Madhavan Nair, J.

1. In support of the appeals, Mr. Parikh first submitted that the arrangement of 1867 is in the nature of a; bona fide settlement of family disputes in respect of Ramachandrudus estate between the widow and Subbaramayya which in law would bind the reversioner though he was not party to it. No doubt, under this arrangement the disputes between Achamma and Subbaramayya, to whom Bangaramma had transferred in 1866 whatever she had got under the arrangement of 1859, were settled by Subbaramayya taking a two-thirds and Achamma a one-third share of properties; but what is important to notice is this, that Subbaramayya had no rights to the properties except what he derived by the gift made in his favour by Bangaramma. Since it has not been shown that Subbaramayya had any competing title of his own in respect of the properties in dispute, there can be no basis in their Lordships opinion for a valid family settlement between the parties which would bind the reversion. In Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (1911) L.R. 38 I.A. 87 their Lordships pointed out that Ibid. 102 "the true test to apply to a transaction "which is challenged by the reversioners as an alienation not "binding on them is, whether the alienee derives title from "the holder of the limited interest or life tenant." In the present case it is clear that what title Subbaramayya had to the properties was acquired under the compromise from the widow, since he had no antecedent title of his own to them. In the circumstances, their Lordships agree with the High Court that the claim of the contesting defendants to a two-thirds share of the properties cannot be sustained on the basis of the arrangement of 1867.

2. Nor could that claim be sustained under the arrangement of 1859--the plea next urged in support of it. As the defendants deliberately suppressed the document, the High Court, beyond accepting the arrangement as genuine, refused to draw "particular inferences as to the nature and effect of it from "the recitals contained in the deed of 1867 " or "to speculate "as to its exact form or purport merely to support the "defendants contentions." The plea that this arrangement amounted to a family settlement, put forward in the trial court, was abandoned in the High Court, where it was contended for the first time that the transaction might fairly be regarded as a " surrender " by the widow in favour of the mother, and that limitation against the reversioners started in 1878, when the mother Bangaramma died: see Vytla Sitanna v. Marivada Viranna (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 200. This argument cannot be accepted. In the absence of the document evidencing the arrangement it is unsafe to infer the true nature of the transaction from the bare reference to its terms contained in the deed of 1866. So far as their Lordships can gather from the recitals, it would appear that the transaction was something in the nature of a division of the estate between Bangaramma and Achamma. The reference to the transaction as a " vibhaga," and also the use of the word farikath (partition deed), would show that the transaction was treated by the parties themselves as partaking of the nature of a division. It may well be, as pointed out by the High Court, that for reasons not disclosed in the evidence the mother-in-law took a larger portion of the estate than the daughter-in-law, but that cannot convert what is referred to as partition in the deed of 1866 into a "surrender." Further, the reservation to herself by Achamma after Bangarammas death of an interest in remainder in two of the villages, which has not been explained, would make it difficult to hold that the " surrender " is effective, as it has not been of the widows entire interest in the properties. Their Lordships therefore reject the plea that the arrangement relied on amounts to a surrender which in law would accelerate the succession.

3. The next point to consider on this part of the case is whether the plaintiffs suit is barred under Section I, Clause I2, of the Indian Limitation Act, XIV. of 1859. Ordinarily, the suit would be governed by the Limitation Act, IX. of 1908, which is the law in force when the suit was instituted; but if the defendants are able to show that the right of action had become barred under the Act of 1859 then the title that they had acquired could not be defeated by the subsequent Limitation Acts.

4. The relevant portions of Section 1 of the Act of 1859 run as follows: " No suit shall be maintained in any Court of Judicature ".... in India .... unless the same is instituted within "the period of limitation hereinafter made applicable to a "suit of that nature, .... and the suits to which the same ". . . . shall be applicable, shall be the following, that is to "say," and then Clause 12 states as follows: "To suits for the "recovery of immovable property or of any interest in "immovable property to which no other provision of this Act "applies--the period of twelve years from the time the cause "of action arose."

5. As already stated, the defendants contend that as immediately after the death of Ramachandrudu in 1859 Bangaramma took possession of his properties and held them adversely against Achamma, in whom the inheritance had vested, they, claiming through her, have a perfect title to the properties by efflux of time before the Act IX. of 1871 came into effect in April, 1873; and that if the widow was thus barred before the new Act came into force then the reversioner is also barred.

6. A reversioner who succeeds to the property has now twelve years to bring his suit from the time " when his estate falls "into possession." Under the Act of 1859 the limitation for the suit was " the period of twelve years from the time the "cause of action arose." In Nobin Chunder Chuckerbtdty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty (1868) 9 Suth. W.R. 505 it was held that " the cause "of action " for the widow to recover the properties arose at the time when she was dispossessed, and limitation which barred her rights would bar the rights of the reversionary heirs also. The reasoning of the decision was that the reversioner had no " new and independent " cause of action from that which was available to the widow at the time of her dispossession. Referring to the decision, their Lordships in Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajoneekant Mitter (1875) L.R. 2 I.A. 113, 121 observed as follows: " It has been held by a Full Bench of the High "Court at Calcutta that in the case of a succession by a "reversionary heir after the death of a widow, who takes by "inheritance from her husband, and is dispossessed, the "period of limitation as against the reversionary heir, in the "absence of fraud, is not to be reckoned from the time when "he succeeds to the estate but from the time at which it would "have been reckoned against the widow if she had lived and "brought the suit: see Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur "Chunder Chuckerbutty (1868) 9 Suth. W.R. 505. That rule has been acted upon in "other cases, and it appears to their Lordships that the principle "of that decision is correct."

7. The crucial point of time with regard to limitation being the dispossession of the widow, it follows that the question for consideration is whether or not Achamma had a cause of action against Bangaramma on the ground that she was dispossessed by her. The evidence on the point is scanty; it consists mainly of a few entries in a few revenue papers, the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and the general circumstances of the case. The arrangement of October 16, 1859, being undoubted, the defendants in order to succeed in their contention that Achamma had a cause of action against Bangaramma will have to prove that Bangaramma entered into actual possession of lands before that date, but there is no satisfactory evidence to support that contention. The earliest date that can be invoked in favour of the defendants is February 6, 1860, entered in the cist book for fasli 1269, which shows that an installment of cist with respect to dry land in one of the villages was paid "through Bangaramma," but as appears from the headnote on the page, "Receipt for fasli 1269 was "granted to Upalapali Ramachandrudu pattadar of the "village. . . ." evidently patta continued to remain in the name of the deceased Ramachandrudu. It would appear that patta was transferred to Bangarammas name in fasli 1271 (1861-62), for we find from the cist receipt book that receipt was granted for that fasli to Bangaramma, described as "pattadar" of the village of Upilapadu, though along with another, Lakshamayya. These dates are all subsequent to the arrangements of October, 1859, and cannot therefore help the defendants. This sums up the evidence that has been brought to their Lordships notice on this point. There is nothing in this evidence to establish that Bangaramma did take possession of Ramachandrudus property before the arrangement of 1859. As shown by Ex W (May 8, 1866), when she knew that lands standing in the name of her husband were registered in the name of her mother-in-law, Achamma submitted a petition to the Collector wherein she stated that "while she is the "rightful owner of the fields that were standing in the name "of her husband, they were since his death registered in the "name of Bangaramma, her mother-in-law." The Tashildar took some action on this petition, but evidence does not show how the revenue authorities ultimately disposed of the matter. As the properties had been by this time conveyed by Bangaramma to her grandson, Achamma divided the properties with him, stating in her deed, referring to the document executed by Bangaramma that "I contended too had rights to the "property mentioned in the said document . . . . " In this connection it is well to remember that Achamma never joined her husband after her marriage, but always lived with her parents in a different village. It is clear from her conduct that acts of dispossession, if any, on the part of Bangaramma known to her would have been objected to by Achamma, but as stated already, there is no evidence of any such act of dispossession. Therefore no cause of action to sue on the footing of dispossession accrued to Achamma. Bangarammas possession of the lands after the arrangement of October, 1859, is to be referred to that arrangement, and cannot amount to dispossession giving Achamma a cause of action to institute a suit against Bangaramma for the recovery of the properties: hence the question of adverse possession barring the rights of Achamma, the widow, and consequently the rights of the plaintiff, does not arise, and the latters cause of action would only accrue after the death of Achamma, and would be a right to set aside the arrangement under which Bangaramma took possession of the lands as not binding on him. Their Lordships agree with the High Court that the Additional Subordinate Judge was not right in holding that the remedy of the estate to recover the properties in the possession of Bangaramma became barred under the Act XIV. of 1859.

8. As regards the one-third share of the properties alienated by Achamma, the lower courts have found on the merits that the evidence does not establish that there was legal necessity to support the alienations. No case has been made out in this appeal to persuade their Lordships to depart from the usual practice of not interfering with concurrent findings of facts.

9. In the result, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed, with costs.