Atkinson, J.The plaintiff in this suit sued the defendants for a money-debt alleged to be due by the defendants to the plaintiff. The suit was compromised on the basis that the defendants would pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 975 in full discharge of principal and interest by annual kists. A decree was drawn up in the form of a consent decree; and it provided that the sum of Rs. 975 should be paid by instalments. The decree itself is dated the 29th April 1912, and the instalments were to become payable on the 1st April of each succeeding year after the date of the decree until the entire debt of Rs. 975 was satisfied and discharged. The decree also provided that in the event of default being made in the payment of any one of the instalments, the balance remaining unpaid should immediately fall due and be forthwith recover-able.

2. The instalment payable on the 1st April 1913 amounted to Rs. 200 and that sum was in fact paid. The instalment due on the 1st April 1914 was Rs. 150 and this sum was also paid. Both the aforesaid instalments were paid on the 1st April 1914. Since the 1st April 1914 no payments have been made in respect of the kists for the years 1915, 1916 and 1917.

3. The plaintiff accordingly instituted an application seeking leave to execute the decree to recover the unrealized instalments for the respective kists due for the years 1815 1916 and 1917.

4. Admittedly the first two instalments amounting to Rs. 350 have been paid by the judgment-debtor.

5. The learned Vakil appearing on behalf of the petitioners and defendants contends before us that inasmuch as no payment or valid acknowledgment was made or given for the payments made for the kists falling due on the 1st April 1913 and on the 1st April 1914, the amount due for the succeeding kists could not be recovered, and the right to issue execution of the decree is now barred by lapse of time. The foundation of this argument is based on the construction of Section 20 of the Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908). On the analysis of this section it is quite clear that the argument addressed to us is not well-founded in point of law.

6. It is contended that the learned Judge was wrong in the conclusion at which he arrived, inasmuch as he held that the signature of the person endorsing the fact of payment at the time the instalments for 1913 and 1914 were paid, was the genuine signature of the person called Kangal Rai, and that, therefore, the debt for which execution was sought could be recovered. It is clear from the tenor of the judgment of the learned Judge that he never had present to his mind the application of the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act. If, he had, he would have been obliged to hold on the evidence that the signature of Kangal Rai in respect of the payments made was invalid, inasmuch as it was not established by proof that Kangal Rai was the duly authorised agent of the judgment-debtor, and that Kangal Rai in fact made the payments alleged in discharge of the instalments for the years 1913 and 1914.

7. The decree-holder himself admits in his evidence that the kists for the years 1918 and 1914 were paid by the judgment-debtor and by no one else; and that the same were paid in discharge of principal and interest due, and consequently by virtue of the proviso to Section 20 of the Limitation Act, it is clear that a fresh period of limitation can only begin to run if the fact of the person making the payment or part payment of the principal debt appears in the handwriting of such person.

8. The part payment made was made by the judgment-debtor and not by Kangal Rai and, therefore, in order that such payment should operate as a fresh period from which limitation should begin to run, it was essentially necessary that the judgment-debtor should sign and endorse the fact of the payment so made by him. The signature as to the fact of payment, even if genuinely made by Kangal Rai, would not satisfy the requirements of the Limitation Act inasmuch as he did not make the payment relied on even, though he may have been authorized to endorse the fact of payment by the judgment-debtor.

9. This point was considered in this Court in a case reported as Bishun Perkash Narain Singh v. Muhammad Sadique 35 Ind. Cas. 375 [LQ/PatHC/1916/156] : 1 P.L.J. 474. In that case we adopted the interpretation of Section 20 of the Limitation Act laid down in the Full Bench ruling reported as Mukhi Haji Rahmuttulla v. Coverji Bhuja 23 C. 546 : 12 Ind. Dec. 363 (F.B.) The case reported in the Patna Law Journal 35 Ind. Cas. 375 [LQ/PatHC/1916/156] : 1 P.L.J. 474 and the Full Bench ruling in Calcutta (2), in their facts, resemble very much the facts of the present case. Therefore, we are of opinion that the point taken by the learned Vakil on behalf of the petitioner is not, well-founded and cannot be supported in point of law.

10. It does not appear that the learned Judge properly applied the law applicable to the facts of this case. If the case rested merely on the true interpretation of Section 20 of the Limitation Act, the learned Judges decision would have been erroneous.

11. The short answer given by Mr. Boy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the decree-holder, to the point taken by the judgment debtor seems completely to dispense with the necessity of deciding the question of the construction of Section 20 of the Limitation Act in this case. However, we feel it right to express our opinion thereon owing to the erroneous decision of the learned Judge. Mr. Roy bases his argument on Article 182, clause 7 of the Limitation Act of 1908; and he argued that the learned Judge was in error as to the nature and effect of the alleged payments made in 1913 and 1914 which he conceived, had the legal effect of keeping the principal debt alive. Mr. Roy argues that he is not concerned with any such proposition.

12. The application before the Court was for leave to execute the decree for recovery of specified sums of money due on the respective dates upon which the same were payable; and Mr. Roy contends that because the decree is in that form, it gives the decree-holder a right to enforce payment of each instalment as it falls due within 3 years from the date on which the instalment became automatically payable under the decree.

13. The wording of clause 7, Article 182, runs as follows: "(Where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date."

14. Accordingly Mr. Roy argues that by reason of clause 7 of Article 182, he is entitled to execute the decree for 1915, 1916 and 1917 and to recover all the kists respectively payable on the 1st April 1915, 1st April 1916 and 1st April 1917, these being instalments which accrued due and were payable within 3 years from the date of the application for leave to issue execution.

15. We think that Mr. Roys argument is well-founded; and that he correctly interprets the powers exercisable under Article 182, clause 7,

16. The cases reported as Ajudhia v. Kunjal 30 A. 123 : 5 A.L.J. 72 : (1908) A.W.N. 36 Shankar Prasad v. Jalpa Prasad 16 A. 371 : A.W.N. (1894) 115 : 8 Ind. Dec. 241 and Lachmi Narain v. Sarju Parshad 38 Ind. Cas. 634 : 15 A.L.J. 102 : 39 A. 230 all consistently support the argument addressed to us by Mr. Roy and, as we believe, accurately declare the law. The right to execute accrues and continues for three years from the date when the default is made in the payment of any one instalment.

17. The learned Vakil on behalf of the petitioner relies on the case reported as Hurri Pershad Chowdhry v. Nasib Singh 21 C. 542 : 10 Ind. Dec. 992, where ft different view of the law appears to have been taken from that laid down in the long line of decisions in the Allahabad High Court. With great respect to the learned Judges decision reported as Hurri Pershad Chowdhry v. Nasib Singh 21 C. 542 : 10 Ind. Dec.992, we are unable to follow their reasoning. The decisions, reported in the Allahabad Series (3), (4), (5) appear to us to be consistent with the exact wording of Article 182, clause 7, and it would be, in our opinion, contrary to the ends of justice if any artificial construction was to be put on Article 182, clause 7, which is clear and express in its terms and void of ambiguity.

18. it must be remembered that in the oases cited in the Allahabad Series (3), (4), (5) it was pointed out that a decree-holder having "i. decree in the form of the decree in the present case, has a right to execute the decree for the whole amount due if default be made; and to have the decree, as far as possible, construed in his favour. Therefore, unless the decree clearly leaves the decree-holder no option on the happening of a default but to execute the decree once and for all for the whole amount due under it, the decree-holder may execute it on the- happening of the first, second or any subsequent default; and limitation will run only against him in respect of each instalment separately from the time when each such instalment may become due and payable.

19. For these reasons we think that the arguments of Mr. Roy is well-founded and that the application for leave to issue execution is not barred; and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover by this execution proceeding the kists due for the years 1915, 1916 and 1917.

20. We accordingly dismiss the appeal and we direct that the judgment-debtor do pay to the plaintiff the sum of 2 gold mohurs as costs of this appeal.

Manck. J.

21. I agree.