T.S. Doabia, J.

Succession was claimed to the cash deposits left by Smt. Vimla Gour. This Vimla Gour was in the employment of the Government. She left behind General Provident Fund, Family Benefit Fund and certain other amounts payable to her by the Government. These come to Rs. 55, 413/-. Application under section 372 of the Indian Succession Act was filed by the respondent Suresh Kumar. Suresh Kumar is the brother of Smt. Vimla Gour. This application was opposed by her husband Mohan Prasad. Claim of Mohan Prasad was negatived by both the courts below, He has filed this revision petition in the Court. The petitioner submits that he is a preferential heir and is entitled to the cash amounts left by his wife, he is placing reliance on Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. His claim was, however, negatived on the basis of the disqualification found incorporated in Sec. 25 of the aforesaid Act it was the case of the respondent/brother that his sister was treated with such cruelty which ultimately caused her death and therefore, the petitioner should be held to be debarred in view of the provisions contained in section 25 of the Act. It is this aspect which found favour with the Courts below. The claim of the present petitioner was negatived. Before noticing the various submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties it be seen that the deceased Smt. Vimla Gour had named her brother as a nominee for receiving the aforementioned amount. This fact also prevailed with the courts below in granting the succession certificate in favour of the brother.

There may be something to be said in favour of the petitioner so far concept of nominee is concerned. A nominee is only entitled to receive the money and he is supposed to distribute the amount amongst the heirs. Such is the view expressed by the Supreme Court of India in the case reported as Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi (: AIR 1984 SC 346 ). In the above case it was held that mere nomination under section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 docs not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount. Thus, merely because the brother was named as a nominee may not in itself be a ground to declare him as entitled to the amount in question. What is required to be seen is whether independently of the above the husband intitled to claim the amount or not.

Another argument which has been raised with a view to seek dismissal of the revision petition is that the amount regarding which claim is made was Stridhan of Smt. Vimal Clour and therefore, it should go to the brother and not to the husband.

Thus, the questions which are required to be gone into this petition are (i) Whether the concept of Slridhan would stand in the way of the petitioner and (ii) Whether the bar contained in Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act would be attracted to the facts of this case. So far as the first argument is concerned, there is a direct authority of this Court in Krishna Pyari Bai Dixit (Smt.) v. Gobind Mishra (1992) I.L.J. 624) in which the provisions of Section 15 and also the concept of Stridhan was taken into consideration. Relevant observations made in paras. 3 and 4 be noticed:-

The Court below has rejected the prayer and has dismissed the application up-holding the objection of respondent. In this connection it may be stated that the deceased, Neetabai, was married to the respondent on 25.2.84. But, the admitted fact is that the couple lived together for only three days. It is also undisputed that respondent sued deceased Neetabai for a divorce but he could get decree for judicial separation against her which was passed on 8.4.1988. It is also not disputed by the respondent that he contracted a second marriage though he slated that marriage did not take place in May 1988, but some time after deceased Neetabais death in November. 1988. The Court below has accordingly taken the view that under the Hindu Succession Act the mother could not claim to be prima-facia best entitled to the certificate prayed because she could not claim to be deceaseds legal heir. It is true, as per section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 1956, for short 1956 Act, a Hindu female dying intestate leaves her properly, in order of preference, "firstly" the sons, daughters and husband jointly and the mothers turn comes "thirdly". However, the trial Court failed to lake notice of the legal position that overriding effect of the 1956 Act was circumscribed by section 4 of the Act. Legislature has made it clear that only "with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act" the Shastric Law shall be deemed repealed and indeed that position is made clear by Explanation to section 14 of the 1956 Act. It is recognised that the stridhan of a Hindu female continues to be her absolute property lo mean obviously that Shastric Law with respect thereto continued lo be in force.

In the instant case the contention of Shri Modi is that the property in question would be deemed to be maidens property of deceased Neetabai under Shastric Law and in that connection he has placed reliance on para. 135 of Mullass Hundu Law 15th Edition at page 198. Learned author has succinctly summed up the law stating that the property of a maiden acquired by "mechanical arts or otherwise by her own exertions constitute her stridhan". He has submitted rightly indeed that the character of the property did not change during converture because deceased Neelabais right to hold the post was created during her maidenhood and she continued to hold that post without that right being affected in any manner by her marriage. In other words, lo that property the provisions of Section 15 of 1956 Act would not apply but succession to that property would be regulated by Shastlic law. In that connection he placed reliance on para, 145, ibid (page 201) and to the statement of law of learned author, that a maidcivs property according to all schools passes in order of preference first to uterine brother, then to her mother and thereafter to lather and others. In the instant case, the brother having not preferred any claim the mother should have been, according to me, granted the succession certificate under section 373 (3) of the Act, for reasons to follow.

Honble Dr. T.N. Singh, J. in the above case came to the conclusion that the property in question would be deemed lo be maiden property as per Shastric Law and the husband who came in the life of the deceased lady was a way-farer who came to violate her maidenhood by a fleeting association. It was further observed that such a situation could not have raised legimately any objection to grant of succession certificate to deceased mother who for all intent and purposes could be treated as having prima-facie best title to her daughters property sanctioned by Shastric Law, saved by Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act. The above observations fully apply to the facts of this case also. This would become still clearer when circumstances leading to the death of Smt. Vimla Gour are taken into consideration.

It is the case of the respondent that her sister was treated with cruelty. It is stated that the present petitioner was found of drinking and of non-vegetarian food. The witness have staled that whenever there was an occasion for his sister to come to the parental house, she was found weeping and slating that she is given beating by her husband. Reliance was placed on certain letters written by her. It is also slated that two days before his sister died the co-workers working in the department informed him that her sister was being treated cruelly. As a matter of fact, the first information report was also lodged. This was lodged on 30th October, 1988 and a case was registered under section 306/498-A of the Indian Penal Code. Later on, the husband and his relations were tried under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code also. In the criminal case the allegation made was that the deceased was asking for a scooter. She was taken to one doctor by name of Subhash Sharma. She was in unconscious state and information regarding the serious condition of Smt. Vimla Gour was not given to her family members. When she was brought to Gwalior, she was declared as dead. The bed head ticket does indicate that the froth was coming out from the mouth the deceased Smt. Vimla Gour and she was unconscious. No doubt, the court of Sessions acquitted the petitioner and his family but this judgment of acquittal cannot stand in the way of reappreciating the evidence which has come on the record. If the evidence which has come on the record is perused it does indicate that the deceased was subjected to such treatment which caused her death. As such the bar of section 25 of Hindu Succession Act would be attracted. Such is view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case reported as Mst. Biro v. Banla Singh (: AIR 1980 P&H 164 ). In the above case the plaintiff/respondent was found to have caused injuries to his adopted father as were sufficient to cause his death. It was also found that the deceased died as a result of injuries caused to him. Under the circumstances it was held that the act of the person causing in juries would be covered by the definition of term murder and he would be debarred from claiming succession under section 25 of the Act. Paras. 11 and 12 arc relevant and be noticed :

The next question that arises for consideration is under what section the offence committed by the plaintiff-respondent shall fall. A reading of S.299 and 300, I.P.C., shows that the offence committed by the plaintiff-respondent is clearly of murder and nothing short of it. His case does not fall in any of the exceptions of Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Neither there is any plea nor there is any evidence to show that the case of the plaintiff falls in any of the exceptions. Accordingly, I am of the view that the plaintiff-respondent is guilty of murder which clearly attracts S. 25 of the Hindu Succession Act. with the result that he would not be entitled to succeed to the estate left by his adopted father who was murdered by him. 7. "Parliament had inserted Section 25 in the Hindu Succession Act as a matter of high public Policy based on well-known principles of justice, equity and good conscience so that a person may not be able to accelerate the succession by murdering the last owner of the property and it is done by the next heir, he stands excluded from succession, meaning thereby that he would not be allowed to take benefit of succession by his own wrong by committing the murder of the previous owner. This view of mine finds support, not only from the bare reading of the section but by a similar provision under the Hindu Law and from a decision in Seetharamaiah v. Ramkrishanaiah, : AIR 1970 AP 407 , the relevant portion of which deserves to be reproduced :-

This court has held that murder was clearly committed within the meaning of S.300. I.P.C. The fact that he was given the benefit of doubt arising out of the conflicting versions of two witnesses and convicted under S. 324. I.P.C. does not in any way absolve him from the heinous crime to which he had made his own infamy contribution. S. 25 is introduced in the Hindu Succession Act as a matter of high public policy based on principles of justice, equity and good conscience to make it absolutely impossible for a murderer ho deserves to be hanged or to be shut behind the prison bars for life, to derive advantage or beneficial interest from the very heinous act committed by him.

In the present case, the evidence has come on the record that on account of cruel treatment meeted out to Suit. Vimla Gour she met her death. No doubt the petitioner and his relations stand acquitted of the criminal charges but this does not mean that the matter cannot be given a fresh look. As a matter of fact in the case reported as Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi (: AIR 1955 SC 566 ) the Supreme Court of India has expressed an opinion that the findings recorded by the Criminal Court are not binding on the Civil Court. A judgment given by the Criminal Court is only relevant to show that there was a trial resulting in the conviction by is not evidence of the fact in a civil trial as to whether offence was committed or not. In the present case I have gone through the statement of the brother. He has stated in categoric terms that his sister was treated with cruelty which ultimately brought a pre-mature end of her life. The fault for this has been attributed to the petitioner. I am of the opinion that this has been rightly so attributed. I am thus of the opinion that the view expressed by the Andhara Pradesh High Court which view was noticed and approved by the Punjab and Haryana High Court would be attracted to the facts of this case also. The petitioner is not entitled to the liquid assets left by Smt. Vimla Gour. This petition is found to be without merit and is dismissed with costs. Costs Rs. 1000/-.