1. The plaintiff-appellant in this case is a Mohammadan taluqdar who executed a marriage settlement in favour of his daughter-in-law, defendant No. 1, at the time of her marriage to his son, defendant No. 2. According to the terms of that document the plaintiff gave to defendant No. 1 a half share of a certain village for her life stipulating that if she gave birth to a male child by defendant No. 2 the property would devolve on that child and otherwise would revert to her husband and his heirs. Mutation was to be effected within a week after the celebration of the wedding, but at that time the plaintiff was unwilling to give effect to the settlement and defendant No. 1 brought a suit for enforcement thereof. The suit was decreed in accordance with a compromise which gave possession of the half village subject to the provisions of the marriage settlement to the present defendant No. 1, who was plaintiff in that suit. The present suit has been filed for revocation of the original settlement. In the plaint it was alleged that the settlement had been made under undue influence, but subsequently the plaintiff's Counsel made a statement admitting that this plea was barred by the decision of the previous suit where the alleged undue influence was a point at issue. Accordingly, it was agreed that the deed could not now be questioned on these grounds and could only be challenged on certain other grounds mentioned in the plaint and amplified in an amendment. We have, therefore, to consider only two questions:first, whether the deed was revocable by the plaintiff, in that it was of the nature of an ariat, and, secondly, whether there had been any breach of condition on the part of the defendant No. 1 which would justify the Court in setting aside the deed.

2. First, we shall consider whether the deed in suit can be described as an ariat. Ariat is a term used in the Hanafi Law for a gratuitous loan and the essentials of an ariat are:

(1) that it can be revoked;

(2) that it cannot be a transfer of property;

(3) that it must be for a definite period, and

(4) that it does not devolve upon the heirs of the recipient.

3. In our opinion none of these essentials of an ariat appertain in the marriage settlement in suit. In more than one place it is definitely said that the donor and his representatives shall have no power to make any changes or alterations in the deed or interfere in any way with the property or create any burden thereon. These statements cannot be reconciled with the theory that the deed is revocable.

4. It is perfectly clear from the document that the property in question was to be conveyed to defendant No. 1. This is clearly stated in paragraph 1 and the condition as to mutation is in itself proof that transfer was intended. Moreover, the property has actually been transferred as a result of the compromise between the parties in accordance with this very document. Even if only a transfer of usufruct was contemplated as contended by the appellant we are of opinion that this would be a sufficient transfer for this purpose: [See Durga Devi v. Duri Chand [1905] 2 A.L.J. 668.]

5. This deed is not for a definite period of time. As regards defendant No. 1 it is for her life-time and it is quite clear that her interest is limited to her life-time merely to protect the interests of her son and not those of the donor.

6. Clause 2 of the deed lays down an order of succession to this property on the death of the defendant No. 1. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of the appellant that this deed is in any sense an ariat. The case reported in Mumtaz-un-nissa v. Tufail Ahmad [1905] 28 All. 264 is entirely different, being one in which the only evidence of transfer was an application for mutation of names made by a Muhammadan in favour of his wife. In our view it is what it calls itself, a marriage settlement, executed by the donor not under the + Law but under the taluqdari law of Oudh. In our opinion the deed is a contract between the donor and Sheikh Asad Husain Qidwari, the brother of defendant No. 1, who only consented to give his sister in marriage on the condition that this settlement was made in her favour. Once the contract was complete by the marriage on the one side and the gift of property on the other the plaintiff-appellant has no longer any interest in the property and no right to revoke the deed.

7. As to the allegation that there has been some breach of condition on the part of defendant No. 1 which would entitle the plaintiff to have the deed set aside we can only say that the deed contains no such condition. We are referred to paragraph 5, but this merely lays down a pious wish that the defendant No. 1 should always obey her husband and never give cause for any disunion. This, if it is a condition at all, is one between the two defendants and not between the defendant No. 1 and the plaintiff-appellant. No doubt, the lower Court took no evidence as to the allegations in the plaint and the amendment of the plaint as to the conduct of defendant No. 2. We are unable to see that any of these allegations affected the defendant No. 1 but we cannot see how evidence adduced on these points could have in any way affected the decision of the suit.

8. It has also been argued that the lower Court should not have laid stress on the fact that a male child has actually been born to defendant No. 1 and allowed this fact to influence its decision. In our opinion the birth of this child has no effect on the case and we have laid no stress on the fact in our judgment. In our opinion the plaintiff totally failed to prove that he is entitled to any part of the relief claimed and we dismiss the appeal with costs.