Subodh Abhyankar, J.

1. This Miscellaneous petition has been filed by the petitioner /M.P.Panschim Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Ltd (hereinafter referred to as 'MPPKVVCL/the Company'), under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 18/01/2021, passed in the Case No. W0472520 by the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Indore; whereby, in the Appeal preferred by the respondent against the order dated 09.08.2017, passed by the Assistant Engineer, MPPKVVCL Jawra, it has been reversed.

2. In brief facts of the case are that the respondent M/S Badshah Industries which is a partnership firm, is in the business of Fabrication, and was having an electricity connection, regarding which, on an inspection by the Officer's of the petitioner/Company it was found that from 13.1.2015 to 09.08.2017, there was some tampering, and after its repair on 09.08.2017, a demand was raised for the first time on 28.08.2017, and subsequently on 31.10.2017, a demand notice for recovery of Rs. 12,84,677/-was issued to the respondents, but as the respondent did not pay the aforesaid amount, another demand notice was against issued on 13.12.2017, and thereafter on 20.08.2020, i.e, after 32 months the third demand notice was issued, and as the respondents failed to pay the aforesaid amount on 28.09.2020, the Electricity supply was disconnected. On 05.10.2020, the respondents deposited Rs. 10,000/-under protest, and on 21.10.2020, the respondent also applied for permanent disconnection. Subsequent thereto, vide notice dated 29.10.2020, again the demand of Rs. 12,84,677/-was raised by the petitioner, and an additional demand for October, 2020 for Rs. 1,79,602/-was also raised.

3. Against the demand dated 31.10.2017, on 27.11.2020, the respondents filed a complaint under section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter to be referred to as Act of 2003) before the Electricity Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Indore which has been allowed directing that the petitioner is not entitled to recover the amount on account of it being barred by limitation, and being aggrieved, the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner.

4. Shri Amay Bajaj, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside as the learned Members of the Electricity Forum has erred in not properly appreciating the provisions of Section 56(2) of theof 2003, and holding that no recovery can be made from the respondent.

5. In support of his submissions, Shri Bajaj has also relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/S Prem Cottex Vs. Uttar Haryana Biljli Vitran Nigam Ltd and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 7235/2009 dated 05.10.2021 reported as 2021 SCC Online SC 870 and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer (D1) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and another Vs. Rahamatullah Khan @ Rahamjulla passed in Civil Appeal No. 1672/2020 dated 18/02/2020 reported as(2020) 4 SCC 650.

6. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand has opposed the prayer and it is submitted that no case for interference is made out as the demand itself was clearly barred by mandatory provisions of Section 56(2) of theof 2003, and thus, no illegality has been committed by the Forum in passing the impugned order. Counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance upon a judgment passed by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited Vs. Electricity Ombudsman Mumbai reported as AIR 2019 BOM 113 [LQ/BomHC/2019/668] .

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8. From the record, it is apparent that the case involves the interpretation of Section 56 of theof 2003.Thus, it would be apt to refer to the same at this stage only.

9. Section 56 of theof 2003 reads as under:-

"56. Disconnection of supply in default of payment.

- (1) Where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission or distribution or wheeling of electricity to him, the licensee or the generating company may, after giving not less than fifteen clear days' notice in writing, to such person and without prejudice to his rights to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply of electricity and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works being the property of such licensee or the generating company through which electricity may have been supplied, transmitted, distributed or wheeled and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer:

Provided that the supply of electricity shall not be cut off if such person deposits, under protest,-

(a) an amount equal to the sum claimed from him, or

(b) the electricity charges due from him for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months,

whichever is less, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the licensee.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity."

10. So far as the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer (D1) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (supra) is concerned, it refers to the interpretation of section56 of the of 2006, paras 8 and 9 of the same read as under:-

"8. Section 56(2), however, does not preclude the licensee company from raising a supplementary demand after the expiry of the limitation period of two years. It only restricts the right of the licensee to disconnect electricity supply due to non-payment of dues after the period of limitation of two years has expired, nor does it restrict other modes of recovery which may be initiated by the licensee company for recovery of a supplementary demand.

9. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present case, the licensee company raised an additional demand on 18-3-2014 for the period July 2009 to September 2011. The licensee company discovered the mistake of billing under the wrong Tariff Code on 18-3-2014. The limitation period of two years under Section 56(2) had by then already expired.

9.1.Section 56(2) did not preclude the licensee company from raising an additional or supplementary demand after the expiry of the limitation period under Section 56(2) in the case of a mistake or bona fide error. It did not, however, empower the licensee company to take recourse to the coercive measure of disconnection of electricity supply, for recovery of the additional demand.

9.2.As per Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in case of a mistake, the limitation period begins to run from the date when the mistake is discovered for the first time. In Mahabir Kishore v. State of M.P. [Mahabir Kishore v. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC 1] [LQ/SC/1989/366] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 11, para 22)

"22.Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that in the case of a suit for relief on the ground of mistake, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff had discovered the mistake or could with reasonable diligence, have discovered it. In a case where payment has been made under a mistake of law as contrasted with a mistake of fact, generally the mistake becomes known to the party only when a court makes a declaration as to the invalidity of the law. Though a party could, with reasonable diligence, discover a mistake of fact even before a court makes a pronouncement, it is seldom that a person can, even with reasonable diligence, discover a mistake of law before a judgment adjudging the validity of the law."

(emphasis supplied in original)

9.3.In the present case, the period of limitation would commence from the date of discovery of the mistake i.e. 18-3-2014. The licensee company may take recourse to any remedy available in law for recovery of the additional demand, but is barred from taking recourse to disconnection of supply of electricity under sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the."

(emphasis supplied)

11. In the light of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court as aforesaid, it is apparent that what s.56 prohibits is the recovery of the amount due under s.56 only, after a period of two years, but because of non-payment, it is precluded from disconnecting the electricity. However, it does not preclude the Company from recovering the dues by resorting to other modes of recovery. This Court also finds that the Forum has held that the electricity Company is not entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 12,84,677/-under Section 56(2) of theof 2003, as the same is barred by limitation, and although, this finding does not appear to be erroneous, however, the Forum ought to have reserved the liberty to the Petitioner to recover the amount by the other legal modes available.

It is apparent that the attention of the Forum was not brought to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of M/S Prem Cottex (supra), and Assistant Engineer (D1) Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (supra) in which the only conclusion which the Supreme Court has drawn is that Section 56(2) of theof 2003 only restricts the right of the licensee to disconnect the electricity supply due to non-payment of dues after the period of limitation of two years has expired, and it does not restrict the other modes of recovery which may be initiated by the licencee/company for recovery of the demand.

12. So far as the decision cited by the counsel for the respondent is concerned, the same is distinguishable and is of no avail to the respondent.

13. In such circumstances, the impugned order dated 18/01/2021 is hereby set aside, so far as it relates to the finding recorded by the Forum that the demand is barred by limitation, and it is directed that the petitioner/company would be entitled to recover the aforesaid amount in accordance with law, but not u/s. 56(2) of the of 2003.

14. Needless to say, the time spent by the petitioner in prosecuting this petition shall be excluded from the period of limitation if the petitioner chooses to further pursue the matter by resorting to the appropriate remedy.

15. Accordingly, the petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent, and is hereby disposed of.