Ramaswami, J.

(1) In this case the petitioner who is the Secretary of the Sasamusa Workers Union has obtained a rule calling upon the State of Bihar and other respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be issued commanding the State of Bihar to refer "the entire dispute between the petitioner and Sasamusa Sugar Mills, Limited, for being decided by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act."

(2) Cause was shown against the rule by the State of Bihar to whom notice of the rule was given. The other respondents, Nos. 2 and 3, have not entered appearance and contested the rule.

(3) The material facts are not controverted. On 28th of August 1949 the Sasamusa Workers Union sent a letter to the Manager of the Sugar Mills in which they set out 15 demands with respect to certain disputed matters like non-implementation of certain awards. On 31st October 1949 further demands were made by the petitioner upon which conciliation proceedings were started at the instance of the Labour Commissioner of Bihar. A settlement was arrived at between the Workers Union and the management with respect to most of the matters in dispute. The remaining points were left for the decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour by the agreement of both the parties. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour accordingly decided the point and the whole settlement was published on 9th of January 1950, in a Government Notification. Two days later the Workers Union served a notice of strike on the factory management setting forth 44 specific demands. On 19th of January 1950 the Labour Officer visited Sasamusa and made a report after making certain enquiries. On 24th January 1950 the Labour Commissioner wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Workers Union requesting him to attend a meeting at Mirganj intimating that the strike will be illegal in view of the fact that conciliation proceedings had already started. Shortly after the Government of Bihar acting under Section 10, Subsection (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act referred the industrial dispute existing between the managements of certain Sugar Mill Factories in the State of Bihar and their workers as represented by the Union regarding four matters which were specified in Schedule A of the notification.

(4) In support of this petition it was argued by Mr. T.K. Prasad, in the first place that the dispute between the management and the Workers Union related to 44 specific items set forth in the notice of strike sent on nth January 1950 and it was not competent for the State of Bihar to refer to Tribunal only the four matters specified in Annexure A of the notification. But there is no material in the present case adduced on behalf of the petitioner that there was industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act with reference to the "44 demands specified in the notice of strike." Learned Counsel was unable to point out that the notice of strike was in fact served upon the management or that reasonable opportunity was given to the latter to comply with the demands made on behalf of the Workers Union. It is true that there is reference to the impending strike in the letter of the Labour Commissioner, dated 24th of January 1950, and also in the letter of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour dated 22nd of January 1950, printed at pages 24 and 26 of the paper book. But it is not stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner that the notice of strike was in fact communicated to the management of the factory or that the management was otherwise aware of the demands made on behalf of the Workers Union. It is impossible to hold upon the materials furnished that there was an "industrial dispute" with reference to the "44 demands" within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot, therefore, be held that the reference made by the State of Bihar in the notification of 6th February 1950 was only with respect to a part of the industrial dispute as contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner.

(5) Even assuming that there is material to establish that there was industrial dispute with respect to the 44 demands made by the Workers Union in the strike notice it must nevertheless be held that the Government of the State had discretion to refer to Industrial Tribunal for adjudication only the matters specified in Annexure A of the notification. It was contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the dispute itself comprised the entire list of 44 demands and it was beyond the jurisdiction of the State Government to refer only a part of the dispute, meaning thereby the items specified in Annexure A of the notification. In my opinion the argument of the learned, counsel is untenable and cannot prevail. Section 2 (k) of the Act defines an industrial dispute to be:

"any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."

According to this definition, each demand when made by the Workers Union and refused by the management gives rise to an industrial dispute. I conceive therefore that 44 demands in the strike notice would give rise not to a single trade dispute but to an aggregate of 44 such disputes. For the reasons that I shall presently state the Government is not legally bound to refer all such disputes under Section 10 (1), even if a public utility service is involved and notice of strike under Section 22 has been given. It follows that the reference made by the State Government with reference to the four matters mentioned in annexure A of the notification is intra vires and legal. 5a. Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act states:-

"If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may, by order in writing, (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication."

There is a proviso to the effect that

"where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced."

Reading the whole sub-section with the proviso it is clear that the statute has granted a power rather than imposed a duty, that it has conferred a discretion but did not impose an obligation. The section merely intends to give the appropriate Government a power to refer for settlement or adjudic-atiori an industrial dispute relating to a public utility service when strike notice has been given not-withstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced. It is a power or discretion which is given and not duty or obligation. This construction is supported by the fact that the expressions, such as "unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given" or "that it would be inexpedient so to do" confer a wide and unfettered discretion on the appropriate Government. This view is supported by the decision of the Full Bench in BAGARAM TULOULE V. STATE OP BIHAR, AIR (37) 1950 Pat 387 [LQ/PatHC/1950/80] in which it was held that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 cannot be issued directing the Government to refer the dispute in a case where the State Government has refused to refer the industrial dispute under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

(6) Reference should be made in this context to KING V. MARSHLAND SMEETH AND PEN DISTRICT COMMISSIONER, (1920) 1 KB 165 in which Section 1, Marshland Smeeth and Pen District Act, 1796 (36 Geo. III, C. 100) provided as follows:

"Be it enacted that the said tracts of common and waste lands called Marshland Smeeth and Marsn. land Pen, shall be effectually regulated, set out inclosed, divided, and allotted, by such Commissioners, in such manner and under such powers and authorities, and subject to such rules, orders and directions, as are hereinafter appointed, mentioned and declared."

One of the owners of land in the district alleged Commissioners had neglected to drain the district effectually, commanded them to do so. The Commissioners by their return to the writ alleged that they had carried out the order of the Court to the best of their ability. The plaintiff by his reply to the return joined issue thereon, and claimed damages for injury sustained by his land through the Commissioners neglect to drain the district, One of the questions raised was whether the Commissioners were entitled to argue that the writ of mandamus should not have been issued by the Divisional Court. McCardie J. held that the Commissioners were so entitled. He then observed as follows:

"Concisely put, the defendants contend that the Acts which govern them are permissive rather than directory, and that the Commissioners have a discretion as to the carrying out of those Acts of Parliament which, if exercised bona fide, cannot be supervised, governed or directed. The validity of this contention must, I think, depend in every case upon the true construction of the enactment in question. If, for example, a jurisdiction be given to an inferior Court all that that Court can be called upon by the High Court to do, save in special circumstances, is to hear and determine the matters brought before it in a regular and proper manner. Hence, a mandamus is granted, if Jurisdiction has been declined by the inferior Court, to hear and determine only. If the inferior Court has a discretion as to the decision it may rive, then if that discretion be exercised bona fide and not arbitrarily or illegally and without reference to extraneous considerations the Court will not control the exercise of that discretion. See the cases cited in Short and Mellor on Crown Officer Practice, edition 2, pages 200 and 20

1. But I conceive that Acts of Parliament which confer a judicial discretion upon a subordinate Tribunal are fundamentally different from Acts of Parliament which place duties upon such bodies as canal companies, dock companies, land drainage corporations and the like. The object of the former enactments is to secure a bearing and determination. They could scarcely provide that a decision should be given contrary to the view of the tribunal. But the object of the latter class of enactments is wholly distinct. They aim at securing a benefit to the public or a particular section of the community by creating a body for the performance of certain public works and the discharge of the duties appropriate thereto. But even in the latter class it may be that the Act of Parliament has granted a power rather than imposed a duty, has conferred a discretion rather than an obligation, if a power or discretion only, as distinct from a duty, exists then the prerogative writ of mandamus will not be issued by the Court."

My conclusion therefore is that under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act it is competent for the Government of the State to issue the notification which is impugned in the present case. I am also of the opinion that no writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued by this Court to the State Government directing them to refer the remaining matters which are alleged to be in dispute, between the Workers Union and the management of the Sasamusa Factory in the circumstances disclosed in the present case.

(7) An argument has been addressed by Mr. T.K. Prasad in support of this rule that the decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 7th December 1949 was illegal and it ought to be quashed. From page 11 of the paper book it is apparent that as a result of the conciliation proceedings it was agreed between the Workers Union on the one hand and the management on the other that as regards certain workers who had been discharged the Assistant Labour Commissioner should examine their cases and his decision will be final. In accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties the Assistant Labour Commissioner examined the cases of the workers concerned and pronounced his decision which is printed at pages 13 to 17 of the paper book. The argument of the learned counsel is founded on Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act which enacts:

"

1. Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.

(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.

(3) If a settlement of the dispute or any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute."

It was contended that the phrase "settlement of the dispute" could not include the decision given by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in the pre-bent case. It is obvious that this argument is wholly untenable for the parties to a dispute may well lagree that a particular item may be decided by a third party whose decision will be accepted as final. It is difficult therefore to hold that there is any illegality committed in the course of the conciliation proceedings or that the decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner ought not to have been included in the notification published on the 9th January 1950 as a part of the conciliation proceedings.

(8) For the reasons assigned I hold that the application must be dismissed and the rule discharged with costs to respondent No.

1. Hearing fee five gold mohars.