Shearer, J.

(1) An order of demand made under the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950 was served on the petitioner Syed Mohammad Anzar Husnain, requiring him to deliver a certain quantity of paddy to a person and at a place named in the order. The petitioner did not comply with the order and was, in consequence, prosecuted. An application was then made to this Court under Article 228 of the Constitution, and as questions of constitutional law arose, this Court withdrew the case from the Court of the trying Magistrate in order that these questions might be decided. The questions that arose are, in the first place, whether the extent of the delegation of legislative or quasi legislative power made by the legislature to the executive in Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, is in excess of that permissible under the Constitution, and secondly, whether certain provisions contained in the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, violate the fundamental rights conferred by Article 14 and Article 19, Clauses (f) and (g) of the Constitution. These questions are of far-reaching importance, and his Lordship the Chief Justice constituted myself and my brothers Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prosad, JJ. as a Special Bench to determine them.

(2) The impugned Act is not a mere skeleton or frame-work, that is, it does not merely state in general terms the object which the legislature has in view and then delegate to an outside authority a completely untrammelled power to take any steps whatever which it may consider necessary or desirable to achieve that object. It is interesting to compare it with the Food-stuffs (Prevention of Exploitation) Act, 1931, which was enacted by British Parliament when Great Britain went off the gold standard in order to meet a situation comparable with that with which the Indian legislature had to deal. The English Act is described in the preamble as:

"an Act to authorise the Board of Trade in case of need to take exceptional measures for preventing or remedying shortages in, or unreasonable increase in the price of, certain articles of food or drink."

Section 1(1) of the Act left it entirely to the Board of Trade to decide what the articles of food or drink should be, merely postulating that in its opinion they should be articles of food or drink of general consumption. The impugned Act, on the other hand, defines with the greatest particularity what an essential commodity is. Again, the English Act, after conferring on the Board of Trade a power to make regulations, went on to state that such regulations might "confer or impose on any person or body of persons, such powers or duties as the Board of Trade may consider necessary or expedient for effecting the purpose aforesaid." Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the impugned Act, on the other hand, lays down the broad outlines of the policy which the Indian legislature wished to adopt in order to achieve its purpose. It is true, that while laying down the policy parliament left it to the executive to work out in detail the administrative measures necessary to render the policy effective and successful. It was inevitable that legislation of this kind should take the form which it did. India is a sub-continent and conditions vary greatly in different parts o it. Clause (b) of Section 3(2) of the impugned Act authorises the making of orders for the purpose of bringing waste or arable land under cultivation. It is obvious that in one part of India there may be a great deal more waste or arable land than in another, and that steps effective to bring such land under cultivation in one part of India may be quite ineffective in another. Clause (i) of Section 3(2) authorizes the making of orders requiring certain persons to maintain and produce for inspection books, accounts and records, relating to their business. It is obvious that the books, accounts and records, which it might be reasonable to require such persons to maintain in Madras, might be books, accounts and records, which it would be impossible for such persons to maintain in Bihar. Before the necessary data relating to such matters as these could have been collected and collated, much valuable time would have been wasted. To have legislated in detail regarding them would have been quite impracticable and would have been likely to do more harm than good. Clause (g) of Section 3(2) of the Act confers a power to make orders

"for regulating or prohibiting any class of commercial or financial transaction relating to foodstuffs or cotton textiles which, in the opinion of the authority making the order, are, or if unregulated are likely to be, detrimental to public interests."

When a famine occurs, or is threatened, attempts are likely to be made to buy up or obtain control of large quantities of food-stuffs. That, it is notorious, is what happened in the recent famine in Bengal, and made that famine a far more serious one than it would otherwise have been. Parliament, it is obvious, could not possibly foresee what action might be taken by speculators, and if it had attempted to lay down or even to indicate the kind of transactions which it was necessary to prohibit, speculators would merely have been stimulated into evading the provisions of the Act. If, on each occasion on which they succeeded in doing so, Parliament had had to be summoned and the Act had had to be amended, great harm would or might have been done before any remedial step could possibly be taken. It was inevitable that very wide discretion should be conferred by Parliament on the executive to meet rapidly and effectively a danger of this kind.

(3 ) Mr. B.C. Ghosh, in attacking the impugned Act, relies mainly 6n the provisions contained in Sub-section (1) of Section 3, Section 4 and Section 6. The learned advocate for the petitioner points out that jurisdiction to legislate on the subject-matter of Section 3 (1) of the Act, is under the Constitution, assigned to the States and that the power which Parliament at present has to legislate or it is (sic) or was originally derived from a statute of the British Parliament ( 9 and 10, George VI, Caput 39). Mr. Ghosh also points out that the articles of trade or commerce which are set out in the English statute are precisely the articles which are defined in the impugned Act as essential commodities. In this situation, Mr. Ghosh contended, Parliament, in enacting Section 3(1), has delegated its whole power to legislate on this particular matter, and under the Constitution it was not entitled and had no power to do this. This argument which Mr. Ghosh puts forward is substantially the argument which commended itself to Evatt, J. of the Australian High Court in VICTORIAN STEVEDORING and GENERAL CONTRACTING CO. v. DIGNAN, (1931) 46 Comm- W LR 73 at p. 1

23. Evatt, J. there said that a law might be a law with respect to the legislative power of the Commonwealth and yet might also be a law with respect to one of the matters on which the Parliament of the Commonwealth was empowered to legislate, in which case the law would be a valid law. If, on the other hand, a law of the Commonwealth Parliament was a law with respect to legislative power and if that were the only description to which it answered it would not be valid. I do not think that the criterion adopted by Evatt, J. can be applied in India, or at all events, can be applied to an Act passed by the Indian Parliament. In Australia, Parliament is under the Constitution, empowered to legislate on certain specified matters concurrently with the States and exclusively on a small number of other matters and residuary powers are vested in the States. In this situation it may well be said that if a law enacted by Parliament does not answer the description of a law relating to one or other of the specified matters set out in the Constitution Act, it is not a law which Parliament had legislative jurisdiction to make. In India, however, residuary powers of legislation are vested in Parliament, and, in consequence any law which Parliament may enact which does not come under any of the other entries in the Union or Concurrent Lists must come under entry No. 97 in the Union List unless, of course, it comes under some entry in the State List in which case it is invalid on quite another ground. Apart, however, from this it seems to me quite clear that if the criterion laid down by Evatt, J. were applied to the impugned Act, it would have to be held that it was intra vires. It has to be remembered that Evatt, J. had in mind a hypothetical case in which an enactment was passed to the following effect: "The executive Government may make regulations having the force of law upon the subject of trade and commerce with other countries or among the States." Now, even if Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the impugned Act is considered in isolation from the context in which it appears, it clearly does not go quite so far as that. It, for instance, stipulates that the power or discretion conferred on the executive is to be exercised only for certain specific purposes. Section 3(1) cannot, however, be divorced from Sub-section (2) of Section 3 which immediately follows it. Sub-section (2), as I have already said, indicates with some precision the steps which Parliament considered ought to be taken to achieve its purpose. The reason, it seems clear, why Sub-section (1) was inserted was to enable other similar steps, of which Parliament had not foreseen the necessity, being taken as soon the occasion for taking them should arise. The draftsman accomplished this by inserting in the Act a general provision, and then following it up with another and detailed special provision.

(4 ) Section 4 of the impugned Act, Mr. B.C. Ghosh contended, authorized a further delegation of legislative power which was not permission. No authority was cited by Mr. Ghosh for the latter contention and on general principle there appears to be no reason why Parliament, in authorizing the executive to exercise legislative or quasi-legislative power, should not also authorise the executive to re-delegate that power to another person or body. The British Parliament has frequency done so. It did it, for instance, in the Food-stuffs (Prevention of Exploitation) Act, 1931, to which 1 have already referred. The legislature of British Columbia in Canada also did it in enacting the Natural Products (Marketting) British Columbia Act and when on this among other grounds the validity of the Act was challenged, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee rejected the argument summarily. (Vide SHANNON v. LOWER MAINLAND DAIRY PRODUCTS. BOARD, (1938) A C 708 at p. 722. In any case it is not, I think, correct to say that Parliament, in this particular case, authorised any further delegation of the power which it had conferred on the executive. Section 4 no doubt provides that orders may be made by the State Governments, but it requires the concurrence of the executive of the Union in such orders before they can become operative. In effect, therefore, it may be said that an order which purports, on the face of it, to be an order of a State Government is really an order of the Union Government.

(5) Section 6 of the Act was attacked by Mr. Ghosh on the ground that it conferred a power to repeal or modify existing laws. This, however, is not so. On general principle, when the provisions contained in a latter statute are wholly at variance with and repugnant to provisions in an earlier statute, there is, by necessary implication, a repeal of the latter by the former. The section would appear to have been inserted in order to remove any doubt that might arise on this point, and make it clear that an order made under the impugned Act had the same force and effect as a statute The Australian Act, of which the validity was questioned, in VICTORIAN STEVEDORING AND GENERAL CONTRACTING COMPANY v. DIGNAN, 46 Comm-W L R 73, contained a similar provision, and so far as I have been able to gather from the reports, little or no reliance was placed on this by those who sought to have it declared unconstitutional.

(6) Mr. B.C. Ghosh, for the petitioner referred us to a number of passages in the judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the recent case, IN RE Article 143, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AND DELHI LAWS ACT (1912) ETC., AIR (38) 1951 S C 332. The question at issue there was whether it was within the competence of Parliament to confer on the executive a power to bring certain Acts into operation in certain specified local areas, and also, in doing so, to make modification or amendments in those Acts and to repeal, in whole or part, other Acts which were in operation in the local areas in question. The question now at issue is whether it is within the competence of Parliament to confer on the executive a power of ancillary or subordinate legislation in order to implement a policy set out in the Act conferring the power. The one type of delegated legislation is radically different from the other type. Nevertheless, as appears from the judgments of their Lordships the principle to be applied in deciding on the validity of the Act conferring either power is the same. Such limitation as exists on the competence of Parliament to delegate legislative authority must be found in the division of powers which the Constitution makes between the three organs of Government, the legislature, the judiciary and the executive. It was primarily on the existence of such a division in the Australian Constitution that the High Court of Australia was, in the case to which I have already referred, called upon to say whether or not the legislature in Australia had in this matter as absolute power as the British Parliament. The High Court of Australia came to the conclusion that, if there was in fact any limitation on its powers the limitation was so very slight as for all practical purposes to be nonexistent. The Supreme Court has taken the view that in this matter the power of the Indian Parliament is more restricted. As I understand the judgments, an Act of Parliament, conferring on the executive powers of subordinate or ancillary legislation on certain matters is liable to be pronounced unconstitutional if it can be said that Parliament ought itself to have legislated on the matters in question, and ought not to have devolved the responsibility of doing so, which under the Constitution lay on it, to an outside authority, and in deciding whether in fact Parliament ought to have legislated itself, it is irrelevant that it still retains the power to set aside any subordinate or ancillary legislation which the outside authority may have enacted. It will obviously be a matter of the very greatest difficulty to say in any particular case whether Parliament has transgressed or has kept within the permissible limits. As early as 1825, Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of America observed:

"The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from hose of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the etails." WAYMAN v. SOUTHARD, (1825) 6 Law d 253. Obviously also, in deciding whether or not Parliament has transgressed the limits, regard must be had to the object which Parliament had in view in enacting the statute, of which the validity is attacked and to the circumstances which led to its enactment. Kania, C. J., one of the dissenting Judges, appears to have recognised this when he said:

"The extent of the specific and detailed lines of the rule of conduct to be laid down may vary according to the circumstances or exigencies of each case. The result will be that if owing to unusual circumstances or exigencies the legislature does not choose to lay down detailed rules or regulations that work may be left to another body which is then deemed to have subordinate legislative powers."

The impugned Act was placed on the statute book in order to enable steps to be taken to deal with an economic situation of great complexity which had arisen and which, if permitted to develop uncontrolled, might have proved a serious danger to the stability of the State and certainly to the well-being of the great majority of its citizens. As I have pointed out, it would have been quite impracticable for Parliament to have legislated in any detail regarding certain of the matters referred to in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the impugned Act, and for it to have attempted to legislate more particularly regarding at least one matter, would have been both impracticable and dangerous. When the provisions in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the impugned Act are examined clause by clause, it will, I think, be found difficult to say with any degree of certainty that Parliament could and ought to have legislated in greater detail than it did. Mr. Ghosh complained bitterly that it had been left entirely to the discretion of the Provincial Government to determine how much his client should be paid for the paddy which he was compelled to deliver, and at one time I was disposed to think that Parliament could and ought, in enacting Clause (f) of Section 3 (2) to have stipulated that the price should not be less than the wholesale price which had obtained at a certain prior date. On further consideration, however, it may well have been inexpedient, and perhaps highly inexpedient, for such a provision to have been made. The impugned Act sets out the object the legislature had in view, and sets out also, in sufficient details, the action which the legislature thought necessary or advisable to be taken to achieve that object. It left to the executive the task of working out in detail the administrative measures necessary in order to ensure that the action which it wished to be taken should be effective. More exception can, perhaps, be taken to the: ostensibly wider power of subordinate legislation conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 3. As, however, I have already said, that sub-section would appear to have been enacted in order to confer on the executive a power to take action similar or analogous to the action which it was authorised to take in the various clauses contained in Sub-section (2). To deny to the legislature, authority to delegate such a power might well render it more difficult for the executive to grapple effectively with a situation such as that, at which the impugned Act was aimed, and I am not prepared to say that such a delegation was beyond the power of Parliament to make, in my event, Sub-section (2) can be severed from Sub-section (1) of Section 3, and the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, was made in pursuance of one or other of the special powers conferred by Sub-section (2), and not in pursuance of the general power conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 3.

(7) Mr. B.C. Ghosh for the petitioner next attacked the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, and contended that it deprives his client of the fundamental rights conferred on him by Clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19 (1) of the Constitution. It is, I think, open to doubt whether it can fairly be said that a proprietor or tenure-holder or cultivator falling within the definition of a large producer contained in Sub-clause (f) of Clause (2) of the Order carries on an occupation, trade or business. Even, however, if he can be said to do so, the restrictions imposed on his right. to carry on his occupation or business are, in the first place, that he must make a declaration of his stocks; secondly, that he must take out a license; and thirdly, that under the license he must submit a monthly return showing the stocks which he has acquired and disposed of in the preceding month. Clearly, it cannot be said that such restrictions are not reasonable restrictions, and are not imposed in the interests of the general public. Mr. Ghosh in fact did not press this point very seriously, and concentrated his attention on Clause (f) of Article 19 (1). An order requiring a person to deliver a quantity of paddy is in effect an order depriving him of property, and the order which is now attacked might, I am inclined to think, be said to be a law falling under Article 31 (1) of the Constitution. This point was not, however, raised in the course of the argument, and I shall proceed to deal with the case on the assumption that the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, in so far as it prevents large producers from holding up stocks of grain and disposing of them in the most advantageous market, interferes with their exercise of the fundamental right conferred by Clause (f) of Article 19 (1). A considerable part of the argument which was addressed to us by Mr. B.C. Ghosh was devoted to an attempt to show that under the order very arbitrary action could be, and was likely to be, taken by subordinate function arises. Mr. Ghosh, for instance, complained that the order did not provide for the making of any enquiry or for any opportunity being given to a large producer to be heard before a demand was made on him. Again, Mr. Ghosh said, a large producer might be required to deliver paddy at some place far away from his residence, that payment to him might be most unreasonably delayed, and even that when payment was eventually made, it need not necessarily be made in money. The rate of payment which had been fixed, Mr. Ghosh said, and in support of his assertion produced a notification issued by the provincial Government, was a rate which was the same or every part of the province, no account being taken either of the quality of the paddy or of variations in the market price which, Mr. Ghosh said, notoriously obtained not only in different parts of the province but often in different parts of the same district. The sum and substance of this part of the learned Advocates argument was that the order, in so fax as it permits arbitrary action of this kind to be taken, is an unreasonable order, and as such must be held to be unconstitutional. Mr. Ghosh found support for this contention in the judgment of Meredith, C. J., in BRAJNANDAN SHARMA v. STATE OF BIHAR, 29 Pat 461 FB, and more particularly in an observation contained in the judgment that "a law which enables such things to be done is not a reasonable law." I was myself a party to that decision, and found it necessary to dissent from the learned Chief Justice and stated my own point of view In these words:

"What is the criterion to be adopted by the Courts in deciding whether legislation of this kind is or is not valid legislation What is the question to which the Courts are bound to address themselves The answer given by the Constitution is that the question is this: "Are the restrictions which have been or can be imposed reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public That, it seems to me, is equivalent to saying: "Are the restrictions reasonably necessary in the interests of the general public or, to depart still further from the language used in the Constitution: "Is the extent to which the rights of individuals are or are liable to be interfered with no more than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the public "If that is the criterion to be adopted, then it is, I think, immaterial that there may be ancillary provisions in the statute which may lead to hardship in individual cases. Whether such provisions were reasonable or not was a matter for the legislature to determine, and the judiciary cannot now sit in review over what the legislature has done."

Mr. Ghosh for the petitioner has said that the Supreme Court has endorsed the opinion expressed by Meredith, C. J., and has dissented from the opinion which I expressed. I very much doubt, however, if their Lordships intended to endorse the particular observation of Meredith, C. J., which I have quoted and which is the basis of the argument which has been addressed to us. What Kania, C. J., said was:

"The law providing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19 may contain substantive provisions as well as procedural provisions. While the reasonableness of the restrictions has to be considered with regard to the exercise of the right, it does not necessarily exclude from the consideration of the Court the question of reasonableness of the procedural part of the law": DR. N.B. KHARE v. STATE OF DELHI, 1950, S C R 519 at 52

4. In his judgment, while approving of the decision of Meredith, C. J., and Das, J., the learned Chief Justice also referred with approval to a decision of the Bombay High Court: JESINGBHAI ISHWARLAL v. EMPEROR, AIR (37) 1950 Bom 363 [LQ/BomHC/1950/40] FB.) In that case Chagla, C. J., had observed:

"In order to decide whether a restriction is reasonable or not, the Court must look at the nature of the restriction, the manner in which it is imposed, its extent both territorial and temporal, and if after considering all this the Court comes to the conclusion that the restriction is unreasonable, then the restriction is not justified and the Court will not uphold that restriction."

There is nothing in either of the decisions to support the contention of Mr. Ghosh that if under this order arbitrary and unreasonable action may conceivably be taken, the order must, on that ground, be held to be an invalid order. No doubt the view which I had myself expressed that the reasonableness of any purely ancillary provisions contained in an order of this Court was a matter for the authority making the order to determine, and not a matter for the Courts to go into, was overruled. The substantive provision in the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, which imposes on the petitioner a restriction in the exercise of his fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property is contained in Clause (5) of the Order, which requires him to deliver, on demand, such quantity of food-grains as may be specified in the order making the demand. It cannot be said, and indeed was not said, by Mr. Ghosh that this was an unreasonable restriction, or a restriction which was not imposed in the interests of the general public. What Mr. Ghosh attacked in the order were the ancillary or procedural provisions as to the fixation of the amount of the demand, the rate and mode of payment, and so on. In other countries in which the State has found it necessary to requisition part of the crops raised by substantial cultivators it has sometimes happened that so much has been taken that the cultivators have been discouraged from growing as much as they could in subsequent agricultural year. In fact so much has sometimes been taken that they have not been left with enough for their own subsistence or for seed. It is clear that this danger was realised by the Government of Bihar and that it took (sic) large producer has to make he is required to state the acreage of land held under each kind of crop and also the number of his dependants and the number of servants who depend on him for their supply of food. Presumably, the reason why such particulars were required was to ensure that every large producer should be left with sufficient grain to enable him to feed his dependents and to have seed for the next agricultural season. Indeed it is clear from the license which large producers are required to take out that many of them at least are intended to be left with a surplus of grain over and above what they themselves require which they are to be at liberty to sell, Finally, the scale of levy is based on the assumption that in Bihar the average gross produce of paddy from one acre of land is 12 maunds or 8 maunds, according as the land is or is not canal irrigated, and that in Chotanagpur and the San-thai Parganas the average gross produce is 12,8 or 4 maunds of paddy according as the land is first, second or third class land, respectively. Presumably, the data on which these estimates were made was found in the various settlement reports. I have myself little or no experience of Chota Nagpur, but in the earlier part of my service I had a fair amount of experience of rent commutation cases in certain parts of Bihar, and if my recollection is correct the average outturn of paddy from one acre of land, which was canal-irrigated, was appreciably more than 12 maunds of paddy, and the average outturn of one acre of land which was not so irrigated was appreciably more than 8 maunds. Throughout Bihar and Chota Nagpur except in Khas Mahal villages, the State has no officials capable of appraising crops, and to have recruited a staff for this purpose would, I imagine, have been quite impracticable. Moreover, appraising standing crops is a very difficult task and serious errors are likely to be made one way or the other. Even if it had been possibly to do this, and it would, in my opinion, have been quite impossible, more hardship would have been likely to have been caused than is likely to be caused by the procedure adopted, namely by assessing the amount of the demand in each case on the assumption that the average outturn will be a certain quantity of paddy per acre, the national (sic) figure taken being well on the low side. Finally, it has to be remembered that the Order contains provisions entitling any large producer, on whom a demand is made, to apply for a revision of the assessment, and if the assessment is not revised to his satisfaction, to appeal against it. Mr. Ghosh complained that no large producer could apply in revision, or appeal unless and until he had complied partially with the demand. When however, an application in revision is made, only one-fourth of the quantity demanded is to be supplied, and when an appeal is preferred, only one-half. There ought to be very few instances in which four times as much as has been demanded as ought to have been demanded, and still fewer instances in which, after a review, the amount of the demand is still twice what it ought to have been. Without some provision of this kind it is clear that very many quite frivolous applications in revision and appeals would have been preferred, and that as, inevitably much delay would have occurred in their being disposed of, the maintenance of supplies would have been very seriously interfered with. Mr. Ghosh said that there must be non-canal-irrigated land in Bihar of which the gross outturn was less than 8 maunds of paddy and complained that the Order did not permit of the responsible authority assessing it at less. The heading to Clause 5 of the Order, namely, scale of Levy, perhaps suggests this. But, having regard to the petition (sic) of that clause in the Order, I am not satisfied that it is not open to the authority entitled to review an order of demand to make the assessment on what, it is satisfied, is the actual outturn. The power conferred on the Commissioner by Clause 5 (5) to reduce the scale of levy in a particular area when there has been a failure of crops is not inconsistent with the reviewing or appellate authority having discretion to modify an assessment in any way it thinks proper.

(8) The most serious difficulty which must confront those who are charged with the administration of this Order is the ascertaining of the acreage which any large producer actually has under paddy or wheat. Mr. Ghosh complained that the Order did not provide for any inquiry, and that there was a danger of the authority responsible for making a demand making it on thoroughly unreliable information -- information indeed, which might have been supplied by persons who had a grudge against the persons to be assessed. Such a danger may, no doubt, exist. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how detailed provisions could have been made as to the kind of inquiry which ought to be held. It has to be remembered that every large producer is required to make a declaration and take out a license and submit monthly returns, and when that has been done and the large producer has acted with complete honesty, the declaration and the returns will, by themselves, contain a great deal of the material necessary to enable an assessment to be made. If any large producer wilfully neglects to comply with the law, and inquiries have to be made, he can have no real complaint if these inquiries result in a demand being made on him which is an excessive demand: Moreover, in such a case, it is still open to him to make amends and ask for permission to make the declaration which he ought to have made earlier, and, presumably, if he can put forward any reasonable excuse for not having complied with the . law, the Sub-divisional Magistrate will exercise the discretion given to him by Clause 3 (2) of the Order and permit a declaration to be made before he deals with the application for review.

(9) Mr. Ghosh drew our attention to Clause 5 (2) (a) and said that it was unreasonable that the demand made on a large producer, who was a proprietor or a tenure-holder or thikadar, should be based on the produce that he was likely to get from his tenants as rent in kind, and not on the produce which he actually got from them. As I understand it, however a demand is made before the crop is actually harvested, or, at all events, before any bataidars of a proprietor or tenure-holder actually pay him their rent in kind. If the making of a demand is deferred until the whole of the crop has been got in, the large producer will not know how much of it he is entitled to sell, and he may, for one reason or another, wish to sell it as soon as possible. Also, it is, if my recollection is correct, not uncommon for crops to be sold while they are still standing. If a demand is based on the assumption that a proprietor or tenure-holder is likely to receive more from his bataidars than he himself estimates, it is open to him to apply for a review of toe order and to ask that the hearing should be deferred until he has received the whole of the rent in kind due to him in order that he may be able to satisfy the Court how much exactly be received. There is, I consider, nothing in Mr. Ghoshs complaint that power ought not to have been conferred on the District Magistrate, the District Supply Officer or the Sub-divisional Magistrate to prescribe the mode of payment for grain delivered in pursuance of a demand. When grain is delivered to the person in charge of a State godown, that person can scarcely be entrusted with the money to pay for it, and some procedure must be laid down as to how the supplier is to receive payment from the treasury. A more substantial complaint made by Mr. Ghosh was that the Provincial Government was authorized to fix, and had fixed, on flat rate of payment for the whole of the province, and that the rate so fixed was applicable to paddy of every quality. On the other hand, it appears that the wholesale price of paddy has also been fixed by the State, and that the rate so fixed is a flat rate for the whole of the province and for every kind of paddy grown in Bihar. In other words, a large producer is paid for the paddy taken from him at one flat rate and is required to sell so much of his surplus paddy as he wishes to dispose of at another flat rate. Mr. Ghosh also complained that the difference between the rate at which the state purchased paddy and the date (sic) at which it sold it was excessive. We have not the materials on which we can go into this point, nor in my opinion, are we entitled to do so,

(10 The scale of levy is a graduated scale according as the amount of the produce exceeds 200 maunds, 400 maunds, 600 maunds and 800 maunds of paddy. This results in certain anomalies which are most marked in the case of produce derived from canal-irrigated land. A large producer, who receives 400 maunds of paddy grown on such land is left with 325 maunds whereas a producer who receives 401 maunds is left with only 250 5/8 maunds. A producer who receives 800 maunds of paddy from canal-irrigated land, is left with 400 maunds whereas a producer who receives 801 maunds is left with only 200 1/4 maunds. A producer who has in one agricultural year obtained no more than 800 maunds will not, in a subsequent agricultural year be allowed to retain more than 400 maunds unless he increases his outturn to 1,600 maunds or more. Mr. Ghosh said, pertinently enough, that under the scheme there was no incentive for certain producers to increase their outturn, and that, on the contrary, they might be under a temptation to reduce it, and went on to argue that the objection which the legislature had in view, namely, the maintenance of supplies of foodgrains would not be achieved. The learned Advocate for the petitioner relied on CHINTAMAN RAO v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH, 1950 S C R 75

9. This decision is not, in my opinion, in point. The mere circumstance that a very limited number of producers may be deprived of any incentive to grow more food, is immaterial, if the scheme as a whole results in the maintenance of supplies and it is quite clear that the scheme is likely to have that effect. Mr. Ghosh was on firmer ground when he attacked these provisions in the Order on the ground that they were a violation of the fundamental right conferred on his client by Article 14 of the Constitution. Much reliance was placed on KAMESHWAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR, 30 Pat 454 SB, a decision to which I was a party. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, the State proposed to acquire the estates of proprietors and tenure-holders, and also proposed to take over the collection of arrears of rent due to such proprietors and tenure-holders, paying to them one-half of the amount of arrears. As proprietors and tenure-holders were to receive half the arrears of rent due to them a payment had in every case to be made and this was euphemistically described in the Act as compensation. It was shown that the amount which would thus be paid to the owners of the bigger zamindaris in the province would be less than the amount due to them as arrears of rent at the time when their estates were taken over. In other words, the estates of such proprietors were in effect, confiscated without any compensation whatever. On the other hand, it was shown that a very large number of the smaller proprietors and tenure-holders in the province would, in all probability, receive as compensation more than the market-value of their property. The Bihar Land Reforms Act contained no provisions relating to the raising of money to finance the scheme, and it was admitted that the intention of the State was to make a profit out of the bigger estates which it acquired for nothing or for much less than their market-value and so raise the money with which eventually the smaller estates and tenures would be acquired at a fair and perhaps even a generous price. The Act was thus aimed at a comparatively small section of persons belonging to a class, and the intention was to benefit a large number of other persons belonging to that class at their expense. Relying on the construction which the Supreme Court had put on Article 14 in CHARANJIT LAL v. UNION OF INDIA, AIR (38) 1951 S C 41, my learned brothers and myself came to the conclusion that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was a discriminatory piece of class legislation and was on that ground unconstitutional. The Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, may divide large producers into a number of artificial sub-classes, in very much the same way as the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, divided proprietors and tenure-holders The analogy between the Order and the Act, however stops there. It cannot fairly, or indeed at all, be said that the object of the Ministry in making this Order was to benefit one sub-class of producers at the expense of any other sub-class. There is, clearly, nothing objectionable in the levy being a progressive one, that is in any comparatively large producer being required to deliver to the state a proportionately greater quantity of his grain than a smaller producer. Mr. Ghosh in fact does not question the propriety of this, but says each producer should be required to deliver the same proportion of the first 200 maunds of paddy which he receives, the same proportion of the next 200 maunds, and so on, or alternatively, that there should be a provision that no producer in a higher sub-class should be required to deliver more paddy than a producer in the sub-class immediately below him. Even in America, however, the Fourteenth Amendment does not appear, to have been given so extended are application. For instance, the Courts have, as a rule, been reluctant to apply it in income-tax cases, In the absence of authority, I am not prepared to construe Article 14 of the Constitution in the way in which the learned Advocate for the petitioner invites me to construe it. It has to be remembered that the paddy which a producer is required to deliver is not confiscated. The producer is paid for it, and the difference between what He receives from the State and what he would have obtained if he had sold it at the controlled wholesale price is not very great. No doubt, it would be more convenient for him to sell it in the open market, and not to have to deal with minor, officials. But too much ought not to be allowed to be made of such a grievance, and none at all of the grievance that he might, quite possibly, be able to obtain from some speculator more than the controlled wholesale price.

(11) To sum up, India is a predominantly agricultural country, and yet at the moment cannot produce enough food for its rapidly increasing population. In such a situation, in order to prevent famine occurring in particular local areas, it is necessary that the State should control the distribution of grain and in order to enable it to do this, it must have control of large stocks of grain itself. The only way in which it can do this is to require producers to deliver a part of their stocks to the State or agents of the State. As I have already said, the quantity of grain which any producer is required to deliver is not so high that it does not leave him with sufficient for his own consumption and for seed, and indeed, in some cases, also with a certain surplus which he is at liberty to sell. That being so, the restriction imposed on producers is a reasonable restriction, and is imposed in the interests of the general public. In the view which I took in BRAJNANDAN SHARMA v. STATE OF BIHAR, 29 Pat 461, that would be sufficient to dispose of this case. But, in consequence of the later pronouncement of the Supreme Court I am also required to consider whether the ancillary and procedural provisions contained in this Order are reasonable. I must confess that that is a task which any Court must find it extremely difficult to discharge. What the reasons were, which weighed with the officials responsible for the drawing up of this Order, it is impossible for this Court to discover. It has, however, to bear in mind that in this province there are no State Officials in the villages, and that the records of rights are not kept up-to-date. That alone must make the task of administering a scheme of this kind extremely difficult, and must also involve a very great deal being left to the discretion of Collectors, District Supply Officers and Sub-divisional Magistrates who are acquainted with local conditions. I am not prepared to say that any of the ancillary or procedural provisions in the Order is unreasonable except possibly the provisions to which I have just referred as to the scale of the levy and if these are unreasonable, they are unreasonable only in the case of a limited number of producers. What proportion these are to the entire body of producers I have no means of ascertaining. The validity of this provision must, in my opinion, be tested by reference to Article 14 and not by reference to Article 19 (f) of the Constitution, and for the reasons already given it does not transgress Article

1

4. Also, unless and until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, I am not prepared to hold that the circumstances that one of a number of purely ancillary or procedural provisions in the Order is unreasonable is sufficient to render the Order ultra vires. Important as is the part assigned in the Constitution to the judiciary, I do not think that it was ever intended that it should be within the power of the judiciary to bring this procurement scheme to a complete standstill unless and until it was amended in some such particular to its satisfaction. Nor do I think myself that a rule of that kind is one which the judiciary can adequately sustain. It does not know, and cannot fully appreciate the difficulties which confront the executives in working out administrative measures of this kind.

(12) In the result, then I would say that neither the Essential Supplies (Temporary Provisions) Act nor the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, is an unconstitutional law and would remand the case to the learned trying Magistrate to be disposed of according to law. There ought not, I consider, to be any order for costs. Ramaswami, J.

(13) The main questions argued in this case are (1) whether Section 3 (1) and Section 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, improperly delegate legislative power to the Executive authorities, and (2) whether certain provisions of the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order 1950 violate the constitunonal guarantees under Article 14 and Article 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution.

(14) Act XXIV of 1946 is entitled as: "an Act to provide for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities." Section 2 defines essential commodity to mean particular classes of commodities which are set out in detail. Section 3 (1) empowers the Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary, or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, to make provision for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Section 3 (2) illustrates with some precision in what manner the Central Government should exercise the power delegated. Under Section 3 (2) the Central Government is empowered (a) by license or permit to regulate the production or manufacture of any essential commodity, (b) to provide for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land, (c) to control the prices at which all essential commodity may be bought and sold, (d) to regulate by license, permit or otherwise the transport, distribution, acquisition and use of any essential commodity, (e) to prohibit the withholding of sale of any essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale, (f) to require any person holding stock of an essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of such stock at such price and to such person or in such circumstances specified in the order, (g) to regulate or prohibit any class of transactions relating to foodstuffs or cotton textiles which, in the opinion of the authority making the order, are if unregulated likely to be detrimental to the public interest, (h) to collect information and statistics with a view to regulate or prohibit any of the aforesaid matters, (i) to require persons engaged in production or commerce of any essential commodity to maintain and produce for inspection books, accounts and records and to furnish information, (j) to provide for incidental and supplementary matters including in particular search and seizure of articles in respect of which there is reason to believe that a contravention of the order is being or is about to be committed, to provide for the grant and issue of licenses and the charging of fees thereof. Section 4 states:

"The Central Government may by notified order direct that the power to make orders under Section 3 shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also by --(a) such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, or (b) such State Government or such officer or authority sub-ordinate to a State Government, as may be specified in the direction."

(15) On 21st October 1946, the Central Government issued a Notification No. P Y 603 (2)--1 directing that the powers conferred on it by Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall, in relation to foodstuffs be exercisable also by the Provincial Government subject to the conditions that, (a) before making any order relating to any matter specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of the said Sub-section (2), the "Provincial Government shall obtain the concurrence of the Central Government; (b) no order made in the exercise of the aforesaid powers shall have effect so as to prohibit or restrict the export, from any place in the province to any place outside India, of any articles.

(16) On 16th October 1950, the Stale Government with the concurrence of the Central Government promulgated the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order, 1950, the validity of which is attacked in the present case.

(17) The first argument on behalf of the petitioner is that Sections 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies Act are unconstitutional since there is an improper delegation of legislative power to the Executive Government. Learned Counsel pointed out that Section 3 of the Essential Supplies Act conferred a very wide and uncertain authority to the Central Government to legislate with respect to production, supply and distribution of a large number of essential commodities. It was argued that Section 4 of the Act enabled the Central Government to further delegate its power to make orders under Section 3 to an officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to a Provincial Government or an officer or authority subordinate to the Provincial Government. It was contended that there was no definite policy or standard laid down by the legislature to limit and guide the Executive Government in exercising the power delegated. It was stressed that the legislature has practically effaced itself and surrendered its legislative responsibilities to the Central or State Government or their subordinate officers.

(18.) In my opinion the argument is attractive but wholly unsound. The power of subordinate legislation conferred on the Executive Government is not unconfined or vagrant. Section 2 of the Act defines with great particularity what an essential commodity is. Section 3 (2) indicates with sufficient precision the contour of the policy intended by Parliament for achieving the object. It is true that Section 3 and Section 4 confer a wide power and discretion on the executive authorities. But the object of the Act was to control a complex and rapidly deteriorating economic situation caused by the scarcity of foodgrains, the tendency of the agriculturists to withhold stock and the anti-social activities of speculators. As the social and economic conditions notoriously vary in the Indian States it was manifestly impracticable for Parliament to provide for detailed machinery. It was inevitable in the circumstance that a wide power of subordinate law-making should be conferred on the Central and State Governments for enacting measures to carry out the policy of Parliament. It was argued that by enacting Sections 3 and 4 the legislature has effaced itself and abdicated its essential legislative function. The argument is not correct. For Parliament retains its whole power of control intact and Parliament can whenever it pleases destroy the agency which it has created and take the matter directly into its own hands. The powers conferred by Sections 3 and 4 can be taken away by Parliament at any moment and the orders made by the Executive Government can doubtless be annulled or repealed. In my opinion the delegation of legislative power made under Section 3 or 4 of the Act is permissible and is not in conflict with any constitutional principle.

(19) A delegation of similar width and amplitude has been upheld as valid in a catena of leading authorities. In HODGE v. REG, (1884) 9 AC 117, the question was whether certain regulations made under Section 4 of the Liquor License Act, 1877, of Ontario amounted to an improper delegation of legislative power. It was contended that the legislature had no power to authorise the License Commissioners to make regulations, create offences or annex penalties. The argument was rejected by the Judicial Committee. At page 132 Sir Barnes Peacock said:

"When the British North America Act enacted that there should be a legislature for Ontario, and that its legislative assembly should have exclusive authority to make laws for the Province and for provincial purposes in relation to the matters enumerated in Section 92, it conferred powers not in any sense to be exercised by delegation from or as agents of the Imperial Parliament, but authority as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by Section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow. Within these limits of subjects and area the local legislature is supreme, and has the same authority as the Imperial Parliament, or the Parliament of the Dominion, would have had under like circumstances to confide to a municipal institution or body of its own creation authority to make by-laws or resolutions as to subjects specified in the enactment, and with the object of carrying the enactment into operation and effect...."

(20) In THE VICTORIAN STEVEDORING AND GENERAL CONTRACTING CO. v. DIGNAN, (1931) 46 Comm-W L R 73 the question arose whether it was within the legislative power of Parliament to confer upon the Governor-General power to make regulations under Section 3 of the Transport Workers Act. The Act empowered the Governor-General to make regulations which shall have the force of law, with respect to the employment of transport workers, and in particular for regulating the engagement, service, and discharge of transport workers, and the licensing of persons as transport workers, and for regulating or prohibiting the employment of unlicensed persons as transport workers, and for the protection of transport workers. In exercise of the power conferred by the section the Governor-General had on June 26, 1931, issued the Waterside Employment Regulations which provided amongst other things that transport workers of certain kinds should be given priority in employment. The regulation conflicted to a certain extent with an award of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration made under a previous Act. It was argued that Section 3 was ultra vires on the ground that it delegated legislative power to the Governor-General. The High Court rejected the argument holding that it was within the legislative power of the Parliament to confer upon the Governor-General power of making regulations under Section 3 of the Transport Workers Act 1928-29.

(21) The same doctrine has been laid down by the Judicial Committee in SHANNON v. LOWER MAINLAND DAIRY PRODUCTS BOARD, (1938) A C 708, in which the validity of the Natural Products Marketing (British Columbia) Act, 1936, was attacked on the ground that there was delegation of legislative power to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council and by the latter to the Marketing Boards. It was objected that it was only a skeleton of an Act and that the legislature had surrendered its legislative responsibility to another body. The objection was summarily rejected by the Judicial Committee and the Act was held to be constitutionally valid. At page 722 Lord Atkin states:

"The third objection is that it is not within the power of the Provincial Legislature to delegate so-called legislative power to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, or to give him powers of further delegation. This objection appears to their Lordships subversive of the rights which the Provincial Legislature enjoys while dealing with matters falling within the classes of subjects in relation to which the Constitution has granted legislative powers. Within its appointed sphere the Provincial legislature is as supreme as any other Parliament; and it is unnecessary to try to enumerate the innumerable occasions on which legislatures, Provincial, Dominion and Imperial, have entrusted various persons and bodies with similar powers to those contained in the Act."

(22) Upon principle and precedent it is manifest that Sections 3 arid 4 of the Essential Supplies Act do not improperly delegate legislative power to the Executive authorities, and the argument of Mr. B.C. Ghosh on this part of the case must fail.

(23) The next argument is that by promulgating the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order 1950 the Government of the State has violated the guarantee under Article 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. Article 19(1) (f) states that all citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold, or dispose of property. Article 19(1) (g) declares that all citizens shall have the right to practise any profession or trade or business. But these rights are not absolute or sacred for Article 19 Clause 5 enacts that the State may make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the guaranteed rights in the interests of the general public. Learned advocate for the petitioner however argued that the restrictions imposed under the impugned order were unreasonable. Mr. B.C. Ghosh pointed out that under Clause 3 a large producer is required to make a declaration of his stock before the Sub-divisional Magistrate; that under Clause 4 he cannot sell or store any foodgrain except in accordance with a license; and that under the terms of the license, he must submit a monthly return showing the stock acquired and sold in the preceding month. It is difficult to accept the argument that these conditions are unreasonable. Clause 5 of the Order requires that a large producer should deliver on demand from the District Magistrate, District Supply Officer, or the Sub-divisional Magistrate such quantity of foodgrain to such person at such place within such period as may be specified in the order making the demand. Mr. B.C. Ghosh complained that the local officers have been granted a discretion carte blancher which they are likely to abuse. Mr. Ghosh also complained that the provisions for appeal and revision are hedged with drastic restrictions and that the Order did not make provision for any preliminary enquiry before the officer proceeds to make assessment. But these arguments are without substance. The Order enjoins upon every large producer to make a declaration of his stock of food-grain, the acreage of land held under cultivation by himself, acreage of land held under each kind of crops, total yield of each kind of crop, number of tenants who pay rent in kind, rent received from each tenant and so on. In many cases, the declaration itself must form the basis upon which the officers must proceed to make the assessment. It should be remembered in this connection that the greater part of the land in the State is held under zemindari system, that the settlement records are obsolete and that the Government have no papers to show the names of the large producers and the areas they hold and cultivate. It is unavoidable in these circumstances that a large measure of discretion should be conferred on the local officers if the object of the legislature was to be rapidly carried out. It was argued by Mr. Ghosh that if under the Order arbitrary or unreasonable action may conceivably be taken, the Order must be held to be invalid. This argument is not correct. There is some risk of abuse when wide power is committed to a large body of men, but the constitutional validity of a law cannot be contested on the ground of such apprehension. It is, there-lore, impossible to hold that either the substantive or procedural part of the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order is unreasonable -- that is, not necessary or appropriate for the accomplishment of the object aimed at.

(24) It cannot be questioned that the State has a right to regulate the acquisition and disposal of property in order to promote social advantage. Property is a bundle of legal rights -- which exist only because the State recognises and protects them. But the regulations of the State must be reasonable -- the test of reasonableness is whether the regulation is necessary and appropriate for the accomplishment of the object aimed at or whether the restrictions imposed are arbitrary and excessive. It is impossible in the present case to hold that the provisions of the Paddy Levy Order are arbitrary or that they are not necessary and appropriate for the accomplishment of the object) specified. In this connection it is important to remember the principle that every possible presumption should be made in favour of the constitutionality of a statute. The Court must presume that the legislative body acted advisedly and in good faith, with full knowledge of existing facts and conditions upon which the legislation is based. "To the legislature no less than to the Courts is committed the guardianship of deeply cherished liberties", observed Justice Frankfurter in a recent case,

"to fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and before the legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people."

(25) The next argument is that the Order in question violates the guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the scale of levy was progressive according as the amount of the produce exceeds 200 maunds, 400 maunds, 600 maunds and 800 maunds of paddy. Mr. Ghosh argued that this created certain anomalies, which are prominent in the case of produce from canal irrigated land. For instance, a large producer who grows 800 maunds of paddy from canal irrigated land is left with 400 maunds; but if a large producer grows 801 maunds, he is left only with 2001 maunds. Similarly a producer who owns 100 acres of canal irrigated land was required to deliver 250 maunds whereas a producer with 101 acres of land was required to deliver 303 maunds. But these cases are extreme illustrations and they do not furnish a test of the practical operation of the classification. Mr. Ghosh did not dispute that a progressive rate of levy was reasonable. But counsel contended that the levy should have been on a slab system -- that each producer should be required to deliver the same proportion on the first 200 maunds of paddy, the same proportion on the next 200 maunds and so on -- or alternatively there should be a provision that no producer in a higher class should be required to deliver more paddy than a producer in the class immediately below him. It was also submitted by learned counsel that the exemption limit of 50 acres or 200 maunds of paddy might work hardship in certain cases and that the Government should have fixed a higher limit.

(26) In my opinion the argument proceeds on misconception. The guarantee of equal protection f laws under Article 14 is not absolute. The equality which the Constitution safeguards is equally in a social organisation which requires the protection of law against evils which menace the health, safety and welfare of the people. The rights and powers of the Constitution are largely means of protecting important social and individual interests; and because it is necessary that these interests should be balanced, the Articles of the Constitution cannot be construed in an absolute sense. For instance Article 38 imposes a duty upon the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting a social order in which justice social and economic shall inform (sic) the institutions of national life. Article 46 similarly enjoins upon the State the duty of promoting with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people. Likewise Article 47 states that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of the people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. Interpreted in the context of these important constitutional provisions it is manifest that the guarantee of equal protection under Article 14 is not absolute. It cannot also be purpose of Article 14 to take away from the legislature the right or the power to classify the subjects of legislation. It is true that classification must be reasonable but a legislature has a wide discretion and -an Act will not be held invalid unless the classification is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. What classification is reasonable rests in the discretion of the legislative body in the first instance. The question is not whether the Court considers the classification, reasonable to its satisfaction or whether in its opinion the Government could have devised a more equitable scheme. The question must be posed on the other hand -- Is the statute so clearly arbitrary that legislators acting reasonably could not have believed it to be necessary in the public interest. To put it in other words, the question is whether there was any rational basis for legislative action. Applying this test, it is obvious that the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order considered as a whole and notwithstanding certain anomalies, does not violate the guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. To adopt the words of Justice Stone:

"It is a salutary principle of judicial decision long emphasised and followed by this Court that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it and that Courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. A statutory discrimination Will not be set aside as the denial of the equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it METROPOLITAN CASUALTY INSURANCE CO. v. BROW-NELL, (1935) 294 US 580."

(27) For the reasons assigned I agree with my learned brother Shearer J. that both the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order are constitutionally valid, and that the case should be remanded to the trying Magistrate for being dealt with in accordance with law. Sarjoo Prosad, J.

(28) The salient points raised in argument by Counsel for the parties have been elaborately considered by my learned brothers. I have no inclination to add much to the discussion in their judgments. I will, however, state my own reactions as briefly as I can.

(29) I agree that the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946) are not void on account of an improper delegation of legislative powers to agencies other than the Legislative authority itself. I can see nothing in Sections 3 and 4 of the impugned Act to lead me to hold that there is any illegal delegation of legislative functions. The policy of the law has been fully indicated in the Act itself and it is only with the object of fulfilling the intentions of the law and of making it adaptable to the working of the complex administrative machinery that the said provisions have been incorporated in the law. It is true that Sub-section (1) of Section 3 gives wide powers to the Central Government but having regard to the purpose of the enactment this was not only unavoidable but inevitable. The Legislature could not possibly provide for all the administrative details and the eventualities that the Executive Government was likely to face in giving effect to the law, and it was only wise and expedient to arm Government with ancillary powers to meet the exigencies of the situation. Moreover, the Central Government could not function alone. It had to control an emergent situation in regard to essential supplies in different parts of the country, and this it could only do effectively through the different State Governments or their subordinate authorities who were better acquainted with local needs and local problems. The fact that the Legislature foresaw these contingencies and provided for them shows that it acted judiciously in making allowance for these conditions. Legislations of this characters cannot be held to be delegated legislations but merely conditional legislations or delegation of authority for ancillary purposes of the law itself. It is important to note that the Legislature on the face of the provisions themselves has been careful not to abdicate its authority completely but to make the agencies work under the directions prescribed by the law. This is clearly borne out by the language of Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3 as also by Section 4 itself. I was, however, impressed with the argument that S. 6 of the impugned Act gave definite legislative recognition to the orders passed by the Central Government or its delegates under Section 3 of the Act, and it went to the length of asserting that such an order "shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act etc". It was contended that this tantamounts to complete abdication of legislative powers by the Legislature. It was argued -- not without some show of reason, --that even if the Central Legislature were to pass a law to the contrary that law would be ineffective as against the order of the Central Executive Government or any delegated authority under Section 3 of the Act. This argument though quite plausible does not bear the test of scrutiny. If the Central Legislature were to pass a law to the contrary it will have the effect of abrogating the Act to the extent so provided. The authority which has created the agent can always and at any time destroy the same and recall the power which it entrusted to the agent. Section 6 of the Act has, therefore, to be read in the light of that principle. In so far as an order under Section 3 may be inconsistent with any other existing legislation, in my opinion, the effect of the order would not be to repeal that legislation but only to save the order itself which will continue to be operative. Section 6, in other words, is, therefore, a saving section which affords protection to the order under Section 3 as against the onslaught of any other law merely by reason of its inconsistency. I therefore am satisfied on the whole that the impugned Act is not invalid on the ground of improper delegation of powers of legislation.

(30) The other question is whether the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order of 1950 brought into being by virtue of Sub-section (1) of section 3 of the aforesaid Act violates the constitutional guarantees given under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. On this point I find myself in agreement with the views expressed by my learned brothers. The anomalies pointed out by Mr. Ghosh are undoubtedly there so much so that in examining some of the clauses of the Order in regard to the scale of levy I felt that they led to ridiculous results. The learned Government Advocate is, however, right in contending that the scale could not be fixed on a precise mathematical basis and some rough and ready method had to be adopted-- some workable formula. Therefore, the line had to be drawn somewhere in fixing the classification of produce and the scale of levy. Such a classification could not be held to be unreasonable so as to bring it within the mischief of either of the two Articles of the Constitution aforesaid. Under Article 19(5) of the Constitution it is, of course, the duty of the Court to see whether the restrictions imposed, by any legislation or order, on the right of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property or to carry on any trade or business, are reasonable. In order to do that the Court must of necessity examine all the provisions of the impugned legislation or order as a whole including the substantive and the procedural part of it. This, however, does not imply that the Court should do so with such meticulous care that if it thinks that any particular provision thereof in its application to particular set of facts is likely to lead to some undesirable or unreasonable consequences, it must straightway proceed to declare the same invalid for want of reasonableness. What the Court has to consider is the effect of the Statute or Order in its entirety and the purpose which It intends to serve; -- unless some part of it is so flagrantly unreasonable as to affect the reasonableness of the entire structure. My learned brother Shearer, J. has correctly pointed out, if I am allowed to say so with respect, that in most cases the Court has not all the materials before it on which to pronounce whether the data adopted by the framers of the legislation or those promulgating the Order in question were altogether unreasonable or that they were ill-advised in incorporating a certain provision therein which under given circumstances may be open to exception. Besides, the test of reasonableness is often so elusive. "But ideas of reasonableness are apt to vary widely" observed Meredith, C. J. in RATAN ROY v. STATE OP BIHAR, 29 Pat 410 at p. 417: "Take for example, laws relating to prohibition; or take such a matter as adultery which the Indian law regards as a crime punishable with imprisonment, but the English law does not." The argument, therefore, on its ultimate analysis does not commend itself to me. I think I have said enough to indicate that none of the points urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner lasustainable.

(31) I am also, therefore, of the opinion that both the Essential Supplies Act and the Bihar Agriculturists Levy Order are constitutionally valid and that the case should now be remanded for trial according to law.