Kundaiah, J. 1. This writ appeal is directed against judgment of our learned brother Chowdary, J., dismissing the appellants writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to give effect to the proceedings of the District forest officer, Cuddapah dated 28-7-1976 as confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1976 and by the High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 dated 7-2-1978 and consequently to direct the respondent to release the Ambassador Car bearing No. A.A.T. 2236. 2. The Ambassador car along with 117 billets of Sandal-wood was seized by the Forest Authorities on 28th July 1976 at Rajampet for contravention of Rule 3 of Andhra Pradesh Sandal-wood and Red-Sandal Wood transit Rules by transporting the Sandal-wood billets without the requisite mark and without a transport permit by the requisite authority. The forest produce and the vehicle were seized immediately and they were produced before the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah, who recorded statements of four persons, including the second appellant herein. The commission of offence was admitted before the District Forest Officer. The accused were also produced on the same day before the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rajampet. The first appellant is said to be the member of E.P.D.C. Motor Taxi Drivers Cooperative Society and he claims to be the hire purchaser of that vehicle from that Society. 3. The District Forest Officer, Cuddapah in exercise of his powers under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ordered confiscation of the forest produce so seized, together with the vehicle used in committing the offence on 28-7-76 as he was satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect of forest produce produced before him. 4. Against the confiscation order of the District Forest Officer, the first appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1976, under Sub-section (2-E) of section 44 of the Act as he was aggrieved by the order of the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah confiscating the forest produce and the vehicle under Sub-Section (2-A) of Section 44 of the Act. The appeal to the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah was dismissed. Thereupon Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 was filed before this court and the same was dismissed on 7-12-1978. The result of the aforesaid proceedings is that the order of confiscation passed by the District Forest Officer, Cuddapah on 28-7-76 under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 was confirmed and upheld by this court in Criminal Revision case No. 189 of 1977 on 7-2-1978. 5. However, the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused, who were charged with the commission of offence of transporting sandalwood billets unauthorised ended in acquittal of the accused by an order of the Judicial Second Class Magistrate, Rajampet on 17-6-1978. The Criminal appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal was also rejected by this Court on 4-12-1978. 6. The present writ petition has been filed by the appellants on the premise that the first appellant is the hire-purchaser of the vehicle and the Second appellant has an agreement to use the vehicle and they are therefore interested in the vehicle and the forest produce so seized. 7. The claim of the appellants was rejected by the learned single Judge holding that the first appellant, who was a party to the proceedings before the District Forest Officer, who confiscated the forest produce and the vehicle, and to the appeal before the District Judge and also to the revision in this Court, cannot be heard to say that the order of this court as embodied in the Criminal Revision Case shall not be given effect to. Consequently the order of confiscation has been allowed to become final and there is no error or want of jurisdiction in the earlier proceedings. Hence this writ appeal proceedings. The plea of the appellants-petitioners before the learned single Judge that Section 44 (2) of the Act is analogous to rule 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act has not been acceded to. Hence this writ appeal. 8. The sum and substance of the contentions of Mr. Innayya Reddy learned counsel for the appellants is that the appellants arc entitled to have the Ambassador car returned in view of the acquittal of the 2nd appellant in the criminal proceedings and also in view of the fact that the provisions of section 44 (2) of the Act are analogous to Rule 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. According to the learned Counsel, the proceedings relating to confiscation of the forest produce and the vehicle under Sub-section (2-A) of section 44 are of summary in nature, although an appeal (p the District Court under Sub section (2-E) is provided and revision under the Criminal Procedure Code against the order of the Sessions Judge is permissible. A decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of A.P. and other 1978 (2) ALT 44 (NRC) = 978 (2) APLJ 191, is relied upon by the appellants counsel in support of his stand. 9. This claim of the appellants is resisted by the Government Pleader for industries contending inter alia that the Act has provided under Chapter VII, two independent procedures, one relating to confiscation of the forest produce along with the vehicle used in committing such as offence and the other relating to the prosecuting of the persons, who committed the forest offence, that the procedure prescribed for the confiscation of the forest produce along with the vehicle is not summary in nature, that in any event the procedure, which provides for an appeal and a revision is a proper one, that the result of the criminal proceedings against the accused persons would not have any impact 011 the decision taken by the concerned authorities for the confiscation of the forest produce and the vehicle used in committing; such an offence, that the decision of the division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of A.P and others 1 relied upon by the appellants learned counsel, has been set aside by the Supreme Court in C.A. No. 1216 of 1979, dated 23-4-1979 and that therefore there is no valid or justifiable ground for interference by this Court with the order of the learned single Judge. 10. The Short question that falls for consideration is whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for the commission of a forest offence would come to the help of the appellants to claim return of the motor vehicles used in committing that particular forest offence 11. The answer to the question depends upon the provisions of chapter VII and in particular sections 44 to 50. Section 44 (1) provides for the seizure of forest produce along with all tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles and cattle used for committing such an offence, by any forest officer or police officer. Sub-section (2) en joins the officer seizing any property under Sub-section (1) to place a mark indicating the same as having been so seized, and either produced before an officer, not below the rank of a Asst. Conservator of forests authorised by the Government in this behalf by a notification or make a report of such a seizure to a Magistrate. It means immediate action should be taken by the officer, who seized the property and the vehicles, without any unreasonable delay. Secondly he should resort to this procedure only where the offender does not agree in writing forthwith to get the offence compounded. Where the property seized belongs to the Central or State Government and the offender is not known, a report narrating the circumstances under which the offence was believed to have been committed may be made to the Divisional Forest Officer. Where the produce seized along with the vehicle has been produced by the officer, who seized the same in the commission of forest offence before a forest officer, the provisions of sub-section (2-A) of section 44 would come into play. Where the forest officer himself has seized the forest produce along with the vehicle, he may order confiscation of the forest produce or other produce so seized with all tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles and cattle used to commit such forest offence, if he is satisfied that a forest offence is committed in respect thereof. He can also exercise this power of confiscation under this provision where any timber or forest produce along with tools, vehicles etc., has been produced by the officer, who seized them under sub-section (2) of section 44. Sub section (2-B) requires a notice in writing informing the person from where the property is seized, of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such property and also an opportunity to such a person of making a representation in writing as well as a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the grounds for confiscation. Unless this notice and a reasonable opportunity, as provided under sub-section (2-B) is afforded no order of confiscation of any property shall be made under sub-section (2-A) of section 44. 12. Sub-section (2-C) of section 44 does not empower confiscation of any tool, rope, chain, beat or vehicle, if the owner thereof proves to the satisfaction of the Forest Officer that it was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance, or knowledge or connivance of his agent, if any, or the person in charge of it, in committing an offence and that each of them has taken all necessary and reasonable precautions against such use. In other words if a tool, rope, chain, beat or Vehicle is confiscated along with the forest produce under sub-section (2-A) by a Forest Officer, its owner can successfully claim back his property, if he can establish to the satisfaction of the Forest Officer that it was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance, or the knowledge or connivance of his agent or a person in charge of it, provided that each one of them has taken all reasonable " and necessary precautions against such use. 13. Sub-section (2-D) empowers any forest officer, below the rank of a conservator of Forests to call for, either suo motu or on application, and examine the record of the order of confiscation passed by the Forest officer under sub-section (2-A) and to make such inquiry and pass such order as he may think fit. However, no order prejudicial to any person can be made without giving an opportunity of being heard, to that person. 14. Sub-Section (2-E) provides for a regular appeal by any person aggrieved by an order passed under Sub-section (2-A) or sub-section (2-D) to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the property has been sized. The District Court, shall after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, pass such order as it may think fit and the order so passed shall become final, Therefore, not only the first appellant, who claims to Have hire-purchase interest, as the society owned the vehicle,but also the second appellant, who claims to have some interest in the vehicle could have preferred an appeal. The appeal provided under sub-section (2-E) to the District Court against an order of confiscation under sub-section (2-A) by a forest officer, is a regular appeal, wherein the parties would be given full opportunity to establish their claims. 15. Sub-section (3) of section 44 applies to a case where a forest officer, not below the rank of a Forester, or whose subordinate, has seized any tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles or cattle under sub-section (1) and where he makes report of such seizure to a Magistrate under sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) therefore empowers the forest officer to return the tools, ropes, chains, beats, vehicles, or cattle seized under sub-section (1) on condition that he (the owner) produces the same as and when required before the Magistrate, to whom a report is made under sub-section (2). 16. Sub-section (4) prescribes the procedure for the Magistrate to proceed upon the receipt of any report under sub-section (2) by a Forest Officer or police officer, who seized the forest produce along with a vehicle. The Magistrate, under this sub-section (4) shall take such measures as may be necessary for the trial of the case, unless the offence is compounded and thereafter take steps lo the disposal of the property according to law. 17. Sub-section (5) requires the property seized under sub-section (I) to be kept in the custody of the forest officer until the compensation for compounding the offence is paid or until an order of the Magistrate directing its disposal, is received. 18. Section 45 enjoins the Court to confiscate to the Government the timber or forest produce in respect of which such an offence was committed or of any tool, beat, vehicle or other conveyance so used in committing such an offence, wherever a person is convicted of a forest offence. The only exception to it is in respect of a case where an order of confiscation has already been passed in respect thereof under section 44 of the Act. In other words the Legislature has clearly made a provision for confiscation of the forest produce and the tools, ropes, chains, vehicles, cattle etc., used in committing the offence under sub-sections (2-A) by a forest officer, against whose order an opportunity of appeal under sub-section (2-E) to the District Court is provided and a revision under the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court. Though the Court, which convicted any person for a forest offence, has a statutory duty to confiscate the forest produce along with the vessel or other conveyance used under section 45, exception is made with regard to confiscation in case where an order of confiscation has already been passed under section 44 of the Act. This clearly indicates that the Act contemplates two procedures, one being independent of the other. Though prosecution of the person is provided for only in a criminal Court i.e., before a Magistrate under sub-section (4), section 44 (4) read with section 45 contemplates two separate procedures so far as the confiscation of the property, vehicle or vesseal so used was concerned. Section 46 provides for the disposal of any timber or forest produce in respect of which any forest offence was committed after conclusion of the trial. Where property is found to belong to the Central or State Government or if it is confiscated, it shall be taken possession of by and under the authority of the Divisional Forest Officer. In any other case such timber or forest produce shall be disposed of in such manner as the Court having jurisdiction may by order direct. Section 46 would apply only to the case of disposal of any timber or forest produce after the conclusion of the trial of any forest offence. It is significant to note that section 46 does not tally with a case pertaining to the disposal of any tool, beat, vessel, vehicle or other conveyance or any other article used in committing a forest offence. 19. A dose, careful and combined reading of sections 44. 45 and 46 of the Act would leave no doubt in our minds that sub-section (2-A) provides specifically for the confiscation of any timber or.forest produce along with tools, ropes, chains, beats and vehicles used in committing the forest offence. A specific provision, which shall be given effect to in so far as this aspect is concerned, for a regular appeal, a revision and a suo moto revision is provided. This is a very effective and efficacious remedy The orders of confiscation passed under section 44 would not in any way depend upon the result of the criminal prosecution against accused persons in respect of the forest affiance, as seen from section 45 or section 46 of the Act. 20. We are therefore, of the firm view that the order of confiscation passed by the forest officer under sub-section (2-A) in the present case has become final in view of the decision of this court in Criminal Revision Case No. 189 of 1977 dated 7th February 1978 to which the first appellant is a party and it is binding on him. The second appellant also, if really so aggrieved by the order of the forest officer under sub-section (2-A), could have preferred an appeal to the Sessions Judge, Cuddapah under sub-section (2-A) as any person aggrieved by the order of confiscation passed under sub-section (2-A) can prefer an appeal to the District Court. 21. That apart the criminal courts judgment, which ended in acquittal of the second appellant and others would not entitle him to claim return of the vehicle or the sandal-wood. The previsions of section 44 or any other section of the Forest Act would not come to the aid of the appellants herein in this regard. Mr. Innayya Reddy tries to rely upon the provisions of subsection (2) or section 44. which according to him, are analogous to section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. As pointed out earlier section 44 (2) would only require the officer, be it Forest officer or police officer, who seized the forest produce along with the vehicle, to place a mark and also to produce the property seized before an officer not below the rank of an Asst. Conservator of Forests without any unreasonable delay, unless the offenders agree in writing forthwith to get the offence compounded or make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate. Option is given to the concerned officer to have resort to either of the courses indicated therein. 22. Section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955 would apply to a case where a person, who was prosecuted for the contravention of the licensing order in respect of which an order of confiscation has been made under section 6-C was acquitted. It provides for the return of the essential commodities so seized to such person or pay the price there of if confiscation was already ordered No such corresponding provision has been made in the Forest Act. As pointed out earlier section 44 (2) is in no way analogous to section 6-C (2) of the Essential Commodities Act. 23. That apart no writ can be issued not to give effect to an order of this court passed in a Criminal Revision Case preferred by the first appellant against the order of Sessions Judge, Cuddapah under sub-section (2-E) of section 44 of the Act, which confirmed the order of confiscation passed by the Forest officer under sub-section (2-A) of section 44. No authority has been placed before us in support of the appellants plea that a writ must be issued in a case where the order of confiscation has been passed by an authority, which is competent to make the same under a statute and which has been allowed to become final. 24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Hazi Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1978 (2) ALT 44 (NRC) = 1978 (2) APLJ 191 on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Innayya Reddy, need not detain us long. True, as submitted by the learned counsel, it was observed therein, that in the event of an acquittal in a prosecution before the Magistrate on the confiscation by the Forest officer, the custody of the goods is with the forest officer and delivery to persons mentioned in clause (3) is only subject to the order of the Magistrate in view of the provisions of sections 44 and 45 of the Act. With great respect we arc unable to subscribe to this view as pointed out earlier. 25. That apart the decision relied upon by the learned counsel has been set aside by the Supreme Court in C. A. 1216 of 1979 dated 23-4-1979, wherein the learned Judge, Untwalia J. speaking for the court, observed:- "In our opinion on the facts and circumstances of this case the order of the High Court is not fit to be sustained. The High Court has taken an erroneous view of the report by the forest ranger to the Magistrate while forwarding the accused to him. The proceedings as to the confiscation of the property seized as also the car has got to go on before the Divisional Forest officer. He will decide the matter unfettered and unprejudiced by anything that has been said in the judgment of the High Court. Thereafter if necessary, it will be open to the respondents to file on appeal before the District Court." 26. For all the reasons stated, we see no merit in this writ appeal. It is therefore dismissed, but in circumstances, the costs. WA.dismissed.