1. This is an appeal by one of the defendants in a suit forcontribution. The circumstances under which the present plaintiff seeks reliefare somewhat complicated; but the facts essential for the appreciation of thequestion of law raised before us may be shortly stated. There were three setsof plaintiffs, who for the sake of brevity may be called X, Y and Z, and whoinstituted a suit for rent against a number of defendants. One of thesedefendants was the present plaintiff. Another defendant was the husband of thepresent appellant, whose estate is now represented by her as the executrixunder his Will. A decree was drawn up in this suit for rent, under which thetenant defendants became liable to the plaintiffs for a large sum of money. Thedecree, however, specified the extent of the relief to which the plaintiffs X,Y and Z were entitled as amongst themselves. It may be observed incidentallythat the decree was drawn up in this form, because the landlords wereaccustomed to collect rent in their respective shares separately. But as waspointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of Raja Pramada Nath Roy v.Raja Ramani Kanta Roy : 35 I.A. 73 : 35 C. 331 : 7 C.L.J. 139: 12 C.W.N. 249 (P.C.) : 10 Bom. L.R. 66 : 3 M.L.T. 151 : 18 M.L.J. 43, thatdid not stand in the way of a suit by all the landlords for a joint decreeagainst all the defendants. After this decree had been drawn up in favour of X,Y and Z, X proceeded to execute the decree against one of the defendants, Yagainst another and Z against a third. The result was that the presentplaintiff satisfied the claim made in execution by one of the decree-holders,and the husband of the present appellant similarly satisfied the claim made byanother decree-holder. The plaintiff now asserts that he has paid more than hisshare of the aggregate liability under the decree and is accordingly entitledto seek contribution from all the defendants to the original suit. The presentappellant contends that her husband had also paid more than his share of thetotal liability under the decree, and that consequently no right ofcontribution can be claimed against her as his representative. This defence hasnot found favour with the Court below. The District Judge seems to have thoughtthat there were separate decrees in favour of the different sets of landlordswhom we have named X, Y, Z, and that it was not open to the present appellant,whose husband had satisfied the claim of one of these decree-holders Y, toassert in answer to the claim for contribution by the plaintiff, who hadsatisfied the claim made by the other decree-holder X, that he had made apayment in excess of his own liability and was consequently not liable tocontribution. In our opinion this view cannot be supported.

2. In the first place, there was only one decree in the suitfor rent. No doubt, that decree specified the extent of relief to which thedifferent sets of plaintiffs were entitled. But the liability of the defendantswas joint and several. Consequently, if any one of the defendants to theoriginal suit satisfied more than his share of the liability, no claim forcontribution could be made against him by any other co-sharer. It may beconceded that if he had made a payment in excess of his own share and wantedrelief against his co-debtors, he was bound to bring a suit for contributionagainst them. But so long as he did not actively seek relief against hisco-debtors, he was entitled to plead in answer to a claim for contribution by aco-debtor that he had discharged his liability and could not be called upon tocontribute to the original debt. The contrary view cannot possibly be supportedon principle.

3. In the second place, assume, as the respondent contends,that there were in essence three decrees in one sheet of paper in favour ofthree different sets of landlords, X, Y and Z, the question still remainswhether satisfaction, by one of the joint debtors, of the claim of one of thedecree-holders could not be pleaded in answer to a claim for contribution by aco-debtor who had satisfied another decree in favour of another landlord. Theposition may be thus re-stated for the sake of clearness. X, Y, and Z areco-sharer landlords, each of whom collects his share of the rent separately. Xobtains a decree for rent against A, B and C. Similar decrees are obtained by Yand Z against the same set of tenants; A satisfies the decree of X, B that ofY, and C that of Z. If a suit for contribution is brought by A against B and C,in respect of payment made by him to satisfy the decree of X, is it open to Band C to plead non-liability on the ground that they have discharged aliability which would otherwise have fallen upon A under the decrees obtainedby Y and Z Clearly, the answer should be in the affirmative. If a defence likethis were not available, the result would be that every joint debtor who makesa payment in satisfaction of the joint debt must have recourse to a suit forcontribution; if he omits to seek relief by way of contribution, he does so athis peril. This view was not accepted by this Court as well-founded onprinciple in the cases of Gogun Chand Dut v. Huri Mokun Dut 12 C.L.R. 539 andGajadhar Mahto v. Ragkubar Gope : 12 C.W.N. 60. When, ashere, or as in the hypothetical case just mentioned, the judgment-debtssatisfied are closely connected and arise out of the same or similartransactions, there is no good reason why in a suit by one of the joint debtorsfor contribution, the defence should not be allowed to the co-debtors that theyhad discharged a similar liability which would otherwise have fallen upon theclaimant. In our opinion, the contention of the respondent is based upon amisapprehension of the nature and purpose of a suit for contribution. The rightof contribution has its foundation in, and is controlled by the principles ofjustice, equity and good conscience. It does not arise from contract, althoughit has sometimes been based on the theory of an implied contract forcontribution supposed to exist between parties jointly liable ex contractu.Every joint debtor who has been compelled to pay more than his share of thecommon debt, has the right of contribution, from each of his co-debtors. Theprinciple is that one who has discharged a common liability can recover fromhis co-obligors only for the excess that he has paid over his share, and eachco-obligor is liable to contribute only in proportion to his share of thecommon debt or obligation; hence, it follows as a corollary that nocontribution can be claimed against a person who has paid more than his shareof the debt. It is not necessary that the entire debt should have beensatisfied by the plaintiff, but he must establish that he has paid more thanhis share of the joint liability. As soon as the plaintiff establishes this, hebecomes entitled to contribution from every one of the joint debtors who hasnot paid up to the full extent of his share of the liability. In a suit soframed, the liabilities of the different parties, plaintiffs, and defendants,must be separately ascertained; a joint decree cannot be made in favour of theplaintiffs against the defendants, because that would be contrary to theprinciple that each co-obligor is liable to contribute only in proportion tohis liability; a joint decree against the defendants in a contribution suitwould render necessary a succession of contribution suits. Tested in the lightof these principles, the claim of the respondent against the appellant provesentirely unsustainable, for it has not been disputed that the husband of theappellant paid more than his share of the liability, and that is a completeanswer to the claim of the plaintiff.

4. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree ofthe District Judge set aside in so far as the present appellant is concerned,and the suit dismissed with costs against her in all the Courts.

5. This judgment, it is conceded, will govern the other twoappeals (Nos. 1644 and 1624 of 1912) in which similar decrees will be drawn up.

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Matungini Debi vs.Brojeswar Banerjee (29.05.1914 - CALHC)3