred to herein above, there is no clarification or justification why the appellant desires to use the word Talod when he does not belong to that area. Further, when Talod as a geographical area has not acquired any kind of reputation that it is famous for this kind of products of instant mix, then, what is the idea or the purpose of use of the word Talod when he is operating from outside Talod at Bombay. On the other hand, the claim is made by the respondent original plaintiff that he belongs to Talod, the name of the firm is Talod Gruh Udyog and its products of instant mix have acquired a goodwill and reputation not only in India but abroad also over a period of time due to which the marks have been registered which has been produced on record.

53. Therefore, when the respondent is the registered owner of the mark even if it uses the geographical name, it cannot be overlooked at this stage for the purpose of deciding the present proceedings against the interim application/injunction. The submission made by the respondent that the mark is descriptive with reference to the geographical area could be raised at the pre-registration stage or as provided under the Act for variation or cancellation.

54. In any event, it is well-accepted by catena of judicial pronouncements with regard to the scope of interfering with the discretionary order in such Appeal from Order. A useful reference can be made to the observations made by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. And anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727, wherein it has been observed in para 14:

".The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial courts exercise of discretion."

55. A useful reference can also be made to the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Jasoda Indralal Vadhva v. Hemendrabhai Kakulal Vyas and ors., reported in 2009(4) GLR 3213, wherein it has been observed:

"Granting of injunction is a matter of discretion. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury are triable issues and are required to be examined and positively found. It is settled law that while hearing appeal against discretionary exercise of powers by the trial Judge, while deciding the application under Order 39, Rule 1 &2 of C.P.C., the appellate court is not expected to interfere with the discretion, unless it is shown that power has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in perversity and against the settled principles of law. Appellate Court is not expected to re-assess the material and to reach a conclusion different than the one reached by the Court below."

56. Therefore, unless it can be said to be contrary to the statutory provision of law or perverse, normally, the Court would not disturb any such discretionary order. Moreover, if the view is possible or plausible, merely because a different view could be taken would not be a ground to disturb the discretionary order of the court below.

57. Therefore, the present Appeal from Order cannot be entertained and deserves to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed.

58. In view of dismissal of the order, the civil application would not survive and the same is accordingly disposed of.